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1 1 
 Introduction 
 1.1.  Background: challenges in African 
agricultural development 
 In the fi rst decade of the twenty-fi rst century sub-Saharan Africa moved, 
in the words of  The Economist , from being ‘hopeless Africa’ to ‘the hopeful 
continent’. 1 Economic growth indicators from 2000 to 2010 show an impres-
sive recovery from the poor performance of previous decades, although 
growth rates vary considerably between regions and countries within Africa, 
with West and East African coastal countries growing faster than other regions 
(United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and African 
Union, 2012). 
 There are, however, concerns about the quality of economic growth in 
Africa. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and 
African Union (2012) note that Africa has witnessed jobless growth due partly 
to the fact that most of the growth has occurred in capital intensive extractive 
sectors with limited forward and backward linkages to the local economies. 
This is associated with high levels of unemployment and underemployment, 
particularly among the youth, with most of the youth trapped in less produc-
tive informal sectors. At the same time, not much structural transformation 
in African economies has taken place, implying that a large proportion of 
African people still depend on agriculture as a source of livelihood. These 
observations underlie concerns about growing inequity within African 
economies, and continuing high levels of poverty and particularly rural pov-
erty (Africa Progress Panel, 2012). There are also major concerns about food 
insecurity in Africa, with adverse welfare and developmental effects of high 
national and international food prices on both the urban and rural poor, 
 1  The Economist (13 May 2000). ‘Hopeless Africa’,  <http://www.economist.com/node/333429 > 
and  The Economist (3 December 2011). ‘The Hopeful continent: Africa Rising’  <http://www. 
economist.com/node/21541015 > (18 September 2012). 
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despite the offsetting effects of economic growth (Headey, 2011b; Dorward, 
2012b, 2013; Verpoorten et al., 2012). These concerns link into a set of long-
standing but resurgent debates and controversies about agricultural develop-
ment in Africa regarding 
 •  the importance and role of agriculture in development; 
 •  the extent and causes of African agriculture’s poor historic performance; 
 •  the relative advantages and disadvantages of large and small farms in 
agricultural development; and 
 •  the best means of promoting agricultural development in Africa. 
 Emphasis on agriculture as a critical sector for development has fl uctuated 
over the last 50 years or so. At independence, most developing country gov-
ernments saw agriculture as either a driver of growth in their economies or as 
a foreign exchange earner, with a large reserve of unutilized labour to be taxed 
to support industrial development for a modern economy. With a weak and/
or mistrusted private sector, this led to large public investments in agricultural 
development. In many African countries these large investments were either 
ineffective or, where they were effective, very expensive and—in the con-
text of over-extension of government budgets and activities—unsustainable 
without donor support. This was not forthcoming with both the emerging 
Washington Consensus (promoting structural adjustment and market liber-
alization) and disenchantment with agricultural investments—which were 
seen as ineffective and unnecessary in the context of increasing global food 
production and falling prices (although paradoxically these were partly the 
result of large and highly successful public investments in the Asian Green 
Revolution). Emphasis on agriculture was further undermined by empirical 
studies that revealed the widespread importance of non-farm incomes in the 
livelihoods of rural farming households (for example, Ellis, 2000; Haggblade 
et al., 2007b; Reardon, 1998). 
 With time, however, the pendulum began to swing back as a result of 
further empirical work showing the importance of the agricultural sector 
to poor rural economies and to the livelihoods of poor people within those 
economies (see, for example, Datt and Ravallion, 1996; Mellor, 2000; Thirtle 
et al., 2003; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2010; Christiaensen et al., 2011). This 
coincided with growing concern among governments and donors about the 
lack of growth in African agriculture (particularly in staple crop production). 
In 2008 the World Development Report made a powerful case for the impor-
tance of agriculture in poverty reduction (World Bank, 2007b) and this was 
brought home by the 2008 global food price spike and recognition that the 
era of low and stable food prices was over, if it ever existed (Dorward, 2011, 
2013). 
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 As noted above, resurgent interest in agricultural development was in part 
stimulated by African agriculture’s poor performance and associated problems 
of food insecurity, lack of rural growth, and persistent rural poverty. Cereal 
production faced particular diffi culties in that, while production grew (just 
keeping pace with population growth), most of this growth was the result 
of expansion in cereal areas, with very limited increases in yields.  Table 1.1 
shows that in contrast to Latin America and Asia, annual average growth in 
land under cereals was higher than growth in yields in sub-Saharan Africa 
from 1961 to 2009, and this applied both before and after 2000, though with 
higher rates of growth in both cereal areas and yields after 2000. 
 Wiggins and Leturque (2010) provide a helpful summary of different 
explanations for sub-Saharan Africa’s poor agricultural performance, while 
pointing to considerable variation in performance between regions within 
Africa. They identify core problems as limited production potential (due 
to geography, environmental degradation, and fertility decline which they 
link to lack of technical innovation), unfavourable external conditions (aris-
ing from OECD subsidies and trade rules and from limited demand for farm 
output), and government and market failures (the former involving a policy 
that deters investors and too little investment, the latter failing to deliver 
credit and input services and overcome poverty traps). These diffi culties are 
of course interrelated. However, the lack of technical innovation is arguably 
the proximate cause of the lack of land and labour productivity growth in 
African agriculture and is the outcome of other diffi culties—which reduce 
benefi ts, raise costs, or in other ways inhibit technical change—particularly 
on poor, small-scale farms. 2 
 2  We do not address here the longstanding debate on the relative merits of investment and 
support for large- and small-scale farms (see, for example, Collier and Dercon, 2009; Hazell et al., 
2010; Hazell, 2012). We favour the complementary approach to large and small farms advocated 
by Hazell (2012), but our focus is on the potential multiple benefi ts of overcoming problems faced 
by poor, small-scale farmers. 
 Table 1.1.  Annual changes in cereal production from 1961 and 2000 
 East Asia & 
Pacifi c 
 Latin America 
& Caribbean 
 South Asia  Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
 Cereal prodn  1961–2009  2.80%  2.58%  2.27%  2.45% 
 Cereal land  1961–2009  0.39%  0.61%  0.31%  1.73% 
 Cereal yield  1961–2009  2.40%  1.95%  1.95%  0.95% 
 Cereal prodn  2000–09  1.93%  1.78%  1.01%  3.65% 
 Cereal land  2000–09  0.72%  0.41%  -0.01%  2.20% 
 Cereal yield  2000–09  1.20%  1.37%  1.01%  1.42% 
 Source: Author calculations from World Bank (2011). 
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 A critical and widely recognized difference between agriculture in sub-Saha-
ran Africa and in other regions is the low rate of fertilizer use in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The extent of this is illustrated in the upper part of  Table 1.2 , which 
shows FAO estimates of mean rates of inorganic fertilizer application (meas-
ured in kg nitrogen per ha arable and permanent crop land) from 2002–9 in 
different regions of the world. Even allowing for the diffi culties of gathering 
and interpreting such data, the table shows a striking contrast between sub-
Saharan Africa and other parts of the world. Although signifi cant amounts of 
fertilizer use is for non-cereal crops (and the importance of this varies between 
countries), a similar contrast is evident for cereal yields. 
 The lower part of  Table 1.2 shows estimated nitrogen application rates for 
the six sub-Saharan African countries with the highest fertilizer rates. It also 
provides an indicator of the importance of cereal production in the agricul-
tural sector. 3 Mauritius has a very high rate of fertilizer use but negligible cere-
als production, so the high rates of fertilizer use are largely on other crops. 
Fertilizer use in South Africa is spread across both cereals and other crops 
but is affected by substantial maize production by the large-scale commercial 
sector. 4 Malawi then stands out for its relatively high rate of fertilizer use (by 
African but not global standards), large share of cereals in the agricultural 
 Table 1.2.  Fertilizer use, cereal yields, and value of cereal production, 2002–9 
 Nitrogen application, 
kg/ha 
 Cereal yield, kg/ha  Value of cereal prodn 
as % agric. value 
added 
 Asia  106.0  3404 
 Northern America  58.8  5723 
 Europe  44.2  3563 
 Central America  38.6  2967 
 South America  36.6  3447 
 Northern Africa  37.8  1852 
 Sub Saharan Africa  5.9  1274  23% 
 Mauritius  96.3  0% 
 South Africa  27.2  41% 
 Malawi  22.8  55% 
 Zambia  17.6  18% 
 Zimbabwe  15.1  27% 
 Kenya  12.3  13% 
 Sources: Author calculations from FAO (2012), World Bank (2011), World Bank (2012). 
 3  Due to diffi culties in sourcing better data the indicator used is value of cereal production at 
international grain prices (estimated with prices and grain index weights taken from World Bank, 
2012) as a percentage of agricultural value added (World Bank, 2011) in current US$. 
 4  The 2002–9 average rate of nitrogen application per ha arable and permanent crop land in 
sub-Saharan Africa, excluding Mauritius and Swaziland, is only 4.0 kg/ha. 
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sector, and (not shown in  Table 1.2 ) the overwhelming importance of small-
holder agriculture in cereal production. 5 Many would argue that a major factor 
in Malawi’s high rate of fertilizer use in a poor and smallholder maize-based 
agricultural economy has been its longstanding use of agricultural fertilizer 
subsidies. In  Table 1.2 , data for Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Kenya are presented 
below data for Malawi. Smallholder cereal production accounts for a smaller 
share of agriculture in all three of these economies as compared with Malawi. 
Zambia has, however, also been implementing an agricultural input subsidy 
programme. The basis for the relatively high rates of fertilizer use reported for 
Zimbabwe is not clear, but contributors to higher fertilizer use in Kenya with-
out subsidies have been explored by Minde et al. (2008) and Ariga and Jayne 
(2011) and these include: good transport links to and through Mombasa, 
high export volumes reducing back-load costs, and high fertilizer demand 
for use on smallholder cash crops alongside food crops (stimulating market 
development and lowering retail unit costs as well as supporting a variety 
of mechanisms for easing cash fl ow constraints on purchases of fertilizer for 
food crops). 
 In this book we examine the often controversial roles and impacts of agricul-
tural input subsidies (generally dominated by fertilizer subsidies) in promot-
ing technical change in agricultural development, with particular attention 
to lessons and insights from the large agricultural input subsidy programme 
which Malawi embarked on in 2005. 
 The topics addressed are important for many countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa, as well as for Malawi. As discussed above, agricultural production has 
been stagnant in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, and associated with high 
incidence and severity of rural poverty and food insecurity. The challenges in 
‘getting agriculture moving’ are exacerbated by local resource pressures from 
rapid population growth, the threat of climate change leading to increasingly 
uncertain rainfall in many parts of the region, high and volatile world food 
prices, and uncertainties about the global economy. As we shall discuss, the 
number of African countries implementing large-scale agricultural input sub-
sidies has been growing, and these programmes are costly—in terms of fi scal 
costs, lost benefi ts from investments of these resources in alternative uses 
(such as in education, health, infrastructure, or agricultural research), and 
the long term distortions they can foster in political, fi nancial, social, and 
economic structures. Failure will not only blight the lives of millions of poor 
rural people and their children, it may also prejudice policy makers against 
future investments in agriculture. 
 5  Smallholder maize production is estimated to account for 97% of the maize and total cereal 
areas in Malawi in 2009/10 (Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, 2010). 
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 Malawi is, unfortunately, no exception to this. However, its post-2005 
subsidy experience provides a good case study for examining the poten-
tial strengths and weaknesses of agricultural input subsidies in addressing 
these issues. The programme follows and builds on a long history of differ-
ent forms of subsidy in Malawi, with fertilizer price subsidies to smallholder 
farmers from the 1960s to 1980s, which were then removed and reinstated 
in the 1990s, and then replaced by an initially universal Starter Pack but later 
Targeted Input Programme (TIP) of free distribution of small fertilizer and 
seed packs to smallholder farmers. This programme (thoroughly documented 
in Levy, 2005) adopted increasingly innovative systems involving private dis-
tributors of seed and fertilizer and was continued until the 2004/5  season. 
Following the 2004 elections and food shortages in 2005, however, the increas-
ing political signifi cance of fertilizer subsidies led to the introduction of a 
much larger programme providing approximately 50% of Malawian small-
holder farmers with much larger packs of inputs at highly subsidized prices. 
This new programme, the Agricultural or Farm Input Subsidy Programme 
(AISP or FISP), 6 attracted immediate controversy, from both supporters (for 
 example, Dugger, 2007; Denning et al., 2009) and detractors (for example,  The 
Economist , 2008) but was very popular in Malawi and has since continued. 7 
The programme has been held up as an example for other countries to follow, 
and large-scale input subsidies are now being implemented in a large number 
of African countries. Many of these are both drawing on Malawi’s experience 
and introducing their own innovations to address perceived opportunities 
for improvement. There are, however, also signifi cant concerns among many 
economists, development analysts, and policy makers both in Malawi and 
elsewhere about the effects and cost of Malawi’s programme. 
 The FISP has also been the subject of a range of different studies, of varying 
scope and quality, and advocates and sceptics, supporters and detractors of 
the programme often draw on contradictory evidence to support their posi-
tions. 8 There is therefore a need to bring these different perspectives and stud-
ies together and to set these in the context of wider debates and experience 
 6  The names Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme and Farm Inputs Subsidy Programme (AISP 
and FISP) are often used interchangeably. We generally use the former in discussion of the earlier 
years of the programme, when AISP was its offi cial title, and the latter when discussing the later 
years of the programme or the programme as a whole. 
 7  Chinsinga (2006) provides a detailed analysis of the political narratives of the farm input 
subsidy programmes including broad agreement across political parties on the need for farm sub-
sidies in varying form, and the sceptical views of development partners. We discuss these issues 
in Chapter 4. 
 8  Indeed Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne (2012) suggest that debates on agricultural input subsidies 
are addressing a ‘wicked problem’ that is diffi cult or impossible to resolve because of contested 
framings of the problem, incomplete and contested information, and absence of agreement on 
the core issues. 
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to draw robust conclusions where these are possible, to recognize areas of 
disagreement and ambiguity, and to identify outstanding questions for agri-
cultural policy makers, programme implementers, and researchers not only 
in Malawi but across Africa. That is the purpose of this book. 
 1.2.  Objectives and outline 
 In this book we aim to contribute to a greater understanding of the roles, 
contributions, and pitfalls of agricultural input subsidies as instruments for 
promoting food security, poverty reduction, social protection, and wider eco-
nomic growth in poor agrarian economies. The specifi c objectives are 
 •  to update and develop theoretical understanding of agricultural input 
subsidies’ impacts, allowing for new delivery systems and instruments 
and specifi c constraints inhibiting the livelihoods of poor subsistence 
farmers and the economies of which they are a major part; 
 •  to derive from Malawi’s experience lessons about the implementation 
and impacts of a large-scale agricultural input subsidy programme, 
with specifi c focus on the contextual, design, and implementation 
determinants of economy-wide, benefi ciary, and market impacts; and 
 •  to promote debate about strategic policy decisions in the design of 
large-scale agricultural input subsidies in contemporary low income 
agrarian economies, including targeting and graduation, to foster their 
sustainable contribution to agricultural development and poverty 
reduction. 
 In order to achieve these objectives the book is divided into three parts fol-
lowing this introduction. The fi rst part provides the theoretical and empirical 
context for the rest of the book. It is consists of three chapters. Chapter 2 
sets out the longer standing empirical evidence and theories on the roles 
of agricultural input subsidies in poor agrarian economies. It then extends 
conventional theories to provide a richer account of the potential contri-
butions of innovative delivery systems and instruments to microeconomic, 
mesoeconomic, and economy-wide processes promoting poverty reduc-
tion, food security, economic diversifi cation, and wider economic growth. 
This provides the basis for a broad understanding of the potential roles and 
impacts, positive and negative, of a large-scale subsidy programme in poor 
agrarian economies with different characteristics. Chapter 3 follows with a 
review of the limited information available on twenty-fi rst century agricul-
tural input subsidy programmes in sub-Saharan Africa—but leaves to later 
chapters any discussion of Malawi’s post-2005 programme. It identifi es a 
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number of commonalities across different programmes, against which the 
Malawi programme is compared in later chapters. Chapter 4 completes the 
fi rst part of the book with a review of Malawi’s political, livelihood, market, 
and agricultural policy history. 
 The second part of the book draws on panel household surveys, market 
surveys, monitoring and implementation reports, close engagement with a 
range of stakeholders, and the authors’ detailed studies of the Malawi subsidy 
programme from 2006/7 to 2011/12. Chapter 5 describes in detail its evolv-
ing implementation. Chapters 6, 7, and 8 analyse various potential impacts—
direct impacts on benefi ciaries and on production, indirect impacts on the 
wider economy, and direct and indirect impacts on input markets. Returns to 
investment are considered in Chapter 9. 
 The fi nal part of the book examines two major issues that emerge from 
Malawi’s recent subsidy experience, focusing on targeting (in Chapter 10) 
and graduation (in Chapter  11). The concluding chapter summarizes the 
main arguments and evidence presented in Chapters 2 and 3, draws out the 
major lessons from the Malawi experience, and considers the question of 
agro-ecological, fi scal, and political sustainability. It concludes with a brief 
discussion of possible ways forward for agricultural input subsidies in sub-
Saharan Africa. 
 Although parts of the book are written from an economist’s perspective, 
most of the book should be of much wider interest, addressing general policy 
and implementation issues concerned both with agricultural input subsidies 
and wider problems of development in poor agrarian economies. There is also 
explicit consideration of the political infl uences on policy and its implemen-
tation: these considerations have wider relevance beyond policies concerned 
only with input subsidies. 
 1.3.  Data and methods 
 We conclude this introductory chapter with a brief discussion on the main 
sources of information used in analysis of the Malawi subsidy programme. 
We draw on four main sources of information: 
 •  implementation records on the subsidy programme; 
 •  household and input supplier surveys conducted in 2006/7, 2008/9, and 
2010/11 as part of the evaluation of the programme; 
 •  offi cial statistics; 
 •  other studies on the subsidy programme. 
 We discuss each of these in turn. 
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 1.3.1.  Implementation records on the Malawi subsidy programme 
 Since 2006/7 the logistics of subsidized fertilizer distribution and payments 
to fertilizer suppliers, fertilizer transporters, and seed suppliers have been 
managed by the Logistics Unit, working in close cooperation with the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MoAFS), donors, the two par-
astatals involved in subsidized fertilizer and seed distribution (Agricultural 
Marketing and Development Corporation and Smallholder Farmer Fertilizer 
Revolving Fund of Malawi, ADMARC and SFFRFM), and contracted trans-
porters and seed and fertilizer suppliers. In Chapter 5 extensive use is made 
of information from the Logistics Unit’s weekly and annual reports, sup-
ported by minutes of weekly task force meetings and information supplied 
directly by the MoAFS. 
 1.3.2.  Programme evaluation studies 
 Much of the information and analysis on implementation is also contained 
in various reports of FISP evaluations led by the authors (for example, SOAS 
et al., 2008; Dorward et al., 2010; Dorward and Chirwa, 2011). Since 2006/7 
the authors have led annual evaluations of the subsidy programme, with 
more intensive and ‘light touch’ evaluations in alternate years. More inten-
sive evaluations of the 2006/7, 2008/9, and 2010/11 programmes involved 
household surveys with focus group discussions and a community survey 
and in 2006/7 and 2008/9 an input supplier survey. ‘Light touch’ evaluations 
of the 2007/8, 2009/10, and 2011/12 programme years have drawn mainly on 
implementation records as outlined above, together with information from 
other studies and offi cial statistics, and analysis of data from more intensive 
evaluations. 
 The 2006/7 survey used a sub-sample of households sampled in the National 
Statistical Offi ce (NSO) 2004/5 second Integrated Household Survey (IHS2) in 
order to provide panel data for analysis of programme impacts on benefi ciar-
ies. A total of 3298 households were sampled across all districts in Malawi. 
After data cleaning this gave 2431 balanced matched panel households also 
sampled in the IHS2. Agro-economic livelihood zones defi ned by the Malawi 
Vulnerability Assessment Committee (MVAC) were used to stratify the sam-
ple (Malawi National Vulnerability Assessment Committee, 2005). Urban, 
peri-urban, and protected areas (national parks and reserves) were omitted 
from the sample. Data collection and entry were conducted by the National 
Statistical Offi ce. The survey provided very valuable information on house-
hold access to subsidized and unsubsidized inputs and on many aspects of 
programme implementation. Unfortunately it was less successful as regards 
plot areas and production reported by farmers: these were not found to give 
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reliable and consistent results, and this prevented estimation of production 
impacts of the programme. The 2006/7 input supplier survey involved focus 
group discussions, key informant interviews, and a survey of 271 retail out-
lets in 6 districts. This was supplemented by information from fertilizer and 
seed importers and sellers. The fi ndings were reported in School of Oriental 
and African Studies et al. (2008). 
 The household survey in 2008/9 was conducted by the evaluation team 
with a sample of 1982 households across 14 districts and represented almost 
all livelihood zones. The sample was a sub-set of the 2006/7 sample and there-
fore provided a panel data set across three surveys going back to the IHS2. 
The input supply retailer survey sampled 230 retailers in 6 districts. Both 
surveys were again supplemented by focus group discussions, key inform-
ant interviews, and a community survey, but detailed fertilizer import infor-
mation was not available. Findings were presented in a portfolio of reports 
focusing on  different aspects of the programme (for example, Dorward et al., 
2010a, b; Kelly et al., 2010). The survey again provided valuable information 
on  programme implementation and outputs. However, the introduction of 
innovative approaches to production and yield measurement (such as yield 
sub-plots with enumerator and farmer harvests), plot areas, and production 
data did not give reliable and consistent results. This not only precluded 
estimation of production impacts of the programme, it also raised questions 
about the reliability and consistency of area, production, and yield estimates 
from other studies which rely mainly on farmer estimates and recall of pro-
duction (see Dorward and Chirwa, 2010b). 
 The 2010/11 study did not include an input supplier survey, and the sam-
ple size of the household survey was reduced further to 760 households across 
8 districts in the 3 regions. The sample represented 8 major maize growing 
livelihood zones covering 77% of all rural households and was again a sub-
set of the previous survey (this time the 2008/9 survey). The 2010/11 survey 
replaced attrition households with younger and newly formed households. 
The IHS2 and three FISP evaluation surveys generated a matched panel of 461 
households. As for 2008/9, fi ndings were reported in a portfolio of topic-spe-
cifi c reports (for example, Chirwa et al., 2011d; Dorward and Chirwa, 2011a; 
Mvula et al., 2011). 
 A number of specifi c studies were conducted and reported within the 
programme evaluation—for example, on programme impacts, benefi t–cost 
analysis, targeting, and graduation. These are explained and cited where 
appropriate. It is, however, necessary to provide a little more information 
here on the development and use of the partial equilibrium Informal Rural 
Economy or IRE model to explore some of the economy-wide impacts of the 
programme. This model is fully described in Dorward and Chirwa (2012b). It 
is based on detailed programming models of different farm household types 
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in the two most populous livelihood zones in Malawi. These models allow 
for seasonal constraints affecting farm household activities and the direct 
impacts of the subsidy are investigated by simulating the livelihood effects of 
specifi c households’ access to subsidized inputs. These effects are then aggre-
gated in order to estimate impacts on supply and demand of seasonal labour 
and maize. Wage rates and maize prices are then adjusted iteratively to fi nd 
new equilibrium wages and prices and to derive estimates of economy-wide 
impacts on both subsidy recipients and non-recipients. The nature of the data 
available and of the models means that results should be interpreted as indic-
ative of possible effects rather than predictive of actual effects. Nevertheless, 
when taken together with other information they provide useful insights 
into possible economy-wide impacts. 
 A full set of evaluation reports from 2006/7 to 2011/12 can be found at 
<http://www.wadonda.com/ > . These provide further documentation of 
analytical methods and references are provided whenever their fi ndings are 
drawn upon. 
 1.3.3.  Offi cial statistics 
 Malawi has an extensive set of agricultural and other national statistics. 
 The Ministry of Agriculture publishes valuable monthly information on 
market prices for major crops, with data collected on a weekly basis from a 
large number of markets around the country. The Ministry also publishes 
annual estimates of crop areas, production, and yields, and reports annual 
estimates of the number of farm families. The annual production estimates, 
with large increases in estimated maize production following the introduc-
tion of the subsidy programme in 2005/6, have been widely cited as evidence 
of the impact of the subsidy programme. However, there are inconsistencies 
between the large estimated production increases from 2005/6 and the very 
high domestic maize prices experienced in some years, notably in 2008/9. 
These inconsistencies are discussed in Chapter 7. There are also inconsisten-
cies between national maize areas, production, and yield estimates from the 
Ministry of Agriculture, and from different reports by the National Statistical 
Offi ce (National Statistical Offi ce, 2005a, 2010a). These discrepancies are dis-
cussed in more detail in Dorward and Chirwa (2010b) and summarized in 
Chapter 6. Another set of discrepancies between Ministry of Agriculture and 
NSO data concerns the number of farm families (reported annually by the 
Ministry of Agriculture) and the number of rural households enumerated in 
the 2008 census (National Statistical Offi ce, 2008a). This discrepancy and the 
diffi culties it raises are discussed in Chapter 5. 
 Apparent discrepancies also arise between maize prices reported by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and the consumer price index reported by the NSO. 
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No detailed analysis of this has been published, to our knowledge, but the 
high maize prices observed in 2008/9 and in 2011 do not appear to be con-
sistent with consumer price index fi gures for the same period, given the high 
weighting of food and particularly maize in the consumer price index. We 
also note that the NSO itself refers to revised ‘CPI data’ with ‘overall infl ation 
between the IHS2 and IHS3 periods of 128.9 per cent’ (National Statistical 
Offi ce, 2012: p. 207), when offi cial CPI estimates for the same period suggest 
a considerably lower rate of infl ation. This also raises wider questions about 
the defl ator used in recent years’ GDP estimates, and hence about these GDP 
estimates themselves. 
 Integrated Household Surveys (IHS) conducted by the NSO in 2004/5 (IHS2) 
and 2010/11 (IHS3) provide national estimates on a wide range of variables. 
We refer to these in Chapters 4 and 7. However, we also note some apparent 
discrepancies between and within some of the results presented, and—with 
the publication of the fi rst report on the 2010/11 survey (National Statistical 
Offi ce, 2012) as the manuscript for this book was being fi nalized—it has not 
been possible to resolve these. 
 1.3.4.  Other studies on the subsidy programme 
 A number of other studies have been made of different aspects of the subsidy 
programme. Due to their varied nature and focus we do not discuss these here 
but refer to them at relevant points in the following chapters. In broad terms 
the main focus of most other work has been to use survey data to compare 
observations on recipients and non-recipients in order to examine targeting 
of and direct outcomes and impacts of subsidy receipt—in terms of differences 
in wealth, gender, and other household characteristics affecting access to and 
use of subsidized and unsubsidized inputs, and subsequent differences in 
changes in wealth and other household characteristics. There has been much 
less examination of indirect and economy-wide impacts, of impacts on mar-
ket development, of benefi ts relative to costs, and of the important question 
of graduation, though we discuss notable exceptions where appropriate. 
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Background 
 In this part of the book we provide essential theoretical and empirical context 
for the rest of the book. The three chapters 
 •  set out and extend more conventional theories on agricultural input 
subsidies’ strengths and shortcomings; 
 •  review limited information available on twenty-fi rst century agricultural 
input subsidy programmes in sub-Saharan Africa; and 
 •  describe Malawi’s specifi c political, economic, and agricultural features. 
 These chapters structure and underpin the description, analysis, and evalu-
ation of the Malawi subsidy programme, and the wider application of that 
evaluation, in the remainder of the book. 
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 Agricultural input subsidies: changing theory 
and practice 
 2.1.  Introduction 
 This chapter sets the scene and identifi es critical issues addressed in the rest 
of the book by setting out evolving understandings on agricultural input sub-
sidies in low income countries. We begin with a summary of conventional 
economic theories regarding agricultural input subsidies’ potential benefi ts 
and of the diffi culties experienced in realizing these. This leads on to con-
sideration of different theoretical and practical challenges to conventional 
criticisms of input subsidies. The chapter concludes with a conceptual frame-
work that sets out key elements and processes linking input subsidies’ design, 
implementation, and impacts—a framework that underpins the structure 
and content of the rest of the book. 
 2.2.  ‘Conventional’ input subsidies in agricultural 
development—theory and practice 
 Large-scale (so called universal) agricultural input subsidies were a com-
mon and major feature of agricultural development policies in poor rural 
economies from the 1960s to the 1980s. They were generally implemented as 
‘across the board’ price subsidies accessible to all producers, or to all produc-
ers of a particular category. If they were sold through a state monopsony then 
there were common attempts at price discrimination, with, for example, only 
smallholder farmers supposed to purchase subsidized fertilizer and forbidden 
from selling it on. Fertilizer subsidies were particularly expensive and made 
heavy and growing demands on government budgets as they stimulated 
increased fertilizer consumption (and hence increased volumes of fertilizer 
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subsidy) while political pressures also led to pressures for the subsidy rate to 
increase, or at least not contract, in the face of rising fertilizer prices. 
 Conventional arguments for subsidies in agricultural development focused 
on promoting agricultural productivity by making adoption of new technolo-
gies more attractive to smallholder farmers (Ellis, 1992). The reduced costs of 
subsidized inputs increase their profi tability and reduce the risks perceived by 
farmers with a limited knowledge of input benefi ts and of correct usage. With 
credit and extension services, input subsidies were supposed to help farmers 
implement, benefi t from, and—with later subsidy withdrawal—buy and use 
inputs on their own: rapid learning about input use and benefi ts would mean 
that subsidies should be needed for only a short time and could be rapidly 
phased out. However, subsidies were often subsequently implemented more 
widely with pan territorial pricing to support agricultural development in 
more remote areas, and to counteract taxes on agriculture through export 
tariffs, managed exchange rates, and controls on domestic prices. 
 Standard economic analysis of price subsidies considers the costs and ben-
efi ts of subsidies in shifting farmers’ supply curves for agricultural produce 
(see  Figure 2.1 ). If there are no market failures then a subsidy of $Z per unit 
output increases effective producer price above the market price by $Z. If the 
subsidy is addressing a market failure then a subsidy of $Z per unit output 
will increase effective producer price above the market price by more than $Z 
(say $Z’). The increase in effective producer price causes a downward shift in 
the market price supply curve (S to S’ in  Figure 2.1 ). This leads to an expan-

















 Figure  2.1.  Input subsidy impacts on output supply, price, and stakeholder 
welfare 
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product (from P to P’ in  Figure 2.1 , assuming that the good is a non-tradable 
with a downward sloping demand curve), with an increase in both producer 
surplus (shown in  Figure 2.1 by the shaded area  abcd ) and consumer surplus 
(shown by the shaded area  abef ). The total cost of the subsidy is the total 
subsidy paid (new equilibrium quantity multiplied by the per unit subsidy, 
Q’.Z, shown by the shaded area  dcef ) plus administration costs (not shown 
in the graph). The total subsidy paid is greater than the sum of the increased 
consumer and producer welfare by a deadweight loss indicated in  Figure 2.1 
by the triangle  bce (Siamwalla and Valdes, 1986). Under such circumstances, 
and even without allowing for administration costs, the subsidy leads to a 
net economic loss to the country and an income transfer from taxpayers to 
consumers and producers. 
 Three related points emerge from this analysis. 
 First, a subsidy only generates a positive overall net economic return if 
there is some market failure so that the downward shift in the supply curve 
is greater than the total cost of the subsidy (that is Z, the per unit cost of the 
subsidy to the government including administration costs, is less than Z’, the 
effective increase in output price—or reduction in per unit costs—received by 
producers). This may occur where farmers’ perceived private cost of inputs is 
higher than the true social or economic cost, and/or farmers’ perceptions of 
private benefi ts from increased input use are lower than the actual social or 
economic benefi ts. 1 This may occur where 
 •  farmers’ lack of knowledge about input use means that their expectation 
of its benefi ts are less than the actual benefi ts; 
 •  there are learning costs, so that initial farmer returns to input use are 
low but will increase with experience (see, for example, Ellis, 1992; 
Crawford et al., 2006; Morris et al., 2007); 
 •  farmers’ private costs of working capital for input purchase are greater 
than the social cost of capital; and 
 •  farmers’ risk assessment and aversion in investing in input purchase and 
use are higher than society’s. 
 The fi rst two divergences between farmers’ and society’s costs, benefi ts and 
perceptions of them, should decline with experience, knowledge, and effi -
ciency in using inputs (and are effectively an infant industry argument), the 
latter two may decline with increasing farm productivity, wealth, and market 
integration. 
 Second, the size of the deadweight loss and the distribution of benefi ts 
between consumers and producers depend on elasticities of supply and 
 1  Dorward (2009b) shows this using marginal value product and marginal factor cost analysis. 
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demand, as shown in  Table 2.1 . This is important, as larger deadweight losses 
are associated with increasing ineffi ciencies, and the distribution of gains and 
costs between producers, consumers, and taxpayers has equity and poverty 
reduction impacts, depending on the relative wealth and incomes of the pro-
ducers, consumers, and taxpayers concerned. 
 Elastic demand or supply tends to be associated with larger deadweight 
losses while producer and consumer shares of benefi ts are determined by rela-
tive supply and demand elasticities: inelastic demand is associated with larger 
shares of consumer surplus benefi ts, and inelastic supply (both price elastic-
ity and in response to the subsidy) is associated with larger shares of pro-
ducer surplus benefi ts. Supply and demand elasticities therefore affect both 
the effi ciency of subsidy programmes and their equity and poverty reduction 
impacts (depending upon the relative wealth and incomes of affected pro-
ducers and consumers). These observations are signifi cant when linked with 
supply and demand characteristics of different crops in different contexts. 
Staple food markets in land-locked countries (with large import/export parity 
price differentials) tend to be associated with more inelastic demand (where 
prices lie between export and import parity prices). Demand tends to be more 
elastic for cash crops, particularly export cash crops, for traded staples and 
where subsidy implementation is not on a large enough scale to affect out-
put prices (small-scale subsidies that do not signifi cantly affect production 
and product prices are analytically equivalent to subsidies with highly elastic 
product demand: subsidy benefi ts are largely captured by suppliers/produc-
ers, and deadweight costs depend upon the elasticity of supply). 
 Third, transfers to producers can be analysed in terms of ineffi ciencies 
associated with  economic rents . Rents arise in three ways. First, part of the 
cost of a general input subsidy goes to reducing the cost of production for 
produce that would be produced anyway (this is the producer surplus on 
produce that would be produced without the subsidy). This is an ineffi cient 
way of stimulating increased production and increased productivity, unless 
 Table 2.1.  Effects of demand and supply inelasticities on consumer and producer gains 
and on deadweights 
 Perfectly elastic 
demand 
 Unitary demand  Perfectly inelastic 
demand 
 Perfectly elastic sup-
ply, shifts down 
 n/a  All gains to consumers, 
Large deadweight 
 All gains to 
consumers, No 
deadweight 
 Unitary supply, shifts 
down/to the right 
 All gains to suppliers, 
Large deadweight 
 Shared gains, Some 
deadweight 
 All gains to consum-
ers, No deadweight 
 Perfectly inelastic 
supply (may shift 
to the right) 
 All gains to suppliers, 
No deadweight 
 Gains shared (depend-
ing on supply shift), 
No deadweight 
 n/a 
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there is some social or economic benefi t from transferring income to produc-
ers already using the subsidised input. Second, producer transfers often end 
up affecting the demand for agricultural land and labour, and bid up the 
demand for inputs. Apparent transfers to producers may then be passed back 
to the suppliers of these factors of production as pure economic rents. This 
is not a problem if the providers of this land and labour are poor, indeed as 
will be argued later this can be an important way for subsidies to promote 
pro-poor growth. Third, where subsidized inputs are rationed (offi cially or 
unoffi cially), then this leads to opportunities for those controlling subsidized 
inputs (politicians, government offi cials, fertilizer suppliers, farmer organi-
zation offi ce bearers, etc.), to divert subsidized inputs from their intended 
benefi ciaries for a side payment or to demand payments from benefi ciaries in 
return for provision of subsidized inputs. Economic rents mean that even if 
there are net economic and social gains from a subsidy (as discussed above), 
much of the subsidy cost may be a straight transfer from the state (or taxpay-
ers) to producers and suppliers of land, labour, and inputs without any eco-
nomic gain, with the relative shares of transfers depending on the elasticities 
of supply and demand. 
 Another concern with input subsides relates to the extent of leakages and 
diversion of subsidized inputs away from their intended use. This can be con-
sidered in three ways: 
 a)  Diversion between products: farmers are likely to apply inputs to the 
use with the greatest expected return. Fertilizers, for example, may be 
applied to a variety of crops. Even if subsidies are intended to expand 
production of the food staples consumed by poor people with inelas-
tic demand (and benefi t poor consumers with low deadweight losses), 
farmers may apply subsidized fertilizers to (cash) crops with more price 
elastic demand if these offer higher returns. Direct switching of inputs 
between crops or products may not be so easy for subsidized seeds, 
although some indirect switching may happen due to wider capital 
fungibility. 
 b)  Diversion from intended benefi ciaries: input subsidies in developing 
countries have commonly been intended for smallholder rather than 
commercial farmers. With a general subsidy it is diffi cult to channel 
subsidized inputs to smallholders unless there are a limited number 
of tightly controlled supply chains, clear ways of identifying intended 
benefi ciaries, and control of private fertilizer transactions. Use of sub-
sidized inputs by larger scale commercial farms is likely to increase the 
diversion from staple food to cash crops and to less-poor producers less 
constrained by market failures. Similar issues arise in subsidy access 
between richer and poorer smallholders. 
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 c)  Cross-border leakages: these arise when subsidized inputs are sold out-
side the country at a discount. The value of the discount represents a 
straight loss from the transfer of resources outside the country, with the 
loss of any chance of consumer benefi t or economic gain from increased 
input use. 
 The fi nal point to note from analysis of input subsidies’ effects on product 
supply and demand is that the extent of supply shifts is critical in determin-
ing deadweight losses, the distribution of transfers between producers and 
consumers, and the extent of wider economic gains. The supply shift depends 
upon the technical effi ciency of input use—determined by the quality and 
appropriateness of the inputs to the product they are used on, timing of their 
delivery to farmers, availability of complementary resources (for example, 
seed and fertilizer together, market access), and technical skills in input use. 
 This analysis of product supply and demand impacts of input subsidies 
helps to identify features of subsidies that are likely to yield more benefi ts 
and reduce the dangers of things going wrong, with additional insights into 
where subsidies are most likely to be useful, and into the ways that subsidies 
should be implemented. It suggests that inputs subsidies should be focused 
 •  on producers who are not using inputs because of market failures; 
 •  on inputs for products where they can induce a substantial supply shift 
(and this may also require complementary investments in, for example, 
other input supply, extension and output markets’ infrastructure and 
services); and 
 •  on inputs for products with inelastic demand and supply (particularly 
inelastic demand) among poor producers and consumers: staple grain 
production tends to have these characteristics in poor land-locked 
countries or large countries with suitable agro-ecological conditions. 
 Although input subsidies are directed at producers and at changing produc-
tion methods and producer behaviour, this analysis emphasizes the impor-
tance of consumer benefi ts in addition to (or rather than) producer benefi ts 
for maximizing both economic and welfare gains from subsidies. Input sub-
sidies should also be implemented in ways that (a) reduce deadweight losses 
and rents from straight transfers, (b) reduce leakages, and (c) have low admin-
istration costs. Subsidies may also be less effi cient instruments if they are 
primarily aimed at delivering income transfers to producers and remote areas, 
because of high deadweight and administration costs, generation of rents, 
and the diffi culties in developing/delivering complementary services needed 
for technically and economically effi cient use of subsidized inputs. The dis-
tributional impacts and multipliers from expenditure on input subsidies also 
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need to be considered against alternative (tax and subsidy or transfer) instru-
ments for changing income distribution and for stimulating growth. 
 The conclusions from the theoretical analysis above matches (and infl u-
enced) the conventional wisdom among most economists and northern 
policy analysts on the diffi culties with input subsidy programmes. This also 
emphasized diffi culties with 
 •  controlling costs, as there tend to be strong political pressures for the 
expansion of subsidies, and only weak pressures for their control; 
 •  ‘exits’, as there is strong political resistance to scaling down or 
termination of subsidies; 
 •  effectiveness of targeting of input subsidies to particular farmer 
types, with the problems of diversion and leakage noted above both 
expanding programme cost and reducing effi ciency; 
 •  over use of inputs, or adoption of input intensive production methods, 
as a result of artifi cially low input prices; 
 •  regressive benefi ts favouring larger farmers who can afford subsidized 
inputs (the poorest farmers may not be able to afford inputs even where 
they are subsidized); 
 •  market distortions, and particularly parastatal involvement in 
subsidized input delivery, tending to crowd out and inhibit private 
sector investment in input supply systems and hence impede 
sustainable development. 
 These concerns led to the conventional wisdom among economists and 
international donors in the 1980s and 1990s that input subsidies had been 
ineffective and ineffi cient policy instruments in Africa and that they had 
contributed to government over-spending and fi scal and macro-economic 
problems. From the mid 1990s, however, this conventional wisdom was 
increasingly challenged, with a resurgence of interest in agricultural input 
subsidies in Africa, new thinking about the historical and potential roles in 
agricultural development, and the complementary emergence of innovative 
subsidy delivery systems and instruments. 
 2.3.  Resurgent interest in input subsidies 
 The fundamental driver for new thinking on input (and particularly ferti-
lizer) subsidies in Africa was concern among African politicians, NGOs, and 
some policy analysts about the apparent failures of liberalized policies in 
supporting broad-based agricultural development, particularly sustainable 
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intensifi cation of staple food crop production. This was accompanied by 
continuing political demands for fertilizer subsidies in many countries; ten-
sions among donors in resisting such demands (with increasing legitimacy 
of democratic governments in Africa and divergent donor views on subsidy 
merits); concerns about declining soil fertility, agricultural stagnation, and 
rural poverty in Africa; and identifi cation of input subsidies as a potential 
instrument for social protection policies. 
 These concerns led to interest in the potential for input subsidies to deliver 
a wider range of (sometimes unstated) objectives than those formerly recog-
nized in the conventional wisdom described earlier. These objectives included 
short-term private input market development, replenishment of soil fertility, 
social protection for poor subsidy recipients, and national and household 
food security (Morris et al., 2007). 
 There has also been considerable interest in the development of new 
instruments and approaches in designing and delivering input subsidies, as 
so called ‘smart subsidies’. Morris et al. (2007) describe 10 features of smart 
subsidies: ‘promoting fertiliser as part of a wider strategy’, ‘favouring market 
based solutions’ and ‘promoting competition’ in input supply, ‘paying atten-
tion to demand’, ‘insisting on economic effi ciency’, ‘empowering farmers’, 
‘involving an exit strategy’, ‘pursuing regional integration’, ‘ensuring sus-
tainability’, and ‘promoting pro-poor economic growth’ (Morris et al., 2007: 
103–4). They recognize that ‘in exceptional circumstances, poverty reduc-
tion or food security objectives may even be given precedence over effi ciency 
and sustainability goals’ (Morris et al., 2007: 104–5). Instruments proposed 
for implementing smart subsidies include demonstration packs, vouchers, 
rationing, targeting, matching grants, and loan guarantees. For all of these 
the details of instrument design and implementation are critical to their 
success, and there is continuing concern over the problems of subsidies dis-
cussed earlier and the importance of addressing wider problems in input sup-
ply chains (Jayne et al., 2009; Minot and Benson, 2009; Bumb et al., 2011). 
 The interest in getting input subsidies to serve new functions and objec-
tives, and the extent to which input subsidies are the most cost-effective way 
of achieving these objectives, continues to be controversial. The main text 
of the 2008 World Development Report on ‘Agriculture for Development’, 
for example, recognized all the features of smart subsides outlined above, 
but its summarized position was more restricted and conventional, focusing 
on subsidy roles as being to provide ‘sustainable solutions to market fail-
ures . . . through . . . ‘market smart’ approaches to jumpstarting agricultural 
input markets. . . . and underwriting risks of early adoption of new technolo-
gies to help achieve economies of scale . . . to reduce input prices . . . as part of 
a comprehensive strategy to improve productivity with credible exit options’ 
(World Bank, 2007b). 
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 It is, however, possible to question how important some of the objectives 
listed above were in successful Asian Green Revolutions (for example, replen-
ishment of soil fertility and social protection for poor subsidy recipients) and 
to identify other, perhaps more important, outcomes from subsidy use in 
these green revolutions (see, for example, Hazell and Rosegrant, 2000) or in 
more recent input subsidy programmes. Such outcomes included 
 •  long-term ‘thickening’ of supply chains and rural markets; 
 •  lower staple food prices and higher wages; 
 •  increased real incomes for poor non-recipients as well as food-insecure 
recipients as a result of food price and wage changes; and 
 •  longer term structural changes in livelihoods and the rural and national 
economy with expanded domestic demand for higher value farm 
products and for non-farm goods and services, together with expanded 
supply capacity, due to release of land and labour as a result of increased 
staple crop productivity. 
 These debates, together with new insights into development processes, 
require an extension of the conventional wisdom on subsidies with a 
re-examination of: 
 •  the empirical record of their success and failure; 
 •  development opportunities and constraints facing African farmers; 
 •  thinking on input subsidies’ roles and objectives in development, on 
new design and implementation features, and on the conditions for 
inputs subsidies to be effective; and 
 •  a more holistic conceptual framework for examining the roles, 
instruments, and implementation of input subsidies. 
 We consider each of these issues in turn to provide a basis for a review of 
recent experience with input subsidies in Africa in the subsequent chapter. 
 2.4.  Input subsidies’ successes, failures, and potential 
 The substantial success of the Green Revolution in Asian countries in driv-
ing growth and poverty and reduction is widely recognized but, implicitly 
or explicitly, this is often considered to have been achieved despite, rather 
than assisted by, input subsidies (see, for example, Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 2008). This position is taken despite longstanding work showing the 
importance of subsidies in Indonesia (see, for example, Timmer, 2004), in 
promoting agricultural growth in situations where subsidies should have the 
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greatest effect (food staples in large countries, with high physical returns from 
input use). Djurfeldt et al. (2005) argue that input subsidies were a critical 
element in Green Revolution policies across a range of Asian countries. Fan 
et al. (2007) estimate a signifi cant contribution of input subsidies to growth 
and poverty reduction in India in the early stages of the Green Revolution 
but not later (although estimated returns to some other investments such as 
agricultural research were higher). Dorward et al. (2004a) argue that sustained 
(but not indefi nite) input subsidies were a major part of successful Green 
Revolution packages, making a critical contribution to thickening and thus 
‘kick starting’ markets, fi rst within staple food supply chains and then in the 
wider rural economy. 
 Dorward et al. (2004a) also argue that later problems with input subsidies 
should not obscure their initial contribution to driving growth forward, and 
much of the pessimism about subsidies was founded on later ineffi ciency of 
Asian subsidies and African experience of such subsidies. The Berg report crit-
icized input subsidies as a major element in ineffi cient and fi scally and eco-
nomically unsustainable policies that distorted market incentives, blunted 
competitiveness and farmer incentives, and undermined growth in private 
sector services in Africa. Subsidized input systems may have looked good for 
farmers, but the theoretical problems discussed earlier were compounded by 
diversion and ineffi ciency such that actual benefi ts to farmers were often 
very limited (World Bank, 1981). However, there are African countries that 
implemented input subsidy systems that had initial success in raising pro-
ductivity, but for varying political and economic reasons failed to sustain the 
fi scal investment and market systems needed to sustain benefi ts (for example, 
Zimbabwe and Malawi). 
 Taking these Asian and African experiences together, Dorward et  al. 
(2009) note that while there are egregious examples of failure with state-
led approaches, there are also examples of dramatic success in fostering 
widespread and sustained growth in smallholder food staples (as noted 
above). Private market-led approaches, on the other hand, have very few 
examples of such success, and many failures, but the failures of continued 
rural poverty may be more hidden from economists working with govern-
ments and businesses than macro-economic and fi scal crises. It can also 
be argued, however, that private market-led approaches have never been 
properly tried—liberalization of food markets has proved very diffi cult to 
implement consistently—and not just in Africa. This can also be seen, how-
ever, as another challenge to private market-led approaches. An exception 
to this was the mid-2000s growth of smallholder fertilizer use in Kenya 
(Ariga et al., 2008) which, while aided by special conditions which prevent 
its wholesale application to other countries, nevertheless carries important 
lessons. 
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 The record of input subsidies, as a major part of state-led development 
approaches, therefore appears to be more mixed than conventional criticisms 
suggest. This requires consideration of both context and programme design 
and implementation in appraising the potential for input subsidies as effec-
tive instruments for agricultural (and wider) development. Successful invest-
ments in input subsidies in the Asian Green Revolution cannot be simply 
transferred to African countries. It is important to identify situations where 
input subsidies could work to take opportunities and overcome constraints 
facing African farmers. 
 Poulton and Dorward (2008) and Dorward et  al. (2008) consider con-
straints and opportunities for growth for different agricultural products in 
different situations in Africa and southern Africa. They suggest that while 
high response cereals (with roots and tubers) are the products with the great-
est importance and potential for driving and/or spreading growth, they are 
also the crops that are most affected by interlinked challenges and failures in 
price instability, the price/productivity tightrope, 2 and seasonal input fi nance 
provision. In terms of conventional economic theory on subsidy gains and 
losses (as discussed earlier in Section 2.2), these characteristics suggest that 
high response cereals fulfi l many of the requirements for well-designed and 
implemented input subsidies to have a role to play in stimulating pro-poor 
growth: 
 •  the seasonal fi nance challenges are market failures that inhibit input 
use, so that the gains from subsidies addressing input affordability 
problems have the potential to exceed deadweight and implementation 
costs; 
 •  inelastic demand for food staples means that (a) deadweight losses 
should be relatively low and (b) many of the gains of producer subsidies 
should accrue to poor consumers—if subsidies increase production on a 
suffi ciently large scale to lower prices—and in this way input subsidies 
can provide a means to address the food price/productivity tightrope; 
 •  they can, in the right agro-ecological conditions and with proper 
management, lead to substantial productivity and production increase. 
 This last point is important, in the context of arguments by Dorward et al. 
(2004a) that state interventionist approaches (including input subsidies) 
require (a) technologies, management, and agro-ecological conditions that 
generate suffi cient productivity gains and (b) complementary infrastructure 
and institutions to support extension services and market activities. This ties 
 2  The price/productivity tightrope is the dilemma in poor agrarian countries where on the one 
hand high food prices are needed to stimulate investment in inputs but on the other hand high 
prices damage poor consumers who spend a large part of their income on staple foods. 
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in with earlier arguments about large deadweight costs in producer-oriented 
subsidies in remote areas to suggest that input subsidies are more effective 
with favourable agro-ecological conditions for high response cereals, good 
market access, and higher population densities. This approach is articulated 
in AGRA’s thinking about prioritization of investments in ‘breadbasket areas’ 
in Africa (AGRA, 2008). 
 2.5.  Input subsidies’ roles and objectives 
 2.5.1.  Dynamic effects of subsidies on growth 
 The above discussion of subsidy impacts has been largely concerned with 
subsidies’ ‘static’ impacts on producer costs and decisions, hence on pro-
duce supply and prices and consumer welfare (the more dynamic impacts on 
producer knowledge of input benefi ts and effi cient input use contributed to 
these static changes). There are, however, two important potential dynamic 
benefi ts of subsidies that have been given much less emphasis in conven-
tional discussion of subsidies’ potential impacts. 
 First, subsidies that are effective in raising land and labour productivity 
(with overall increases in on-farm labour demand) and in driving down food 
staple prices will raise the real incomes of large numbers of poor consumers 
and producers, and this should expand demand for locally produced non-
staple foods (horticultural and animal products) and non-farm goods and 
services, driving up local labour demand and wages and improving people’s 
nutrition. 3 At the same time increasing staple crop productivity can release 
resources for production of the same non-staple foods (horticultural and ani-
mal products) and non-farm goods and services. These growth multipliers 
were critical in driving growth in Asia (Hazell and Rosegrant, 2000). Subsidies’ 
potential contributions to the three core development processes of ‘hanging 
in, stepping up and stepping out’ (Dorward, 2009a) require particular empha-
sis on subsidy impacts on wages and food prices for poor consumers and 
producers who are net food buyers (around 50% of African farmers—Barrett, 
2008)  as well as subsidy implementation over a longer period, to achieve 
structural change rather than short-term productivity gains. The focus on 
staple crops—and both on labour productivity in their cultivation and on 
 3  Effective subsidies for staple crop production offer double benefi ts when staple markets are rel-
atively isolated from international markets—with both broad-based increases in land and labour 
productivity and increases in real incomes for net food buyers who benefi t from falling staple 
prices. However, the dynamic benefi ts of broad-based productivity increases in staple produc-
tion may by themselves be very signifi cant, even if staple markets are more open to imports and 
exports, with a narrower band between import and export prices reducing the scope for falling 
prices of staple foods. 
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prices faced by net food buyers suggest that there can be particular benefi ts 
for women, with common gendered responsibilities in staple crop produc-
tion and acquisition. 
 A second set of important potential dynamic benefi ts from input subsidies 
arises from their stimulation of increased input and output trade and wider 
economic activity (as described above) having positive spillover effects with 
‘market thickening’. This happens if the greater volume of economic activity 
stimulated by the subsidy reduces coordination and transaction costs and 
risks and promotes institutional and communications and transport service 
and infrastructure development (see Dorward et al., 2004a, 2009; Dorward 
and Kydd, 2004). Dynamic effects of input subsidies on the development of 
input supply systems (considered below) are a specifi c feature of this. 
 These potential dynamic benefi ts of subsidies require longer term and sta-
ble implementation of subsidies to induce behavioural and structural change, 
integration of subsidy policy and implementation with other policies promot-
ing these changes, and evaluations of subsidy programmes that take account 
of and ideally assess these wider indirect and dynamic impacts. 
 2.5.2.  Soil fertility replenishment 
 One of the reasons put forward for implementing fertilizer subsidies is the 
need to combat the alarming decline in soil nutrients in many parts of Africa 
and the need for (and benefi ts of) their replenishment. Crawford et al. (2006) 
summarize soil fertility problems in terms of declining fallows, rapid defor-
estation, land degradation, and declining nitrogen, phosphate, and potas-
sium levels in arable soils. Subsidies to promote fertilizer application may 
then be justifi ed in terms of positive externalities where increased fertilizer 
use, higher soil fertility, and higher farm yields provide a number of benefi ts 
to society rather than to individual farmers: reductions in soil erosion and 
downstream fl ooding and siltation, in deforestation and CO 2 emissions, and 
in soil and wider ecosystem and biodiversity loss as a result of reduced pres-
sures to cultivate marginal and fragile land; and reductions in poverty and in 
rural–urban migration and hence in the wider social costs of addressing rural 
and urban poverty as a result of increased farm and rural incomes (Sánchez 
et al., 1997). It may also be argued that poverty and food insecurity cause 
many African farmers to place a higher value on short-term income and food 
production and a lower value on longer term investments in soil fertility and 
other types of natural capital (as compared with their value to wider society), 
again leading to under investment in soil fertility and a justifi cation for sub-
sidies to promote investments in better soil management. Negative externali-
ties from nitrate leaching are not generally a problem with the very low rates 
of fertilizer application on poor farms in Africa. 
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 2.5.3.  Effects of subsidies on input supply systems 
 Effective large-scale input subsidies should lead to substantial increases in 
volumes of inputs purchased by farmers, and this can have a number of dif-
ferent impacts on input supply systems and markets. We consider a number 
of different processes and impacts. 
 First, the short-run effects of an input subsidy on the input market depend 
upon the nature of the subsidy and on the structure of the input supply sys-
tem. If the subsidy is provided to farmers this has the effect of shifting input 
demand upwards. Alternatively input subsidies may be provided to input 
suppliers (India, for example, has used fertilizer subsidies to domestic produc-
ers to develop and protect its fertilizer industry, Fan et al., 2007). The effects 
of this on the input market depend upon input supply elasticity, and this in 
turn will depend upon the structure, conduct, and performance in domestic 
production and imports. This varies between countries and between different 
kinds of inputs. Few African countries produce fertilizer, with local fertilizer 
suppliers either importing blends or blending particular formulations from 
domestic and imported raw materials. Price elasticities for imported fertilizers 
should be very high, unless there are either signifi cant importation costs and 
limited importation capacity (as may be the case for land-locked countries, 
with increased input demand bidding up importation costs and revenues 
(rents) in transport costs) or limited competition between importers (bid-
ding up revenues (rents) of importers). The situation is often very different 
with seed supply, where imports are impeded by national seed certifi cation 
controls and there is limited domestic capacity in seed production, with long 
multiplication lead times. Short and long run supply elasticities also differ 
(with greater long-run elasticity with stable policies). More elastic input sup-
ply leads to more of a subsidy accruing to producers, with gains for producers 
and/or consumers depending on the product elasticity of supply and demand 
(see Dorward, 2009b, for a graphical presentation of this). More elastic input 
supply leads to reduced subsidy capture by input suppliers, increased benefi ts 
to producers and/or consumers, and greater development benefi ts. 
 Input subsidies can impact benefi cially on input supply systems by reduc-
ing supplier margins through economies of scale across the industry and 
within particular suppliers (as a result of increased volumes) and/or through 
increased competition if increased volumes attract new entrants into input 
supply. These benefi ts should accrue to both subsidized and unsubsidized 
supplies of the same inputs, and expand supply and its elasticity. The extent 
of improvements in economies of scale and competition depend upon the 
nature of the inputs and their supply systems, and upon ways in which sub-
sidized inputs are acquired and disbursed (for example, through general 
price support, voucher systems or direct issue with distribution involving 
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government institutions, input supplier cartels, or competitive input mar-
kets). Government supply is not incompatible with realization of economies 
of scale in subsidized input disbursement, but spillovers to unsubsidized sales 
are likely to be limited (unless the government also markets these) and lack 
of competition faced by government organizations (and by cartels) tends to 
undermine the achievement of such economies. 
 Another process by which input subsidies can impact benefi cially on input 
supply systems is through their promotion of new relationships and forms 
of relationships among input sellers and buyers in poor rural areas with, for 
example, interlocking arrangements for linking input sellers, seasonal fi nance 
providers, and produce buyers. Again this process depends on the nature of 
the inputs and their supply systems, and on the ways in which subsidized 
inputs are disbursed. As noted earlier, this can also contribute to wider eco-
nomic and market activity due to input market activities’ potential spillovers 
into other markets (for example, expansion of a network to sell subsidized 
inputs may also promote buying and selling of other commodities). 
 The impacts of input subsidies on input supply systems are not, however, 
always benefi cial. Damaging effects can arise in two main ways. 
 First, input subsidies may create considerable uncertainty and risks for 
input suppliers and directly undermine incentives for private investment in 
input supply systems. This occurs most obviously when governments inter-
vene directly in input markets through direct supply of subsidized inputs 
and/or through regulation of input markets. Direct supply of subsidized 
inputs by government may take away business from private suppliers if there 
is signifi cant displacement of unsubsidized sales by subsidized sales, leading 
to unsold stocks and lower sales volumes to carry fi xed costs. 4 Regulation of 
input markets may restrict prices or volumes, or require sales of unprofi table 
lines or in unprofi table locations—again restricting revenues and increasing 
costs and risks. Inconsistent and changeable policies and interventions are 
particularly damaging. 
 Subsidies may also damage the development of input supply systems by 
distorting incentives so that input suppliers direct resources into competition 
for government contracts to supply subsidized inputs, instead of competition 
to expand retail sales. 
 The implications of this discussion are that subsidy programmes can 
promote input supply system development, but this needs careful con-
sideration of input supply markets’ structure, conduct and performance, 
careful programme design, and long-term stable but effi ciency-focused 
 4  An extreme case arises if farmers do not purchase unsubsidized inputs because they expect to 
obtain subsidized inputs, but subsequently cannot—in such circumstances a subsidy can not only 
displace unsubsidized inputs but actually depress total input use. 
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relationships of trust between governments and private suppliers. Quick 
exits and unstable, changeable subsidy programmes are unlikely to induce 
the private sector investments necessary for supply system development. 
These issues are the major concerns of many subsidy analysts (for example, 
Crawford et al., 2006; Morris et al., 2007; Jayne et al., 2009; Minot and 
Benson, 2009; Bumb et al., 2011). 
 2.5.4.  Social protection 
 A number of authors (for example, Morris et al., 2007) suggest that subsidies 
may provide an effective way of delivering social protection. Dorward et al. 
(2006) locate this within an evolving relationship between agricultural devel-
opment and social protection policies which they characterize as (a) social 
protection  from agriculture, (b) social protection  independent of agriculture, 
(c) social protection  for agriculture, (d) social protection  through agriculture, 
and (e) social protection  with agriculture. Input subsidies fi t into (a), (d), or (e) 
depending upon the relative emphasis on social protection and agriculture in 
subsidy policy design and implementation. There seems to be little empirical 
review of the effectiveness of subsidies as social protection instruments: we 
discuss issues and evidence in Malawi later (in Chapters 6 and 7) but note 
here that as compared with cash transfer programmes, social protection ben-
efi ts from direct input subsidy transfers are reduced in a number of ways: by 
targeting that is only partially effective in reaching the vulnerable and mar-
ginalized; by diffi culties and costs in redeeming coupons; by the diffi culties 
that labour- and land-scarce households have in using fertilizers; and by rents 
or ‘cuts’ taken by middlemen in secondary markets for coupons and inputs. 
Poor, labour-scarce households may also receive limited benefi ts from indi-
rect subsidy impacts on wage rates. However, poor and vulnerable households 
should receive more benefi ts from indirect impacts on staple food prices and 
from wider growth impacts which increase the resources available for infor-
mal social protection mechanisms. 
 2.5.5.  Input profi tability 
 Input subsidies are just one of four ways of improving the profi tability of 
input use, the others being (a) raising physical productivity of inputs (through 
adaptation of technologies and farmers’ learning how to manage them, and 
when—and when not—to use them); (b) reducing the costs of input pur-
chases by increasing effi ciencies (for example, in fertilizer or seed production 
and/or delivery systems); and (c) increasing output prices (with either high 
consumer prices or with subsidies funded by tax payers). As noted earlier, 
there are often considerable opportunities for both raising productivity and 
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reducing costs (Crawford et al., 2006; Morris et al., 2007; Jayne et al., 2009; 
Bumb et al., 2011). 
 As we have seen, conventional thinking on input subsidies emphasizes 
their role in improving the profi tability of input use. While  profi tability con-
straints on input use on food crops continue to be important, the nature of 
these constraints has changed, and (as will be discussed later) at the same 
time  affordability constraints have become more important. 
 We discuss these two changes in turn, noting that different analysis may be 
needed for different inputs (for example, fertilizers and seeds). 
 Regarding constraints to farmer purchases as a result of lack of knowledge of 
fertilizer benefi ts and their correct usage, it is generally no longer the case that 
most farmers are unaware of fertilizers’ benefi ts, indeed lack of access to ferti-
lizer is commonly cited by farmers as a major constraint on their agricultural 
production. Although the extent of farmers’ direct experience of fertilizer 
use varies, in most areas there are farmers with direct experience of fertilizer 
use, and observation and reports of fertilizer use are widespread. Farmers’ 
ability to use fertilizers effectively and effi ciently (through proper selection 
of fertilizer types, appropriate timing and method of application, and use 
of complementary investments in, for example, soil and water management 
and crop varieties) is more variable. Poorer farmers who do not have access to 
fertilizers for cash crop production may face particular problems. Input sub-
sidy programmes continue to have a potential role in helping farmers to learn 
from experience here, but this requires timely provision of appropriate fer-
tilizers supported by complementary investments in extension services and 
in promotion of improved soil and water management and crop varieties. 
Seed subsidies may have an important and more conventional ‘profi tability’ 
role in promoting both achievement and knowledge of higher returns from 
fertilizer use and of higher returns from their own use in conjunction with 
fertilizer. 
 The high costs of fertilizers (as a proportion of crop production costs) mean 
that the (perceived and actual) profi tability of their use is strongly infl uenced 
not only by physical responses to fertilizer use (discussed above) but also 
by relative fertilizer and crop prices. Relative global prices of crops and fer-
tilizers have fl uctuated over the last 40 years with a trend of falling relative 
cereal prices (Dorward, 2013). Relative domestic prices, however, will have 
changed in different ways in different countries. Although we cannot gener-
alize as regards declining or increasing profi tability of unsubsidized fertilizer 
use over the last 30 years, variability in food prices is a major issue in many 
countries. Risks of low food prices leading to the low profi tability of ferti-
lizer use may depress fertilizer use in less poor farmers’ production of surplus 
food for the market. Fears of high food prices may make fertilizer use more 
profi table, but use of fertilizer by poorer food defi cit farmers is more likely to 
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be constrained by  affordability arising from problems in accessing seasonal 
fi nance, to which we now turn. 
 2.5.6.  Input affordability 
 As noted earlier, access to seasonal fi nance is widely considered to be a major 
constraint on input use on staple food crops, especially among poorer farmers 
(see, for example, Newberry and Stiglitz, 1981; Feder et al., 1985;  Binswanger 
and Rosenzweig, 1986; Binswanger and McIntire, 1987; Dorward, 1996, 2006; 
Dorward et al., 2005b, 2009). We describe this in terms of diffi culties with the 
 affordability of inputs. In theory farmers can fi nance input purchases from 
farm savings, from non-farm income sources, or from borrowing. However, 
(particularly poorer) small farm households are rarely able to save enough to 
fund signifi cant intensifi cation, and few have access to suffi cient non-farm 
income sources for this purpose. Credit has therefore long been recognized as 
a priority to support input purchases and agricultural intensifi cation (see, for 
example, Feder et al., 1985) and state provision of subsidized seasonal credit 
services were a signifi cant part of the bundle of subsidized services, with input 
provision, in successful Green Revolutions (Dorward et al., 2004a; Djurfeldt 
et al., 2005). Severe (and justifi able) criticism of agricultural credit programmes 
(for example, Adams and Vogel, 1986; Yaron, 1992) as fi scally unsustainable 
(with a large subsidy component and major repayment problems), and regres-
sive (with the majority of loans going to well-connected, wealthy borrowers 
and limited benefi ts to poor households) led to their demise. The abolition of 
these programmes has not, however, led to their replacement by private sector 
and micro-fi nance services for staple food crop production. 5 
 The absence of fi nancial services allowing farmers to access credit to 
fi nance the signifi cant costs of purchasing fertilizer means that only if subsi-
dies lead to suffi ciently large reductions in fertilizer prices for poorer farmers 
will they lead to increased access to fertilizers by such farmers. If subsidies 
lead to smaller reductions in fertilizer prices which do not make them afford-
able by poorer farmers then they are likely to mainly benefi t less poor farmers 
whose use of unsubsidized fertilizer is less constrained by inability to fi nance 
their purchase. Such considerations are likely to be particularly pertinent for 
poorer women farmers, with particular shortages of working capital and dif-
fi culties in accessing credit and/or input subsidies. 
 5  Financing of inputs for staple crop production cannot use ‘interlocking’ or contract farming 
mechanisms for loan recovery, mechanisms which have been and continue to be successful mod-
els for delivery of seasonal fi nance to non-staple producers where higher value crops give limited 
numbers of produce buyers incentives to invest in smallholder production (for example, Dorward 
et al., 1998; Jayne et al., 2009). Staple crops pose further diffi culties for farmers’ consumption, 
rather than sale, of the product. 
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 Dorward (2009b) examines the issue of affordability using analysis of input 
use, comparing marginal value products and marginal factor costs in input 
use in the presence of seasonal capital constraints and fi nancial market fail-
ures. Poor households face high interest and transaction costs when borrow-
ing short-term capital, with limited capital of their own and high opportunity 
costs. These capital costs lead to much higher total marginal factor costs, and 
lower (often zero) input use as compared with households without afford-
ability constraints. Dorward (2012a) presents a wider review of these issues 
in farm household models. Both analyses show how an input subsidy which 
substantially reduces the capital requirements and costs of input purchase for 
capital-constrained households can make input purchases possible for such 
households. They also show, however, how there may be substantial inef-
fi ciencies if heavily subsidized inputs are made available to farmers whose 
unsubsidized input use is not signifi cantly limited by capital constraints. 
This suggests that input subsidies’ effi ciency and effectiveness in stimulat-
ing increased input use can be improved by smart subsidies that reduce the 
quantities of input subsidies received by less capital-constrained farmers. This 
can be achieved in two ways: by targeting and by rationing, topics that we 
consider later in this chapter and which, as we shall see in later chapters, have 
been major issues in the Malawi Farm Input Subsidy Programme. 
 An alternative and complementary perspective on the role of subsidies in 
overcoming affordability constraints on fertilizer use is provided in a study 
by Dufl o et al. (2011) in Kenya. They report that a small targeted subsidy 
for fertilizer purchases provided shortly after harvest time is as effective in 
promoting fertilizer purchases among poorer households as a larger subsidy 
later in the season. This is because this helps farmers commit available funds 
to fertilizer purchase, which, once purchased, is much less fungible. This 
phenomenon has parallels with the popularity in Malawi of a ‘fertilizer for 
work’ programme as compared with food for work (Gregory, 2006; Devereux, 
2006) and offers a potential alternative to, or graduation pathway away from, 
large-scale subsidies. Further investigation is needed, however, into the appli-
cability of these fi ndings in other contexts. 
 2.5.7.  Political economy issues 
 Large-scale input subsidy programmes are extremely costly, represent very sig-
nifi cant transfers to subsidy recipients, and offer opportunities for very sub-
stantial captures of rents by a variety of stakeholders (politicians, programme 
administrators, input suppliers, traders, and less poor farmers). Political 
economy diffi culties with large-scale input subsidies are consequently found 
in almost all countries where subsidies are implemented. Thus, in OECD 
countries agricultural subsidies (not specifi cally input subsidies) are widely 
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recognized to be ineffi cient but have continued because they serve particular 
political interests. Input subsidies (fertilizer and electricity, for example) per-
sist for similar reasons in many Asian countries after they have served their 
role of ‘kick starting’ rural growth, despite being extremely costly (Gale et al., 
2005; Gulati and Pursell, 2008; JiKun et al., 2011). 
 Political economy diffi culties can, however, be particularly problematic in 
poorer rural economies where (a) there are very substantial economic oppor-
tunity costs from the diversion of scarce fi scal resources to input subsidies 
and away from other productive investments, and (b) potential personal 
and political gains from subsidy rents are very large relative to other income, 
patronage, and rent seeking opportunities in the economy. A paradox arises 
because substantial political commitment is needed for large-scale input 
subsidies to be implemented, but the political objectives behind such com-
mitment may often focus around or be shifted towards short-term patron-
age opportunities. 6 Unfortunately, however, pursuit of these opportunities 
may undermine the economic effi ciency and wider pro-poor growth benefi ts 
of input subsidies—by directing subsidies to less poor recipients with more 
political voice, directing subsidies towards cash crops, undermining compe-
tition and effi ciency in input delivery systems, and increasing leakages and 
non-transparent secondary markets. These diffi culties are particularly preva-
lent in political systems with signifi cant neo-patrimonial elements, as is com-
mon in many poorer rural economies, particularly in Africa (Van de Walle, 
1999) and may be enhanced rather than reduced by the electoral cycles of 
democratic government (Poulton, 2012). 
 Another political economy paradox arises with regard to stable, continuing, 
and longer term subsidies if they are to lead to supply system development 
and wider dynamic changes in rural economies (as discussed earlier). While 
this carries important benefi ts, it also carries important risks, as if subsidies 
are not set up with clear time limits and if they continue for long periods then 
the risks of their being politically entrenched and ‘hijacked’ are increased. 
Similarly, the longer subsidies are in place with stable subsidy systems, the 
greater the opportunities for fraud and subsidy diversion. There are therefore 
substantial challenges in promoting stability and trust for farmers and input 
suppliers while at the same time specifying clear exit mechanisms and rules 
(to reduce risks of political capture) and varying systems (to reduce fraud). 
 A key part of addressing these political economy issues is understand-
ing the diverse legitimate and illegitimate interests and powers of different 
 6  This is not intended to suggest that there are not other less self-interested and extremely 
important reasons for political interest in agricultural input subsidies—these are a major focus of 
this book. As will be discussed, subsidies may be particularly attractive to policy makers because 
they can lead to quick increases in food production and in some circumstances it may also be more 
cost-effective to subsidize fertilizer than to pay for food imports. 
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stakeholders (for example, farmers with different livelihoods; produce buyers, 
sellers, and consumers; tax payers; local and national politicians; technicians; 
donors; input supply businesses and employees; civil society; government 
and private organizations and their managers; traditional leaders), as they 
relate to personal, local, organizational, and wider political, fi nancial, eco-
nomic, and symbolic 7 constraints and objectives and promoting transpar-
ency and accountability. 
 2.6.  Design and implementation features 
 2.6.1.  Targeting and rationing of input subsidies 
 A subsidy is likely to be more economically effi cient and effective if subsi-
dized inputs are directed or targeted at farmers who otherwise would not use 
inputs (for example, due to affordability or risk aversion constraints) but who 
will make productive use of any subsidized inputs they can obtain. Dorward 
(2009b) extends the analysis of  Figure 2.1 above to show that if poorer, cap-
ital-constrained farmers are targeted, then this increases the economic effi -
ciency of the subsidy (as compared with a universal subsidy) and leads to 
a transfer from less-poor producers and tax payers to poorer producers and 
consumers (assuming that the subsidy is increasing production of a staple 
food crop and reducing its price relative to wages). The extent to which less 
poor producers (without the subsidy) actually lose from a fall in producer 
prices depends on the price fall (which depends upon incremental produc-
tion among targeted famers and elasticity of demand) and upon alternative 
activities open to them (affecting their elasticity of supply). 
 The targeting of subsidized inputs to different groups or types of people is, 
however, a critical and sensitive issue, with signifi cant costs and diffi culties. 
In this it is helpful to distinguish between geographical targeting (between 
regions, districts, and different geographically defi ned communities) and 
intra-community targeting (between different categories of people or house-
holds within communities). Geographical differences between areas and com-
munities are often correlated with socio-economic and cultural differences 
between these areas and communities. Costs of geographical targeting will 
generally be lower than intra-community targeting, with the relative effec-
tiveness of these targeting approaches (in terms of inclusion and exclusion 
 7  ‘Symbolic’ constraints and opportunities are those that while not apparently technocratically 
rational have signifi cant symbolic importance. Examples include national food self-suffi ciency—
this may or may not be an economically effi cient way of ensuring national food security, but in 
some countries it has signifi cant symbolic political importance. Avoiding of weakness or devalua-
tion of national currency is another example of a symbolic objective in some countries. 
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errors) and the political tensions they cause depending on inter- and intra-
community differences and social, political, and cultural factors. Targeting 
also commonly leads to secondary markets for inputs where recipients sell 
subsidized inputs to non-recipients (we discuss this issue below under leak-
ages and diversion). 
 The political, economic, welfare, and equity issues associated with target-
ing mean that targeting criteria and methods are constrained by political 
concerns and practicalities (at national, regional, and community levels), by 
programme objectives (for example, production, growth, or social protection 
objectives), and by the feasibility and costs of targeting. There may be argu-
ments for comprehensive or area targeting that delivers smaller quantities of 
inputs (or of entitlements to inputs) to all households or farmers in a country 
or area (to allow greater accountability, avoid political and fi nancial costs of 
attempts at targeting, and possibly even reduce targeting errors if targeting 
mechanisms are very ineffective). 
 A fi nal comment is needed on the relative effi ciencies of input use by poor 
and less poor producers. It has been argued above that targeting poor produc-
ers can improve subsidies’ effectiveness in addressing market failures (reduc-
ing displacement, and increasing welfare and distributional benefi ts). These 
arguments, however, are undermined if poor producers make less effi cient 
use of inputs than less poor producers. There is substantial empirical evidence 
supported by continually evolving theory that smaller, poorer farms tend to 
be more effi cient users of land in the cultivation of labour intensive staple 
crops in poor rural economies, but larger farms tend to be more effi cient users 
of land in the cultivation of capital and market-intensive higher value cash 
crops (Poulton et al., 2010). There is less evidence on relative effi ciencies in 
use of inputs. Although poorer farmers are generally more effi cient users of 
capital, this may not apply if there are increasing returns to capital with the 
use of purchased inputs (this may occur if input productivity is enhanced by 
complementary investments). 
 Targeting limits total subsidy volumes and costs by limiting access to 
subsidized inputs to a limited number of benefi ciaries. Rationing also 
limits total subsidy volumes, by limiting quantities of subsidized input 
per benefi ciary. Like targeting, it can be an effective way of reducing the 
total costs of a subsidy programme while at the same time allowing a 
higher per unit subsidy. Dorward (2009b) uses marginal analysis and sup-
ply and demand analysis (extending  Figure 2.1 ) to show that rationing 
can also raise the effi ciency of input use, with or without targeting, as 
there are commonly diminishing marginal benefi ts to increased input use. 
However, as with targeting, rationing is only effective where there are no 
(or limited) secondary markets in which recipients sell subsidized inputs 
to non-recipients. 
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 2.6.2.  Entitlement and distribution systems 
 Any targeting or rationing system restricts access to subsidized inputs. This 
requires specifi cation of entitled benefi ciaries and their subsidized input enti-
tlement, with a mechanism allowing access to that entitlement. This may 
involve physical distribution of inputs against lists of entitled benefi ciaries, 
with secure identifi cation, or separate distribution of evidence of entitlement 
which is then ‘redeemed’ at authorized retail outlets. Evidence of entitlement 
is most commonly a paper voucher, but scratch cards and electronic systems 
involving bank cards, electronic ‘smart’ cards, and mobile phones may also 
be used. Since entitlements have considerable fi nancial value, these must be 
very secure to prevent counterfeit fraud and theft (with secure printing proc-
esses and print features and/or real time, secure, and centralized monitoring 
of allocated and redeemed entitlements). Different systems offer different 
potential benefi ts but pose different political, technical, administrative, and 
social challenges (biometric information, for example, raises questions about 
intra-household control over input subsidy entitlements; electronic systems 
must be able to operate in areas with no electricity, and may require reliable 
mobile phone network access and expensive and/or sensitive equipment). 
 Entitlements may be input specifi c (entitling the benefi ciary to a particular 
quantity of a particular input) or fl exible (allowing choice between a lim-
ited range of specifi ed inputs). They may also be fi xed value (with benefi ci-
aries paying a top up which varies for different locations, outlets or inputs) 
or associated with a fi xed top up (where the top up paid by the benefi ciary 
is constant but the redemption value to the retail outlet varies). There are 
important interactions between types of vouchers, secondary markets, recipi-
ent choice (of inputs and suppliers), control of fraud and of programme costs, 
and gendered access to and control of subsidized inputs within households. 
 2.6.3.  Programme exits and graduation 
 As discussed earlier, a major criticism of input subsidies has been that for a 
variety of reasons they tend to continue as expensive and ineffective pro-
grammes long after their initial economic and developmental justifi cation 
has become irrelevant. Consequently an important feature of ‘smart’ subsi-
dies has been an ‘exit strategy’ (Morris et al., 2007) or ‘exit options’ (World 
Bank, 2007b). This should involve a clear understanding of the market fail-
ures that the subsidy is intended to overcome and hence of the structural 
changes it is intended to promote—with regard, for example, to farmers’ 
knowledge of input use and its benefi ts, wider thickening of markets, soil 
fertility, input supply system development, input profi tability, and/or input 
affordability. Such understanding should lead to the design of criteria and 
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processes for ‘exits’ or, to use a more nuanced term, ‘graduation’ from the use 
of subsidies in promoting farmers’ access to inputs to reliance on other, gen-
erally market-based, systems and processes. Graduation processes and criteria 
will need to consider interactions between the objectives of a programme, the 
particular constraints it is attempting to address, available resources, and the 
needs and situations of different targeting groups. We discuss this in more 
detail in Chapter 11. 
 2.7.  Conditions affecting effectiveness 
 An effective input subsidy needs design and implementation that ensure 
(a) that input subsidies reach and are used by benefi ciaries that would not 
otherwise use these inputs, and (b) that they are used effi ciently and effec-
tively to increase crop production. The design features of targeting, ration-
ing, and entitlement and distribution systems discussed above are intended 
to promote (a) and, less directly, (b). We now consider three other issues 
affecting the reach, use, and productivity of input subsidies. 
 2.7.1.  Leakages and secondary markets 
 Leakages were discussed earlier in terms of cross-crop, cross-farmer, and cross-
border leakages. These are associated with the development of secondary 
markets where subsidy recipients sell their inputs (or input entitlements) to 
others, at prices normally discounted against unsubsidized inputs. Such mar-
kets may arise with targeted and rationed subsidies as a result of differences 
between subsidy recipients and non-recipients in access to and needs for work-
ing capital (with poorer, capital-constrained farmers selling inputs to less poor 
farmers) and/or differences in perceived marginal benefi ts to input use (with 
farmers with more land, for example, requiring larger quantities of inputs). 
 It is often argued that secondary markets should not be impeded because 
(a) farmers generally know what is best for them and (b) attempts to limit sec-
ondary markets generally lead to (poorer) sellers of inputs into these markets 
getting lower prices to the benefi t of (less-poor) buyers and middlemen who 
capture a large share of subsidy benefi ts. Such arguments lead to a common 
related question: would it be better to give poor producers cash rather than an 
input subsidy and let them choose what to do with the money? This is impor-
tant in the context of social protection and welfare policies’ increasing use 
of cash transfers to avoid the ineffi ciencies and leakages common in subsidy 
administration and secondary markets. 
 There are, however, signifi cant arguments that both the provision of cash 
transfers and widespread secondary markets fundamentally undermine 
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Agricultural input subsidies
39
input subsidy programmes’ wider benefi ts. At the heart of arguments for 
input subsidies are information and market failures and externalities, all of 
which cause individual optimizing farmers to make decisions that are sub-
optimal or ineffi cient in meeting the goals of wider society. A well designed 
and effectively implemented input subsidy programme can address four 
interacting sets of information and market failure and externality problems 
together: 
 •  Farmers’ under-valuation of the benefi ts of input use to themselves as 
individuals and to society, as a result of inadequate information on 
the effects of inputs when properly used and on effi cient ways to use 
them—an information failure. 
 •  Poorer farmers’ inability to obtain seasonal working and consumption 
capital, or ability to obtain it only at much higher cost than the social 
opportunity cost of such capital—a credit market failure. 
 •  Farmers not benefi ting directly from economies of scale when increased 
input volumes reduce input supply costs and margins—a ‘non-
pecuniary’ externality that arises from increasing returns to scale. 
 •  Farmers not benefi ting directly from lower output prices and 
consequent dynamic pro-poor growth effects of subsidies which raise 
staple food production and productivity—a ‘pecuniary externality’. 
 If cash transfers replace input subsidies, or secondary markets are encour-
aged, then welfare transfers can be delivered more effi ciently to subsidy ben-
efi ciaries (subsidy recipients and/or staple food consumers) but cash transfers 
are unlikely to be able to address as effi ciently at least three of the four infor-
mation and market failure and externality problems described above. 8 Policy 
choices between cash transfers and input subsidies with or without con-
straints on secondary market operation therefore need to take account of spe-
cifi c policy objectives; of the nature of the informational, market, externality, 
and distributional problems that need to be addressed; and of alternative 
instruments and combinations of complementary instruments that may be 
used (Filipski and Taylor, 2011). 
 This discussion of the role of subsidies in addressing information and 
market failures and externalities has important implications not only for 
thinking and policies on secondary markets but also on farmer choice 
within subsidy programmes. It is sometimes argued that voucher systems 
 8  One would expect cash transfers to address seasonal credit market failures, but Gregory (2006) 
and Dorward (2006) suggest that this may not be the case as transfers as input subsidies rather 
than cash may help with ‘enforced savings’ as money savings are too fungible. Observations by 
Dufl o et al. (2011) regarding poor Kenyan farmers’ changing willingness or ability to invest in 
fertilizer purchase suggests further behavioural reasons for in-kind rather than cash transfers. 
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can and should be used to extend farmer choice, with fi xed value vouchers 
being redeemable for different inputs which farmers may choose between. 
This empowers farmers, and allows them to use the subsidy to invest in 
inputs that they consider will make the largest contribution to their live-
lihoods. The effectiveness with which subsidies address information and 
market failures and externalities may, however, require some restrictions on 
farmer choice, to ensure that their choices align with wider social effi ciency 
objectives. 9 
 2.7.2.  Subsistence production and net defi cit producers 
 Our discussion of input subsidy impacts on output supply and stakeholder 
welfare has considered separately the subsidy impacts on output produc-
ers and consumers, linking them through market prices. This analysis is, of 
course, highly stylized. While there is evidence that many staple food markets 
in southern and eastern Africa are reasonably well integrated (Abdulai, 2007), 
they also tend to be characterized by high margins that inhibit exchange and 
incentives for surplus production (Barrett, 2008). This, together with vari-
able staple food prices and limited off-farm income opportunities, leads to 
substantial subsistence production and very large numbers of African farmers 
who are poor defi cit staple food producers and net staple food buyers (Barrett, 
2008). Such farmers are both producers who can utilize an input subsidy and 
consumers who benefi t from lower food prices. 
 Dorward (2009b) examines subsidy impacts on supply and demand within 
households and their impact on maize sales and purchases. He shows that 
the impacts of a subsidy on farmers will differ with the initial situation of the 
household as autarchic or a net buyer or seller, household composition (con-
sumers and workers), and access to land and capital. Subsidy impacts in pro-
duction and consumption by many households will not be fully refl ected by 
changes in quantities bought and sold in food markets, and this may dampen 
market effects of subsidies when measured in absolute terms. However, the 
signifi cant quantities of produce that are consumed within farm households 
without ever reaching markets also means that produce markets may be very 
thin, so that small percentage changes in production can lead to very large 
percentage changes in market supply and demand, making markets very 
unstable. This can be important for understanding the food market impacts 
 9  This discussion is also relevant to suggestions that it is ‘theoretically optimal’ to address mar-
ket failures directly, not through input subsidies, for example by providing credit services to poor 
farmers’ production of staple foods, as argued, for example, by Wiggins and Brooks (2012). Such 
arguments ignore both the arguments made here about input subsidies’ ability to address multiple 
market failures and the very great diffi culties with, and lack of examples of, successful experience 
in providing credit services to poor farmers’ production of staple foods (Dorward et al., 2008). 
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of input subsidies (and indeed of any policy or natural events that affect 
smallholder production). 
 2.7.3.  Complementary integration, investments and policies 
 Positive impacts from input subsidies are determined by the on-farm physical 
productivity of inputs; by input supply system effi ciency, transport and com-
munication systems and costs; and by output market effi ciency—as well as by 
the effectiveness and effi ciency of implementation of the subsidy programme 
itself. Programme impacts can therefore often be enhanced by complemen-
tary investments in agricultural research and extension that can raise input 
productivity; by subsidies for complementary inputs (for example, seeds  and 
fertilizers); and by investments in road, communications, and market infra-
structure and service development. Changes in power relations—for exam-
ple, in men’s and women’s responsibilities and control of resources—may 
also have critical impacts on input access and use and on direct and indirect 
impacts. Programme effectiveness and effi ciency can also be improved by 
designing and implementing subsidy and other policy instruments in ways 
that are complementary (for example, cash transfer or cash for work pro-
grammes may be linked to subsidy entitlement systems to facilitate participa-
tion by and benefi t for very poor producers; more gender aware entitlement 
and access systems may increase input uptake and effi ciency; or subsidy enti-
tlements may be linked to and incentivize investments in soil and water con-
servation). Complementary development of staple food markets is an area 
of complementary policy that is particularly important given the way that 
major subsidy benefi ts involve consumers’ accessing food at lower prices. 
 2.8.  Rethinking input subsidies: a conceptual framework 
 We now build on the integration of conventional and newer thinking in this 
chapter to identify key issues that need to be considered in designing, imple-
menting, and evaluating agricultural input subsidy programmes. 
 The ‘success’ of an input subsidy programme has to be judged against the 
objectives of that programme. As we have seen, input subsidy programmes 
can and do have a wide range of different possible objectives. Most of these 
objectives are mutually complementary but there may be incompatibilities 
between some objectives (for example, there are some trade-offs between con-
sumer and producer objectives, and between effi ciency objectives and some 
rents—even allowing for some rents being necessary for political economy 
purposes to allow a subsidy to be implemented). It is also important to note 
that stated formal programme objectives may differ from the objectives of 
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individual stakeholders. The balance of programme objectives should then 
determine the key design and implementation elements of input subsidy 
programmes—their focus and scale, the inputs to be subsidized, targeting 
and rationing systems, procurement and delivery systems, private and public 
sector roles, entitlement systems, graduation systems, and complementary 
policies and investments. 
 These elements have all been discussed explicitly or implicitly in earlier 
sections. They have suggested that input subsidies will generally (but not 
always) yield the greatest social and economic returns where they 
 •  focus on consumer benefi ts and on indirect gains to pro-poor economic 
growth from increased food staple productivity; 
 •  operate at a large enough scale (in terms of the number of benefi ciaries, 
the subsidy per benefi ciary and the total subsidized volumes) to lower 
staple produce prices and/or raise the productivity of substantial 
amounts of land and labour; 
 •  have rationing and targeting criteria and methods with entitlement and 
distribution systems which direct subsidized inputs to producers whose 
productive input use is constrained by market failures which can be 
overcome or substantially reduced through the subsidy; and 
 •  include graduation processes and criteria which encourage the 
achievement of structural changes which then allow the scaling down 
and phasing out of subsidies. 
 Rationing and targeting will normally be best achieved by various forms of 
voucher systems which enable cost-effective and timely input distribution, 
which support sustainable unsubsidized (commercial) input supply system 
development, and which limit secondary market development and leakages. 
Effective implementation of these various elements will normally require 
coordinated complementary investments and policies supporting infrastruc-
tural development, agricultural research and development, and effi cient out-
put markets offering lower and more stable staple prices to consumers. 
 However, as should also be clear from these sections, these elements are also 
highly inter-related, with many synergies and trade-offs. These interactions 
are most easily identifi ed around the themes of scale and scope: large-scale 
subsidy programmes offer wider supply-side benefi ts (in input supply system 
development, in consumer and dynamic pro-poor growth impacts) but make 
effective, timely, and effi cient programme management more diffi cult and 
can crowd out complementary investments needed for higher productivity 
of input use. Different entitlement, targeting, and rationing systems are effec-
tively attempts to control the scale of subsidy programmes by directing lim-
ited resources to their most productive uses—but these are themselves often 
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diffi cult and costly to implement. Indeed there is something of a paradox 
here, that it is in the application of targeted subsidies to input use on staple 
foods in poor rural areas that such subsidies both offer the greatest potential 
benefi ts and pose the greatest implementation, resourcing and coordination 
challenges (Dorward et al., 2009). 
 Figure 2.2 provides a conceptual framework that draws on the analysis 
and issues addressed in this chapter to identify the key variables and rela-
tionships affecting input subsidy programme impacts. It details how imple-
mentation (and its various elements) impact directly on rural households, 
input supply systems, and the macro-economy. Impacts on rural households 
can be separated into direct impacts on subsidy recipients or benefi ciaries 
and indirect impacts on other households through the effects on the rural 
economy of changes in benefi ciary behaviour and market activities. Direct 
and indirect rural economy effects, input supply system effects, and macro-
economic effects all interact with and affect each other, and are also affected 
by and may affect other policies and processes. The fi gure may most eas-
ily be interpreted as an examination of short-term (say annual) effects, but 
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 Figure 2.2.  A conceptual framework for investigating agricultural input subsidies’ 
impacts (adapted from School of Oriental and African Studies et al., 2008) 
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 Table 2.2.  Critical aspects of input subsidy programmes 
 A  Design & implementation 
 A.1  Basic subsidy system (objectives, focus on consumer or producer benefi ts, direct recipients) 
 A.2  Product focus—staple foods, cash crops, etc. 
 A.3  Input specifi cation 
 A.4  Scale—benefi ciary coverage 
 A.5  Subsidy per benefi ciary 
 A.6  Total volumes subsidized 
 A.7  Procurement systems 
 A.8  Voucher or other entitlement systems, distribution & input access systems & timing 
 A.9  Rationing—objectives, methods 
 A.10  Targeting—objectives, criteria & methods 
 A.11  Input supply systems (involvement of parastatal & /or private importers & wholesale & 
retail suppliers) & timing 
 A.12  Secondary market & leakage policies (& enforcement mechanisms) 
 A.13  Complementary integration & investments & policies 
 A.14  Timing of all activities 
 A.15  Private & public sector incentives, resources, roles & responsibilities 
 A.16  Resource allocation & mobilization (fi nance, personnel, transport, etc.) 
 A.17  Auditing systems 
 A.18  Consistency, adaptation across areas, years 
 A.19  Graduation objectives, criteria, processes, etc. 
 B  Outputs 
 B.1  Subsidized input deliveries & receipts– quantities, locations, timing, target groups 
 B.2  Subsidy imports & disbursement by private sector suppliers, by type & location 
 C  Outcomes 
 C.1  Incremental input use 
 C.2  Input leakage, displacement, diversion 
 C.3  Incremental production 
 C.4  Increased productivity 
 D  Impacts (short & long term) 
 D.1  Output price changes (producer & consumer prices) 
 D.2  Input price changes 
 D.3  Labour market changes (hired labour demand, wages) 
 D.4  National/household food self suffi ciency/security 
 D.5  Input supply system 
 D.6  Other market changes 
 D.7  Rents (supplier, producer, administrative, political) 
 D.8  Programme benefi t–cost analysis (fi scal, economic) 
 D.9  Opportunity costs of programme 
 D.10  Macro-economic effects 
 D.11  Welfare & growth impacts 
 D.12  Wider (pro-poor) economic growth 
 D.13  Consumer benefi ts—lower output prices, access (emphasis on poorer consumers?) 
 D.14  Producer welfare (emphasis on poorer producers?) 
 D.15  Input supply system development & effi ciency 
 D.16  Soil fertility replenishment 
 D.17  Sustained input adoption 
 D.18  Sustained input use effi ciency 
 D.19  Soil fertility management 
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 This framework, along with the previous discussion, helps to identify criti-
cal aspects of subsidy programmes. These are summarized in  Table 2.2 . The 
distinctions between design and implementation, outputs, outcomes, and 
short- and long-term impacts should not be taken as at all precise. Design and 
implementation must of course take into account short- and long-term objec-
tives and the intended logical framework linking implementation to desired 
outputs, outcomes, and impacts. Similarly, separations between outputs and 
outcomes, between outcomes and impacts, and between short- and long-
term impacts are by no means clear. Nevertheless, this provides a helpful 
guide to the gradation between on the one hand long-term impact objectives 
which are infl uenced but not controlled by programme design and imple-
mentation, and on the other hand short-term output and (to a lesser extent) 
outcome objectives which are directly controlled by and the responsibility 
of programme designers and implementers—as a direct result of their design 
and implementation decisions and actions. 
 Figure 2.2 and  Table 2.2 together set out the key issues that are examined 
in the remainder of this book, as we consider the recent record of agricultural 
input subsidies in other countries in Africa (in Chapter 3) and in Malawi in 
Chapters 4 to 12. They also underpin the analytical framework set out in 
Part II for examining the Malawi subsidy programme’s implementation and 
impacts. 
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 3 
 Recent African experience with 
input subsidies 
 3.1.  Introduction 
 Having considered key features of input subsidy programmes and a con-
ceptual framework of their impacts in the previous chapter, we now turn to 
examine experience with the implementation of recent, large-scale initiatives 
in poorer agrarian economies. This leads to an emphasis on programmes in 
Africa. As noted in Chapter 2, there has been resurgent interest in input sub-
sidies, in particular ‘smart subsidies’ for fertilizers in Africa. Unfortunately 
there are few detailed and rigorous evaluations of most of these programmes. 
In this chapter we review African programmes for which there is new infor-
mation since an earlier review by Dorward (2009b)—but we explicitly exclude 
any discussion of the Malawi experience from 2005/6. In subsequent chapters 
we will, however, where appropriate compare Malawi’s post-2005 experience 
with observations from this review. This review does not cover all large-scale 
subsidy programmes in sub-Saharan Africa since 2005, only those for which 
some information is available. Thus, there is no review on achievements 
under Kenya’s National Accelerated Agricultural Input Programme (NAAIP), 
planned for implementation from 2008 (Dorward, 2009b). Similarly, there is 
very little information available on programmes in Mali and Senegal (Kelly 
et al., 2011) and these are therefore considered together. A number of authors 
comment on the lack of systematic and good quality information on subsidy 
programmes in Africa (Dorward, 2009b; Morris et al., 2009; Kelly et al., 2011; 
Druilhe and Barreiro-Hurlé, 2012). 
 We summarize here observations from an examination of nine fertilizer 
subsidy programmes in Africa selected on the basis of (a) availability of infor-
mation and (b) relevance to our review of large-scale subsidy programmes 
aimed at boosting input use in staple crop production. We fi rst briefl y describe 
the main elements of each programme’s history before considering what they 
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can teach us regarding general patterns of subsidy programme objectives, 
design, implementation, and impacts. 
 3.2.  Ghana 1 
 In early 2008 Ghana faced high food prices and rising fertilizer prices and 
the government and large fertilizer importers (who had signifi cant but high 
priced fertilizer stocks) discussed the potential and possible modalities for a 
national fertilizer subsidy programme. Press reports (Ghana News Agency, 9 
June 2008, 3 July 2008) indicate that the programme was formally announced 
in June 2008 and operated from July to December. A total of 30,000 tons of 
four types of fertilizer was made available by three major importers, with 
pan-territorial farmer prices representing an approximate 50% subsidy, 
keeping farmer prices similar to the previous years’, in the context of rising 
international prices, at a total cost of around US$15 million. 2 Large numbers 
of vouchers (over 1 million) were printed against planned subsidy sales of 
600,000 bags. Deliveries were late for the cropping season in the south of 
the country (April to July), but were more timely for the north, and this may 
account for lower uptake and fertilizer sales in the south and use on a wider 
range of minor crops as compared with the north where there was more sub-
stantial uptake and use mainly on maize. 
 Vouchers were distributed by Ministry of Agriculture staff for redemption 
by distributors linked to the major fertilizer importers. There was wide varia-
tion in voucher distribution approaches, systems, and numbers across differ-
ent areas, and limited information to fi eld level staff on the total number of 
vouchers that they would receive for distribution. Redemption prices varied 
geographically to provide pan-territorial farmer prices in district capitals, but 
this tended to discourage suppliers from supplying fertilizers outside district 
capitals as neither redemption nor farmer prices covered costs of transport 
outside district capitals. No subsidy sales were made by (smaller) distributors 
independent of the major fertilizer importers (indeed in the north unsub-
sidized sales were reported to be banned completely) and the programme 
may have reduced competition and depressed sales and revenues for smaller 
retailers closest to farmers in rural areas. It may also have strengthened the 
position of importers participating in the programme (who gained from 
increased sales of previously imported stocks) at the expense of others. It was 
 1  Information on the Ghana 2008 fertilizer subsidy programme is obtained from Banful (2009, 
2011); Krausova and Banful (2010); Yawson et al. (2010). 
 2  Total budgeted subsidy cost was $25 million but only about $15 million was directly for the 
subsidy inputs and voucher costs (personal communication, Afua Branoah Banful). 
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also widely believed that sales without vouchers were illegal. Banful (2011) 
reports that both political and economic effi ciency considerations appear to 
have infl uenced distribution of vouchers between districts. Receipt of vouch-
ers by farmers is reported to be associated with access to distribution points, 
reliance on agricultural income, hiring of labour, wealth, and years farming 
(Vondolia et al., 2012). There is less specifi c and detailed information about 
subsequent programmes, which appear to have operated in a similar way. 
However, the scale of the programme had doubled by 2011—when 150,000 
tons were subsidized at a cost of US$70 million and a 50% subsidy rate—
and there are continuing concerns over late implementation (Ghana News 
Agency, 2012; Alassan, 2012). 
 3.3.  Zambia Fertilizer Support Programme and Food 
Security Pack 
 We consider two input subsidy programmes in Zambia, the Food Security 
Pack and the Fertilizer Support Programme, both confusingly known as FSP. 
 The Food Security Pack as reviewed by Ellis (2007) has a number of differ-
ences in design from other programmes reviewed in this chapter, but displays 
many similarities in its actual operation. 3 It was developed and has consist-
ently been considered more as a social transfer programme than an input 
subsidy programme, aimed at ‘vulnerable but viable’ farming households, 
but attempting to address a cause of vulnerability: lack of access to productive 
inputs. Its main objectives have been to provide basic inputs to vulnerable 
households with some land and labour, but also to promote crop diversifi ca-
tion and conservation farming. Its primarily social welfare objectives led to 
its implementation by a national NGO coordinating a network of district 
NGOs under the direction of the Ministry of Community Development and 
Social Services, with technical support from the Ministry of Agriculture and a 
domestically funded budget line from the Ministry of Finance and National 
Planning. 
 The fi rst year of operation of the Food Security Pack was 2000/1, and it was 
intended to reach 200,000 households per year for three years. It has in fact 
operated for a much longer period on a much smaller scale as regards the 
number of benefi ciaries served, but has been thinly spread across all 72 dis-
tricts in Zambia. Budgetary provision, benefi ciaries reached, and input packs 
have varied widely across the years (Ellis, 2007; Kodamaya, 2011), as has the 
composition of input packs. These were supposed to contain inputs for 0.25 
 3  Information on the Food Security Pack is from Ellis (2007) unless another source is specifi cally 
cited. 
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ha of cereal (maize) production, for 0.25 ha of cassava or sweet potato produc-
tion, and for 0.25 ha of legume production. Packs are provided free, but after 
the fi rst couple of years the programme farmers are expected to repay 50% of 
the value in kind after harvest with the proceeds partly stored food security 
and partly sold to fi nance public works (Jorgensen and Loudjeva, 2005). 
 There have been particular diffi culties with the sourcing of inputs for 
root crops and legumes, and in 2005/6 for example, only maize inputs were 
provided. Funding has often been inadequate, unpredictable, and late, and 
thus reached a smaller than budgeted number of benefi ciaries with common 
late delivery of inputs. The small numbers of benefi ciaries in each district 
have often been concentrated in small geographical areas for logistical rea-
sons. Within these areas, targeting by local committees has been affected 
by local elite capture and also by widespread splitting and sharing of packs. 
Benefi ciary selection was supposed to use primary targeting criteria focused 
on land-operating but land-poor households with unemployed labour, 
together with secondary criteria focused on favouring particular vulnerable 
groups (for example, households of the elderly, disabled, orphaned or unem-
ployed youth members). However, Jayne et al. (2006) report that in 2002/3 
benefi ciaries under the Food Security Pack had average per capita incomes of 
less than half of those of benefi ciaries of the Fertilizer Support Programme 
discussed below. There is, however, very little information available on the 
programme’s impacts. 
 Turning now to consider the much larger Fertilizer Support Programme, 
this was initiated in 2002 as the successor to a long history of fertilizer sub-
sidies and alongside the smaller and socially targeted Food Security Pack dis-
cussed above. Since that time the programme has grown and evolved: from 
2002/3 to 2009/10 benefi ciaries rose from 120,000 to 500,000 farmers, subsi-
dized inputs rose from 48,000 to 180,000 tons of fertilizer and from 2000 tons 
to nearly 9000 tons of maize seed, and the subsidy rose from 50% to 75% of 
input costs (Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, 2011). However, the 
same basic approach has been maintained, with fertilizer imports by private 
companies under government tender with distribution to farmers through 
cooperative societies. Our review draws on a number of studies which have 
examined different aspects of the programme over time. 
 Minde et  al. (2008) report that the objectives of the programme have 
changed over time with it being intended at fi rst to assist smallholders access-
ing inputs in remote areas which it was thought were not served by private 
traders. However, private sector market and service expansion, in these areas 
particularly, has also been stressed, with reduced government involvement 
in input supply. Thus, the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (2011) 
lists the 2011/12 programme overall objectives as ‘to increase private sector 
participation in the supply of agricultural inputs to small-scale farmers and 
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contribute to increased household food security and income’ with specifi c 
objectives to expand private sector input markets and involvement, reduce 
government involvement, ensure timely and effective supply to targeted farm-
ers, improve these farmers’ access to inputs, promote competitiveness and 
transparency in input supply and distribution, reduce risks in farmers’ inputs 
use, and promote rural institutional development. However, the Zambia 
Agricultural Consultative Forum (2009) proposed that the overall objective 
of the programme should be ‘to increase small scale farmers’ productivity 
in order to contribute to improved household and national household food 
security’ (p.  14) with (as above) specifi c objectives to improve small-scale 
farmers’ access to inputs with increased participation of the private sector, 
an expanded agro-dealer network, and timely, effective, and adequate input 
supply. 
 These multiple objectives lead to a number of different criteria by which 
the programme is judged. As regards private expansion, there are persistent 
criticisms that the programme has discouraged (or at best had mixed effects 
on) private trader participation due to the restricted number of companies 
supplying fertilizers, and unpredictable location, timing, and composition 
of subsidy supplies leading to uncertainty over commercial demand (for 
example, Jorgensen and Loudjeva, 2005; World Bank, 2010b). This is associ-
ated with concerns that there has been signifi cant leakage of supplies from 
the subsidy supply chain into the commercial supply chain (Muleba, 2008; 
Minde et al., 2008; World Bank, 2010b; Mason, 2011) and displacement of 
unsubsidized sales by subsidized sales to larger farms in less remote areas 
where the bulk of supplies have gone (Minde et al., 2008; Xu et al., 2009a; 
Mason, 2011; Jayne et al., 2011). 
 Displacement and targeting, and widespread reports of late input delivery, 
also affect the programme’s effectiveness in raising maize production and 
in improving the food security and livelihoods of poorer farmers, and again 
this is the subject of concern in a number of studies (Civil Society for Poverty 
Reduction, 2005; Jorgensen and Loudjeva, 2005; Minde et al., 2008; Zambia 
Agricultural Consultative Forum, 2009; World Bank, 2010b; Mason and 
Ricker-Gilbert, 2012). While these issues reduce the effectiveness of the pro-
gramme in raising maize production, the programme’s impact on increased 
maize production is recognized, though these increases may be smaller than 
the effects of good rainfall and smaller than offi cial estimates of the pro-
gramme’s benefi ts (Minde et  al., 2008; World Bank, 2010b; Mason et  al., 
2011). There are, however, also concerns that yield responses are limited by 
soil acidity and other complementary investments are needed for fertilizer 
subsidies to be effective (Burke et al., 2012). 
 There are also concerns that the programme’s emphasis on maize has dis-
couraged production of other crops such as sorghum and cassava (Haantuba 
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et al., 2011). Coupled with these are wider concerns about poor monitor-
ing and evaluation, expansion of the programme as regards both volume of 
subsidized inputs and the subsidy rate despite initial intentions to scale both 
back, annual budget over-runs and consequent growing programme cost—
averaging nearly 40% of the Ministry of Agriculture’s budget from 2002 to 
2009 (Civil Society for Poverty Reduction, 2005; Jorgensen and Loudjeva, 
2005; Zambia Agricultural Consultative Forum, 2009; World Bank, 2010b). 
Nevertheless, the programme is estimated to yield an economic cost—benefi t 
ratio that is greater than 1 (Jayne et al., 2007) but a large number of studies 
comment that it is crowding out alternative and higher return investments in 
longer term research or infrastructural programmes (Jorgensen and Loudjeva, 
2005; Jayne et  al., 2007; Minde et  al., 2008; Bigsten and Tengstam, 2008; 
Govereh et al., 2009; Xu et al., 2009a). 
 3.4.  Nigeria 
 Nigeria has implemented large-scale fertilizer subsidies since the 1970s 
with the broad objective of promoting agricultural productivity and, lat-
terly at least, improving food security by making fertilizers more affordable 
and accessible to smallholder farmers. Subsidies have been marked by wide 
variation in rates and modalities over time, accompanied by substantial dif-
ferences between states (Akande et al., 2011). There is, however, general con-
sistency in a very active role of the state in fertilizer delivery and widespread 
reports of high diversion of fertilizer, such that smallholder farmers receive 
only 30% of subsidized fertilizers at subsidized prices (Nagy and Edun (2002) 
cited by Liverpool-Tasie et al. (2010b), Banful and Olayide (2010)), with gen-
erally late delivery of subsidized fertilizers and frequent reports of concerns 
about quality (Nagy and Edun (2002) cited by Liverpool-Tasie et al. (2010b), 
Kiger and Adodo (2010), Banful and Olayide (2010)). There is, however, very 
little information on the impacts of subsidies in terms of increased fertilizer 
use, production, food security, or poverty reduction (Mogues et al., 2008). 
Banful and Olayide (2010) and Banful et al. (2010) report that farmers and 
stakeholders consider unavailability of fertilizers, late delivery, and poor 
quality to be much greater constraints to fertilizer use by farmers than its 
expense (although access to credit is also cited as a major constraint (Banful 
and Olayide, 2010)). Liverpool-Tasie et al. (2010b) therefore recommend that 
much more emphasis should be given to stable policies that encourage the 
development of private sector suppliers. One approach to this is the use of 
fertilizer vouchers to deliver subsidies. Small pilots of this approach were 
championed by IFDC from 2004 (Gregory, 2006) and judged to be successful 
in demonstrating that a voucher-based system could improve farmer access 
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to fertilizers if implemented with the private sector. Progressively larger pilots 
were implemented, with large programmes in two states in 2009 and 2010 
reaching 194,000 and 171,000 farmers respectively with sales of 29,800 and 
16,397MT (Kiger and Adodo, 2010). Kiger and Adodo (2010) report that the 
programme has been very successful in improving farmers’ access to sub-
sidized fertilizers, in reducing leakages, and in demonstrating and building 
private capacity in fertilizer supply, while recognizing continuing but sur-
mountable challenges facing the programme. There is, however, no informa-
tion on programme impacts in terms of increased fertilizer use, production, or 
food security, and a survey by Liverpool-Tasie et al. (2010a) fi nd that farmers 
still reported late delivery and poor fertilizer quality. Their study also raises 
questions about benefi ciary targeting—criteria seem to be very broad, with 
voucher distribution to members of farming or other groups, and there was 
some evidence of multiple receipt within households, but recipients tended 
to be poorer than non-recipients (Liverpool-Tasie, 2012). In this context, and 
with over 70% of farmers outside the subsidy programme buying fertilizer in 
the private market, Liverpool-Tasie (2012) do not fi nd evidence that subsidy 
receipt depresses the probability of farmers buying unsubsidized fertilizer, 
and indeed fi nd that for subsidy recipients who are buying unsubsidized fer-
tilizers there is a signifi cant crowding in effect, with receipt of a bag of sub-
sidized fertilizer increasing unsubsidized purchases by 0.8 of a bag. This is 
attributed to the subsidy programme encouraging the establishment of a bet-
ter private distribution network. Overall, there seems to be little doubt that 
the programme is a substantial improvement over the standard programmes 
being administered by the Federal and State governments. 
 3.5.  Tanzania 
 Like many countries in Africa, Tanzania has implemented a variety of input 
subsidy programmes over the years. Following the withdrawal of subsidies 
in the 1990s, fertilizer transport subsidies were introduced in 2003 with the 
objective of facilitating fertilizer use in remote areas (Minot, 2009). The pro-
gramme subsidized transport costs and fi xed margins and prices for farm-
ers, with government management of stocks and transport. Although this 
appeared to lead to some increases in fertilizer use, there were problems with 
the heavy involvement of government in managing distribution, late fer-
tilizer delivery due to budgetary processes, ineffective price controls, and 
leakage from target benefi ciaries (to local unsubsidized markets and also to 
neighbouring countries), with the latter problems associated with lack of skill 
and fi nancial capacity among agro-dealers (Minot, 2009; World Bank, 2009). 
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 In view of these problems, the government started piloting a ‘smart sub-
sidy’ programme from 2007. This grew into the National Agricultural Input 
Voucher Scheme (NAIVS), with increasing pilots in 2008 and the develop-
ment of a very large programme with World Bank support implemented from 
2009 to 2012 (World Bank, 2009). 
 The objectives of the NAIVS are to facilitate fertilizer use in high-potential 
areas, to offset rising international fertilizer costs, to reduce food prices by 
stimulating production, and to stimulate expansion and increased capacity 
in the private input supply system. The main features of the programme, 
summarized by Minot (2009), include the use of vouchers for food crop 
inputs (fertilizer and maize and rice seed) and distribution to targeted ben-
efi ciaries with complementary support to help them improve the effi ciency 
of input use and to expand input suppliers’ fi nancial and skills capacity. The 
programme is also intended to fi rst of all scale-up and then scale-down, with 
a maximum of three years access by each benefi ciary and termination in 2012 
(although extension of the programme to other regions is under considera-
tion). Vouchers, covering 50% of full input prices, are redeemed by farmers at 
agro-dealers who then redeem them through the large branch network of the 
National Microfi nance Bank. Vouchers and inputs are targeted to high-poten-
tial regions according to the number of maize and rice farmers per region and 
then targeted to full-time resident maize or rice farmers with less than one 
ha and the ability to part fi nance input purchases. Among eligible farmers, 
priority should be given to female-headed households and those not using 
improved inputs in the previous fi ve years. 
 It has not been possible to source evaluation studies of the programme since 
2010, but the World Bank (2009) identifi es benefi ts and challenges from the 
pilot programmes. Major benefi ts of the targeted subsidy mechanisms over 
the previous transport subsidy include easier monitoring of input distribution 
and impacts, wider coverage and improved input affordability for farmers, 
and mutually benefi cial links and strengthened relations with and between 
the National Microfi nance Bank and agro-dealers. There are, however, also 
challenges identifi ed from the NAIVS 2008/9 pilot where there was a need for 
more human and fi nancial fi eld resources for implementation and technical 
support (for the Government and National Microfi nance Bank), there were 
insuffi cient inputs for all eligible farmers and late delivery of inputs to farm-
ers, there were late bank payments to agro-dealers and late government pay-
ments to the bank, and agro-dealers lacked suffi cient working capital. Minot 
(2009) commends the programme design for its targeting approach and use 
of vouchers, intention to scale-down after 2012, and complementary support 
to the fertilizer subsidy (in terms of a public awareness campaign, capacity 
building and certifi cation for agro-dealers, seed sector support, an emphasis 
on integrated soil fertility management, and investment in monitoring and 
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evaluation). However he also questions whether it will be politically  feasible 
to scale the programme down after 2012, and if the targeting will be effective. 
 Pan and Christiaensen (2012) and Patel (2011) report household survey 
fi ndings in 2008 and 2009 that provide some insights into the targeting 
and timing of input delivery. In a sample survey in the Kilimanjaro dis-
trict, Pan and Christiaensen (2012) report some diffi culties with targeting 
in 2008. The major observation is that there are confl icts between potential 
targeting objectives, with an emphasis on economic effi ciency in increas-
ing production requiring targeting outcomes that favour those house-
holds with the highest marginal return to fertilizer use on fertilizer that 
they would not have used without subsidy receipt. These may not be the 
same households as those that should be targeted to reduce poverty and 
inequity. However, examination of actual targeting outcomes shows that 
elected village offi cials received about 60% of the distributed vouchers, and 
this ‘substantially reduces the targeting performance . . . At the margin, vil-
lage elected offi cials are usually not the more effi cient input users’ (Pan and 
Christiaensen, 2012: p. 1627). 
 Patel (2011) fi nds that cost was the most commonly cited reason for 
farmers not using improved inputs (cited by 69% of households not using 
seeds, and by 36% of households not using fertilizers), but lack of aware-
ness was also a signifi cant impediment. Lack of fertilizer availability was 
cited as problem by only 6% of farmers. They also fi nd that the targeting 
criteria were not consistently followed but do not suggest that vouchers are 
going to the wrong farmers—contrary to Pan and Christiaensen (2012) they 
fi nd no evidence of elite capture. While benefi ciaries tended to be wealth-
ier than non-benefi ciaries, they note that the programme is not intended 
to be a pro-poor programme and targets ‘middle-level farmers’ most able to 
make good use of the inputs. They recognize, however, that this may lead to 
problems of displacement of unsubsidized sales. Poorer and female-headed 
households, which the programme also aims to prioritize, are often unable 
to fi nance the purchase cost even of the subsidized inputs. They fi nd that in 
terms of programme implementation, NAIVS operations generally adhered 
to the guidelines, although anecdotal reports for subsequent seasons are less 
optimistic. However survey estimates of benefi ciary coverage were much 
lower than indicated by MAFC’s programme data, which estimate coverage 
above 80% in some districts. They make initial estimates of incremental 
production gains from input use of 147% for maize and 35% for paddy, 
but are not clear that this is high enough for unsubsidized input applica-
tion to be profi table, raising questions about the economic returns to the 
programme. 
 As regards programme implementation, the Ministry of Agriculture Food 
Security and Cooperatives (2012) provides information on programme 
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activities from 2008/9 to 2011/12: 3.5 million households are identifi ed as 
eligible for voucher receipt, with actual recipients rising from 730,000 house-
holds in 2008/9 to 1.5, 2.0, and 1.8 million households respectively in the 
following three years. However the 2011/12 recipients excludes households 
who started receiving vouchers in 2008/9 and therefore ‘graduated’ after three 
years in the programme. This should give a total of some 2.5 million direct 
benefi ciary households over the three years, each receiving three vouchers 
per year (two for fertilizer and one for maize or rice seed). 
 Activities designed to support private input supply development and more 
effective input use by farmers have included agro-dealer training, matching 
grants to guarantee agro-dealer loans from input supply companies, devel-
opment of seed systems, and research and (to a lesser extent) extension on 
Integrated Soil Fertility Management and input use. Although some of these 
activities have been delayed for various reasons, signifi cant progress has been 
made on others. Just under 4,000 agro-dealers have been trained and 23 agro-
dealer associations formed; 2,335 agro dealers participated in the 2010/11 pro-
gramme and 2,010 in 2011/12. The drop out of some agro-dealers in 2011/12 
was due to discouragement from late payments in 2010/11, late delivery of the 
2011/12 vouchers, phasing out of the matching grant for input supplier loans, 
and exclusion of a small number of agro-dealers following poor performance in 
2010/11. Approximately 1,800 agro-dealers who received training did not par-
ticipate in the programme in 2011/12. Some planned agro-dealer training and 
support activities were not implemented due to procurement process problems. 
 A full evaluation of the impacts of the programme on benefi ciary and non-
benefi ciary households, on input access and use, and on the input supply 
system should be very informative. 
 3.6.  Rwanda 
 In 2008 Rwanda responded to rapid rises in food and fertilizer prices by 
introducing a novel fertilizer subsidy system that involved (a) a general sub-
sidy to fertilizers imported by the government and sold under auction to 
private companies obliged to sell these fertilizers at ceiling retail prices and 
(b) vouchers allowing farmers to buy a proportion of these at 50% of ceiling 
prices (Morris et al., 2009). Limited information available in 2009 suggested 
that both parts of the subsidy (through the ceiling price and vouchers) were 
broadly successful in raising productivity and in encouraging growth among 
private sector input suppliers (Morris et al., 2009). 
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 3.7.  Mali and Senegal 
 Kelly et  al. (2011) and Druilhe and Barreiro-Hurlé (2012) summarize key 
features of programmes in Mali and Senegal, noting that in both cases 
information is limited due to a lack of formal monitoring and evaluation 
processes. The programmes started in 2008 and were largely funded from 
domestic resources (though in Mali donors funded just under 40% of total 
costs in 2008/9 and 2009/10, but a number of donors then withdrew sub-
sequent funding due to lack of transparency and reported ‘leakages’). Both 
programmes aimed to boost production and yields of staple food crops (for 
example, rice, maize, and wheat in Mali) and (in Mali) of cotton, to lower 
urban rice prices and to compensate farmers for high input prices. In both 
countries the primary objective was to promote food security, while in Mali 
there was an additional objective to promote exports. Programmes provided 
a 25 to 50% universal subsidy on fertilizers and seeds to all farmers cultivating 
target crops. Subsidies were provided for imports by private companies under 
tender and, in Mali, were administered using effectively a voucher system (a 
‘ caution technique ’) through producer organizations and through agro-dealers 
associated with importers. In both countries fertilizer deliveries suffered from 
delays and importers suffered from late payments—although they benefi ted 
from growth in import volumes with, it appears, limited losses from displace-
ment of unsubsidized sales. The lack of any apparent impact on rice prices, 
which remained high, calls into question both production statistics and pro-
gramme benefi ts (Kelly et al., 2011). 
 3.8.  Millennium Villages 
 The Millennium Villages Project (MVP) established integrated projects in selected 
villages to demonstrate the substantial changes that are possible with signifi cant 
investments in health, agriculture, and community development across Africa. 
A major part of this is the provision of subsidized agricultural inputs (seed and 
fertilizer). Monitoring and evaluation systems are in place. This approach has 
invested in relatively small-scale, localized input subsidy programmes with 
much wider but generally unrealized objectives of national scaling-up. 
 3.9.  Overall lessons 
 We now consider wider lessons across the eight reviewed programmes against 
the major issues identifi ed in Chapter 2 as important for subsidy programme 
evaluation. 
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Recent African experience with input subsidies
57
 3.9.1.  Programme objectives 
 Here, we consider how far the different possible programme objectives dis-
cussed in Chapter  2 are found in the different programmes and types of 
programme. 
 •  Food security (household or national), input adoption, and producer 
welfare are found as objectives of all or almost all programmes (with 
variation as regards particular emphasis on poorer or food-insecure 
producers). 
 •  Only three programmes explicitly recognize the potential for 
producer subsidies to benefi t poor consumers, except subsistence 
producers. Although this is small, given the importance of consumer 
benefi ts in consideration of large-scale staple crop subsidies, it is an 
improvement over fi ndings in Dorward (2009b) where none of the 
reviewed programmes appeared to consider consumer benefi ts at all. 
Nevertheless, there is no recognition of the potential role of subsidies 
in addressing the price-productivity tight rope, and only in the MVP 
is there a wider recognition of the potential role of subsidies in driving 
forward pro-poor growth: even here there is no explicit consideration 
of the mechanisms by which this may be achieved or of processes of 
structural change in the economy as a whole. 4 
 •  Input use effi ciency and soil fertility replenishment are only 
explicitly considered as programme objectives in the Tanzania 
programmes. 
 •  Input access and input supply system development are explicit 
objectives in all programmes except Mali and Senegal (and limited 
sources may mean that this has been overlooked), the Zambia Food 
Security Pack and the MVP. 
 •  Political considerations were important for the Ghana programme 
and the Zambia Fertilizer Support Programme, but are not explicitly 
mentioned in the documentation on other programmes (though they 
are likely to have been important). In Nigeria the FVP’s implementation 
is driven by an interest in depoliticizing some aspects of the existing 
wider Federal and state subsidy programmes, which are highly 
politicized. 
 4  Other programmes may also implicitly consider that increased productivity and producer 
welfare may drive forward growth, but consideration of the food price, non-staple and non-farm 
production, and demand mechanisms is absent. 
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 3.9.2.  Design and implementation 
 As regards design and implementation features of the different programmes, 
there is broad commonality across the different programmes as regards 
 •  the basic focus of subsidy systems on producers as major (and generally 
sole) direct subsidy benefi ciaries; 
 •  a primary focus on subsidizing inputs for staple food production (for 
subsistence production or for sale into domestic markets); 
 •  very substantial subsidized input price reductions (of 50% or more 
for most programmes), consistent with measures to address both 
affordability and profi tability constraints to input use; 
 •  almost all programmes clearly rationing (or attempting to ration) the 
quantity of subsidized inputs to be received per household, with vouchers 
being a common (but not universal) means of achieving this; and 
 •  use of private sector importers to provide basic fertilizer supplies. 
 There are differences across the programmes as regards 
 •  scale, with some national programmes and others piloting potential 
national programmes; 
 •  targeting, with differences as geographical targeting (in some 
programmes) and some programmes focusing on food-insecure/
vulnerable households and others seeking to maximize production by 
focusing on less poor households; 
 •  use of vouchers for targeting, rationing, and/or supply system 
development; 
 •  private sector and farmer organization involvement (and nature of 
involvement) in distribution; 
 •  recognition of the importance of gender awareness in targeting and 
entitlement and access; 
 •  complementary policies, and their links to programme objectives; and 
 •  graduation and exits (with the Tanzanian programme explicitly 
limiting farmer access to three years and with scaling-back aspirations 
for both the Zambian programmes, but little or no mention of exits or 
graduation in other programmes). 
 3.9.3.  Programme outcomes 
 Different programme outcomes—or information gaps about particular out-
comes—are closely related to the programme objectives. Thus, limited examples 
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of subsidies leading to output (food staple) price changes and the lack of infor-
mation on labour demands and markets and longer term and wider welfare 
and growth impacts are not surprising. Similarly, the lack of information on 
soil fertility replenishment is consistent with the lack of emphasis on this in 
programme objectives. There are, however, other similarities in outcomes that 
cut across differences in programme objectives, notably very common (but 
not universal) problems with late input delivery in subsidy programmes and 
common (but again not universal) leakages. Both of these are important for 
programme impacts, irrespective of programme objectives. There is a lack of 
reliable information on displacement and on production and productivity 
impacts, although increases in input use are reported for most programmes. 
 Lack of reliable information on a number of topics is associated with a pau-
city of programmes with monitoring and evaluation systems. Consequently, 
there are few estimates of economic benefi ts although, as will be discussed in 
Chapter 9, such estimates are diffi cult to calculate and, once calculated, often 
diffi cult to compare. 
 There are, of course, also substantial differences across programmes, some 
of these related to differences in programme objectives, as noted above. Thus, 
differences in reporting of input supply system impacts are related to dif-
ferences in interest in these impacts. However programmes with the inten-
tion of developing supply systems may actually undermine them, if poorly 
designed and implemented. 
 3.10.  Conclusions from recent experience 
 A number of observations from the limited programmes reviewed here war-
rant particular emphasis: 
 First, we reiterate a point made by Druilhe and Barreiro-Hurlé (2012) that 
the resurgence of agricultural input subsidy programmes in Africa is not a 
temporary phenomenon—they are attempting to address a real set of agri-
cultural and development problems and their visibility and immediacy make 
them politically attractive. In this context, debates about their effectiveness 
and about ways to improve that effectiveness are healthy and should be wel-
comed. It is, however, important that such debates are based on thorough 
agronomic, economic, political, and administrative analysis of historic, cur-
rent, and potential costs and achievements of subsidy programmes. 
 In this context our second observation, again supported by Druilhe and 
Barreiro-Hurlé (2012) is disappointing: it is notable how diffi cult it is to fi nd 
comprehensive reviews of subsidy programmes, despite the substantial num-
ber of programmes that have been or are being implemented across Africa 
and the very substantial investments of public funds in these programmes. 
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There is a major need for country studies to document country experiences, 
using a comprehensive conceptual framework linking inputs, activities, out-
comes, and wider impacts, as developed in the previous chapter. 
 Third, we note a continuing tendency for programmes to focus on produc-
tion objectives and producer welfare, and to ignore the interests of consum-
ers and the processes (and necessary conditions) for subsidy programmes to 
contribute to wider pro-poor economic growth. This is a critical omission, 
and is linked to the limited extent that the design and implementation of 
many programmes are integrated with complementary investments. Such 
integration is needed fi rst for subsidy programmes to effectively deliver their 
stated objectives of incremental production, and then for them to contribute 
to the wider processes of pro-poor growth. Recognition of the importance of 
consumer price benefi ts and of the ‘price productivity tightrope’ is particu-
larly important here. Druilhe and Barreiro-Hurlé (2012) also note the ten-
dency to focus on producers, production objectives, and expansion of input 
access, and argue that there is insuffi cient attention paid to improved soil 
fertility and health, to development of private sector input supply, to com-
plementary investments raising input productivity, to effective programme 
implementation (with more secure entitlement systems, better targeting, 
better monitoring and evaluation), and to phasing out and exits for input 
subsidies. However Druilhe and Barreiro-Hurlé (2012) themselves make lit-
tle mention of programme benefi ts for consumers and for wider economic 
growth, and provide no discussion of farm level (as opposed to input supply) 
processes whereby subsidy delivery may lead to reduced need for and benefi ts 
from subsidies. 
 Fourth, and related to the previous two points, there appears in some pro-
grammes to be an unfortunate lack of interest in improving effectiveness and 
effi ciency. This is evident from the limited monitoring, evaluation, and audit 
systems in some programmes, limited cost benefi t and fi scal effi ciency anal-
ysis, and limited attention to problems of late delivery, displacement, and 
leakage. Challenges from fi scal constraints, likely rising fertilizer prices, and 
the effects of climate change will make it even more important that in the 
future governments improve the effi ciency and effectiveness of input sub-
sidy programmes in both raising productivity and promoting wider pro-poor 
growth within and beyond agriculture. 
 Limited apparent interest in exits and graduation is also common. In the 
examples where this is not the case (Tanzania and Zambia) there appear to 
be diffi culties in implementing this. This may be related to an apparent and 
indeed remarkable lack of attention to the question of why and how scaling 
back, graduation, and exit should and could occur. In the Tanzanian case, 
for example, farmers are to access subsidies for a maximum of three years. It 
is not clear how or why farmers will no long need access to the subsidy in a 
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fourth year, but this raises important questions about the processes of change 
needed for this (in farmers’ livelihoods and resources, in local economies, in 
input supply systems). Similar questions arise regarding the development of 
private sector input suppliers. 
 Two notable commonalities observed across programmes are (a) the lack 
or limited focus on replenishing soil fertility and (b) a strong (almost univer-
sal) prevalence of heavy subsidies (50% to 100% subsidy rates) on rationed 
inputs. This commonality occurs despite differences between programmes 
as regards fi rst relative emphasis on improving national food security (and 
total input use and production) as against improving household food secu-
rity (and helping food-insecure households) and second relative emphasis on 
supply system development. Political objectives and strong political infl u-
ences on programmes are explicitly mentioned in only some of the pro-
grammes reviewed, but the scale of resources allocated to these programmes 
and their continued implementation suggests very strong political interest in 
and commitment to these programmes—even if the implications of this for 
programme design and implementation are not generally given very much 
emphasis. 
 When compared with the earlier review by Dorward (2009b), this review 
suggests that there is increased implementation of important aspects of smart 
subsidies, but there are still weaknesses in design and implementation, par-
ticularly late input delivery. There is also a continuing lack of emphasis on 
improving programme effectiveness and effi ciency, limited attention to grad-
uation processes, and inadequate attention to integration with complemen-
tary policies and programmes for improving achievements of both direct and 
indirect benefi ts of input subsidy programmes. The mixed record of input 
subsidies continues. 
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
62
 4 
 Malawi: political, policy, livelihoods, 
and market background 
 4.1.  Introduction 
 This chapter sets out the background for examination of the Malawi subsidy 
experience in the rest of the book. We begin with some contextual informa-
tion about Malawi, including a brief outline of its post-colonial history, struc-
tural characteristics, and economic and welfare indicators. This leads on to a 
more detailed discussion of the interactions between Malawian politics and 
policy. We then examine critical features of rural livelihoods and the poten-
tial impacts of input subsidies in this context. 
 4.2.  The context 
 At its independence in 1964 Malawi was a small land-locked country with 
a population a little under 4 million largely engaged in and dependent on 
smallholder agriculture, with poorly developed infrastructure and little 
industry or mineral resources. The infrastructure and industry that was there 
tended to be concentrated, along with the bulk of the population, in the 
south and, to a lesser extent, in the centre of the country, while the north 
had a very low population density and very little infrastructure or indus-
try. Cultural and historical differences between regions, however, meant that 
commitment to and standards of education in the north were higher than in 
the centre and the south. 
 Many long term generic features of the country have not changed much 
over the last 40 years or so since independence, despite major (if somewhat 
erratic) investments and policies to address them (see, for example, Cammack 
et al. (2010)). These features include high dependence on agriculture; low pro-
ductivity in production of maize (the dominant staple crop which accounts 
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for around 70% of cultivated area); lack of other exploitable natural resources; 
isolation and high import and export costs due to its land- locked location 
and poor external transport systems; poor physical infrastructure; chronic 
poor health, with very high infant mortality from malaria, water-borne dis-
eases, and mal- and under-nutrition; low levels of literacy and education; 1 
and broad regional differences in many of these variables. Other elements 
have emerged more recently as a result of development failures or wider eco-
nomic, social, and natural processes. These include high population densities 
and small landholdings (particularly in the south), falling soil fertility, and 
high rates of HIV/AIDS infection, morbidity, and mortality. A further set of 
problems emerged from the mid 1990s due to policy and governance failures, 
and these include the collapse of the industrial economy due to exposure to 
outside competition; poor macro-economic management with large budget 
defi cits, high interest rates, large devaluations of the Malawi Kwacha (MK), 
and high infl ation rates; high crime rates in urban and rural areas; and weak 
governance. 2 
 As a result, in 2004/5, Malawi was one of the poorest countries in the world, 
with 56% of Malawi’s rural population classifi ed as poor and 24% as ultra-
poor (National Statistical Offi ce, 2005a), a GNI per capita of around US$160, 
very low achievements on a range of social and economic indicators (see 
 Table 4.1 ), and many people characterized by high levels of vulnerability, due 
to the fragility of their livelihoods, susceptibility to shocks, and large numbers 
of the non-poor living just above a very low poverty line (Devereux, 2006). 
 Understanding this depressing backdrop to the emergence of the agri-
cultural input subsidy programme in 2005, the starting point of the pro-
gramme addressed in this book, requires an understanding of agricultural 
and other policies in the context of wider political change in Malawi, to 
which we now turn. 
 4.3.  Politics and policies 
 The relationship between politics and policies is best considered in relation to 
the periods of tenure of the three presidents of Malawi since independence: 
Kamuzu Banda (from 1964 to 1994), Bakili Muluzi (from 1994 to 2004), and 
 1  From the mid 1990s there were major improvements in primary school enrolment and its 
gender balance (but not in the quality of primary education) and substantial falls in infant and 
under-fi ve mortality (though these are still very high). 
 2  From 2005 to 2009 there was a dramatic improvement in macro-economic management and 
consequent reduction of infl ation and interest rates and much greater currency stability. Good 
weather and input subsidies also contributed to growth in food production, as will be discussed 
later. Macro-economic management declined, however, from 2009 to 2011. 
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 Table 4.1.  Social and economic indicators for Malawi, 1975 to 2005 
 1975  1985  1995  2000  2005 
 Population  Population, 
total 
(millions) 










 364  368  468  465  .. 








 ..  46  43  40  41 
 Mortality rate, 
under-5 
(per 1,000) 
 304  245  193  155  125 




 ..  ..  ..  ..  14.1 
 Nutrition  Stunting 
(% chil-
dren 6 to 
59 months) 
 49  43 




 ..  ..  ..  139  122 





 130  160  160  150  160 
 GDP growth 
(annual %) 
 6.1  4.6  16.7  1.6  2.8 




 ..  21.9  83.3  29.6  15.4 
 Real interest 
rate (%) 




 37  43  30  40  35 
 Industry, value 
added 
(% of GDP) 
 20  11  20  18  19 
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Bingu wa Mutharika (from 2004 until his death in 2012). These three periods 
can be examined in terms of neo-patrimonialism where politics is centred 
around the president who uses the power and resources of the state to dis-
pense patronage to sustain political power (Booth et al., 2006) and, following 
Cammack et al. (2010), in terms of three features of government: centraliza-
tion of rent utilization and time horizons (as with stationary and roving ban-
dits (Olson, 1993)), relations of political leaders with a more or less capable 
technocracy, and political inclusiveness and competition. It is also helpful to 
explore these using a simple distinction between three different patronage 
client groups: the political elite, the middle classes, and the wider masses. 
Regional dimensions are also important in garnering the on-going support of 
regional elites and, in the run up to elections, of regional masses. Poulton’s 
analysis of the relations between political and technical considerations and 
processes in determining agricultural policy in different contexts also pro-
vides valuable insights (Poulton, 2012). 
 The fi rst president of Malawi, Hastings Banda, held the reins of power for 
30 years from independence in 1964 until he was ousted in democratic elec-
tions in 1994. He presided over a highly personalized and repressive regime, 
taking a strong personal interest in policy and engaging closely with a capa-
ble civil service. Two phases of policy under Banda may be considered (Booth 
 1975  1985  1995  2000  2005 
 Services, etc., 
value added 
(% of GDP) 
 42  35  50  43  46 




 46  30  48  35  52 




 9  8  14  10  18 








 0.93  0.97  1.50  2.46  .. 





 Sources: From National Statistical Offi ce and ORC Macro (2001); National Statistical Offi ce (2005a); Imperial College 
et al. (2007); World Bank (2007a). 
Table 4.1. (continued)
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et al., 2006; Cammack et al., 2010), the fi rst delivering quite rapid economic 
growth but achieving this through a set of ultimately economically and polit-
ically unsustainable policies. These focused on developing highly import-
dependent estate agriculture producing tobacco, while the smallholder sector 
grew much more slowly (the estate sector grew from a very small base at an 
average of 17% per annum from 1964 to 1977, while the much larger small-
holder sector grew at less than 3% per annum (Harrigan, 2003), below the 
population growth rate). Smallholders were restricted to cultivation of food 
crops and low value cash crops, while providing a low cost labour reserve 
for estate agriculture. Banda used the promotion of tobacco (Malawi’s ‘green 
gold’) in the estate sector as an important means of dispensing political 
patronage to elites and a small but emerging middle class based primarily 
in the central and, with time, in the northern regions. Middle class support 
was also garnered by investments in secondary and higher education and by 
growth in civil service employment, while mass support rested upon large-
scale visible investments in a variety of infrastructural and development pro-
jects in all regions of the country, including fertilizer and credit subsidies 
channelled to better off (or less poor) smallholders, and a commitment to 
deliver national food security. Estate and smallholder agriculture were highly 
regulated, with a high degree of state intervention through generally effec-
tive parastatals and government ministries. Booth et al. (2006) characterize 
Banda’s approach in this period as ‘patronage following policy’. There was 
little explicit attention to welfare policies in this policy phase as government 
and the Malawi Congress Party played down the existence of chronic poverty. 
 The fragility of the growth developed under these policies became appar-
ent when the economy was hit by a number of external shocks in the early 
1980s. The government was then forced to recognize the need for different 
policies and to seek fi nancial assistance, with policy conditions, from the IMF 
and World Bank. Malawi consequently entered its second post-independence 
policy phase, of liberalization, coinciding with Banda’s increasing fragility 
and a decline in his personal policy engagement. Policies then looked to 
increase smallholder export crop production by increasing farmgate prices 
while holding down maize (food) prices (Harrigan, 2003). This encouraged 
the substitution of smallholder maize production by cash crops which, with 
removal of fertilizer subsidies and unsuccessful market reforms, resulted in 
a food crisis in 1987, with rapid increases in maize prices. Banda’s sense of 
responsibility in delivering food self-suffi ciency to the country (and his vul-
nerability to growing calls for political change and the failure of an important 
part of his mass patronage) led to policy reversals and the re-introduction of 
fertilizer subsidies and government intervention in maize markets. Despite a 
positive maize production response to these policy changes, maize shortages 
continued with two severe droughts in the 1992–4 period. At the same time 
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access to patronage from tobacco was extended to a much larger part of the 
middle classes, primarily in the central and northern regions, through the 
promotion of large numbers of small-scale tobacco estates. 
 Following the transition to multi-party democracy and presidential elec-
tions in 1994, Malawi’s second president, Bakili Muluzi, served two terms of 
offi ce, from 1994 to 2004. A major change in agricultural policy in the mid 
1990s was the repeal of the Special Crops Act, which had restricted small-
holder cultivation of some crops, most notably burley tobacco. The liberali-
zation of burley tobacco production was very successful, with rapid growth 
in the number of smallholders growing the crop, and without (initially at 
least) expected declines in quality (Harrigan, 2003). However the 10 years 
from 1994 were characterized by severe macro-economic mismanagement, 
rampant infl ation, dramatic falls in the value of the Malawi Kwacha, and 
a weakening of government capacity. Opportunistic privatization, fund-
ing diversions, and the issue of bonds to fi nance budget defi cits became an 
important source of patronage for a primarily southern region elite with com-
mercial rather than agricultural interests, so that short-term fi nancial inter-
ests of politicians drove policy with ‘policies following patronage’ (Booth 
et al., 2006). As the real value of civil service salaries collapsed, middle class 
patronage involved what Booth et al. (2006) describe as the ‘democratization’ 
of corruption. With the government’s political power base in the south of the 
country (in contrast to Banda’s base in the less populous centre), and with 
stagnation of the economy, growing land pressure in the south, declining soil 
fertility, and experience of wider use of fertilizer in the early 1990s, the poli-
tics and mass patronage of maize self-suffi ciency became associated with the 
politics of fertilizer subsidies. In 1998 the Muluzi government introduced the 
universal free provision of small packs of maize seed and fertilizer under the 
starter pack programme. This was subsequently down-scaled to the Targeted 
Input Programme (TIP), and considered by donors more as a social protec-
tion programme promoting food security for vulnerable households, and less 
as an agricultural subsidy programme. However we note here the populist 
political roots of this programme and the ambiguity as to its role in promot-
ing agricultural development, social protection, and/or short-term political 
patronage objectives. 
 ‘Fertilizer politics’ has subsequently become a major feature of Malawi. In 
the 2004 presidential election, in which President Bingu wa Mutharika was 
elected as the United Democratic Front (UDF) candidate chosen by Bakili 
Muluzi, both the UDF and Malawi Congress Party (MCP) (parties of the two 
former presidents) campaigned with promises of different forms of fertilizer 
subsidy. Fertilizer subsidies continued to be a major political issue in subse-
quent political manoeuvring associated with the President’s breaking away 
from former president Bakili Muluzi to form his own party, the Democratic 
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People’s Party (DPP). Without a base in parliament, where he was vulnerable 
to calls for impeachment by the UDF and MCP, Mutharika introduced the 
highly popular Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme (AISP) to garner sup-
port from the masses, over the heads of parliament. The government also 
appealed to middle class professional and business people through its major 
emphasis and success in improving macro-economic management. This led 
some observers to suggest that Mutharika’s term would in some ways ‘be closer 
to the Banda tradition than to Muluzi’s, with patronage being subordinated 
to an overall vision’ (Booth et al., 2006). As time went on, however, it became 
apparent that Mutharika also shared Banda’s autocratic tendencies, and there 
were increasing concerns about corruption and patronage within his gov-
ernment. These concerns did not prevent him from winning a broad-based 
landslide second term election in 2009—indeed the subsidy programme not 
only allowed him to garner widespread support from rural benefi ciaries, diver-
sion of resources also provided him and his party with potential opportunities 
to capture and use substantial resources for political patronage (Chinsinga, 
2012b).The subsequent substantial parliamentary majority, however, released 
him from his former precarious reliance on support from the middle classes 
and gave free rein to both his autocratic tendencies and to increasing corrup-
tion and patronage (Chinsinga, 2012b). This led to serious political and eco-
nomic problems from late 2010 until his sudden death in April 2012. 
 Understanding agricultural policy changes in Malawi also requires an 
understanding of changing donor interventions (Harrigan, 2003; Chinsinga, 
2006, 2007). These were very supportive of agricultural policies in the fi rst 
phase of Banda’s dualistic policies as described above, making very large 
investments in integrated rural development projects. Concerns about the 
problems of Malawi’s dualistic and interventionist policies, as regards both 
economic vulnerabilities and constraints on smallholder development, then 
came to the fore at the same time as a wider shift in ideology to structural 
adjustment and the Washington Consensus. This was a major driver of the 
liberalization policies in Malawi as it took on structural adjustment loans in 
the early 1980s. Harrigan (2003) then describes a series of ‘U turns’ by the 
World Bank in agreeing to the re-introduction of fertilizer subsidies and then 
later insisting on their removal and opposing their re-introduction under 
the start pack programme. From 2000 onwards donors placed increasing 
emphasis on the development of policies for social protection, and these 
have since evolved as regards their relationship with agricultural policies 
(Dorward et al., 2006) with consequences for attitudes to agricultural poli-
cies. Chinsinga (2006) describes more recent differences between donors and 
changes in individual donor positions. These positions have been driven 
by domestic donor politics, economic ideology, humanitarian concerns, 
changes in international development thinking and practice, and personal 
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concerns of often short-term in-country staff. Changing donor policies have 
been important because (a) they have suffered frequent changes and incon-
sistencies, and (b) they have been unduly infl uential as a result both of the 
high dependence of the Malawian economy on foreign aid and of weak-
nesses (particularly under Muluzi) in government capacity and commitment 
to articulate consistent policies (which Sahley et al. (2005) explains in terms 
of political processes resulting from both Malawian understandings of state 
responsibilities in agriculture and social protection, and clashes with donor 
understandings of these responsibilities). 
 A number of important insights emerge from this discussion. We note that 
the use by different presidents of different approaches to delivering patron-
age to client groups with different regional interests has been a core determi-
nant of the prominence and resources given to agricultural policies and the 
nature of these polices. A major challenge which all three presidents faced 
in this was the need to deliver short-term patronage without compromising 
the longer term capacity of the economy to support such patronage. Thus, 
‘patronage policies’ were critical in the promotion of agricultural policies 
and investment under Banda, while failures by the policies in dealing with 
core poverty/vulnerability and food security problems led to their demise. 
Conversely, the failure of ‘commerce-based’ patronage polices under Muluzi 
led to a resurgent interest in fertilizer subsidies, which Mutharika used as a 
major means of garnering widespread political support in his fi rst term. The 
challenges faced by Mutharika in his second term are more diffi cult to ration-
alize: as will be shown later, excessive and increasing subsidy costs up to 2009 
were effectively reined in after the election, and agriculture received much 
less political attention—although the core elements of the subsidy were 
maintained. This ebb and fl ow of political interest in agriculture has revolved 
around the different regional and patronage group interests in food, fertilizer, 
and tobacco and has at times coincided with, and at times confl icted with, a 
different pattern of changing interests among donors. 
 It is also important to note, however, that an entirely appropriate and 
legitimate political preoccupation with food security arises not because of 
populism and patronage, but because food security is an important preoccu-
pation for poor people, whether urban or rural, who spend a large proportion 
of their income on staple foods and who are very vulnerable to price changes. 
The emphasis on fertilizer subsidies as a response to food insecurity, however, 
is determined by recognition that 
 (a)  high price volatility in relation to domestic supply shocks is a result 
of lack of integration of national and international maize markets 
(due to poor international transport links, and also foreign exchange 
constraints); 
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 (b)  the majority of poor food-insecure people and of the electorate, par-
ticularly in the south, are rural defi cit producers facing particular con-
straints in accessing fertilizers; 
 (c)  less-poor rural people also face diffi culties in accessing fertilizer but have 
an interest in fertilizer access for the production of food and non-food 
cash crops; 
 (d)  most urban people have strong links with rural people and rural inter-
ests; and 
 (e)  widespread understandings among the Malawian population that fer-
tilizers are critical to food security, that this is dependent on food self-
suffi ciency, and that the government has an active responsibility in 
ensuring food self-suffi ciency and hence in enabling widespread ferti-
lizer access. 
 Key to the importance of fertilizers in the food security narrative, therefore, 
is an understanding of severe market failures affecting rural livelihoods, an 
understanding which has been shared by Malawian politicians and techno-
crats—but less often by donors (Sahley et al. (2005) note a related divergence 
between donors and Malawians regarding the role of the state in maize and 
fertilizer provision). This difference in understanding of market failures has 
been an important reason for government/donor disagreements regarding 
instruments for pursuing the poverty reduction and agricultural develop-
ment agendas of donors and the mass patronage and agriculture develop-
ment agendas of domestic politics, even where their interests in these agendas 
appear to converge. We therefore now turn to consider briefl y key features of 
markets and livelihoods in rural Malawi. 
 4.4.  The livelihoods and markets context 
 We focus on two important features of rural livelihoods and markets in 
Malawi that are relevant to our analysis of agriculture policy. 
 First, agriculture policy is politically and economically important because 
of the major importance of small-scale, low productivity, and risky agricul-
ture in the livelihoods of poor rural people. While agriculture is by no means 
the only source of income of poor rural people, it is critically important to 
their livelihoods. There are surprisingly few empirical estimates of the pro-
portion of rural Malawians’ income coming from own farm activities. The 
National Statistical Offi ce (2005a) estimates agricultural activities as compris-
ing 50% of rural household incomes and 55% of the lowest income quartile 
for rural and urban households, and these estimates are consistent with the 
commonly cited fi gure of 50% of income being farm income in different parts 
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of Africa (Ellis, 1998; Reardon, 1998; Jayne et al., 2001). Dorward (2006) esti-
mated fi gures of 33% own farm income in 1998 (closer to fi gures of 20 to 45% 
in different southern Africa case studies cited by Bryceson (1999)), although 
later analysis suggests own farm incomes of 50% or more in two different rural 
areas, but around 40% among poorer households (Dorward, 2007). However 
such fi gures underestimate the wider importance of agriculture in rural liveli-
hoods. Food expenditures are estimated to account for just over 61% of total 
expenditures in the lowest income quintile in the rural population in 2004 
(National Statistical Offi ce, 2005a). A large part of the 50% or more non-own 
farm income of poor people is also derived from employment on other peo-
ple’s farms and from providing services to other rural people whose incomes 
and demand for services are also heavily dependent on agriculture (Dorward, 
2006). This very large importance of agriculture coupled with the low and 
risky nature of smallholder agriculture in Malawi means that agriculture is a 
major source of vulnerability in rural livelihoods. 
 The second major feature of rural markets and livelihoods in Malawi rel-
evant to our analysis is the very low level of market development and eco-
nomic activity. Dorward and Kydd (2004) argue that a defi ning characteristic 
of rural areas in Malawi is that low and fragile incomes and low demand lead 
to limited market activity based on very small transactions. The dependence 
on a relatively narrow range of risky and low productivity activities, which 
leads to increased covariant risk and vulnerability in the economy within 
which rural livelihoods are located, is exacerbated by poor infrastructure, ser-
vices, and communications, with poor roads and transport services and poor 
telecommunications, leading to high costs in physical movement of goods 
and services in and out of rural areas, together with high costs of communica-
tion about market opportunities and prices. 
 The result of the low general level of economic activity, of the risks from 
lack of diversifi cation, and of poor communications, is thin markets, with 
very low traded volumes of key commodities, manufactures, and services 
(notably agricultural produce, agricultural inputs, and agricultural fi nance). 
Thin markets are both a cause of and are caused by high costs and risks in 
trading small volumes in small transactions, requiring high risk premiums 
and margins to make it profi table to engage in markets. However these high 
margins themselves depress demand, and the result is a low level equilibrium 
trap and market failure (Kydd and Dorward, 2004). These problems are par-
ticularly acute in the input, output, and fi nancial markets needed for intensi-
fi cation and increased maize productivity, and can be analysed in terms of a 
‘low maize productivity trap’, set out in  Figure 4.1 . 
 At the heart of  Figure 4.1 is low maize agricultural productivity, the direct 
consequence of low yields resulting from continual cultivation of maize 
on land without organic or inorganic fertilizers. Low yields then require 
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Background
72
increased areas under maize production to meet as much of household staple 
demands as possible (for reasons explained below). Low productivity leads 
to low incomes. For each farm-household this makes it diffi cult to afford 
input purchases for raising agricultural productivity. Most farmers cannot 
buy inputs on credit either because of under-developed credit markets and 
high costs of credit administration, high borrower and lender risks, consump-
tion rather than sale of produce (with lack of cash for repayment), and high 
input prices and access costs due to low input demand, poor infrastructure, 
and high transport costs. 
 At the same time low maize production, low maize sales, and a high degree 
of subsistence consumption lead to thin markets in maize (as a large propor-
tion of the maize produced in Malawi is consumed within households and 
villages, never reaching the market) and this leads to high variability in maize 
prices between years (as a result of good and bad rains or access to inputs) 
and within years (as a result of seasonality in maize stocks, input and labour 
requirements, incomes, and wage rates). This contributes to risks in input use, 
undermining incentives for investment in higher productivity by farmers 
with the potential to produce surpluses. However variability in maize prices 
also means that defi cit producers seek to produce as much maize as they can 
to reduce their exposure to high purchase prices for maize in years when prices 
















Low maize & agric
productivity
Consumer ‘lock in’ to
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incomes
Low demand for non-
agric goods &
services
 Figure 4.1.  Vicious circle of the low productivity maize production trap 
 Source : Dorward and Chirwa (2011c). 
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Malawi: political, policy, livelihoods, and market
73
and vulnerability to shocks (low yields, high food prices, sickness, loss of 
employment or remittance income) further constrain productivity and pro-
ductive investments—with women, who play a key role in agricultural pro-
duction and rural livelihoods, particularly vulnerable to these shocks. 
 Low demand for inputs itself raises costs and inhibits the development of 
input supply systems in less accessible areas. Investments in maize market 
development are also constrained by low traded volumes and price risks in 
thin markets. High price variability for this critical commodity leads to govern-
ment intervention in maize markets (with, for example, setting of minimum 
and maximum prices, export bans, and bans on private trade) but diffi culties 
in designing and implementing interventions mean they often increase price 
variability for maize sellers, buyers, and traders; inhibit investment and partici-
pation in markets; and exacerbate the problems they attempt to address (see, 
for example, Tschirley and Jayne (2010)). These problems have then been exac-
erbated by unstable policies and unstable weather conditions (with particularly 
low maize production from 1992 to 1994, 2001/2, and 2004/5), lack of invest-
ment in roads, and a general policy, infrastructure, and economic context that 
has not encouraged long-term private sector investment and development. 
 The various infl uences and feedbacks described above lead to a vicious cir-
cle of low maize productivity and unstable maize prices inhibiting (a) net 
producers’ investment in maize production, 3 (b) net consumers’ reliance on 
the market for maize purchases, and (c) poor farmers’ exits from low produc-
tivity maize cultivation. The result is a lock-in to widespread cultivation of 
low productivity maize which, because of its scale and importance in the 
wider Malawian economy, depresses labour and agricultural productivity and 
growth in the non-farm economy and of the Malawian economy as a whole. 4 
 This analysis, which builds on wider understandings of coordination prob-
lems and low level traps (Rodenstein-Rodan, 1943; Hoff, 2001; Dorward et al., 
2009) has important implications for understanding livelihood constraints and 
vulnerability, and in the design and implementation of agricultural policies and 
 3  Profi tability of and incentives for fertilizer use are commonly measured by the Value Cost 
Ratio (VCR) with a a general rule of thumb that it needs to be greater than 2 for smallholder invest-
ments in fertilizer use (Morris et al., 2007). School of Oriental and African Studies et al. (2008) 
note that with highly variable inter- and intra-seasonal maize prices and with rising nominal fer-
tilizer prices, the VCR for maize varied markedly from the mid 1990s, with particular divergences 
between VCRs with peak pre-harvest and low post-harvest maize prices. In the latter case it was 
generally below 2, while in the former case it was generally but not always above 2. This suggests 
that profi tability of fertilizer use on maize was a constraint to its use on maize grown for sale at or 
near harvest but not for maize is grown for own consumption. The divergence surplus and defi cit 
maize producers’ VCRs are exacerbated if maize price risk considerations are allowed for, as these 
would lead to a lower (higher) subjective valuation of maize produced for sale (purchase). 
 4  This summary is not a complete account of the many issues involved. Other causes for high 
dependency on maize include different crops’ calorifi c yields, dietary preferences, processing and 
storage considerations, farmers’ familiarity with the crop, and government policies. Poor macro-
economic management also constrained wider growth before 2005. 
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instruments. It identifi es low levels of investment and rural market develop-
ment on the one hand and poverty and vulnerability on the other as interacting 
cause constraints to development and livelihood security. This then suggests 
that without the existence of established and functioning thick markets, mar-
kets cannot be relied on to deliver agricultural and food delivery services—but 
that such markets cannot develop, or can only develop slowly and fi tfully, in 
the context of high levels of poverty. Two major questions emerge from this: 
 1.  How can agricultural service markets (principally for inputs and credit) 
and food markets be developed in the medium to long term in order 
to address the problems of low productivity, poverty, and vulnerability 
that are endemic in Malawi? 
 2.  How can agricultural services and food access be provided in the short 
term in the context of endemic poverty and low productivity and in 
ways that crowd in rather than crowd out market development? 
 These questions interact strongly with the political context discussed earlier 
and in particular with the different interests and ideologies of technocrats, 
politicians, and donors: in the fi rst phase of policy under Banda there was a 
consensus recognizing that these questions, and development and patron-
age interests in agricultural policy, complemented each other. Subsequent 
agricultural liberalization policies have involved a lack of agreement regard-
ing these questions (generally between the predominant Malawian analysis 
on the one hand and donor analysis on the other, but also between donors), 
leading to policy confl ict and reversals as different views have prevailed. We 
examine these issues in the next section of this chapter. However, we con-
sider a third question that emerges from the analysis above of livelihood and 
market constraints: 
 3.  In what ways might a large-scale agricultural input subsidy impact on 
markets and livelihoods and the ‘low productivity maize production 
trap’? 
 This question can be answered in two ways. First, with reference to  Figure 4.1 , 
a subsidy that substantially reduces input costs can make such inputs afford-
able, leading to producer investment in these inputs. If their use then leads to 
increased maize productivity, this can raise real incomes and then, through 
raising real incomes and their stimulus to demand for non-agricultural goods 
and services, this can break the vicious circle of the low productivity maize 
production trap. This will be strengthened where the subsidy is accompanied 
by stable policies, investment in roads, support to private sector growth, and 
policies that encourage more stable maize prices following weather shocks. 
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 We can also investigate the possible impacts of a large-scale agricultural 
input subsidy by exploring possible effects on different households’ liveli-
hoods within the rural economy. This is set out in  Figure 4.2 . 
 Figure 4.2 identifi es three possible uses of the subsidy by the recipients: 
reselling of coupons or of subsidized inputs, incremental use of the inputs 
in production, or use of the inputs with displacement of otherwise unsubsi-
dized purchases. These different uses lead to two main types of direct benefi t 
for recipients: immediate income transfers from reselling or displacement of 
some or all of the input coupons or subsidized inputs, or incremental produc-
tion at harvest if the inputs are used on farm. 
 Immediate transfer benefi ts should lead to a tightening of the labour mar-
ket in the season of implementation, due to contraction in labour supply 
by poorer households (who need to hire out less ganyu—casual labour—to 
earn food, as a result of income from reselling some or all of their coupons 
or subsidized inputs) and a much smaller expansion of hired labour demand 
by less-poor households (who have more resources available to hire labour 
as a result of cash saved by subsidy displacement of unsubsidized seed and 
fertilizer purchases). This tightening of the labour market should lead to an 
increase in real wages. 
 Increased wages lead to immediate real income and hence welfare and con-
sumption gains to poorer households, both recipients and non-recipients. 
Increased on-farm labour use by the poor (as a result of reduced need to hire 



































 Figure 4.2.  Subsidy impacts on benefi ciary households and the rural economy 
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higher wages should lead to incremental production and welfare gains at 
and after harvest, even without any incremental input use (though these 
gains will be offset to some extent in the wider economy by losses of low cost 
labour to the less poor). Less-poor people who hire in labour may also incur 
a loss in net real income if they have to pay higher wages when hiring labour 
in and for purchasing local goods and services whose prices are determined 
largely by unskilled wage costs. 
 Impacts of a subsidy are, however, also expected in the season following its 
implementation, as a result of households having increased stocks of grain 
produced with the subsidy. Depending on the amount of extra production 
that is carried forward in these stocks, there should be two effects: decreased 
need for pre-harvest purchases of grain by households with insuffi cient stored 
grain and, as a result of this, decreased hiring out of ganyu to earn cash and 
food by poorer households and (slightly) increased fi nancing to hire in farm 
labour by less-poor households (Dorward (2012b) provides a graphical house-
hold model analysis of this). The effects of the loosening of the grain market 
should be a fall in maize prices and a rise in wages. 
 This analysis draws out the importance of understanding different direct 
effects of subsidy access on different households and the different indirect 
effects of these as they affect labour and maize markets.  Figure 4.2 shows the 
rather complex set of direct and indirect subsidy impacts and their relation-
ships over time as described above. Further subsidy impacts shown in the fi g-
ure are that increased real incomes should lead to greater farm and non-farm 
investment (in human and social capital as well as in fi nancial, natural, and 
physical capital for particular enterprises), and that growing real incomes in 
rural areas should, through economic linkages or multipliers (Delgado et al., 
1998; Dorward et al., 2002; Haggblade et al., 1989, 2007a), lead to a virtuous 
circle of increased demand for locally produced goods and services, includ-
ing higher value non-staple foods. Increased consumption of vegetables and 
livestock products should lead to nutrition and health benefi ts and further 
tighten local labour demand. There will be similar human capital and welfare 
benefi ts and tightening of labour markets from investments in, for exam-
ple, improved housing and sanitation, from investment in education and/
or other consumption items. Many of these benefi ts should accrue to both 
subsidy recipients and non-recipients as a result of changes in maize prices 
and wages. 
 Impacts on demand for and investment in input services will depend heav-
ily on the way that subsidies are implemented. Understanding of these poten-
tial direct and indirect subsidy benefi ts should guide programme design and 
implementation: it should also guide investigations of programme impacts. 
We return to these issues later in Chapters 6 to 9.  In the next section of 
this chapter, however, we continue our examination of evolving Malawian 
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agricultural policies that have led to, and provide the background for, the 
introduction and development of the Agricultural (or later Farm) Input 
Subsidy Programme (AISP or FISP). 
 4.5.  Agricultural policies 
 We now explore in more detail the major agricultural policies pursued in 
Malawi over the last 40 years or so. These policies have shaped and continue 
to shape infrastructure, research, knowledge, institutions, and the expecta-
tions of different stakeholders (politicians, technocrats, rural people, and 
voters) and, with the political analysis and context provided earlier in this 
chapter, are critical to understanding both the emergence of Malawi’s Farm 
Input Subsidy Programme and its subsequent implementation and evolution. 
 4.5.1.  Post-independence policies 
 Post-independence smallholder agricultural development policy revolved 
around the establishment and then scaling up and out of four large donor-
fi nanced integrated rural development projects (one in the northern region, 
two in the centre, and one in the south) to a national programme of projects 
covering the majority of the country. Although elements varied between pro-
jects, there were a number of common core activities: agricultural extension; 
subsidized supply of improved seeds and fertilizers for maize and cash crops; 
construction of feeder roads and market facilities; construction of offi ces and 
staff housing; and construction of health facilities. Within the context of sup-
porting infrastructure, the core smallholder development activities involved 
the promotion of farming groups which took input loans for seed and fer-
tilizer, loans which were repaid through interlocking sales at fi xed prices to 
the parastatal marketing board, ADMARC. The system was very successful in 
expanding access to purchased inputs, particularly in maize production, and 
in achieving very high rates of credit repayment. Fundamental to this success 
were (a) the role of the parastatal marketing agency, ADMARC, as a sole seller 
of inputs to and sole buyer of produce from smallholders, (b) a major focus 
on facilitation of this system by extension staff, and (c) strict enforcement of 
penalties for non-repayment, (with the denial of access to input purchases on 
both cash and credit for all members of a defaulting group and, in some cases, 
heavy handed confi scation of assets of defaulters). ADMARC also maintained 
pan-territorial and pan-seasonal prices. 
 These policies had complex anti-poor and pro-poor elements (Chirwa 
et al., 2006). The interests of the poor were damaged by food prices frequently 
being held above import parity, and cheaper imported food prices might 
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have allowed the large number of malnourished poor better access to food 
in some years (although lower maize prices would have depressed incentives 
for investment in improved seed and fertilizer use in maize). ADMARC also 
tended to tax the smallholder sector, and the proceeds of this were transferred 
to the estate sector, which also benefi ted from cheap labour in an exploitative 
tenant system of tobacco production. 
 However the smallholder development projects described above invested 
considerable sums in rural areas, and although the direct benefi ciaries of the 
agricultural programmes were generally (but not always) less-poor farmers, 
they did promote national food self-suffi ciency and local food availabil-
ity (both through local production and through the network of ADMARC 
markets which sold maize) and stimulated economic growth in rural areas. 
Smallholder taxation was also mainly on cash crops, and the smallholder 
maize system was moderately subsidized by ADMARC (Kydd and Christiansen, 
1982). Smallholder taxation was also offset, and with time eclipsed, by gov-
ernment infrastructural investment in the integrated rural development pro-
jects described above and by the implicit subsidies in the support of groups in 
obtaining credit and in marketing their produce. 
 This set of agricultural policies can be seen as setting up a system that 
addressed many of the demands made of it. Support for estates provided 
direct patronage to elites (and resources for dispensing patronage) and to 
emerging middle classes as noted earlier, particularly in the central region. 
Donor resources supported smallholder agricultural development that pro-
vided infrastructure and agricultural services and food access to smallholders 
(addressing the market development trap), meeting both donor develop-
mental objectives and government developmental and patronage objectives 
(the latter being through regionally distributed visible project investments, 
civil service and parastatal employment, improved incomes to less poor 
farmers, and stable food availability in rural areas). There were also impor-
tant social protection outcomes from stable pan-territorial, pan-seasonal 
food prices, and reliable food availability in most rural areas in the country. 
Although the direct benefi ciaries of these policies were not generally the 
poorer members of rural communities, and there were differences between 
regions in the benefi ts produced by these policies, both the fl ow of seasonal 
fi nance to less-poor households and the increased incomes arising from the 
use of those inputs (and their multiplier effects) should have increased sea-
sonal liquidity in rural communities, raising demand and wages for casual 
labour and increasing community resources for informal local social pro-
tection measures. The discussion of pro- and anti-poor elements of these 
policies also, however, illustrates confl icts over maize prices (low prices are 
good for poor, food-insecure consumers but high prices are needed to stimu-
late investment), while the longer term failure of the government to sustain 
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these policies illustrates the diffi culties governments face in allocating lim-
ited resources between the short-term demands for distribution of benefi ts 
to different interest groups on the one hand and longer term demands for 
investment in growth on the other. 
 4.5.2.  Liberalization policies 
 As liberalization and, later, multi-party democracy and currency devaluation 
led to the demise of the interlocking smallholder agricultural credit system 
and integrated rural development approach at the core of the agricultural 
policies described above, subsequent agricultural policies were not part of 
such a comprehensive vision of rural development. Agriculture, and indeed 
individual crops, were seen as needing crop- and commodity-specifi c market 
solutions. The best example of this is probably the development of small-
holder tobacco, which, as discussed earlier, was very successful. Harrigan 
(2003) reports a number of benefi ts from this expansion: a major cash injec-
tion with multipliers feeding through into the rest of the non-farm rural 
economy, the use of tobacco income to buy seed and fertilizer for maize 
production, and market development. However she also notes that middle 
income smallholders were the predominant direct benefi ciaries and while 
there were signifi cant numbers of poorer smallholders with very limited land 
growing tobacco, tobacco began to crowd out maize on these farms. This 
led to severe declines in maize production when devaluation of the Malawi 
Kwacha and the removal of input subsidies made the use of fertilizer on maize 
uneconomic. At the same time, growth in smallholder tobacco production 
was mainly in the central and northern regions, not in the southern region 
where the holdings are smallest and the extent, incidence, and severity of 
poverty are greatest (National Statistical Offi ce, 2005a; Prowse, 2007). 
 A variety of social protection instruments were then introduced. Initially 
mainly safety nets, these were closely related to agriculture and changes in 
agriculture policies as they attempted to address increased food insecurity 
and increasing vulnerability from,  inter alia , declining holding sizes and soil 
fertility and the spread of HIV/AIDS among poor rural Malawians. Over time 
a wide variety of different social protection programmes and instruments 
were implemented (Slater and Tsoka, 2007), including targeted nutrition 
programmes, food transfers, public works programmes, school feeding pro-
grammes, credit transfers, and more recently cash transfers. 
 The agricultural synergies and confl icts of many of these programmes are 
well known: injections of cash and food into people’s livelihoods can make 
a critical contribution at lean times of year before harvest when labour is 
needed by people to work on their fi elds, these cash and food injections may 
allow them to work on their fi elds rather than seek work for cash or food 
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elsewhere. These injections can also generate local economic multipliers (Davies 
and Davey, 2008) and build up productive capacity and assets (Covarrubias 
et al., 2012). However cash or food for work programmes face a dilemma in that, 
if they are providing work and income at the time when people need it most, 
then this will take people from their fi elds and undermine their own production 
(Slater and Tsoka, 2007).These programmes also face wider problems regarding 
the extent and value of their contributions to rural assets and most importantly 
to the livelihoods of participants (Devereux, 2006). A tendency for programmes 
to lack long-term funding and consistency has also undermined the extent to 
which they can be relied upon by rural households (Slater and Tsoka, 2007). 
 4.5.3.  Agricultural input provision programmes 
 As discussed earlier, recognition of the importance of agriculture for food 
security, of the need for fertilizers to raise yields for poor farmers with small-
holdings and declining yields under continuous maize cropping, and of dif-
fi culties in accessing maize seed and inputs led to major political, economic, 
and developmental interests in policies and instruments aimed at increas-
ing poor people’s access to inputs (seed and fertilizer) for maize production. 
Two different programmes and instruments concerned with input delivery 
to poor people are important for understanding the subsequent emergence 
of the agricultural input subsidy programme in 2005: ‘inputs for work’ and 
free input distribution (the latter under the ‘Starter Pack’ and ‘Targeted Inputs 
Programme’ or TIP). These programmes have operated at different scales and 
in different ways with different agricultural and social protection objectives 
of stakeholders in supporting different programmes: ambiguity and diversity 
in understandings of programme objectives have been widespread, and have 
had both benefi ts and costs. 
 ‘Inputs for work’ describes the use of public works programmes aimed pri-
marily at delivering social protection but, in contrast to food for work and 
cash for work programmes, participants are paid with agricultural inputs. 
‘Inputs for work’ has only been implemented on a local scale by NGOs with 
donor funding. Payment with inputs is intended to overcome some of the dif-
fi culties with food and cash for work programmes by providing participants 
with work during the dry season, when there is little competition for labour 
with work on their fi elds, but benefi ts during the following cropping sea-
son (by easing labour and cash demands for households looking to purchase 
inputs) and/or by increasing subsequent maize harvests and food stocks. An 
evaluation of a pilot project in two districts of Malawi cited by Devereux 
(2006) concluded that the project was more popular with participants than 
food or cash for work, and yielded a very favourable return in the value of 
increased maize produced. 
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 Free input distribution has been a much more widely used approach to 
extending access to inputs across the country, with large-scale government 
distributions starting from 1993 in response to currency devaluation, the 
removal of fertilizer subsidies, the collapse of the credit system for maize 
inputs, and drought (Devereux, 2006). In 1998, the government implemented 
a universal ‘Starter Pack’ programme, under which every smallholder was 
provided with enough seeds and fertilizer to plant 0.1 hectares of land. This, 
with good weather, was a contributor to an estimated 67% increase in maize 
output, with maize production reaching 2.5 million tonnes (Levy, 2005). 
 The programme, funded by DFID, was continued in 1999 amid consider-
able controversy, rooted in different stakeholder interests in the programme, 
in the political context, and different perceptions of its objectives. As origi-
nally conceived, the Starter Pack was an agricultural development programme 
intended to promote farmer skills in more intensive maize production, diver-
sifi cation out of maize, and the growth of commercial input distribution sys-
tems in rural areas. It was intended to include maize fertilizers and legume 
and maize seed, to be accompanied by a strong extension programme, and to 
address the market and livelihood constraints discussed earlier. However the 
programme was actually funded and implemented more as a social protec-
tion programme, with a major emphasis on fertilizer provision to promote 
immediate food production, and less emphasis on agricultural education, 
provision of legume seed, or the development of commercial input delivery 
systems. The programme was highly politicized, being introduced just before 
the 1999 presidential elections, and was seen as particularly benefi cial for the 
southern region, the ruling party’s power base. 
 Donors were concerned about the politicization of the programme, its high 
cost, its apparent emphasis on maize rather than on promoting diversifi ca-
tion, its possible crowding out effects on input markets, and its effi ciency as 
regards targeting and benefi ts to the poor. There was concern that large num-
bers of non-poor people were benefi ting, and that receipt of inputs by such 
people was simply a transfer, with starter pack inputs displacing commer-
cial purchases, although the extent of displacement is disputed. As a result 
DFID support of the programme was subsequently scaled back to the Targeted 
Input Programme (TIP). 
 Targeting, however, faced problems. There were considerable diffi culties 
in the selection of benefi ciaries and in the effectiveness of targeting. More 
fundamentally, however, Levy (2005) argues that the starter pack assisted 
poorer households in two ways: by increasing their own maize production 
and (by stimulating national maize production) reducing maize prices. The 
second benefi t was lost when the programme was scaled back to a targeted 
programme. Dorward and Kydd (2005) simulate the effects of maize price and 
wage effects of the universal starter pack and compare this with effects under 
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a targeted programme, and argued that even if targeting could be achieved 
without exclusion and inclusion problems, and ignoring both the increased 
costs associated with targeting and displacement effects, the wage and maize 
price effects of a universal subsidy could be more cost-effective than a targeted 
programme in delivering welfare benefi ts to the target group. They were con-
cerned, however, that by depressing maize prices, the universal programme 
‘may undermine the important growth contributions of less poor households 
that engage in more intensive labour demanding maize-production’ (p. 274). 
 4.6.  The 2005/6 Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme 
 High food prices and food shortages following poor harvests in 2000/1 and 
2001/2 (after the scaling back of the starter pack programme), led to food 
security and fertilizer subsidies becoming major political issues in the period 
leading up to the 2004 presidential elections. Both the major parties and 
their candidates promised fertilizer subsidies, though the UDF and Bingu wa 
Mutharika, its presidential candidate, offered an extension of the rationed 
Starter Pack approach while the MCP and its candidate, John Tembo, offered 
a return to price subsidies through farmer groups. After the election the new 
government delayed the introduction of subsidies, perhaps due to the need 
for controlling government expenditure to qualify for debt relief (Chinsinga, 
2006). Uncertainty about a subsidy led to delays in the decision to implement 
another targeted input programme, and also led to delays in fertilizer imports 
and to farmers delaying fertilizer purchases (Sahley et al., 2005). The result 
was another very poor season with subsequent food shortages, high prices, 
very expensive importation of maize, and considerable damage to people’s 
welfare and livelihoods and to the economy. 
 During 2005, therefore, the government decided to implement the 
Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme (AISP) as a rationed and targeted pro-
gramme that would involve the partial subsidy of a much larger volume of 
inputs than were provided under the previous Starter Pack and Targeted Input 
Programme. While the impetus for this was the renewed concerns within 
Malawi over maize production, the decision provided an opportunity for 
President Bingu wa Mutharika to craft a programme that would be popular 
with the rural masses across the country, would provide potential resources 
for patronage, and was clearly different from previous subsidies or input sup-
ply programmes under Banda and Muluzi, but which also had a clear eco-
nomic and welfare rationale that lay fi rmly in traditional domestic analysis 
of smallholder farmer needs. In this it was a critical strategic response to the 
political challenges facing Bingu wa Mutharika as he established his govern-
ment without a majority in parliament. It also drew on new opportunities for 
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independent policy afforded by the introduction of large-scale budget sup-
port by Malawi’s major donors and (to a lesser extent) by ideological divisions 
within the donor community regarding the relative economic and welfare 
benefi ts of such a programme (with, for example, strong support from Jeffrey 
Sachs and the Millennium Programme). 
 The design, implementation, and impacts of the programme, and potential 
wider lessons from this, are the subject of the rest of this book. 
 4.7.  Summary 
 This chapter has described the context of Malawi’s introduction of its 
Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme in 2005. An understanding of the eco-
nomic context of smallholder agriculture and rural livelihoods in Malawi is 
critical for understanding technical arguments for the introduction of this 
programme, and its subsequent implementation and impacts. The impor-
tance of, and diffi culties posed by, the ‘low maize productivity trap’ are par-
ticularly relevant. There are important interactions here with the arguments 
presented in Chapter 2 about subsidies’ objectives and modalities, as well as 
contrasts and similarities with other countries’ engagement with input sub-
sidy programmes, as discussed in Chapter 3. However Malawi’s agriculture, 
rural livelihoods, and economy, and technical understanding of them, are 
themselves strongly infl uenced by its history of changing political circum-
stances and deep-rooted political infl uences and processes. Understanding 
these political issues is equally important for understanding the genesis, evo-
lution, and impacts of agricultural input subsides in Malawi, and indeed in 
other countries. 
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 Part II 
Implementation and Impacts of the 
Malawi Programme 
 In this part of the book we describe the major features of the design and 
implementation of the Malawi Farm Input Subsidy from 2005/6 to 2011/12 
(in Chapter 5) and then examine evidence for various potential impacts of 
the programme. Examination of these impacts and their links to prior pro-
gramme design and implementation is guided by the conceptual framework 
set out in  Figure 2.2 in Chapter 2, by the issues raised in examination of recent 
subsidy programme experience discussed in Chapter 3, by key political, eco-
nomic, and agricultural features of Malawi discussed in Chapter 4, and by 
the possible impacts of a large scale agricultural inputs subsidy on different 
households’ livelihoods within the rural economy as set out in  Figure 4.2 . 
 Figure II.1 draws these strands together and restructures  Figures 2.2 and  4.2 
to show the causal pathway that is traced from examination of input subsidy 
distribution, receipts, and costs (in Chapter 5 on implementation) through 
to various direct and then indirect impacts (in Chapters 6 and 7), alongside 
and interacting with input market impacts (in Chapter 8). Chapter 9 pro-
vides an overarching consideration of the overall benefi ts and costs of the 
programme: we do not attempt to show its links across programme costs and 
welfare and growth impacts in the fi gure. 
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 Figure II.1.  Processes and infl uences linking and affecting inputs, implementation, 
and impacts 
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 5 
 FISP activities and achievements 
 5.1.  Introduction 
 This chapter describes the implementation of the Malawi FISP from its incep-
tion in 2005/6 to 2011/12. Our aims in this chapter are to 
 •  set out the major activities involved in implementing the programme, 
and the core determinants of programme outputs which in turn 
determine programme impacts, as discussed in Chapters 6 and 7; 
 •  describe the major features of the programme with regard to design and 
implementation features identifi ed at the end of Chapter 2 as critical for 
programme evaluation (although some aspects of targeting, rationing, 
and private sector input supply are addressed in later chapters); and 
 •  consider some of the political and other infl uences that have affected 
programme design and implementation. 
 We begin the chapter by introducing the core elements of the programme 
and major changes from 2005/6 to 2011/12. The bulk of the chapter then 
provides more detail on these, on implementation achievements and outputs 
of the programme, and on some of the determinants of changing practices. 
We go into considerable detail on some topics both to document these topics 
and to provide readers with information that is needed to understand issues 
discussed in later chapters. We conclude by discussing how consideration of 
the implementation of the Malawi subsidy programme fi ts within, extends, 
and/or challenges understandings of theory, practice, and policy set out in 
Chapters 2 to 4. We fi rst, however, conclude this introduction with an over-
view of the major tasks and core activities involved in programme implemen-
tation and generation of its core outputs. A simplifi ed summary of these is 
provided in  Figure 5.1 . 
 There are a number of points to note from  Figure 5.1 . First, following on 
from key lessons from the reviews in Chapters 2 and 3, programme outputs 
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are defi ned as timely coupon redemption and incremental input sales. The 
activities and tasks required to deliver these outputs are then divided into 
two broad groups: input management and coupon management, with fur-
ther division into input purchases and market opening on the one hand and 
coupon supply and benefi ciary identifi cation on the other. Across these divi-
sions, however, there are major  planning interactions, as coupon allocations 
to different areas depend upon overall planned input purchases and input dis-
tribution to different areas depends upon coupon allocations to those areas. 
There are also major  implementation interactions between input and coupon 
management as regards timing of separate activities and of the exercise as a 
whole. Starting at the bottom of the fi gure, before coupon redemption can 
start in an area the markets must be stocked and open and benefi ciaries must 
have been issued with their coupons. Similarly, input distribution to depots 
and markets requires the prior allocation of inputs to the areas in which mar-
kets are located. Allocations to areas, however, must follow initial decisions 
on the total volumes of inputs to be sold under the programme. 
 Finally, the fi gure also provides some indication of the way that the pro-
gramme’s complexity and scale pose major challenges in programme plan-
ning and implementation. These activities are carried out for several different 
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 Figure 5.1.  Major tasks in programme implementation 
 Note: see list of abbreviations for description of stakeholders. 
 Source: adapted from Dorward and Chirwa (2011c). 
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country in rural areas that are often poorly served by roads and services, serv-
ing dispersed farmers (many of whom have very low levels of literacy), without 
access to advanced information technology systems. There is also a wide range 
of stakeholders in the programme, often with different understandings of the 
objectives of the programme and of how it is supposed to be implemented, 
and different personal and professional interests in it, with some of these 
interests more and less ‘legitimate’. Fraud and theft are also major temptations 
and threats (criminals are not included as stakeholders, but their infl uence 
and effects on the programme also have to be recognized). All of this occurs 
on a very large scale. For example, in 2008/9 more than 1.5 million fertilizer 
coupon benefi ciaries were selected from over 2.5 million farm households, 
3.5 million fertilizer coupons and 2.5 million seed coupons were printed and 
distributed, and 3.5 million bags of four kinds of fertilizer were purchased and 
distributed, together with 2.5 million bags of two different kinds of maize seed 
and three kinds of legume seed. These subsidized commodities were together 
worth around US$275 million, 1 with each fertilizer coupon’s value greater 
than 10% of annual household income for more than around 40% of the 
population. Discussion of the programme’s implementation, achievements, 
and weaknesses should take into account these considerations. 
 We now consider major implementation activities in turn, considering 
each of the activities in  Figure 5.1 in terms of their structures, volume, and 
outputs over the period 2005/6 to 2011/12. We begin, however, with a brief 
overview of core programme features and of their evolution and of the con-
text of that evolution from 2005/6 to 2011/12. 
 5.2.  Programme design and evolution 
 The core stated objective of the FISP has consistently been to improve resource-
poor smallholder famers’ access to improved agricultural inputs in order to 
achieve their and national food self-suffi ciency and to raise these famers’ 
incomes through increased food and cash crop production. Later years of 
the programme have given greater emphasis to concerns for vulnerable farm 
households. Throughout this, however, there has been an emphasis on pro-
gramme benefi ciaries as farmers and producers, with little emphasis on benefi -
ciaries as consumers (beyond the recognition of the programme’s contribution 
to improving household food self-suffi ciency) and there has been no emphasis 
on the indirect programme effects on maize prices and hence consumers. 
 The core of the programme has been the use of vouchers (or coupons) to 
target approximately 50% of farmers in the country to receive fertilizers and 
 1  This is inclusive of transport costs and farmer redemption payments. 
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Implementation and Impacts
90
improved seeds for staple food (maize) production. ‘Maize fertilizers’ have 
been provided in a package of one voucher for a 50 kg bag of 23:21:0 +4S 
basal fertilizer (NPK) and one voucher for a 50 kg bag of urea for top dress-
ing. Improved maize seeds subsidized under the programme were initially 
open pollinated varieties (OPVs) but there has subsequently been much 
greater emphasis on hybrid maize varieties. The seed and fertilizer packages 
drew on longstanding Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MoAFS) 
crop production recommendations. In the early years there were further 
vouchers for tobacco fertilizers, and in later years support for tobacco inputs 
was withdrawn and more emphasis given to provision of legume seeds. 
Grain storage chemicals were also provided from 2007/8 and cotton seed 
and chemicals provided in some years, but the disbursement and reporting 
channels and methods for these have been different from those for ferti-
lizers and for maize and legume seed, and we do not report on them in 
any detail. The subsidization of complementary inputs (fertilizers, maize 
and legume seed, and maize storage chemicals) have been the main form 
of complementary investment in or associated with the programme, but 
there has also been some provision of extension messages on input use, 
and under the Agricultural Sector Wide Programme some investment in a 
nationwide set of on-farm trials of different integrated soil fertility manage-
ment technologies. 
 Throughout the FISP, the government and other stakeholders have worked 
with varying success and agreement on innovations to address diffi culties, 
improve programme performance, respond to changing political and eco-
nomic conditions, and broaden impact. These changes have emerged from 
formal and informal discussions, reviews and lesson learning within gov-
ernment and with other stakeholders, and from changing policy concerns 
in a changing economic and political environment. Bilateral and multilat-
eral donors have engaged substantially with the government over the pro-
gramme from the 2006/7 season, with specifi c funding of some activities. 
This has involved consistent support for seed subsidies, logistics, monitoring 
and evaluation, and some fertilizer transport. They have also supported ‘buy 
back’ arrangements in some years (allowing the government to carry forward 
unused stocks from one year to the next with the costs of these stocks in 
the budget and accounts for the year of their use rather than purchase) and 
assisted with costs of auditing, anti-corruption measures, coupon printing, 
and exceptionally high fertilizer prices in 2008/9. 
 The major modifi cations in different years are shown in  Tables 5.1 and  5.2 
and involved changes in 
 •  volumes of subsidized fertilizer and seed sales (both maize and legumes) 
and of grain storage chemicals and cotton chemicals and seed, with 
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fertilizer volumes rising and then falling but seed volumes rising apart 
from a fall in maize seeds in 2011/12; 
 •  reliance on private sector imports to supply parastatal fertilizer sales 
(generally rising) and private sector involvement in retail sales of 
subsidized fertilizer only in 2006/7 and 2008/9 but in seed sales for all 
years except 2005/6; 
 •  programme objectives and benefi ciary targeting criteria and systems 
placing increasing emphasis on vulnerable benefi ciaries; 
 •  benefi ciary registration and benefi ciary selection, voucher distribution, 
and market monitoring systems; 
 •  redemption prices falling; and 
 •  coupon design and security features and processes increasing fi tfully. 
 Further details and explanations are provided on these changes in the follow-
ing sections. 
 Table 5.1.  Principal programme features, 2005/6 to 2011/12 
 2005/6  2006/7  2007/8  2008/9  2009/10  2010/11  2011/12 
 Fertilizer voucher 
distribution (MT 
equivalent) 






















 Fertilizer voucher value, 
approx. (MK/bag) 
 1,750  2,480  3,299  7,951  3,841  5,237  6,536 
 Redemption price (MK/
bag) 
 950*  950  900  800  500  500  500 
 Subsidy % (approx.)  64%  72%  79%  91%  88%  91%  93% 
 Subsidized maize seed 
(MT) 
 n/a  4,524  5,541  5,365  8,652  10,650  8,245 
 % Hybrid seed  0%  61%  53%  84%  88%  80%  68% 
 Legume seed (MT)    24  1  1551  2726  2,562 





















 * 950MK per bag for ‘maize fertilizers’ and 1450MK per bag for ‘tobacco fertilizers’. 
 Sources: Logistics Unit reports; Nakhumwa (2006), School of Oriental and African Studies et al. (2008), Dorward and 
Chirwa (2009, 2011a, 2012a), Dorward et al. (2010b). 
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 Table 5.2.  Evolving programme implementation features, 2005/6 to 2011/12 






 Other system 
features 
 2005/6  Maize & tobacco 
fertilizers, Maize 
seed (OPV) 


























 Fertilizers also 
through major 
retailers; 
fl exible maize 
seed vouchers 
through a wide 
range of seed 
retailers 
 Coupons 
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& chemicals 
 District allocation 























 Tea & coffee fertiliz-
ers, maize storage 
chemicals 
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 No cotton chemi-
cals. No tobacco 
fertilizers, Increased 
legume seed, more 
maize seed (hybrid 
& OPV) per pack 
 Elimination of 2nd 
and 3rd round 
distributions. 
Use of voter 
identifi cation 
for registra-
tion, receipt & 
redemption. 
 Variable top up for 
maize seed max 
100MK 
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 Sources : Logistics Unit reports; Nakhumwa (2006), School of Oriental and African Studies et al. (2008), Dorward and 
Chirwa (2009, 2011a, 2012a), Dorward et al. (2010b). 
 5.3.  Input purchases and distribution 
 This section describes processes, achievements, and performance in the pro-
curement and distribution of fertilizers and of maize and legume seeds. 
 5.3.1.  Procurement and distribution systems 
 The programme has used two fertilizer procurement and distribution sys-
tems in different years. The dominant system, with distribution and retailing 
through two parastatal corporations (ADMARC and SFFRFM—Smallholder 
Farmers Fertiliser Revolving Fund of Malawi), was the only system used in 
2005/6 and from 2008/9, while in 2006/7 and 2007/8 this was augmented by 
parallel private sector retailing of subsidized fertilizers. With parastatal distri-
bution, the government calls for tenders for the supply of specifi ed fertiliz-
ers to three SFFRFM depots (in the southern, central, and northern regions). 
After a formal process of tender analysis and awards, successful bidders (both 
private importers and SFFRFM and ADMARC) then deliver contracted quanti-
ties to the specifi ed depots, which also hold any programme stocks bought 
forward from excess supplies in the previous year. The government (working 
through the programme’s Logistics Unit from 2006/7) then contracts private 
transporters to ‘uplift’ fertilizers from the regional depots to ADMARC and 
SFFRFM local area markets which act as the retail outlets for subsidized ferti-
lizer supplies. Timely availability of fertilizers for redemption by benefi ciaries 
Table 5.2. (continued)
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requires timely award of tenders and tender deliveries, timely uplifting of 
supplies from depots to markets (to supply the markets and to free storage 
space for deliveries from importers to depots), and timely sales from markets 
(to supply benefi ciary demand and to free storage space for deliveries from 
depots to markets). 
 Timely sales of fertilizers before or immediately on commencement of the 
rains are critical for a good fertilizer response, particularly for ‘basal’ NPK fer-
tilizers applied at planting. However limited storage space at depots, limited 
transport capacity, poor feeder roads once the rainy season has started, and 
limited storage space at markets pose major logistical challenges in maintain-
ing stocks for selling large quantities of fertilizers quickly after the start of 
the rains. Absence of such stocks leads to shortages at markets, which in turn 
leads to farmers wasting time and money searching and waiting for stocks. 
Shortages also give corrupt sales agents and others opportunities to extort 
extra payments from benefi ciaries. 
 As mentioned above, a parallel fertilizer procurement and distribution 
system using private sector retail outlets was implemented for two years, 
2006/7 and 2007/8. Under this system six input suppliers with rural chains 
of retail outlets were contracted to procure, store, and distribute the fertiliz-
ers that they sold under the programme, with stocks of ‘subsidy fertilizers’ 
not distinguished from stocks of fertilizers for unsubsidized sales (they were 
only treated differently at the point of sale, and in the subsequent submis-
sion of vouchers to the MoAFS Logistics Unit for redemption at previously 
agreed prices). An important part of this system was the funding by DFID of 
a fi nancing agreement with Stanbic Bank to address government concerns 
that ADMARC and SFFRFM might be left holding unused stocks if the private 
sector’s subsidized sales were larger than expected. Under this agreement, 
Stanbic bought unsold fertilizer stocks from the government at the end of the 
season for resale to the government at the start of the next season at the same 
price (plus storage and fi nancing costs). In 2006/7 prices varied by district to 
refl ect varying transport costs to different districts, but in 2007/8 a further 
‘remote areas premium’ was introduced to promote companies extending 
their distribution network into more remote zones. Private sector sales of 
subsidized fertilizer were cancelled by the government at short notice in the 
2008/9 season when contract negotiations were at an advanced stage, on the 
basis of (as far as we know) unsubstantiated reports that some private com-
panies had been misusing fertilizer coupons and accepting them in exchange 
for other sales of other products. 
 With regards to maize and legume seeds, from 2006/7 onwards these have 
been supplied and distributed by private seed suppliers and sold through 
both private and parastatal retail outlets. A small number of seed compa-
nies negotiate annual coupon redemption prices for different seed types 
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and packs (with the ability to charge a further ‘top up’ price to farmers in 
most years). Retailers (retail chains, small scale agro-dealers, and parastatal 
outlets) are then supplied with seed for sale under the programme, and 
have to return seed coupons redeemed by farmers back to the seed compa-
nies, who then present them to the MoAFS Logistics Unit for redemption 
payments. 
 5.3.2.  Fertilizer procurement and distribution 
 Procurement of fertilizers for subsidized sale by ADMARC and SFFRFM is a 
major and critical activity in programme implementation, affecting benefi -
ciaries’ access to fertilizers (in terms of timing, volumes, and access costs), 
programme impacts, and programme costs (with fertilizers accounting for 
around 75% of net programme costs from 2009/10 to 2011/12). While pro-
curement of fertilizers and seeds for sale through private channels is also 
important, this is coordinated and implemented by private companies, with 
critical government involvement restricted to tendering at the beginning 
and payment at the end. We report on these later when we consider coupon 
redemption and seed sales under the subsidy, and benefi ciary information 
about delivery performance. In this section we focus on government and 
parastatal procurement and distribution achievements and performance for 
fertilizers. We discuss more on this in Chapter 8. 
 Figure  5.2 shows fertilizer supplies to the programme by source from 
2005/6 to 2011/12 (excluding unutilized supplies carried forward). The graph 
demonstrates well 
 •  the increasing volume of subsidized fertilizer from 2005/6 to 2008/9 
and its subsequent decline; 
 •  the general trend for increasing reliance on private sector supplies, but 
highly variable volumes of private sector supplies between years (rising 
year on year from 2005/6 to 2008/9, then falling back markedly in 
2009/10); 2 
 •  government distribution of 125,000 MT or more in every year of the 
programme. 
 Given these large volumes, performance in government procurement and 
distribution of fertilizers is very important to programme performance as a 
whole. This can be considered in terms of timing and costs. 
 2  Total private sector supplies to government in 2008/9 were greater than shown in  Figure 5.2 , 
as this excludes government purchases for winter production and purchases that were not used 
and then carried forward, contributing to the 2009/10 drop in new private sector supplies. 
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 Procurement activities have generally been completed a little earlier each 
year, and this has been associated with substantial improvements in end 
of October and end of November deliveries in 2009/10 and 2010/11 (there 
were also greater carry-forward stocks in 2009/10). Despite these improve-
ments, however, end of October deliveries have still been less than 80% of 
total supplies even in the best years, and have frequently been below 40%. 
End of November deliveries were as low as 70% of total supplies in 2008/9, 
and in only two years have all supplies been delivered to depots by the end of 
December. The limited impact of earlier tendering on deliveries is due partly 
to lack of fi rm delivery dates and late delivery penalty clauses in tender con-
tracts, partly to the failure of some suppliers to deliver at all (with consequent 
late contracts with alternative suppliers), and partly to constraints on storage 
space at SFFRFM regional depots. This is affected by diffi culties in uplifting 
stocks from the depots to rural markets, to which we now turn. 
 Earlier deliveries to depots have allowed improvements in uplifting stocks 
from the depots to rural markets (see  Figure 5.3 ), with uplifts by the end 
of November rising steadily from a little over 64% to 86% from 2006/7 to 
2010/11. However this should be 100%, indeed all supplies should be availa-
ble for sale by mid November, whereas even in 2010/11 only 70% was uplifted 
by the end of October and 85% by end November. Although uplifts are con-
strained by the availability of stock in depots, they are also constrained by 
transport capacity, poor roads, and availability of storage space in markets, 




















Private sector tenders  MT Parastatal tenders MT
Brought forward MT Private sector retail MT
Private sector % new supplies
 Figure 5.2.  Fertilizer supplies by source, 2005/6 to 2011/12 
 Sources : Logistics Unit annual reports. 
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sales disruptions to stock fl ows. Sales are determined not only by stock avail-
ability, but also by benefi ciaries being in possession of redeemable coupons. 
We discuss coupon distribution systems determining this later, in Section 
5.4. First, however, we briefl y examine another aspect of procurement perfor-
mance: prices paid for inputs. 
 Figure  5.4 compares average fertilizer costs per metric ton (MT) for NPK 
(23:21:0 +4S) and urea delivered to the three depots with international prices 
for DAP and urea over the period 2006 to 2011 (with good data on procure-
ment prices available for the last three years but weaker data for the previous 
three years). Data are shown each year from March to November, with March 
to April generally being the time at which tenders have been submitted (and 
hence the basis for tender pricing, although some contracts were established 
later in each season) with delivery from August to December: actual timing 
of different suppliers’ purchases is not known, nor are the prices paid. The 
fi gure shows 
 •  broad patterns of change in prices and in difference between delivered 
and international prices; 
 •  sharp rises and falls in international prices, particularly for phosphate 
fertilizers in 2008, with tenders and being placed when prices were 
rising to their peak; 
 •  sharp rises in urea prices from March to June 2011, with a peak in 
September; 
 •  more generally, the very high volatility in fertilizer prices in recent years; 
 •  variations in price differentials between international and landed prices 
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 Figure 5.3.  Montly uplifts to rural markets (‘000 MT & % parastatal sales by end of 
month) 
 Source : Logistics Unit weekly and annual reports. 
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 The variability in international prices, with foreign exchange and other risks, 
and consequent exposure of suppliers to large potential losses and gains 
must lead to suppliers building substantial risk margins into their tenders. 
Measures that allow shorter bid validity periods and faster tender processing 
and awards should lead to lower prices. These measures would also allow for 
earlier delivery of supplies. Costs might also be reduced if the government 
took on more of the foreign exchange risks and was able to manage these risks 
more effectively than private suppliers. 
 Further insights into fertilizer prices paid by the government can be 
gleaned by comparing cost per MT delivered to markets with normal com-
mercial (unsubsidized) sales prices, as shown in  Figure 5.5 . Here market prices 
include landed costs (as in  Figure 5.4 ) and transport costs, but exclude over-
head costs of ADMARC and SFFRFM. Unsubsidized prices are for November 
each year averaged across major centres in Malawi, and for 2008 and 2009 
there is also data collected from markets around the country by the MoAFS. 
The fi gure suggests that if overhead costs were added on to the subsidized 
costs then unsubsidized market prices might be closer to the costs incurred by 
the programme through parastatal delivery (although if ADMARC is reach-
ing more remote areas then higher average costs might also be incurred by 



















NPK, landed in depots
Urea, landed in depots
DAP, international
Urea, E. Europe, Bulk
 Figure 5.4 .  Landed and international fertilizer prices, 2006–11 
 Notes: 2007/8 & 2008/9 information for only part of purchases, 2009/10 excludes ADMARC b/
fwd. Urea at US$1,254/MT, 2011/12 excludes ADMARC supplies of Urea at US$864/MT & NPK 
at US$904/MT. 
 Sources : Logistics Unit reports and data, World Bank commodity price data (World Bank, 2012). 
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 The effectiveness of the programme in obtaining low-priced fertilizer sup-
plies may also be investigated by examining the patterns of tender prices. 
 Table 5.3 presents the range of prices paid from 2008/9 to 2011/12. Price 
ranges are high, although they have generally been falling and in some years 
(such as 2009/10) cannot be explained by wide variation in international 
prices during the buying period. Some suppliers appear to have been paid 
consistently higher prices (for example, Simama and, notably for a large urea 
consignment in 2009/10, ADMARC). On the other hand there is no evidence 
of higher prices being paid to SFFRFM (indeed the low outlier prices for NPK 
and urea in 2008/9 were both for supplies from SFFRFM). Price ranges remain 
high even after removal of outliers, but again have generally been falling 
since 2008/9. 
 5.4.  Coupon distribution 
 We now examine the activities involved in coupon distribution, which, as 
shown earlier in  Figure 5.1 , run in parallel with input procurement and distribu-



















MoAFS survey market price US$/MT
FISP cost in markets US$/MT
FAM prices US$/MT
 Figure  5.5.  Subsidized fertilizer market costs and unsubsidized market prices, 
2006–11 
 Notes: 2011 FAM prices are sensitive to the choice of exchange rate converting MK to US$. Prices 
shown are calculated with the offi cial exchange rate, but if the widely used unoffi cial exchange 
rate in late 2011 were applied then the FAM price would be lower. 
 Sources : Logistics Unit reports and data, Fertiliser Association of Malawi (pers. comm.), MoAFS 
market reports. 
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achievements and performance over the life of the programme, drawing on 
information from programme records and from farm household surveys. 
 5.4.1.  Systems 
 Coupon distribution to benefi ciaries involves a number of activities, as set 
out in  Figure 5.1 : allocations to different areas, benefi ciary identifi cation, and 
then actual distribution of coupons. These activities are conditional on the 
quantity of subsidized inputs set in the national budget, the registration of all 
farm families, the printing of coupons, and then their distribution to districts 
and communities. 
 The formal process and criteria for determining budgeted quantities of sub-
sidized inputs are not clearly documented. Starting from 2005/6 there has 
been an aspiration to provide enough inputs to provide a core maize fertilizer 
package for roughly 50% of Malawian smallholder farmers. Budget decisions 
for subsequent years are likely to have been made on an incremental rather 
than zero budgeting basis, with increases and decreases determined by politi-
cal objectives, funding availability, competition for funds between ministries, 
and budgeted prices and costs. 
 Formal area allocations of coupons then involve the division of the national 
budget for subsidized inputs between Extension Planning Areas (EPAs) within 
districts. From 2005/6 to 2008/9 allocations of the total across EPAs were 
made in two or more rounds. In 2005/6 and 2006/7 the fi rst allocation was 
reported to be proportionate to the previous year’s MoAFS estimates of maize 
and tobacco hectarage in each EPA, but from 2007/8 onwards EPA allocations 
were increasingly, and from 2009/10 exclusively, reported to be proportional 
 Table 5.3.  Fertilizer procurement prices before and after removal of high outliers 














 2008/9  NPK  1,453  407  1,450  348  0.2%  Mulli Bros  1,649  1.3% 
 Urea  1,121  313  1,090  239  0.4%  Simama  1,246  3.0% 
 2009/10  NPK  744  390  736  287  3.1%  Simama, Coin  886  5.1% 
 Urea  715  670  647  221  8.4%  ADMARC  1,246  9.2% 
 2010/11  NPK  791  202  779  192  1.5%  Various inc 
Simama 
 870  13.0% 
 Urea  650  236  645  103  0.7%  Masina 
Investments 
 830  2.5% 
 2011/12  NPK  824  124  817  51  0.7%  ADMARC  904  7.1% 
 Urea  776  200  775  135  0.2%  ADMARC  864  1.4% 
 Source: Author calculations from Logistics Unit Annual reports 
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to MoAFS estimates of the number of farm families per EPA, with, again from 
2009/10, annual registration of farm families by villages within each EPA. 3 
Within EPAs, processes and formal stakeholder roles in coupon allocations 
between and within villages have varied between years and areas and have also 
differed from actual, informal roles. Overall, they have involved Traditional 
Authorities (TAs), local government and MoAFS staff, Village Development 
Committees (VDCs), and local stakeholders identifying benefi ciaries to receive 
coupons for redemption for different inputs at very reduced cash prices. 
 Printing of coupons has been funded and managed by the MoAFS and 
carried out in Malawi in all programme years except 2011/12 (when DFID 
funded printing outside Malawi). A requirement that coupons be clearly iden-
tifi ed with unique benefi ciary serial numbers by district and (in some years) 
EPA, has meant that printing has been conditional on district and EPA alloca-
tions. Once printed, with security features that have varied from year to year 
but have generally become more stringent with time, packs of coupons are 
bundled and distributed to each EPA, via District Agriculture Development 
Offi cers (DADOs). Coupon distribution to benefi ciaries has involved the 
same parties as allocation, with the addition of a police presence to keep law 
and order and to safeguard the valuable packs of coupons. 
 A constant feature of programme design has been that intended recipi-
ents of maize fertilizers should each receive two coupons, to allow subsidized 
purchase of one 50 kg bag of basal fertilizer (23:21:0 +4S) and one 50 kg bag 
of urea. However, there has also been considerable variation over time and 
between areas in allocation and distribution processes and criteria determin-
ing selection of benefi ciaries and the numbers of coupons of different types 
actually received per recipient. 
 Supplementary rounds of coupon allocations to areas and benefi ciaries 
from 2006/7 to 2008/9 were much more opaque as regards systems, crite-
ria, and numbers of coupons distributed. These were nominally intended to 
address problems of unmet demand in the fi rst round of distribution but were 
widely considered to allow opportunities for often politically driven alloca-
tions outside formal systems. 
 5.4.2.  Total coupon receipts 
 Two sources of information on coupon distribution and receipt can be com-
pared: programme records on coupon disbursement, and farm household 
survey estimates of coupon receipt. These can also be compared with input 
sales records on coupon redemption. There is, however, a major diffi culty 
 3  Initial allocations based on crop areas or farm families were commonly modifi ed for a variety 
of generally undocumented technical, administrative, political, and other reasons. 
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with this as the estimation of total coupon receipts from farm household 
survey data requires the multiplication of mean receipts per household (esti-
mated from the survey) by the total number of farm households—but there 
are major discrepancies between the estimates of the number of rural house-
holds based on the National Statistical Offi ce (NSO) 2008 census on the one 
hand and MoAFS estimates of farm families on the other. The extent of these 
discrepancies is shown in  Figure 5.6 . 
 These differences may have a number of causes: 
 a.  the defi nitions of farm families and of rural households may be differ-
ent, with a larger number of smaller-farm families; 
 b.  MoAFS processes may lead to households splitting for the purposes of 
registration, to increase the number of coupons that they may be able 
to receive; 
 c.  ‘ghost’ families and villages may have been created by corrupt fi eld staff 
or traditional leaders to enable them to obtain coupons; 
 d.  the NSO may have missed some households in the census; 
 e.  the NSO rural households listing excludes all households residing in 
cities or in urban areas, but many urban households are also engaged in 
agriculture and may receive coupons. 
 It is possible that the discrepancies in  Figure 5.6 result from all these causes. 
Examination of the fi gure certainly suggests that there has been some 
‘infl ation’ in MoAFS farm family estimates. The central region appears to 
have had a remarkable growth in farm families from 2005/6 to 2009/10 
(reaching 20% in 2009/10), with numbers then fl attening off and actually 
declining from 2010/11 to 2011/12. Combined with a spurt in growth in 
the southern region from 2008/9 to 2009/10, this resulted in an estimated 
increase of 14% in Malawian farm families in 2009/10. Northern region 
 














































































 Figure 5.6.  MoAFS farm families and NSO rural households 
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growth rates were also high from 2005/6 to 2007/8 and then fl attened off. 
These regional and temporal variations pose questions regarding the reli-
ability of the farm family estimates, and suggest that the NSO estimates 
may be more reliable—although they may also exclude some urban farm 
households. 4 
 Table 5.4 compares estimates of coupon issues and receipts from these dif-
ferent sources. Higher MoAFS farm family estimates lead to higher estimates 
of total coupon receipts, exceeding MoAFS formal allocations in 2008/9 and 
2010/11 (although there may have been substantial informal supplementary 
allocations in 2008/9, this was not the case in 2010/11 when the excess is 
 4  The small increase in the NSO rural household growth rates from 2008/9 is due to post-2008 
estimates relying on 2008 rather than 1997 census data. 
 5  Estimates of the percentage of households receiving coupons are in broad agreement with 
survey results for six districts in central and southern Malawi reported by Holden and Lunduka 
(2010b) with 68 and 75% of households receiving coupons in 2007/8 and 2008/9 respectively, and 
1.4 and 1.5 coupons per recipient household in the same years. Chibwana et al. (2010) estimate 
that 77% of households received fertilizer coupons in 2008/9 in samples from two districts in 
central and southern Malawi. 
 Table 5.4.  Estimates of fertilizer coupon issues and receipts from 
different sources 5 
 2006/7  2008/9  2010/11 
 A. Households receiving one or 
more coupons 
 54%  67%  79% 
 B. Coupons received per recipient 
household 
 1.7  1.5  1.4 
 C. Coupons received per house-
hold (all households) 
 1.01  1.12  1.13 
 D. Estimate of total coupons 
received, NSO based rural 
household estimates (millions) 
 2.51  2.79  2.73 
 E. Estimate of total coupons 
received, MoAFS farm family 
estimates (millions) 
 3.32  4.11  4.42 
 F. MoAFS voucher allocation 
(millions) 
 3.48  3.91  3.20 
 Discrepancy as % of missing cou-
pons as % MoAFS allocations 
 G. Using NSO rural household 
estimates (D as % of F) 
 28%  28%  15% 
 H. Using MoAFS farm family 
estimates (E as % of F) 
 5%  −5%  −38% 
 Sources : 2006/7, 2008/9, and 2010/11 household surveys; Logistic Unit reports; author 
calculations from National Statistical Offi ce (2008a) and data supplied by MoAFS. 
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greatest). Lower NSO-based rural household estimates, however, lead to lower 
estimates of total coupon receipts, considerably below MoAFS formal alloca-
tions in all three years. 
 Following the discussion above of  Figure 5.6 and the use of NSO rural house-
hold defi nitions in the farm household estimates of coupons received per 
household, we may expect more reliable estimates of total coupon receipts 
using the NSO rural household estimates. This suggests that a total of 3.3 ris-
ing to 4.4 million fertilizer coupons were distributed to rural households in 
the 2006/7, 2008/9, and 2010/11 seasons. We discuss later the implications of 
this for estimates of diversion and fraud in the programme. 
 Comparable analysis for seed coupons is diffi cult, as a result of changing 
systems and quantities of seed coupon allocations. However, 2008/9 and 
2010/11 survey estimates of coupon receipts per household multiplied by 
estimated rural household numbers give total coupon receipt estimates that 
are close to MoAFS records of total allocations. 
 5.4.3.  Coupon distribution processes and performance 
 Section 5.4.1 has described broad processes for coupon distribution. In 
this section we examine these in a little more detail, comparing formal 
procedures adopted by the programme with those actually reported in 
2006/7, 2008/9, and 2010/11 farm household surveys and focus group 
discussions. We consider how procedures and criteria for coupon alloca-
tion and distribution have changed, the timing of these activities, their 
outcomes in terms of the numbers of coupons distributed, and percep-
tions of these processes. 
 Formal instructions for coupon allocation and distribution have specifi ed 
who should be involved and procedures to be used. These instructions have 
changed over time in response to both diffi culties and complaints on the 
one hand and examples of success on the other. Thus, in 2005/6 Traditional 
Authorities (TAs) were tasked with allocating coupons between villages within 
EPAs, and Village Development Committees (VDC) with allocating coupons 
between households within villages. Complaints that some TAs and VDCs 
were subverting allocations led to instructions in 2006/7 that allocations be 
made by district, area, and village committees in accordance with standard 
local government structures, with detailed terms of reference and member-
ship for each committee. Benefi ciaries, were supposed to be ‘full time small-
holder farmers who cannot afford to purchase one or two bags of fertilizer at 
prevailing commercial prices, as determined by local leaders in their areas’. 
Guidelines also specifi ed that coupons should be issued to benefi ciaries ‘just 
before they go to a market point to purchase inputs, to minimize chances of 
abusing them’. 
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
FISP activities and achievements
105
 In 2007/8 programme objectives and formal targeting criteria were 
amended to give greater emphasis to concerns for vulnerable households. 
Systems for allocation and distribution of coupons within districts were also 
modifi ed to give less power to TAs and more responsibility to MoAFS staff, fol-
lowing support from communities to disburse vouchers through MoAFS staff 
following the 2006/7 programme experience. ‘Flexi-seed’ vouchers were also 
introduced, allowing households who were not given a set of vouchers for 
the maize seed and fertilizer package to nevertheless benefi t from subsidized 
maize, legume, or cotton seed. This was not, however, particularly popular as 
there were very limited supplies of legume seed, cotton seed was wanted by 
relatively few farmers, and many farmers saw it as a poor substitute for receipt 
of fertilizer coupons. Flexi-seed coupons were discontinued in 2009/10 and 
replaced by specifi c legume seed coupons. 
 In 2008/9 all farm families were registered and the list of registered farm 
families was used in subsequent identifi cation of benefi ciaries in ‘open vil-
lage meetings’ led by teams involving MoAFS staff, local government staff, 
religious leaders, VDC members, and civil society representatives. Benefi ciary 
lists were compiled by village and EPA and district. These lists were then 
checked by the Logistics Unit against allocations before distribution registers 
were printed with benefi ciary names by village and delivered to the MoAFS. 
Similar procedures were followed from 2009/10 to 2011/12 except that ben-
efi ciaries were also supposed to have voter ID cards from the 2009 elections 
and there were further increases in emphasis on benefi ciary targeting to focus 
on more vulnerable households—emphasizing child-headed, female-headed, 
or orphan-headed households, those infected or affected with HIV and AIDS, 
and guardians or carers of vulnerable people (all of whom should be also be 
Malawians owning land). 
 Key informant interviews, information from community questionnaires, 
and anecdotal evidence suggest that a wider variety of coupon allocation 
and distribution procedures has been followed than would be expected 
from consistent implementation of the formal instructions. Thus, in 
2006/7 the involvement of the DDC (District Development Committee) 
and VDC was almost, but not quite, universal with, for example, in one 
surveyed district only one committee level under the DDC organizing bulk 
transport of fertilizers for farmers. The extent and nature of involvement of 
the TAs in the process varied widely, and was strongest in the central region 
where there were reports of TAs subverting the process in various ways. 
Targeting criteria reported also varied markedly between districts with, for 
example, different emphases on farmers’ inability to otherwise afford fer-
tilizer purchase. 
 Wide variations in practice were also associated with the introduction of 
open meetings from 2008/9. First the extent of their adoption varied, with 81 
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and 96% of respondents reporting open meetings for allocation and distribu-
tion of fertilizer coupons in 2008/9, and similar fi gures for 2010/11. Where 
open meetings were adopted, some FGDs described them as meetings where 
pre-determined benefi ciary lists were announced, while others reported 
actual participatory selection of benefi ciaries. Some respondents recognized 
their value in informing people about the programme and consequently 
helping to reduce struggles and confl icts, but perceptions also appear to be 
conditional on perceptions about changing numbers of available coupons 
compared to the previous year. 
 As regards the second, supplementary allocation of coupons, a large pro-
portion of respondents reported that these were distributed based on the 
choices of traditional leaders and, in other cases, by politicians mainly tar-
geting their supporters and party sympathizers. However, Chinsinga (2012b) 
documents reports of some more general political interference in coupon 
allocation. 
 A signifi cant and widely practiced variation from offi cial procedures has 
involved ‘redistribution’ of coupons. Coupon allocations should lead to all 
benefi ciaries getting two coupons for ‘maize fertilizer’ (one for NPK and one 
for urea). However, substantial numbers of respondents report receipt of one 
coupon (or even the proceeds of a part of a coupon). This is also reported by 
Holden and Lunduka (2010b) and we discuss this further with regard to tar-
geting outcomes in Chapter 10. 
 We now turn from a description of coupon allocation and distribution pro-
cesses to consideration of performance in these activities as regards timing 
and respondents’ perceptions of effectiveness. Discussion of diversion and 
fraud in coupon allocation is deferred to its own section later in this chapter, 
while targeting is considered later in Chapter 10. 
 Information on the timing of benefi ciaries’ receipt of coupons is available 
from the 2006/7, 2008/9, and 2010/11 household surveys. This is summa-
rized across all regions in  Figure 5.7 and shows a clear improving trend over 
the three surveys, but with only 40% of benefi ciaries receiving their cou-
pons by the end of October in 2010/11 (70% in the south, 11% in the cen-
tre, and none in the north) there is still need for considerable improvement. 
Community survey respondents reported similar patterns. 
 Survey respondents have also been asked to rate different aspects of pro-
gramme implementation from very good to very bad. In  Table 5.5 scorings 
on timing show small but steady annual improvements in perceptions of 
timing since the start of the programme, with overall ratings moving from 
‘bad’ to ‘not good, not bad’ from 2005/6 to 2010/11. Ratings of methods 
of coupon distribution and of criteria for coupon distribution have not 
changed much, and are broadly ‘not good, not bad’. Perceptions of numbers 
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
FISP activities and achievements
107
of coupons distributed have been declining. This may result from changes 
in the average number of coupons received per recipient (see  Table 5.4 ) as a 
result of the increasing redistribution of coupons discussed earlier. Holden 
and Lunduka (2010b) fi nd that 28% of respondents in 2008/9 reported 
‘insuffi cient coupons’ as the main problem with the programme, while 
42% considered corruption to be the main problem. However Holden and 
Lunduka (2010a) also report that 31% of respondents from the same sur-
vey suggested that more or enough coupons should be supplied, with 20% 
suggesting that the coupon distribution system need to be improved, 10% 
each suggesting providing more inputs and introducing a general fertilizer 
subsidy, and 9% suggesting that chiefs be removed from involvement in 
coupon distribution. 
 The fi nal issue to be discussed on coupon distribution is the extent to which 
farmers had to pay for coupons. We may expect some under-reporting of 
this. Five per cent of fertilizer coupons were reported as being obtained with 
some payment in both 2006/7 and 2008/9 (this is lower than the estimate of 
14% for 2008/9 survey reported by Holden and Lunduka (2010b)). Reported 
sources of such fertilizer included TAs and headmen, agricultural staff, VDC 
members, traders, and fellow farmers. A much lower fi gure of 2% was found 
in 2010/11. Reported prices varied dramatically, with medians of 600MK per 
coupon in 2006/7, 2000MK in 2008/9 (when prices for unsubsidized ferti-
lizer were very high) and 1000MK in 2010/11 (Holden and Lunduka (2010b) 

















 Figure 5.7.  Percentage of benefi ciaries reporting receipt of maize fertilizer 
coupons by end of each month 
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 5.5.  Coupon redemption 
 As with input and coupon distribution, we consider coupon redemption with 
an overview of systems and then consider achievements and performance 
over the life of the programme. 
 5.5.1.  Redemption systems 
 Redemption of coupons for subsidized inputs essentially involves the pres-
entation of a valid coupon and any necessary payment to an authorized 
retailer who, after checking the validity of the coupon, issues the specifi ed 
input. Three main systems have been used over the life of the programme: 
redemption of fertilizer coupons by parastatals (SFFRFM and ADMARC), 
redemption of fertilizer coupons by approved private retailers in the 2006/7 
and 2007/8 seasons, and redemption of seed coupons by parastatals or pri-
vate retailers from 2006/7. 6 We describe core features of each of these sys-
tems: a description of more detailed changes between years is provided in 
Section 5.5.3. 
 Under the parastatal system for fertilizer redemption, fertilizer stocks are 
distributed to ADMARC and SFFRFM markets (some of which are specially 
opened during the input supply season) as described earlier. Benefi ciaries then 
present their coupons with the required farmer payment and the parastatal 
issues the fertilizer. ADMARC and SFFRFM were then supposed to return to 
the government both the money and coupons received from farmers. The 
 Table 5.5.  Scoring on different programme elements by year 
 2005/6  2006/7  2007/8  2008/9  2009/10  2010/11 
 Timing of 
distribution 
 2.73  2.73  2.56  2.01  2.20  1.93 
 Methods of 
coupon 
distribution 
 2.89  2.94  2.97  2.81  2.69  2.74 
 Criteria for 
coupon 
allocation 
 2.95  2.92  2.83  2.79  2.83 
 Number of 
coupons 
 2.96  3.02  3.07  3.16  3.20  3.36 
 Scores: 1 = very good; 2 = good; 3 = not good not bad; 4 = bad; 5 = very bad. 
 6  Some subsidized OPV maize seed was supplied through ADMARC and SFFRFM under the 
2005/6 programme without coupons with a 70% subsidy, but there is no further documentation 
of this. 
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extent to which coupons have been returned has varied between years, while 
information on reimbursement of farmer payments is not available. From 
2006/7 onwards fertilizer subsidy sales information has been reported by 
the Logistics Unit on the basis of stock reconciliations and, from 2006/7 to 
2010/11 on the basis of weekly market reports. 
 Redemption of fertilizer coupons by approved private retailers in the 2006/7 
and 2007/8 seasons was identical to redemption of coupons by parastatals as 
regards transactions with farmers. However, reimbursement for sales (of the 
retailer’s own stocks) was obtained by submission of invoices to the MoAFS 
supported by redeemed coupons, with reimbursement per coupon at a previ-
ously contracted price covering subsidy costs (with retailers keeping farmer 
payments as the unsubsidized part of the overall payment). 
 The seed coupon system has been based on annual agreements between 
the MoAFS and seed supply companies in the Seed Traders Association of 
Malawi (STAM). Under these agreements individual companies contract 
with different retailers to supply them with seed approved for subsidized 
sale, and then to receive from these retailers the details of subsidized sales, 
with supporting coupons. The seed companies subsequently invoice the 
MoAFS for each seed coupon returned to them as a result of its use in pur-
chasing their seed. The distribution between retailers and seed supply com-
panies of MoAFS payments and of any farmer payments are a matter for 
negotiation between retailers and seed supply companies and are not a mat-
ter for MoAFS. 
 An important issue in coupon redemption is the setting of redemption fees 
to be paid by farmers. As indicated earlier in  Table 5.1 , while fertilizer prices 
have risen over the life of the programme, farmer contributions through the 
redemption price have fallen by almost 50% in nominal terms (more in real 
terms), from 950MK per bag to 500MK/bag for ‘maize fertilizers’, and the sub-
sidy has therefore increased from around 65% to over 90%. Fertilizer redemp-
tion prices have been politically determined, generally announced by the 
president in political statements or at rallies. There is little evidence of any 
technocratic involvement in the setting of these prices, which are very low: 
when a price of 500MK/bag was announced for the 2012/13 season it was 
widely criticized as a contributor to high and unsustainable and distortionary 
programme costs undermining budgets for other MoAFS activities. Politics 
has generally played a smaller role in the setting of seed prices, which have 
been negotiated by seed companies and the MoAFS. However in 2007/8 agree-
ment that farmer redemption payments (‘top ups’) of up to 100MK could be 
charged per 2 kg pack of hybrid seed had to be abandoned following a politi-
cal statement that all subsidized maize seed was free. Seed redemption prices 
are less important than fertilizer prices, both politically and in their impact 
on the programme budget. 
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 5.5.2.  Total redemption 
 Figure 5.8 shows the total volumes of fertilizer and seed redemptions by year. 
Subsidized fertilizer sales increased from 2005/6 to 2007/8, and were con-
siderably over budget from 2006/7 to 2008/9 (with budgeted fertilizer sales 
of 150,000 MT in 2006/7 and 170,000MT in 2007/8 and 2008/9). The lower 
sales from 2009/10 were almost exactly on budget. Maize seed sales increased 
from 2006/7 to 2010/11 but fell back in 2011/12. Hybrid maize seed sales 
increased dramatically from 2007/8 to 2009/10, with reduced sales of OPV 
seed, but OPV sales then grew again in 2010/11 and 2011/12—with hybrid 
seed sales hardly growing in 2010/11 and then declining in 2011/12. There 
were also dramatic increases in legume seed sales in 2009/10 and 2010/11, 
with 2011/12 sales a little lower than in 2010/11. 
 5.5.3.  Coupon redemption performance 
 Apart from the introduction of private sector seed and fertilizer sales in 
2006/7 and the withdrawal of private sector fertilizer sales in 2009/10, the 
only major changes in redemption processes between years have been vari-
ation in redemption payments required from farmers. These are set out in 
 Table 5.6 . Variation in pack sizes for hybrid and OPV seed packs and in farmer 
top up payments required for different varieties led to some competition and 
farmer choice, where different seed stockists accessible to benefi ciaries carried 
different or a range of stocks. 
 Performance in coupon redemption can be considered in terms of avail-
ability of inputs for redemption, and timing and costs of redemption. These 











































































 Figure 5.8.  Subsidized fertilizer and seed sales by year 
 Source : Calculations from Logistics Unit (2011) and earlier reports. 
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 Lack or limited availability of inputs when needed has been a major dif-
fi culty that has frequently delayed purchase and use of subsidized inputs. We 
have discussed in earlier sections how for fertilizers this has been caused by 
late opening of seasonal markets, late distribution of inputs to markets, and 
late distribution of coupons to benefi ciaries—and how these three factors 
interact—as late market opening and coupon distribution makes timely input 
distribution to markets more diffi cult, and hence fertilizer stock-outs more 
likely. Farmers and sellers have no fl exibility in substituting between types of 
fertilizer since coupons are specifi c to each type of fertilizer. With seeds, how-
ever, there has been more fl exibility, with opportunities to exchange maize 
seed coupons for different varieties of hybrid and OPV seed, if different stocks 
are available. 





 Maize seed pack  Legume seed 











 2005/6  *  OPV pack 
size 
 n/a*  n/a*  -  - 
 2006/7  950  2 kg hybrid 
seed or 
3 or 4 kg 
OPV seed 
 0  400  -  - 




 0**  400  2 kg  400 




 0  680  2 kg  680 




 <=100MK  1500  2 kg  350 




 <=100MK  1650  2 kg  740 




 <=100MK  1815  0MK for 
2 kg 
 815 
 * 950MK per bag for 23:21:0 and urea, 1450MK per bag for Compound D and CAN. 
 ** Farmer top ups agreed initially but subsequent political announcements led to confusion and inconsistent 
payments. 
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 Stock-outs have been relatively common in all years of the programme, 
have affected all inputs, and in 2006/7 were experienced by both private and 
parastatal retailers. 7 However when they manage to get their inputs farmers 
are generally pleased with the fertilizers they get, but are sometimes disap-
pointed by lack of availability of hybrid maize seed and specifi c types of leg-
ume seed. We discuss access to maize seed further in Chapter 8. 
 Stock-outs lead to increased time and cost for farmers travelling to and from 
and waiting at markets, and while it appears that hours travelling and waiting 
have increased over the life of the programme there is no clear evidence of 
changes in transport and other costs or in distances to markets (see  Table 5.7 ). 
 Stock-outs also provide sales clerks with opportunities to demand extra pay-
ments for access to limited stocks. This is a problem that is widely reported in the 
media and in focus group discussions and key informant interviews.  Table 5.8 
provides survey estimates of the extent and nature of these extra demands. 
 Table 5.8 shows no clear trend in the frequency or size of extra payments. 
In 2006/7 the percentage of coupons requiring tips and mean redemption 
price were lower at ADMARC/SFFRFM than at all other distributors, but this 
masks considerable variation between different distributors, with some hav-
ing a slightly lower reported incidence of tipping than ADMARC/SFFRFM. 
In 2008/9 and 2010/11 community survey respondents, focus group dis-
cussions, and key informant interviews all suggested that the payment of 
bribes to redeem inputs was more widespread than is suggested by the survey 
results, with focus groups suggesting that this was closely related to prob-
lems of queuing. Chinsinga (2009) also reported extra payments of 200MK 
to 800MK per bag of fertilizer being demanded by some ADMARC staff (with 
 7  Holden and Lunduka (2010b) fi nd that only 7% of respondents in 2008/9 reported ‘insuffi -
cient inputs’ as the main problem with the programme. However data from the same survey indi-
cate that 19% of households considered fertilizer to arrive too late, 6% considered it was on time 
but insuffi cient, and 8% considered it both late and insuffi cient (equivalent fi gures for 2007/8 
were 37%, 6%, and 6%, respectively) (Holden and Lunduka, 2010a). 
 Table 5.7.  Reported distances to buy inputs, time spent buying inputs, and costs for 
transport and miscellaneous expenses 










 Mean  Median  Mean  median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
 2006/7  13  7  247  150  7  5  7  5 
 2008/9  17  9  304  200  9  5  14  8 
 2010/11  23  12  270  200  5  4  8  6 
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those unable to pay being required to wait two or three days before they 
were served); extortion of cash from benefi ciaries by criminal elements to 
‘facilitate’ input acquisition; and organized theft through tricking farmers. 
The Farmers Union of Malawi (2011) report that 5% of their sample of regis-
tered benefi ciaries reported being asked to pay bribes for input redemption 
although 42% considered it common or very common to be asked for such a 
bribe. 8 However, only 20% of those asked for a bribe reported that they had 
paid it. The Farmers Union of Malawi (2011) FGDs also reported that women 
were particularly vulnerable to these demands 
 It is diffi cult to determine if extra payments made for hybrid seed are cor-
rupt, as extra payments have been supposed to be made for some hybrid 
varieties in some years. However, no payments should have been required for 
OPV or legume seed, but 12% and 11% of respondents reported making some 
payment for OPV and legume seed in 2010/11, respectively. 
 5.6.  Diversion and fraud 
 Diversion of subsidized inputs away from intended benefi ciaries is an issue 
that has been raised in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. Diversion takes several forms, 
from inclusion errors in targeting (whereby inputs go to smallholder farmers 
who were not supposed to get them) through leakages (for example, as a result 
of sales of vouchers or subsidized inputs at low prices) to outright fraud and 
corruption, where people capture subsidized inputs as a result of direct crimi-
nal activity or as a result of political infl uence (and of course illegal political 
capture is itself criminal). We make a distinction here between mis-targeting 
within the smallholder sector and diversion outside the smallholder sector. 
 Table 5.8.  Reported extra payments for coupon redemption (MK/bag fertilizer) 














 2006/7  Private  27%  950  1,223  273  n/a 
 2006/7  Parastatal  18%  950  983  33  n/a 
 2008/9  Parastatal  14%  800  827  27  200 
 2010/11  Parastatal  9%  500  536  36  250–500 
 8  This divergence between perceived frequency and reported experience is interesting and may 
inform interpretation of FGD information—perhaps suggesting that the incidence of these prob-
lems is overstated in FGDs. 
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Targeting is the subject of Chapter 10. We consider here evidence regarding 
the extent of leakage or diversion outside the smallholder sector. 9 
 Illegal activities are inevitably clandestine and diffi cult to trace. There have 
been numerous media reports of cases of theft and fraud regarding FISP cou-
pons and inputs (Tambulasi, 2009), successful prosecutions, and on-going 
police, audit, and Anti-Corruption Bureau investigations. There are also fre-
quent allegations of fraud by village offi cials and extension agents in focus 
group discussions and key informant interviews. It is, however, very diffi cult to 
obtain objective and comprehensive estimates of the extent of these activities. 
The lack of transparency in coupon allocation when combined with excess 
demand for coupons leads to perceptions of and complaints about corruption 
and diversion of coupons, and this may occur even in situations where these 
perceptions and complaints may not be warranted. In addition, while there 
may be many cases that are not discovered, acute interest in those cases that 
are discovered may lead to over-estimates of their occurrence and scale. 
 Fraud may arise in a number of ways: through voucher allocation to non-
existent (‘ghost’) benefi ciaries (or villages), with theft of the allocated vouch-
ers by Ministry of Agriculture staff and/or Traditional Authorities, diversion 
of vouchers to people with power (government staff, traditional leaders, or 
politicians) or to criminals for sale, direct allocation to non-benefi ciaries, 
and printing of extra or counterfeit vouchers within or outside the system. 
There may also be thefts of inputs. Another type of corruption is operated by 
some who act as gatekeepers, with village headmen or sales clerks demand-
ing bribes (extra payments or services) in exchange for coupons or coupon 
redemption which benefi ciaries are entitled to without such bribes. This last 
form of corruption was discussed in Sections 5.4.3 and 5.5.3. 
 Although there should be control systems that prevent or at least moni-
tor these different types and sources of fraud, the existence and operation of 
these systems have not always been clear, or, as with some audits, their imple-
mentation has been slow and a full picture has still to emerge. The extent and 
investigation of diversion has also been affected by changing political condi-
tions, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
 The divergence in estimated number of households between the NSO cen-
sus and the MoAFS farm registry (discussed in Section 5.4.2) poses diffi culties 
in using household surveys to investigate this issue. For example, with the 
NSO farm family estimate it appears that 2.7 million fertilizer coupons were 
received by smallholder farmers in 2010/11 against a recorded allocation of 
3.2 million, leading to an estimate of 0.5 million ‘missing’ coupons (15% of 
those issued, compared to 28% in 2008/9). However, with the MoAFS farm 
 9  It should be noted that some apparent targeting errors within the smallholder sector also 
involve the abuse of power and infl uence by people who are smallholder farmers. 
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family estimate it appears that 4.4 million fertilizer coupons were received by 
smallholder farmers in 2010/11 against a recorded allocation of 3.2 million, 
leading to receipts exceeding issues by 38% (compared to 5% in 2008/9). 
These diffi culties are compounded by the lack of a nationally representative 
sample for the 2010/11 FISP survey. However, they do suggest that if the NSO 
fi gures are taken as being closer to the to the true population with the NSO (as 
opposed to MoAFS) household defi nition (as suggested by earlier examina-
tion of the differences in regional changes in MoAFS fi gures and by the survey 
using NSO households for sampling and the NSO household defi nition) then 
high losses in 2008/9 have been substantially reduced in 2010/11. 
 We can, however, go further than this to make some very broad estimates 
of leakage and diversion of subsidy vouchers and inputs outside the small-
holder sector. The basis of these is the diagram of possible voucher and subsi-
dized input fl ows in  Figure 5.9 . The diagram shows on the left hand side the 
legitimate fl ows of vouchers and inputs within the smallholder sector, and 
on the right the illegitimate fl ows of vouchers and inputs outside the small-
holder sector. Boxes in bold represent variables for which we have estimates 
from household surveys or administrative records (although estimates for 
smallholders’ cheap purchases are not available for 2006/7). This then allows 
some estimation of the scale of diversion fi rst of vouchers (by comparison 
of estimates of voucher receipts and use by smallholders against programme 
voucher redemptions) and then of subsidized seed and fertilizers (by com-
parison of estimated input acquisition and use by smallholders against total 
programme supply). These estimations are prone to error, fi rst as a result of 
uncertainty regarding the total number of farm households (as discussed ear-
lier) and second as a result of making estimates by subtraction, which tends 
to magnify percentage errors. Nevertheless, these estimates may be taken to 
provide some broad indications of the changes in the scale of diversion in 
the programme. These are set out in  Table 5.9 for the 2006/7, 2008/9, and 
2010/11 years when survey data were available. As in Section 5.4.2, we take 
the NSO-based estimates of the number of rural households to be most reli-
able and consistent with the sample surveys. 
 The results of this analysis are presented in  Table 5.9 (capital letters in 
each row refer to the framework in  Figure 5.9 ). This suggests that there were 
very high leakages or diversions outside the smallholder sector in 2006/7 
and 2008/9, with smallholders receiving only 63 and 68% respectively of 
recorded coupon issues. Despite their smaller share of disbursed coupons in 
2006/7, it appears that smallholders redeemed a higher percentage of their 
coupons as compared with others, and as a result bought a greater share of 
the subsidized fertilizers than in 2008/9. Of the fertilizers bought by oth-
ers under the subsidy in 2008/9, however, a large proportion (about 50%) 
appears to have been sold to smallholders at lower than unsubsidized prices, 
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so that the smallholder sector ended up using about 80% of the subsidized 
supplies—though a little over 25% of this was not purchased with the full 
subsidy. This is broadly comparable with Holden and Lunduka (2010b) who 
estimate that in 2008/9 21% of total household fertilizer use was obtained 
through cheap purchases of fertilizer (and 25% through purchased cou-
pons). In 2010/11, however, smallholder farmers received a higher, but still 
not high enough, proportion of voucher issues (85%) and it is also estimated 
that in addition almost all the diverted subsidy fertilizer sales were then 
resold to smallholders (again at prices between full and zero subsidy). If 
smallholders are assumed to have received around 50% of the subsidy when 
buying originally subsidized fertilizers from other sellers then the propor-
tion of fertilizer subsidy captured by others fell from a little under 30% of the 
subsidy in 2008/9 to a little over 10% in 2010/12. Since the subsidy volume 
was approximately 25% higher in 2008/9, and the price of fertilizers was 
approximately 65% higher, the estimated loss through diversion fell by just 
under 80% from 2008/9 to 2010/11. 10 
 






































 Figure 5.9.  Flows of coupons and subsidized inputs 
 10  A similar analysis for maize seeds in 2010/11 (Dorward and Chirwa, 2011) and administrative 
records suggests substantial numbers of counterfeit maize seed coupons that year. These have less 
national and political signifi cance and less individual and aggregate value than fertilizer coupons, 
but nevertheless offer substantial income opportunities for criminal activities. 
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
FISP activities and achievements
117
 Despite the apparently precise estimates presented here, these should be 
taken as illustrative—sampling error will affect survey estimates and, as dis-
cussed earlier, there is uncertainty regarding the number of farm families and 
the subtractions in the calculations may magnify errors. Nevertheless, the broad 
conclusion that there were substantial reductions in the extent and value of 
diversion of subsidized fertilizer from 2008/9 to 2010/11 is likely to be robust. 
While it appears that there is still substantial diversion of fertilizer subsidy ben-
efi ts away from smallholders, it is instructive to compare this with, for example, 
the UK Income Support Allowance, which in 2009/10 suffered from estimates 
of over-payments (estimates which are unlikely to be complete) of a little over 
5% as a result of fraud and error (Department for Work and Pensions, 2012). 
 These conclusions regarding levels and changes in diversion and fraud are 
compatible with the continued reports of variable but widespread diversion 
of fertilizer coupons in rural areas (by government staff, TAs, headmen, and 
VDC members). The apparent reduction in diversion of coupons and ferti-
lizers that never reach rural areas (‘Others’ low price/redemption use—P+Q’ 
 Table  5.9.  Estimated shares of coupon and subsidized fertilizer receipts by smallholders 
and others 1 
 2006/7  2008/9  2010/11 
 Coupons % recorded issues 
 Recorded issues (from MoAFS and Logistics Unit)—A  100%  100%  100% 
 Received by smallholders, exc. purchases—B  63%  68%  85% 
 Received by others (by subtraction)—A-B = C-X  37%  32%  15% 
 Redemptions  Total (from Logistics Unit)—I + J  87%  102%  100% 
 Smallholders—I  63%  69%  78% 
 Others (by subtraction)—J  25%  34%  22% 
 Counterfeits/extras redeemed (min.)  -13%  2%  0% 
 Fertilizers % subsidy sales 
 Total subsidy sales (from Logistics Unit)—I + J  100%  100%  100% 
 Smallholder redemption & use—N  72%  58%  78% 
 Others’ redemption—J by subtraction  28%  42%  22% 
 Smallholder low price purchases—O  n/a  21%  21% 
 Total smallholder use—N + O  n/a  79%  99% 
 Others’ low price/redemption use—P + Q  n/a  21%  1% 
 1 Smallholder low price purchases (O) are estimated as all purchases below a cut-off price. In 2008/9, there was a 
much greater range of fertilizer prices reported by respondents, and the cut-off point for ‘low price’ purchases was 
set at 150MK/kg, around 70% of the standard commercial price. For 2010/11 examination of the data suggested a 
cut-off point of 85MK/kg, around 85% of the standard commercial price. However some of the higher price purchases 
could be for stock from the subsidy if some traders bought subsidized fertilizers and sold it as if it were commercial, 
particularly when selling in smaller quantities. Allowance for this might suggest somewhat higher reselling of sub-
sidized purchases than estimated above, in which case estimates of ‘others low price redemption and use (P + Q)’ 
would fall. However, the broader conclusions of this section would not be signifi cantly changed—indeed some would 
be strengthened. 
 Source : Author calculations from survey data. 
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in  Table 5.9 is dramatically reduced in 2010/11) is also compatible with a 
reduced and changed political signifi cance and role of the programme after 
the 2008/9 election, as mentioned earlier in Chapter 4. Further information 
on these matters may become available in the future as ongoing audit inves-
tigations continue (but these tend to be slow with, for example, media reports 
in 2012 regarding audit investigations of the 2007/8 and 2008/9 programmes) 
and with the change in government in 2012 opening up the political space 
for investigations of prior fraud. 
 5.7.  Farmer support 
 Proper use of subsidized seed and fertilizer is an important determinant of the 
impact of the FISP, and this would suggest that access to extension advice on 
use of fertilizer and improved seeds should be an important component of 
the programme. The household surveys in 2006/7, 2008/9, and 2010/11 do 
not show any consistent changes by year but between 15% and 20% of farm-
ers (benefi ciaries and non-benefi ciaries) received extension advice on fertiliz-
ers and maize varieties, with advice on average being considered moderately 
useful. A greater proportion of farmers in the north received advice than in 
the other two regions, while a somewhat lower proportion of female-headed 
households and poorer households receiving advice (as compared with male-
headed households and less-poor households). 
 5.8.  Programme fi nance and costs 
 The fi nal major implementation issue that we address in this chapter is the cost 
of the programme. We consider overall programme cost to provide a measure 
of fi scal resources used by the programme and of its sources. Examination of 
the cost breakdown and comparison of actual and budgeted costs provides 
further information on resource use and fi nancial management. 
 Constructing a consistent set of fi nancial information about the pro-
gramme over the period 2005/6 to 2011/12 faces a number of diffi culties: 
 1.  There are diffi culties with the treatment of farmer payments for ferti-
lizer sold though ADMARC and SFFRFM. For inputs supplied through 
the private sector, the government reimburses the supplier at an agreed 
rate which is calculated as the cost of input supply less farmer payments. 
However, for fertilizers supplied through ADMARC and SFFRFM, the 
government bears the whole cost of supply and requires reimbursement 
of farmer payments from ADMARC and SFFRFM. There are no publicly 
available accounts of this, though anecdotal information suggests that 
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SFFRFM has been repaying these monies in full for a number of years 
while ADMARC only began to increase its payments in later years. 
 2.  There are substantial gaps in reported costs in different years, leaving 
analysis with decisions to make about estimating these in some years 
but not others, and with doubts about their completeness when they are 
included. 
 3.  Fertilizers may be bought one year and carried over to the next as stock. 
These costs have been handled in different ways in different years, and 
when there are large price rises and falls between years these pose dif-
fi culties for allocating costs between years. 
 4.  There are substantial programme costs that do not appear in any 
accounts—for example, the costs of extension staff time allocated to the 
programme, for at least three months of the year, are not included in 
any fi nancial costs for the programme. 
 5.  Finally, and expanding on the previous two points, there are differences 
between annual fi scal accounts of the programme on the one hand 
(important for consideration of the programme’s fi scal impacts) and eco-
nomic analysis of the programme’s opportunity costs. While this differ-
ence may be conceptually clear, this is often not the case in practice. 
 As a result of these practical and conceptual diffi culties in recording pro-
gramme costs, different statements of aggregate costs may be found in dif-
ferent contexts. 
 Our best estimates of programme costs from 2005/6 to 2011/12 are set out 
in  Table A5.1 . This provides some detail on different information available 
and unavailable in different years and is the basis for information presented 
in  Figure 5.10 . 
 There are a number of points of interest in  Figure 5.10 . First, we note how 
programme costs appeared to be increasing exponentially from 2005/6 to 
2008/9, while the programme budget was supposed to rise more slowly and 
steadily. This led to an increase in estimated expenditure from US$74 to 
US$250 million from 2006/7 to 2008/9, with the programme accounting 
for 68% and 16% of the MoAFS and national budgets and 6.6% of GDP 
in 2008/9. However, while the 2009/10 budget continued to rise, 2009/10 
actual programme costs fell dramatically below the budget, and although 
costs rose again above the budget in 2010/11 and 2011/12 they remained 
below half of the 2008/9 levels in relation to the national budget and GDP 
(at or below 8% and 3% respectively). The major cost item causing pro-
gramme cost changes is clearly the cost of fertilizer (which here includes 
procurement and transport to markets), as seed and other costs are respon-
sible for a small proportion of programme costs and show a steady increase 
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over the life of the programme (due to increases in seed volumes and prices 
and greater reporting of other cost items). Fertilizer costs are then the prod-
uct of volumes and prices, as shown earlier in  Figures  5.4,  5.5, and  5.8, 
respectively.  Figure 5.8 shows that fertilizer volumes increased dramatically 
from 2005/6 to 2007/8, and then fell back somewhat in 2008/9 (though 
they were still above 2006/7 volumes) before being rigorously cut and held 
to budget from 2009/10 onwards. The major cause of the price spike in 
2008/9 was therefore high international fertilizer prices, as clearly shown 
in  Figures 5.4 and  5.5 . The pattern of rising fertilizer volumes from 2005/6 
to 2008/9, the commitment to these volumes despite very high prices and 
costs in 2008/9, and then the rigorous cut in volumes after 2008/9 have to 
be seen in the context of the changing political circumstances before and 
after the May 2009 presidential and parliamentary elections, as discussed in 
the previous chapter. 
 5.9.  Summary 
 This chapter has set out the main features of the evolving design and imple-
mentation of the Farm Input Subsidy Programme from 2005/6 to 2011/12. 
















Fertilizer costs (net)  (US$ million)
Seed costs (US$ million)Other costs  (US$ million)
Programme budget (US$ million)
Cost, % MoAFS budget Cost, % national budget
Cost, % GDP
 Figure 5.10.  Budgeted and actual programme costs 
 Sources : see  Table A5.1. 
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in which design and implementation have evolved in response to lessons 
learnt and, importantly, changing political conditions. Key programme ele-
ments as set out in Chapter 2 concern its stated food security and productivity 
objectives, its focus on producers of staple crops, the importance of political 
commitment to its establishment and operation, and the consequent effects 
of that on targeting, rationing, and diversion. Other ongoing challenges are 
noted, with regard to timeliness of input delivery to farmers and involvement 
of the private sector in the fertilizer supply system, although cost comparisons 
for private and public sector distribution are not clear cut. The changing fi scal 
costs of the programme illustrate both the political pressures for programme 
continuation and expansion (and resource diversion), and the potential for 
scaling the programme back when political conditions and strategies change. 
Implementation of the programme has clearly been affected by continua-
tion of the political considerations that led to its establishment, as discussed 
in Chapter  4. Chinsinga (2012b) reports considerable frustration among 
senior MoAFS staff at the way that the president’s political interest in the 
programme inhibited discussion and implementation of technical sugges-
tions for programme improvement. These sensitivities also affected relations 
between donors and programme management within MoAFS and engage-
ment with monitoring and evaluation activities. The high costs in 2008/9 
also highlight the vulnerability of the programme to international fertilizer 
prices (a vulnerability that is again likely to be evident in the 2012/13 season, 
following the major devaluation of the Malawi Kwacha in 2012). 
 The programme shares many of the design and implementation features 
of other recent subsidy programmes in Africa, as reviewed in Chapter 3. As 
regards objectives, there is a focus on producer gains and on household and 
national food self-suffi ciency, with a lack of regard for consumer interests and 
wider growth processes. There is also limited attention to improving input 
effi ciency, soil fertility replenishment, and fertilizer supply system develop-
ment. This focus is consistent with switching attention to monitoring and 
evaluation and auditing over the life of the programme and associated with 
the political management of the programme by the president. It is also con-
sistent with a relative lack of integrated attention paid both to complemen-
tary investments that will raise programme effi ciency and to ‘graduation’, the 
process by which benefi ciaries and the economies in which they are embed-
ded may grow out of the need for agricultural input subsidies. 11 As regards 
implementation, the programme involves heavy reliance on private sector 
 11  Some of these issues are addressed in the 2011–16 Medium Term plan for the programme 
(Government of Malawi, 2011) which has as its goal ‘to increase food security at household level 
through agricultural output growth’ and its purpose ‘to increase agricultural productivity and 
input market development’. 
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fertilizer imports and a substantial targeted and rationed subsidy distributed 
using vouchers, but limited success in household targeting. It also faces the 
widespread problem of late delivery of inputs to benefi ciaries. 
 These issues are the subject of Chapters 6 to 11 which consider benefi -
ciary, wider and private sector impacts of the programme, targeting, and 
graduation. 
 Table A5.1.  Estimated programme costs, 2005/6 to 2011/12 (US$ million) 
 2005/6  2006/7  2007/8  2008/9  2009/10  2010/11  2011/12 
 Exchange rate, 
MK/US$ 
 140.00  140.00  140.00  140.00  141.31  151.55  166.71 
 Recorded costs 
 Seeds—fl exi/
legumes 
 0.00  0.00  1.89  5.24  2.83  6.66  6.26 
 Seeds—maize  0.00  5.23  4.58  7.33  17.13  21.64  15.12 
 Cotton 
chemicals 
 0.00  0.00  0.24  n/a  0.00  0.00  n/a 
 Fertilizer b/f from 
y-1 
 0.00  0.00  11.82  24.88  35.17  0.00  0.00 
 Fertilizer—new 
supply 
 51.62  61.16  77.60  237.63  57.18  115.28  112.63 
 Fertilizer—pri-
vate retail 
 0.00  17.43  24.53  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 Transport costs  n/a  4.76  5.99  9.24  6.33  5.95  5.54 
 Logistics Unit 
operations 
 n/a  0.37  0.42  0.24  0.21  0.34  0.28 
 ADMARC 
operations 
 n/a  n/a  0.00  0.06  1.06  2.24  1.57 
 SFFRFM 
operations 
 n/a  0.75  1.41  n/a  n/a  2.05  0.98 
 District fi nancing  n/a  0.19  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
 Coupon 
production 
 n/a  0.11  0.09  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
 Communications  n/a  0.20  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
 Input quality 
monitoring 
 n/a  0.05  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
 M&E  n/a  0.29  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
 Buyback fi nance 
fees 
 0.00  0.39  n/a  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 Total recorded 
costs 
 51.62  90.92  128.58  284.63  119.92  154.16  142.38 
 Less: Farmer 
redemption 
due 
 19.62  17.02  21.32  23.12  11.43  10.59  8.39 
 Unused stock (exc. buyback) 
0.0 
 0.00  0.00  19.83  0.00  0.00  0.00 
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 2005/6  2006/7  2007/8  2008/9  2009/10  2010/11  2011/12 
 Net recorded 
Costs 
 32.00  73.90  107.26  241.68  108.49  143.57  133.91 
 Estimated other 
costs 
 Brought forward 
stocks 
 0.00  0.00  n/a  0.62  1.76  0.00  0.00 
 MoAFS 
operations 
 n/a  n/a  n/a  7.86  7.78  7.26  6.60 
 ADMARC/
SFFRFM 
 n/a  n/a  n/a  1.26  n/a  n/a  n/a 
 Voucher printing  n/a  n/a  n/a  0.14  0.14  0.13  0.00 
 Other agencies’ 
costs 
 n/a  n/a  n/a  0.23  0.23  0.21  0.19 
 Total est. other 
costs 
 n/a  n/a  10.11  9.91  7.60  6.79 
 Total net costs, 
recorded & 
estimated 
 n/a  n/a  n/a  251.79  118.40  151.17  140.70 




 n/a  n/a  n/a  274.91  129.83  161.76  149.09 
 Programme 
budget 
 36.43  53.57  82.14  139.14  155.04  129.99  129.48 
 Funding 
 Direct donor 
support 
 0.00  9.51  7.13  37.75  17.48  22.05  44.85 
 Balance: Malawi 
Govt. 
 n/a  64.39  100.13  214.04  100.92  129.12  95.84 
 Cost, % MoAFS 
budget 
 n/a  46.8%  57.2%  67.6%  52.7%  60.1%  48.9% 
 Cost, % national 
budget 
 n/a  6.8%  8.2%  16.2%  6.5%  8.0%  7.1% 
 Cost, % GDP  n/a  2.5%  3.1%  6.6%  2.5%  3.0%  n/a 
 Notes: Farmer redemption due on ADMARC and SFFRFM fertilizer sales. Malawi Government contribution based on 
recorded and estimated costs shown. 
 Sources : Author calculations from Logistics Unit Annual reports, Nakhumwa (2006), School of Oriental and African 
Studies et al. (2008), Dorward and Chirwa (2009, 2011a, 2012a), Dorward et al. (2010b), Malawi Government Annual 
Budget Statements. 
Table A5.1 (continued)
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 6 
 Direct impacts of input subsidies 
 6.1.  Introduction 
 In this chapter we examine evidence on the direct impacts of the subsidy fol-
lowing the causal chain set out in  Figure II.1 in the introduction to Part II. The 
most direct benefi t of the subsidy programme is to increase maize production 
at household level. This is also consistent with the programme’s objective of 
increasing maize productivity and national and household food security in 
Malawi as discussed in Chapter 5. Given diffi culties in obtaining maize pro-
duction and productivity data (as mentioned in Chapter 1, see also Dorward 
and Chirwa (2010b)), we discuss various estimates of programme maize pro-
duction impacts. We then draw on work reported in Chirwa et al. (2011d) 
to look at the contribution of the subsidy programme on welfare indicators 
for benefi ciaries—food consumption, self-assessed poverty, income, assets, 
incidences of shocks and stresses, health, and education. The collection of 
panel data in the periodic evaluation of the subsidy programme and the 
incorporation of the second Integrated Household Survey (IHS2) questions 
in the design of 2006/7, 2008/9, and 2010/11 surveys allows comparison of 
the same households from the 2002/3 or 2003/4 season and thus estimation 
of the impact of the subsidy programme on direct benefi ciary households, as 
compared with non-benefi ciaries, over time. Impacts are also assessed using 
a partial equilibrium model (Dorward and Chirwa, 2012b) and with related 
fi ndings in other studies. 
 There are, however, two main caveats to the household level analysis of 
direct benefi ciary impacts. First, some of the indicators are subjective assess-
ments by households: thus with diffi culties of calibration and differences 
in the timing of interviews, caution must be exercised in interpreting the 
panel level results. Second, if economy-wide effects (discussed in Chapter 7) 
are very strong, with the subsidy benefi ting many households which have 
not been benefi ciaries, the differential impacts at household level may be 
weak regardless of direct benefi ts or the number of times a household has 
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had access to subsidized fertilizers in the past six agricultural seasons. In such 
cases the econometric analysis may not be able to pick up small differences 
between benefi ciary and non-benefi ciary households. It should also be noted 
that although improved seeds are part of the subsidy programme, the analy-
sis of the impacts is focused on receipt of subsidized fertilizers as these are 
generally correlated with receipt of subsidized seed and involve a much larger 
subsidy. 
 The chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents the meth-
ods that are used to evaluate the direct impacts of the fertilizer subsidy on 
benefi ciary households. In Section 6t.3, we examine direct impacts on maize 
production and food security. Section 6.4 evaluates the impacts on human 
capital (health and education). Section 6.5 assesses the impacts on incomes, 
self-assessed poverty, assets, and shocks, and Section 6.7 presents evidence 
from qualitative benefi ciary interviews. Finally Section 6.8 presents conclud-
ing remarks. 
 6.2.  Methods of evaluating direct benefi ciary impacts 
 We report on three main methods to assess direct benefi ciary impacts of the 
Farm Input Subsidy Programme. 1 The fi rst, reported in Chirwa et al. (2011d), 
is panel regression, which exploits matched panel data for different rounds 
of data collection: the second Integrated Household Survey (IHS2) covering 
the 2002/3 and 2003/4 agricultural seasons, the Agricultural Input Subsidy 
Survey (AISS) for the 2006/7 and 2008/9 seasons, and the Farm Input Subsidy 
Survey (FISS) for the 2010/11 agricultural season. This is analysed using a 
fi xed effects panel data strategy with the following specifi cation: 
Y FISP Xit i t k
k
k t ik i it+ ∑ + +=α δ β δ ε25 * )  (6.1) 
 where  i is the individual household,  t is the wave of the survey (2004/05, 
2006/7, 2008/9, and 2010/11),  k indexes the household categorization of 
access to subsidies over the past six years, αi  are individual fi xed effects, δt
is a dummy variable equal to 1 for each round of the survey (with 2004/5 as 
the base category), otherwise equal to 0, and ( * )δt kFISP  is the interaction 
dummy that is equal to 1 only for households that received fertilizer subsidy 
in access category  k ,  Y is the impact indicator, and  X is a vector of household 
characteristics. The coeffi cient βˆ  gives the impact of the subsidy programme. 
The FISS in 2010/11 tracked access to fertilizer subsidy since the programme 
 1  Estimation of maize production impacts also uses other methods, as explained in Section 6.3. 
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started, and this has enabled us to account for the number of times the house-
hold has had access to fertilizer subsidies between the 2005/06 and 2010/11 
seasons. Households are categorized into fi ve groups represented by dummy 
variables: never had access (base category), accessed 1–2 times, accessed 3–4 
times, accessed 5 times, and accessed 6 times (continuously). The impact 
indicators used in the regression model include food security, education and 
heath, assets and welfare, and shocks. 2 Alternatively, we measure access to 
the subsidy programme by the quantity of subsidized fertilizers in place of 
dummy variables. The panel analysis is based on the full panel sample (461 
households) and a sub-sample of panel households that were identifi ed as 
poor based on per capita expenditure in the IHS2 (227 households). The latter 
allows us to investigate the impact of the subsidy programme on households 
that had the same initial condition prior to the subsidy programme. 3 
 Table  6.1 presents the various indicators reported from Chirwa et  al. 
(2011d) for testing various hypotheses on the direct benefi ciary impacts of 
the subsidy programme. In addition to the broad hypothesized relationships 
in  Table 6.1 , we also expect the subsidy to have larger impacts on households 
that have had access to subsidized fertilizers in all the past six seasons com-
pared to those that have had less access. This implies that there should be a 
positive trend in the value of the coeffi cients of times of receipt of subsidy as 
the frequency of receipt increases from 1 to 6 times. 
 Table 6.2 presents the distribution of the panel sample of households in 
Chirwa et al. (2011d) by the number of seasons the households have had 
access to subsidized fertilizer. It is helpful to identify three groups regard-
ing households’ subsidy receipt: a small proportion who never had access to 
subsidized fertilizer (no access), a much larger group who had access to subsi-
dized fertilizer at least once and up to fi ve times in six seasons (intermittent 
access), and those had access to subsidized fertilizer six times (continuous 
access). These groups accounted for 4%, 51%, and 45% of households, respec-
tively. Most of the households are, therefore, repeat benefi ciaries. 4 In terms of 
headship of households in 2010/11, 66% and 34% of the sample households 
were male and female headed, respectively. The distribution of household by 
the poverty status in IHS2 also shows that the overall sample has equal num-
bers of households that were poor and non-poor. 
 2  Panel data on education and health is only available from IHS2 and the 2010/11 FISS and the 
panel analysis is based on two periods. 
 3  Ricker-Gilbert (2011) shows that OLS cross-sectional data analysis fi nds apparently signifi -
cant direct subsidy impacts when regressing some measures of benefi ciary impact against subsidy 
receipt, but that these relationships are not signifi cant when investigated using fi xed effects or 
fi rst difference models. We therefore rely on our own and others’ results only when they take 
account of the effects of possible endogeneity of subsidy receipt. 
 4  However, these fi gures refl ect receipt of subsidized fertilizers and do not account for the quan-
tity received and the last time it was received for those that received it less than six times. 
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 5  Dorward and Chirwa (2012b) provide details of the informal rural economy modelling and 
specifi cation of household types and construction of individual household livelihood models. 
 The second approach used to investigate direct benefi ciary effects is quali-
tative analysis based on focus group discussions, key informants, and life 
stories of some benefi ciaries, collected in the 2006/7, 2008/9, and 2010/11 
periods. In each of these rounds of surveys, and each of the 8–14 districts 
of the surveys, detailed qualitative interviews were conducted covering sys-
tems of implementation of the subsidy programme, cropping patterns and 
livelihoods, and local peoples’ and benefi ciary’s perceptions of the impacts 
of the programme on their welfare. The number of qualitative interviews var-
ied with the number of districts covered in the surveys. For instance, in the 
2010/12 survey, which had the smallest number of districts (8 districts), qual-
itative data was collected through 8 focus group discussions, 24 key inform-
ants’ interviews, and life histories from 64 households. 
 The third method used to investigate direct benefi ciary effects is a partial 
equilibrium model, informal rural economy modelling (Dorward and Chirwa, 
2012b), with analysis for two of the largest livelihood zones in Malawi from 
2005/6 to 2010/11. These two livelihood zones, Kasungu–Lilongwe Plain 
(KAS) and Shire Highlands (SHI) between them include just over 40% of rural 
households in Malawi and also represent examples of less and more densely 
populated areas in the centre and south of the country, respectively. Cluster 
analysis of data from the IHS2 was used to develop a household/livelihood 
classifi cation within the livelihood zones. 5 We report results from simula-
tions based on two scenarios. The basic scenario, simulated in both zones, 
compares model outcomes ‘with subsidy’ with actual prices against outcomes 
‘without subsidy’ with equilibrium prices. The ‘basic with household savings’ 
scenario, only simulated in the SHI livelihood zone, is the same as the basic 
 Table 6.1.  Benefi ciary household level impact indicators and hypotheses 
 Welfare category  Impact indicators  Impact: Alternative 
hypothesis 
 Food security  1) Adequacy in food consumption 
in past month 
 Positive 
 Schooling and health  1) Primary school enrolment 
at household level 
2) Incidence of under-5 illness 
 Positive 
Negative 
 Subjective poverty  1) Subjective assessment of poverty 
status 
 Positive 
 Shocks and stresses  1) Number of shocks experiences 
by household 
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scenario except that it assumes 20% incremental savings carried forward 
by each benefi ciary household from increased income as a result of subsidy 
receipt. 
 6.3.  Impacts on maize production 
 The main justifi cation for implementing the Farm Input Subsidy Programme 
has been to improve maize productivity and achieve food security at house-
hold and national level. Discussion in Chapters 2 and 4 of likely subsidy 
impacts and linkages in  Figure II.1 also suggest that increases in staple 
food production and productivity should be one of the major drivers of 
indirect subsidy impacts, through domestic price and real income effects. 
Determination of subsidy impacts on maize production is therefore funda-
mental to the assessment of programme impacts. 
 Subsidy impacts on maize production have been estimated in a variety of 
ways. The simplest and most commonly quoted indicators of impact have 
been changes in estimated national maize production before and after the 
subsidy (see, for example, Dugger (2007) and Denning et al. (2009)). These 
show dramatic increases in estimates of national maize production, with esti-
mated maize production of 1.2 million MT in 2004/5 (before the subsidy) 
followed by estimates of 2.6, 3.2, 2.8, 3.8, 3.4, 3.8, and 3.6 million MT in 
the seven subsidy years 2005/6 to 2011/12 (these estimates are presented in 
 Figure 6.1 in terms of incremental production above pre-subsidy estimates). 
There are, however, a number of diffi culties with the use of increases in 
 Table 6.2.  Distribution of sample and number of seasons with access to subsidized 
fertilizer 
 Number of 
seasons 
 Panel households  Headship, 
2010/11 
 Poverty status in 
IHS2 
 Proportions of 
poor & non-poor 
 Number  %  Male  Female  Poor  Non-
poor 
 Poor  Non-
poor 
 0  19  4  75  25  33  67  2  5 
 1  42  9  75  25  57  43  7  8 
 2  35  7  72  28  48  52  7  6 
 3  33  7  60  40  48  52  8  10 
 4  45  10  66  34  45  55  97  9 
 5  80  17  55  45  49  51  16  16 
 6  208  45  68  32  52  48  50  47 
 N  461  100  66  34  50  50  100  100 
 Note: Weighted fi gures. 
 Source : Chirwa et al. (2011d). 
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national production estimates as estimates of subsidy impacts, or even as 
indicators of subsidy success. First, there is no way of separating the impacts 
of the subsidy on maize production from the impacts of other variables. 
The most obvious of these is the weather, but other variables may also be 
 important—thus, poor production in 2004/5 was caused by a combination 
of poor rains and late and limited commercial fertilizer deliveries and sales. 
 Second, it is not clear why estimated production should have increased so 
dramatically during the life of FISP (as opposed to increasing mainly follow-
ing its inception). This appears to be the result of increasing estimated hybrid 
maize yields (which rise by 20% from around 2,500 to around 3,000 kg/ha 
from 2005/6 to 2011/12), an increasing proportion of maize area under hybrid 
varieties (with a 70% increase in hybrid maize area over the same period), by 
a small increase in overall maize area (7%), and by a very large differential 
between hybrid and local maize yields (with hybrid maize yields increasing 
from 160 to 240% of local maize yields). However, although hybrid maize 
areas may have increased with increased volumes of subsidized seeds, it is not 
clear what can have driven the large increases in hybrid maize yields when 
volumes of subsidized fertilizer were falling back from 2007/8, although 
Holden and Lunduka (2010b) estimate rising maize yields for both local and 
hybrid maize from 2006 to 2009. A possible explanation for this is that ferti-
lizer use in one year has dynamic effects on yield in the following year. Thus, 
Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne (2011) estimate that 100 kg of subsidized fertilizer 
receipt increases immediate maize yield by 165 kg and receipt of 100kg fer-
tilizer per year over three years yields an extra 316 kg of maize in the fourth 
year. Holden and Lunduka (2010b) also estimate that rising maize yields are 
associated with small falls in overall maize area and maize area share (with a 
net increase in maize production). Chibwana et al. (2012), however, estimate 
increases in maize and tobacco area with the subsidy. 
 Third, the hybrid yield estimates are not consistent with other estimates 
of farmers’ hybrid maize yields (Government of Malawi and World Bank, 
2006; Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2009; Chibwana et al., 2010; Holden and Lunduka, 
2010c; National Statistical Offi ce, 2010a). While these are admittedly very 
variable, they are almost all below 2,000 kg/ha (Dorward and Chirwa, 2010a). 
 The very high national production fi gures are not consistent either, with 
very high domestic prices from early in 2008 through much of 2009. These 
discrepancies are illustrated in  Figure 7.4 in Chapter 7, which plots estimated 
maize availability against price by market season, with remarkably high 
prices in many of the marketing seasons when production estimates would 
have suggested that greater maize production and availability would have 
led to low prices. We discuss possible reasons for this in Chapters 8 and 9, 
but note here that one likely partial explanation is that production was over-
estimated in these years, most notably following the 2006/7 harvest with 
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export of a little over 300,000MT of maize to Zimbabwe in the 2007/8 season. 
Dorward and Chirwa (2010a) also show that there are diffi culties in reconcil-
ing national production fi gures with estimates of consumption and export—
national production fi gures suggest that there should be greater availability 
of maize than required by the population, and this in turn is not consistent 
with high levels of food insecurity and child malnutrition (as shown for the 
latter, for example, in  Table 7.5 ) 
 Finally, there are doubts regarding the methodology used in deriving these 
fi gures. This involves fi eld extension workers taking samples of fi elds and 
estimating yields for these and crop areas, and then the aggregation of yield 
and area estimates up to district, Agricultural Development Division (ADD), 
and national estimates. Sampling and estimation methodologies actually 
employed by fi eld extension workers are not very clear, and aggregate esti-
mates are subject to technical adjustments. Given past examples of over-esti-
mation of cassava areas and yields, tendencies for crop production fi gures 
to be used in judging extension performance, the political importance of 
national fi gures, and instances of apparent attempts in President Mutharika’s 
government to infl uence sensitive statistics, 6 there appear to be considerable 
risks of upward bias of these estimates. 
 With estimates of national maize production therefore not being able to 
provide estimates of the impacts of the subsidy programme, a better alterna-
tive should be to estimate incremental production from the use of subsidised 
inputs, fertilizer, and improved seeds. Here we would ideally use estimates of 
maize yield responses to incremental fertilizer and seed inputs resulting from 
the subsidy programme. These could then be multiplied and added across 
seed types for benefi ciaries and for the programme as a whole. Estimates of 
incremental input use as a result of the programme are examined later in 
Chapter 8. We briefl y consider here estimates of incremental production per 
unit incremental input use made in a number of studies. 
 A number of studies have attempted to estimate yield responses to nitro-
gen on farmers’ fi elds and on-farm yield differences between varieties, from 
on-farm trials and from farm surveys. School of Oriental and African Studies 
et  al. (2008) reviewed a number of these and concluded that 12, 15, and 
18 kg grain per kg of N were reasonable estimates of responses of local (or 
traditional), Open Pollinated (OPV) and hybrid varieties respectively, under 
reasonable farmer management, with further gains of 100 and 200 kg per ha 
for OPVs and hybrid varieties over local varieties, in the absence of fertilizer. 
 6  See, for example, the delayed and very limited release of yield estimates in National Statistical 
Offi ce (2010a), the 2012 Malawi Revenue Authority (MRA) scandal (where the MRA borrowed 
money to infl ate its reported cash holdings), and apparent downward estimates of the consumer 
price index noted in National Statistical Offi ce (2012) and discussed in Chapter 7. 
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A small number of studies since then have specifi cally examined fertilizer 
and seed yield responses. School of Oriental and African Studies et al. (2008) 
and Dorward and Chirwa (2010b) report that attempts to gather suffi ciently 
reliable information from farm household surveys in 2006/7 and 2008/9 had 
not been successful, and the latter reported very wide differences in yield 
estimates from different surveys with little attempt to reconcile differences. 
 Nevertheless, triangulation across national yield, production, and con-
sumption estimates does provide some guidance on which estimates are 
likely to be more or less reliable. 
 •  Chibwana et al. (2010) estimate from farm survey mean yield 
differences of around 210 kg/ha between hybrid and local varieties, with 
fertilizer responses of 11.5 and 9 kg grain per kg N for local and hybrid 
maize respectively. 7 While the basic differential between local and 
hybrid is broadly consistent with other fi ndings, the higher response 
to local than to improved maize is not, and may be the result of the 
parsimonious production function employed with no fertilizer/variety 
interaction terms. 
 •  Holden and Lunduka (2010c) report an average difference of 323 kg/ha 
between ‘matched’ local and hybrid maize yields in their farm surveys, 
and a fertilizer response of 9 kg grain per kg N. 
 •  Makumba et al. (2012) derive fertilizer response estimates of 16.8 kg 
grain per kg N for hybrid maize farmer-managed trials across the 
country. These were achieved with high rates of fertilizer use (over 
250 kg/ha), but comparison of high and low fertilizer rates on 
researcher-managed on-farm trials suggests that response rates might 
be considerably higher than this with lower fertilizer rates. Questions 
about how marginal response rates depend upon overall fertilizer rates, 
upon incremental application of subsidized inputs, and upon other 
aspects of crop management (such as the time of planting, fertilizer 
application, and weeding) further complicate the issue. 
 The approach taken by School of Oriental and African Studies et al. (2008), 
with an approximate +/- 20% range to allow for the effects of over- or under-
estimation, therefore still seems as reasonable as any. This discussion, how-
ever, highlights the importance of improving maize yield and production 
estimates in Malawi, not only for consideration of the direct impacts of the 
subsidy programme, but for wider economic, agricultural sector and food 
security planning and management. 
 7  These fi gures are calculated from fi gure 2 in Chibwana et al. (2010) and assume that fertilizer 
is applied as 50% 23:21: 0 and 50% urea. 
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 Figure 6.1 therefore compares estimates of incremental maize production 
for each year of the programme using fi rst national production estimates 
and then the approach taken by School of Oriental and African Studies et al. 
(2008), with a +/- 20% range allowing for possible over- or under-estimation 
and downward adjustments in some years (2005/6, 2007/8, and 2011/12) 
to allow for the effects of poor rainfall in some parts of Malawi. It should be 
noted that all these estimates ignore the impacts of storage losses (Denning 
et al., 2009). Also for the purpose of obtaining a relatively simple estimate of 
production impacts, the approach taken by School of Oriental and African 
Studies et al. (2008) assumes that the nutrients in subsidized tobacco fertiliz-
ers from 2005/6 to 2008/9 provided benefi ts equivalent to those that would 
have been obtained if the nutrients had been applied to maize, and ben-
efi ts from these nutrients are therefore measured in maize production. This 
should lead to a limited over-estimate of incremental maize production but 
not, when these fi gures are used in the benefi t–cost analysis in Chapter 9, 
an over-estimate of the value of programme benefi ts. Over-estimates of 
maize production should be limited because tobacco fertilizers accounted for 
between 10% and 17% of total subsidized fertilizers in these three years, and 
suffered from much higher estimated displacement rates (School of Oriental 
and African Studies et al., 2008).  Figure 6.1 shows that if incremental national 
maize production estimates are all attributed to the effects of FISP then this 
requires a fertilizer response approximately double the responses used in the 









2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12
M
T
imatesNational crop production est
High SOAS estimate (+20%)
Medium SOAS estimate
Low SOAS estimate (-20%)
 Figure 6.1.  Increases in maize production estimates above 2002/3 and 2003/4 base 
 Source: MoAFS Annual Crop Estimates, author calculations. 
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 Estimates of increased maize production among benefi ciaries are also 
consistent with qualitative evidence from focus group discussions and 
life stories of benefi ciaries in Chirwa et  al. (2011d) and discussed later 
in Section 6.7. These suggest that the subsidy has increased food (maize) 
production at household level. However, most of the more positive sto-
ries came from households that were already buying commercial fertiliz-
ers before the programme and those that received two bags of subsidized 
fertilizers (rather than those that received less as a result of sharing of 
fertilizers). 
 6.4.  Impact on food consumption 
 Improvements in maize production should lead to improved food availabil-
ity and food security for benefi ciary households. In all the panel surveys, 
households were asked whether they considered their food consumption 
in the month before the survey inadequate or adequate. In order to assess 
the impact of food security, Chirwa et al. (2011d) created a dummy variable 
representing adequacy in food consumption equal to one if the household 
revealed that food consumption was adequate or more than adequate, and 
to zero if it was inadequate and to investigate, using fi xed effects, the impact 
of the subsidy programme on food security. Estimation of the impact of the 
number of times that subsidized fertilizer is received (as outlined earlier) indi-
cates that among households that received subsidized fertilizers continuously 
(six times) about 22% more reported adequate food production as compared 
with non-recipients, with the coeffi cient being statistically signifi cant at the 
5% level. Among those who had received subsidized fertilizers less than six 
times, increasing frequency of fertilizer use also led to increasing frequency of 
reported adequate food production. Separate estimation of the impact of the 
quantity of subsidized fertilizer received also provided evidence of a positive 
and signifi cant impact on food consumption adequacy. These fi ndings are 
consistent with the evidence of increased maize production reported above, 
with qualitative reports from focus group discussions (School of Oriental 
and African Studies et al., 2008; Dorward and Chirwa, 2010a; Chirwa et al., 
2011d) and with the fi ndings of Holden and Lunduka (2010a). They report 
that receipt of subsidized inputs increases the probability of households 
being net sellers rather than net buyers of maize, and also that 66% and 69% 
of surveyed households reported improvements in household and commu-
nity food security as a result of the subsidy programme (although 60% of the 
households in their sample were still net buyers of maize despite the subsidy 
programme). However, only 30% of households reported that the subsidy 
programme led to increased maize consumption. 
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 6.5.  Impacts on education and health 
 6.5.1.  Primary school enrolment 
 Chirwa et al. (2011d) also investigate the impact of benefi ciaries’ access to 
subsidized inputs on schooling based on enrolment of the primary school 
age group between 5–13 year olds, while controlling for household charac-
teristics. This analysis uses a two-period panel, IHS2 (in 2003/4 and 2004/5) 
and FISS (in 2010/11), in which members of households that were more than 
5 years old were asked whether they were in school. This enabled the genera-
tion of an indicator of primary school enrolment at household level, com-
puted as the number of primary school age children in school divided by the 
total number of primary school-going age children in the household. The 
results indicate that the subsidy has a positive impact on schooling. Across 
all households, there was a general increase in school enrolment between 
the two periods, a change that was universally confi rmed in focus group dis-
cussions and key informant interviews. The coeffi cients of the dummies for 
receipt of subsidized fertilizer 1–2 times, 5 times, and 6 times are statistically 
signifi cant at the 5%, 1%, and 10% level, respectively, although there is no 
clear trend in the value of the coeffi cients of the number of times of receipt 
and primary school enrolment. Similar but weaker relationships are observed 
for the model estimated only for households categorized as poor in the IHS2. 
 The estimated positive impact of subsidy receipt on educational enrol-
ment is consistent with anecdotal reports on programme impacts, with focus 
group discussion reports (School of Oriental and African Studies et al., 2008; 
Dorward and Chirwa, 2010a), and with Holden and Lunduka (2010a) who 
report that 65% of respondent households perceived that there was a positive 
impact of subsidy receipt on school attendance. 
 6.5.2.  Health and nutrition 
 Improvements in food availability at household level due to access to sub-
sidized fertilizers may improve benefi ciaries’ health in a number of ways—
through improved food security and nutrition from increased own production 
and income, and from increased ability to fi nance health care. This can be 
investigated in a number of ways. Chirwa et al. (2011d) examine the impact 
of subsidy receipt on incidence of illness using data for households that had 
under-5 members in 2004/5 and 2010/11. On average, about 59% of house-
holds in 2004/5 had under-5 members who were ill in the two weeks before 
the survey, but this fell to 49% in 2010/11. The econometric evidence of the 
impact of the subsidy programme on the health of children in benefi ciary 
households shows a negative relationship between access to subsidy and 
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 8  Estimates for model (1) for all households and with dummies for the number of times sub-
sidized fertilizer was received. Similar positive coeffi cients of the year dummies were also found 
with models (a) estimated only for households categorized as poor in the pre-subsidy survey and 
(b) assessing subsidy receipt in terms of the total quantity of subsidized fertilezer received from 
2005/6 to 2010/11. Coeffi cients were statistically signifi cant at 1% or (for 2010/11 with the poor 
households sample) at 5%. 
incidence of under-5 illness: households that had access to subsidized ferti-
lizer fi ve or six times were signifi cantly more likely (at the 5% level) to have 
under-5 children that had not fallen ill in the two weeks before the survey. 
 This impact was not commonly articulated in focus group discussions 
and key informant interviews. However Holden and Lunduka (2010a) also 
explored people’s perceptions of subsidy receipt on health, and report that 
40% of respondents perceived that subsidy receipt improved health. Further 
evidence on the impacts of subsidy access on health, but not of access to FISP 
itself, is provided by Ward and Santos (2010), who examined the impact on 
stunting from access to Targeted Input Programme inputs prior to 2004/5. 
They found a signifi cant reduction in stunting for each year of receipt of 
TIP inputs, and based on strong international evidence on the relationship 
between adult height and wages, discuss possible long-term benefi cial effects 
of increased adult height on earnings. 
 6.6.  We lfare impacts 
 We now consider evidence for direct impacts of subsidy receipt on a number 
of different variables related to welfare: subjective assessment of well-being, 
real incomes, assets, and shocks and stresses. 
 6.6.1.  Subjective wellbeing assessment 
 The panel surveys collected consistent information on self-assessment of 
well-being, using households’ subjective assessment of their poverty status 
based on a ladder ranging from 1 representing the poorest to 6 represent-
ing the richest. As reported in Chirwa et al. (2011d) we use these subjective 
measures as outcome indicators of participation in the Farm Input Subsidy 
Programme. The mean self-assessment of well-being for panel households 
increased from 1.66 in 2004/5 to 2.34 in 2010/11(Chirwa et al., 2011d). After 
controlling for household and year effects, households’ self-assessments 
were higher by 54%, 69%, and 68% in the 2006/7, 2008/9, and 2010/11 
surveys, respectively as compared with the pre-subsidy survey. 8 However, the 
estimated impacts of subsidy receipt by benefi ciaries’ households are small 
and not statistically signifi cant (with some estimates marginally negative). 
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We therefore cannot reject the null hypothesis that receipt of the subsidy 
does not statistically affect changes in self-assessment of poverty among 
benefi ciaries, and this suggests that the subsidy programme may have only 
weak direct income effects on benefi ciary households. 
 These results are consistent with sentiments expressed in qualitative inter-
views in which most households report that they are not able to produce sur-
plus maize which could be sold to earn extra cash income. As discussed below, 
life histories with selected households revealed that although some have had 
access to subsidized fertilizers continuously they may still struggle to produce 
maize that takes them to the next harvest and have to rely on  ganyu to earn 
income to purchase food. Small but insignifi cant positive effects are consist-
ent with small direct improvements from subsidy receipt which may be over-
shadowed by wider positive changes affecting all households through indirect 
market effects of the subsidy and other positive changes from 2002/3 and 
2003/4 to 2006/7 and subsequent years. However, the differences between the 
estimated dummy coeffi cients for 2008/9 and 2010/11 are very small, suggest-
ing that after a substantial improvement in perceived well-being from the pre-
subsidy to 2006/7 surveys, and a smaller improvement from 2006/7 to 2008/9, 
there may have been little or no further improvement in perceived well-being 
from 2008/9 to 2010/11. We discuss these issues in Chapter 7. 
 In contrast with these results, however, Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne (2010b) 
do fi nd a signifi cant increase in satisfaction with life with increased receipt of 
subsidized fertilizer between the pre-subsidy and 2008/9 surveys. 
 6.6.2.  Household real incomes 
 Reliable estimates of real incomes are diffi cult to obtain in survey data, with-
out extensive and thorough analysis of expenditure data. Ricker-Gilbert (2011) 
reports an analysis of the impact of subsidy receipt on reported incomes using 
the same panel data set as Chirwa et al. (2011d), but excluding the 2010/11 
panel. He fi nds no signifi cant impacts of subsidy receipt on non-farm income 
or on total household income, although net value of rainy season crop pro-
duction (a measure of farm income) is positively affected by subsidy receipt in 
the year of receipt (but not subsequent years), with each extra kg of fertilizer 
received increasing net crop income by 174MK (p = 0.01). While net crop 
income is estimated from production estimates, non-farm income is derived 
from respondent estimates, and total income is the sum of farm and non-farm 
income. National Statistical Offi ce (2005a) estimate mean (median) house-
hold expenditure and consumption for 2002/3 to 2003/4 years as 99,532MK 
(72,000MK) and reported income as 50,000MK (36,123MK): reported incomes 
are approximately 50% of reported expenditure and consumption suggesting 
considerable under-estimates in reported incomes. Mean (median) non-farm 
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incomes for 2002/3 to 2003/4, 2006/7, and 2008/9 reported by Ricker-Gilbert 
are 31,000MK (9700MK), 10,000MK (2600MK), and 39,000MK (13,000MK), 
respectively. The extraordinary drop in 2006/7 (which is also refl ected in total 
household income estimates) is not explained and does not match patterns of 
self-assessed well-being reported above or asset holdings reported below. This 
raises serious questions about the reliability of non-farm and total household 
income data and hence of the fi ndings reported by Ricker-Gilbert (2011) on 
the impacts of subsidy receipt on non-farm and total household incomes. 
 These concerns about the reliability of data on reported income suggest that 
other analytical approaches may be preferred for estimating subsidy impacts 
on real incomes. Changes in real incomes of targeted poor households were 
therefore examined using the informal rural economy model introduced in 
Section 6.2 and described more fully in Dorward and Chirwa (2012b). This 
allows comparison of real income estimates for ‘target households’ (that is 
poor male- and female-headed types) with and without the subsidy (with 
an average receipt of 75 kg and 2 kg of subsidized fertilizer and hybrid maize 
seed respectively per household) but with constant prices (that is without any 
wider market equilibrium effects). Gains averaging around 7% (just under 
1000MK) across poorer benefi ciary households are estimated in the Shire 
Highlands with lower gains (around 4%, just under 450MK) in the Kasungu–
Lilongwe Plains where poverty is less severe and poor households are less 
capital constrained and have lower returns to capital. School of Oriental and 
African Studies et al. (2008) also state that increases in benefi ciary incomes 
were reported in a number of focus group discussions in 2007. 
 6.6.3.  Assets 
 Increased productivity and incomes resulting from subsidy receipt may allow 
benefi ciary households to increase their investment in assets. Increases in 
human capital or assets (in education and health) were considered earlier in 
Section 6.5. Here we examine evidence on investment in physical and live-
stock assets. 
 Holden and Lunduka (2010a) examined the impacts of subsidies on the 
value of assets and on livestock ownership measured in tropical livestock 
units. They fi nd a general build-up in the real value of assets from 2006 to 2009 
(particularly from 2007 to 2009), suggesting ‘that welfare has improved on a 
broad scale’ (pp. 20), but they fi nd no evidence of direct impacts of subsidy 
receipt on asset accumulation. They conclude that their results ‘strengthen 
the impression that the direct targeting effect of the subsidy program is less 
important than the economy-wide effect of the program when it comes to 
growth effects in the economy’ (pp. 21–2). There is no evidence of a general 
increase in livestock endowments, nor of direct subsidy impacts on this. 
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 Ricker-Gilbert (2011) also explores possible direct impacts of subsidy receipt 
on asset holdings. He reports no signifi cant impact of subsidy receipt on house-
hold livestock and durable assets for subsidy received in the survey year or in 
each of the previous three years. However, in an earlier presentation Ricker-
Gilbert and Jayne (2010b) report positive but weak impact of subsidy receipt 
aggregated over the previous three years on household total assets, consump-
tion, and productive assets (p = 0.12, p = 0.36, and p = 0.16, respectively). 
Ricker-Gilbert (2011) also fi nds a very large increase in the value of assets in 
the sample as a whole, with an increase of 73% in mean value of assets per 
household and 27% in median value of assets per household, although mean 
values show a large increase from 2002/3 and 2003/4 to 2007, while median 
values show a large increase from 2007 to 2009. The large increase from 2007 
to 2009 was also observed by Holden and Lunduka (2010a). 
 6.6.4.  Shocks and stresses 
 Changes in the vulnerability of households to shocks and stresses are another 
possible impact of subsidy receipt on household welfare. Households expe-
rience a number of shocks and stresses and many of these are agricultural 
related. 
 Simple comparison of the frequency of reported shocks from the IHS2 
(pre-subsidy) survey to the FISS (2010/11) survey shows a decline from 24% 
to 13% in households that experienced lower crop yields due to weather or 
rainfall as the most severe shocks between IHS2 and FISS, respectively. Other 
agriculture-related shocks whose incidence declined were large falls in the 
sale price of crops and a large rise in the price of food. The relative importance 
of chronic and acute illnesses appears to have risen as a result of the decline 
in importance of severe agricultural shocks. 
 Using the panel surveys we investigate whether there is a relationship 
between the extent of subsidization and shocks experienced by households. 
Chirwa et al. (2011d) estimate two fi xed-effect regression models using IHS2 
and FISS survey data, one using all panel households in the sample, the 
other only using households that were classifi ed as poor in the IHS2 sur-
vey before subsidy implementation. Both models show that the number of 
shocks declined between 2004/5 and 2010/11. However, with respect to the 
relationships between shocks and frequency of subsidized fertilizer receipt, 
the estimated coeffi cients for dummy variables show that recipients of ferti-
lizer subsidies tend to experience more shocks than non-recipients (with all 
coeffi cients statistically signifi cant at the 10% or 1% levels and larger coef-
fi cients for recipients that access subsidized fertilizer less than fi ve times). 
A possible explanation for this is that there is some season specifi c targeting 
of the subsidy to households who have experienced shocks. 
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 These issues were explored further with examination of the relationships 
between frequency of access to subsidized fertilizers and the incidence of 
severe agricultural related shocks (identifi ed where these were reported as 
the most severe shock). This analysis gave mixed results. For results obtained 
with all panel households, subsidy receipt is not signifi cantly related with the 
incidence of agricultural shocks (estimated coeffi cients are positive but not 
signifi cant), but the overall incidence of severe agriculture-related shocks has 
declined over time (with the decline signifi cant at 5%). However, for the sub-
sample of panel households identifi ed as poor in IHS2, there is no evidence 
that severe agricultural related shocks have declined (the coeffi cient is mar-
ginally positive but not signifi cant). In contrast to the results above, however, 
it is striking that among poor households those with access to subsidized 
fertilizers are less likely to have agriculture-related shocks as their most severe 
shock (estimated coeffi cients are negative and signifi cant at 1%, 5%, or 10%), 
but there is no clear trend suggesting that higher frequency of access to sub-
sidized fertilizer is associated with more or fewer agricultural related shocks. 
 In summary, the evidence on changes in shocks and stresses is rather mixed. 
Overall, the number of shocks experienced by benefi ciary households has fallen 
signifi cantly over time, although those with access to subsidized fertilizers con-
tinue to experience shocks and stresses like other households. However, among 
poor benefi ciary households, agriculture-related shocks are less likely to be the 
most severe shocks; hence the subsidy appears to have helped poor households 
to become cushioned or resilient against agriculture-related shocks. 
 6.7.  Impacts in life stories of benefi ciary households 
 Analysis of benefi ciary life stories gathered in 2010/11 reveals a mix of per-
ceived impacts of subsidy receipt on their well-being. While there are posi-
tive stories about the increase in food production at household level among 
most households that receive subsidies, the life histories illustrate the chal-
lenges of the programme in delivering sustained direct benefi ts to benefi ciary 
households. In most life histories of benefi ciaries, particularly among the 
most vulnerable groups (female-headed, elderly-headed, and child-headed 
households), the stories were that the subsidy programme has enabled them 
to produce ‘a bit more food’ than when they had no access to the subsidy. The 
qualitative analysis points to the following issues: 
 •  In most cases, households that report success with the subsidy 
programme are those that are already relatively well-to-do and 
purchased commercial fertilizers before the subsidy programme. For 
instance, one of the benefi ciaries who has had access to the subsidy over 
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fi ve seasons, was also buying coupons that enabled him to profi t from 
tobacco cultivation, and claimed that together this transformed his life 
from the ‘poor’ to the ‘well-to-do’ category. 
 •  Households that reported receipt and use of two fertilizer coupons, are 
likely to talk positively about the extent to which the subsidy improved 
their food production for such years compared to households that 
received less than two bags of subsidized fertilizers. 
 •  Sharing of coupons is widespread, and most households that have 
participated in the subsidy programme attribute the perceived failure 
of the programme to signifi cantly change their lives to inadequate 
amounts of fertilizers. This is particularly the case for households that 
have never used fertilizers prior to the subsidy programme. There are 
many life stories that described how the full package of the subsidy 
was beginning to change their lives, only to experience drifting 
back to poverty due to the dilution of the subsidy as a result of the 
redistribution that takes place at village level. 
 •  There is also a tendency for benefi ciaries to thinly spread the subsidized 
inputs over a larger parcel of land. Even among households that 
received two bags of subsidized fertilizers, the sentiments were that 
the subsidized fertilizer was not adequate for the amount of land the 
household had for maize cultivation. This is exacerbated by the lack 
of technical advice on the appropriate use of fertilizers, with most 
households reporting lack of access to agricultural extension services. 
 •  There is widespread recognition that the subsidy has helped benefi ciary 
households to produce a ‘bit more maize’ and more importantly has 
reduced the purchase price of maize even in the lean months of January and 
February. Most of the benefi ciaries interviewed, particularly those that were 
still not able to produce enough own maize to last them to the next season, 
consider the low price of maize as one major benefi t of the programme. 
 •  Households that are not able to produce maize to last to the next harvest 
tend to purchase from the market. Most poor households engage in 
 ganyu to earn incomes to buy maize and most reported that  ganyu wage 
rates have been increasing while maize prices have been falling and 
maize is locally available. This has enabled the poor to afford purchase 
of maize based on  ganyu incomes which have also improved over time. 
Due to higher wages, households reported that they have reduced the 
amount of time they spend on  ganyu and there has also been an increase 
in opportunities to operate off-farm income generating activities. 
 •  Poor and vulnerable households such as female- and/or elderly-headed 
households that received subsidy fertilizers rarely supplement the 
supply of fertilizers with commercial purchases, leading to application 
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of subsidized fertilizers on larger parcels of land. Generally, where 
subsidized fertilizers are supplemented by commercial fertilizers, such 
households were buying commercial fertilizers prior to the subsidy or 
they are better off households that are also receiving subsidies. The 
quantitative analysis also shows that among benefi ciaries there is much 
lower use of supplementary commercial fertilizers by poor households 
as compared with non-poor households. 
 As Chirwa et al. (2011d) note, the case studies of benefi ciaries highlighted 
two challenges that have implications on direct benefi ciary impacts of the 
subsidy programme: targeting and sharing of coupons at village level. We 
discuss these issues in Chapters 10 and 11. 
 6.8.  Summary 
 This chapter has reviewed the direct benefi ciary impacts of the subsidy pro-
gramme using quantitative and qualitative data collected over time in a vari-
ety of different studies. Use of a partial equilibrium model also helped to 
triangulate the results from the analysis of the quantitative and qualitative 
data. A broadly consistent picture of direct subsidy impacts emerges from 
this, which we summarize in  Table 6.3 and discuss below. 
 As  Table 6.3 shows, the evidence examined in this chapter suggests that sub-
sidy receipt has immediate or current season benefi cial impacts on benefi ciar-
ies’ maize production, net crop income, food consumption, and household 
income (though impacts may be limited, particularly with food consumption). 
There appear to be no immediate impacts on ownership of physical assets, 
estimates of immediate impacts on subjective well-being are mixed (one study 
fi nding positive impacts, the other fi nding no impacts) and the observed posi-
tive relationship with shocks is counter-intuitive and perhaps best explained 
by reverse causality. There is then evidence of lagged impacts on benefi ciaries’ 
maize production and food consumption (again with limited impacts). There 
appear to be no lagged impacts on ownership of physical assets, on net crop 
income, or on subjective well-being, there is no evidence from suffi ciently 
robust data to draw any conclusions on lagged impacts on household income, 
and the observed positive relationship with shocks is again counter-intuitive 
and possibly due to reverse causality. The models estimated for examining 
direct subsidy impacts on school enrolment and child health do not allow 
examination of immediate impacts separately from lagged impacts. 
 The fi nding of lagged impacts on maize production is consistent with resid-
ual effects of fertilizer application on soil nutrients (as suggested by Ricker-
Gilbert (2011)) and/or with reduced cash fl ow constraints as postulated earlier 
in Chapter 4. Lagged impacts on food consumption are then consistent with 
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this. The lack of lagged impacts on net crop income, despite these impacts 
on maize production, are consistent with the observed lack of lagged impacts 
of subsidy receipt on tobacco production despite the existence of immediate 
positive impacts (Ricker-Gilbert, 2011). If the limited immediate and lagged 
gains from increased maize production are invested in food consumption, 
school enrolment, and health, this may explain the lack of direct lagged 
impact on subjective well-being and on investment in physical assets. The 
ability of econometric models to identify direct impacts may also be limited 
by the widespread practice of sharing of subsidized fertilizer (as described in 
Chapter 5) and by general increases in maize yields and production, net crop 
income, food consumption, school enrolment, child health, subjective well-
being, and asset ownership (as summarized in the last column of  Table 6.3 ). 
 As regards the impact of sharing of subsidized fertilizer, it was certainly 
the opinion of a number of respondents in focus group discussions and 
life histories that this severely reduced the scale and persistence of subsidy 
impacts, raising questions about possible thresholds for persistent impacts. 
However, the absence of apparent impacts on accumulation of physical assets 
should not obscure the important long-term social and economic benefi ts of 
investment in ‘consumption’ that lead to increased school enrolment and 
improved child health. 
 It is also important that the possible roles of the subsidy in driving general 
improvements should not lead to under-estimates of overall subsidy impact, 
through a narrow focus on direct benefi ciary impacts. This is therefore the 
focus of Chapter 7. 
 Table 6.3.  Summary of fi ndings on direct subsidy impacts 
 Current season impacts  Lagged season 
impacts 
 Wider seasonal 
changes 
 Maize production  +ve  +ve  +ve 
 Net crop income  +ve  X  +ve 
 Food consumption  +ve but limited  +ve but limited  +ve for 2006/7 & 
8/9 
 School enrolment  ?  +ve  +ve 
 Child health  ?  +ve  +ve 
 Subjective well-being  Mixed (+ve, X)  X  +ve 
 Household income  ?, +ve  ?  ? 
 Physical assets  X  Mixed (weak +ve, X)  +ve 
 Shocks  +ve*  +ve*  -ve 
 Notes: * Possible reverse causality. 
 +ve: evidence for positive change; X: evidence does not suggest change. 
 -ve: evidence of negative change; ?: lack of evidence. 
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 7 
 Economy-wide effects of input subsidies 
 7.1.  Introduction 
 Examination of economic theory on subsidy impacts in Chapter 2 stressed 
the importance of considering wider market effects of large-scale input sub-
sidy programmes for staple crops. This was set out in the conceptual frame-
works at the end of Chapter 2, in discussion of possible impacts on Malawian 
farmers’ livelihoods in Section 4.4 of Chapter 4, and in the Introduction to 
Part II. Nevertheless, it was noted in Chapter 3 that these impacts have been 
largely ignored in consideration of both the objectives and impacts of recent 
subsidy programmes in Africa. 
 This chapter follows on from discussion of direct subsidy impacts in 
Chapter 6 and considers evidence of the economy-wide impacts of the FISP. It 
builds on observation of a range of general benefi cial changes summarized in 
 Table 6.3 (increases in maize production, net crop income, food consumption, 
school enrolment, child health, subjective well-being and physical assets, and 
decreases in  ganyu labour supply). The chapter is organized into six sections 
after this introduction. The next section outlines different sources of evi-
dence and analytical methods considered in subsequent sections, which con-
sider in turn the main potential economy-wide impacts identifi ed in  Figure 
II.1 . We then consider in turn the evidence on subsidy programme impacts 
on macro-economic stability (in Section 7.3), on maize trade (in Section 7.4), 
on maize prices and wages (in Section 7.5), and on other variables (in Section 
7.6). Section 7.7 then provides concluding remarks. 
 7.2.  Sources of evidence and analytical methods 
 There are two main tasks in determining both direct and economy-wide 
impacts of the subsidy programme: fi rst the identifi cation of changes associ-
ated with the programme, and second attributing or determining the causal 
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dependence of these changes to or on the programme. For direct impacts, 
there are often opportunities to compare households or areas ‘with and with-
out’ and ‘before and after’ subsidy receipt. A variety of experimental and ana-
lytical approaches can then be used to address problems of selection bias—for 
example, using panel data and fi xed effects analytical methods as outlined in 
Section 6.2 in the previous chapter. 
 Such approaches are not available when considering economy-wide 
impacts of a large-scale programme such as the Malawi Farm Input Subsidy 
Programme, as economy-wide effects spread through the economy ‘with and 
without’ comparisons cannot be made. We therefore draw on four different 
approaches when examining possible impacts of the programme: 
 •  examination of changes in variables where an economy-wide subsidy 
impact is expected, with consideration of likely changes that might 
have been expected in the absence of the programme; 
 •  regression analysis (using panel data) relating the extent and nature of 
subsidy access in an area to area wide variables; 
 •  computable general equilibrium (CGE) models; and 
 •  a partial equilibrium model linking different household livelihood 
models to maize and labour markets. 
 These approaches all have their own strengths and weaknesses, and there 
are different challenges in their implementation and application in different 
contexts. We discuss each briefl y. 
 Examination of changes is a starting point for any analysis of possible econ-
omy-wide programme impacts. Apart from diffi culties in obtaining relevant 
and reliable data on some variables, the major issue here is the problem of 
attribution of change to a particular cause—or indeed the recognition that 
where there has been no change this could be the result of the subsidy pro-
gramme counteracting the effect of some other change. We identify three 
broad changes that roughly coincide with the implementation of the subsidy 
programme from 2005/6 to 2011/12 and that would be expected to have 
widespread benefi ts: improved macro-economic management, good tobacco 
prices, and generally favourable rainfall—although there is some variation 
in each of these within the period. Thus, there were major improvements 
in macro-economic management from 2004 onwards, which are perhaps 
best demonstrated by the fall in interest rates, debt, and debt servicing 
from 2004/5 to 2007/8, but resurgent debt in 2008/9 and subsequent raised 
interest rates (National Statistical Offi ce, 2011). 1 Rainfall was also generally 
 1  We do not discuss rates of infl ation here as National Statistical Offi ce (2012: p. 207) casts some 
doubt on the reliability of infl ation fi gures. 
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favourable over the period 2005/6 to 2010/11. Although there were local 
incidences of fl ooding and dry spells that caused local production shortfalls, 
these did not lead to widespread lowering of yields and production. There 
were more widespread dry spells in 2011/12: these did not lead to a major 
reduction in national production estimates by the MoAFS, but substantial 
areas were affected, leading to estimates of 1.63 million people affected by 
serious food shortages (FEWS NET, 2012). Similarly, burley tobacco prices rose 
in 2007 with high prices continuing in 2008 and 2009 before falling back in 
2011 and recovering somewhat in 2012. Total burley tobacco incomes follow 
a similar pattern though sometimes with a lag as farmers expand (contract) 
tobacco areas following high (low) prices (see  Figure 7.1 ). 
 Improved macro-economic management and good rainfall are prob-
ably best considered as necessary but not suffi cient conditions for rapid 
positive change in the rural economy and in rural people’s livelihoods, 
and it is therefore necessary to look elsewhere for drivers of such change. 
World Bank (2010a) argues that Malawi’s growth is export-led with weak 
linkages between maize production and economic growth due to limited 
sales and thus limited multipliers. This is supported by high correlation 
between annual per capita export volumes and per capita GDP from 1960 
to 2007, and low correlation between annual per capita maize production 
and per capita GDP from 1990 to 2005. This argument places considerable 
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Price (US$/Kg)
Indexed US$ sales value, 2000 = 1
 Figure 7.1.  Burley tobacco prices and sales values, 2000–11 
 Source: Tobacco Control Commission. 
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however, the importance of low maize prices and high maize productivity 
to real incomes of large numbers of net food-buying farmers. It may well 
be the case that in the past there has been very limited correlation between 
per capita maize production and per capita GDP. However, low growth in 
maize productivity may be one of the causes of Malawi’s low GDP growth, 
with exports the major driver of the limited growth that there has been. 
In teasing out the effects of high tobacco prices from those of the subsidy 
programme it may be instructive to note that tobacco prices started to rise 
with the 2007 harvest, whereas the subsidy programme affected the 2006 
harvest. This suggests that changes prior to the middle of 2007 are unlikely 
to have been driven by improved tobacco prices. 
 Regression analysis relating area wide subsidy access and other variables is the 
second approach that may be used to investigate some of the subsidy pro-
gramme’s economy-wide impacts. This approach only works for changes in 
relatively local markets that are not well integrated. There are a number of 
studies that show that Malawian maize markets are relatively well integrated 
(Chirwa and Zakeyo, 2006; Meyer, 2008). Less is known about the integra-
tion of labour markets, but one would expect integration to be low in mar-
kets for  ganyu labour (with intermittent demand, the importance of social 
relations, and relatively immobile suppliers of  ganyu ). Ricker-Gilbert (2011) 
exploits this to investigate the impact of subsidy receipt on wages across dif-
ferent communities. This approach has not, to our knowledge, been applied 
to investigate other possible economy-wide subsidy impacts, but it would 
appear to have potential application in studying impacts of subsidy-induced 
labour market changes, but not subsidy-induced maize market changes. There 
are challenges to the collection of reliable data on rural wages. However, these 
are reduced where panel data are employed since analysis of changes in wages 
among respondents between surveys demands consistency in wage measure-
ment within responses by the same households at different times, rather than 
consistency in wage measurement across households (where standardized 
defi nitions of tasks are very problematic). 
 Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models should in principle be the best 
approach for investigating economy-wide programme impacts. Apart from 
the costs involved in developing such models, there are two main diffi cul-
ties in the use of this approach: obtaining reliable data on the wide range 
of variables and relationships that make up such models, and constructing 
models to properly capture key features of the livelihoods, markets, and 
economies modelled. These challenges are also discussed in Chapter 9, where 
possible uses of CGE models in benefi t–cost analysis are examined. We note 
here, however, that more conventional CGE models, including those that 
have been developed for Malawi, may be considered ‘top down’ models in 
the sense that in broad terms they start from analysis of national accounts 
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to develop a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for the economy as a whole, 
and then work down to model in fairly broad terms the main sectors in the 
national accounts (Dorward et al., 2004b; Benin et al., 2008; Douilleta et al., 
2012). This approach does not, however, adequately describe the seasonal 
constraints and market failures affecting poorer households and hence the 
potential role of the subsidy in addressing the low productivity maize pro-
duction trap, as argued earlier in Chapter 4 (see also Dorward et al., 2004b). 
An alternative approach, the ‘Local Economy-wide Impact Evaluation’ or 
LEWIE model, is currently being developed to address this problem (Taylor, 
2012) with an illustrative application to analysis of the Malawi subsidy pro-
gramme (Filipski and Taylor, 2011). Although this method is expected to 
provide valuable insights into economy-wide impacts of the subsidy in the 
future, existing information from CGE models is limited. Nevertheless, the 
use by Buffi e and Atolia (2009) of a ‘standard’ CGE model to investigate FISP 
impacts provides useful insights given its assumptions, and these insights 
are made more useful by Filipski and Taylor (2011) in their examination of 
potential changes in analysis when some of these assumptions are changed. 
 Partial equilibrium models that link different household livelihood models 
to maize and labour markets are the fourth broad approach used in investigat-
ing economy-wide subsidy impacts. These suffer from similar but narrower 
challenges as CGE models as regards the need for reliable data on a wide range 
of variables and relationships. We use an Informal Rural Economy’ or IRE 
model (described briefl y in Chapter 1 and more fully in Dorward and Chirwa, 
2012b) to explore both the direct impacts of the programme (as described in 
Chapter 6) and economy-wide impacts which arise from impacts on maize 
and labour supply and demand and hence on maize prices and wages. 
 7.3.  Macro-economic environment and role of input subsidies 
 The contribution of the subsidy programme to economic growth and macro-
economic aggregates is diffi cult to disentangle as there are so many factors 
that affect macro-economic stability. However, we compare macro-economic 
developments between 2000 and 2005 (the pre-FISP period) with those 
between 2006 and 2011 (the FISP period). 
 The macro-economic environment since the introduction of the Farm 
Input Subsidy Programme has remained relatively stable with high growth 
rates and low infl ation (Chirwa et al., 2011d).  Table 7.1 shows the average 
performance of the economy between 2000 and 2011. With respect to growth 
in gross domestic product, the offi cial fi gures record average growth between 
2000 and 2005 (pre-FISP period) of 1.7% per annum compared to 7.8% per 
annum in the subsidy period, with the agricultural sector an important driver 
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of recent growth: in the pre-FISP period, the agricultural sector GDP only 
grew by 2.1% per annum compared to 10.3% per annum during the subsidy 
period. Allowance for bounce-back in 2006 following the bad rains in the 
previous year lowers this fi gure by a little over 1%. 
 However data on GDP growth in the FISP period need to be interpreted 
cautiously for two reasons. First, annual crop production estimates are used 
in the calculation of GDP. As was discussed earlier in Chapter 6, there are 
concerns that crop production estimates in the FISP period may be some-
what over-estimated. If this is the case then GDP will also be over-estimated, 
given the close relation between the performance of the agricultural sector 
and the economy. Determining the possible scale of such over-estimates 
is diffi cult but it is unlikely to lead to an infl ation of GDP by more than 
1.5% over the FISP period as a whole. This could then be a small contribu-
tor to higher GDP growth in the FISP period. Possible distortions to the 
GDP defl ator as a result of under-estimates of CPI are, however, possibly 
much larger. National Statistical Offi ce (2012) use an unexplained revised 
estimate of infl ation of just under 130% between the 2003/4 and 2010/11 
Integrated Household Surveys. Comparison of the published CPIs for 2003 
and 2010, 154.3 and 319.8, (Reserve Bank of Malawi, 2012) suggests infl a-
tion of approximately 107%, in which case the real GDP in 2011 might be 
some 17% lower than indicated by current published estimates. This could 
reduce annual GDP growth estimates by some 2.5 percentage points. 2 If 
these calculations are broadly correct, they have very serious implications 
for Malawi’s growth record since 2005. Nevertheless, agricultural sector per-
formance in the FISP period would still be impressive, averaging a little 
under 8%—or a little under 7% if the 2006 recovery from bad 2005 rains is 
factored in. 
 Table 7.1.  Economic growth performance, 2000–10 (% per annum) 
 Indicator  2000–5  2006 –11  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 































 Source: Chirwa (2011) and Chirwa et al. (2011d). 
 2  Although for ease of explanation the effects of possible under-estimation of CPI are aver-
aged across the 2006 to 2011 period, in fact distortions are more likely to have arisen from 2008 
onwards when maize prices started rising. 
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 The agricultural sector has therefore grown consistently during the subsidy 
period, and this has helped overall economic growth. Growth rates in both 
gross domestic product and in agricultural output may be partly attributed to 
the subsidy programme, although as discussed earlier they may also be partly 
attributed to high tobacco prices and to improved macro-economic manage-
ment, and have been aided by the good rains experienced in most seasons 
since 2005/6. The dry spell that hit some parts of the country in 2009 and 
lower tobacco prices and higher interest rates since then have contributed to 
the marked decline in agricultural growth after 2009. 
 There have also been fi scal implications of the subsidy programme, particu-
larly as much of the fi nancing comes from domestic revenues. As detailed in 
Chapter 5, the high costs of the programme have increased resource allocations 
to the agricultural sector and the subsidy accounts for a signifi cant proportion 
of the national budget. Chirwa et al. (2008) note that due to the subsidy pro-
gramme, Malawi became one of the fi rst African countries to achieve a 10% 
budgetary allocation to the agricultural sector, in accordance with the African 
Union (AU) and New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) target 
for stimulation of agricultural growth. However, this increased spending on 
the agricultural sector has come at the expense of increasing budget defi cits 
and increasing debts.  Figure 7.2 shows offi cial fi gures for trends in fi scal defi -
cit/GDP ratio and public debt/GDP ratios from 1999 to 2010. The defi cit as 
a proportion of gross domestic product has worsened during the period of 
implementation of the subsidy programme. The defi cit after grants increased 








1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Deficit before grants
Deficit after grants
 Figure 7.2 .  Fiscal defi cit/GDP ratio, 1999–2010 
Source: Computed by authors based on Reserve Bank Database. 
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FISP in 2008/9 reported in Chapter 5 (with other expenditures related to the 
2009 elections) before a surplus was registered in 2010. 
 There has also been some worsening of domestic debt, which increased 
from 8.2% in 2006 to 15.7% in 2010. The rising costs of the subsidy pro-
gramme from 2006/7 to 2008/9 and, as noted earlier in Chapter 5, its general 
failure to keep within budget (except for 2009/10) may have contributed to 
these trends—together with other pressures on public expenditure associated 
with the 2009 election. However it is also important to consider the budg-
etary implications of possible maize import and humanitarian distribution 
costs for government if the absence of the subsidy would have led to lower 
and possibly insuffi cient national maize production. 
 7.4.  Maize exports and imports 
 There are diffi culties in obtaining good data on international maize trade 
fl ows in Malawi, partly due to the restrictions imposed on maize exports and 
imports and due to informal and hence unreported trade across borders with 
Mozambique, Zambia, and Tanzania. There are confl icting estimates of trade 
across different reports (for example, Jayne et al., 2010; FAOStat; and FEWS 
NET reports). In broad terms, however: 
 •  Malawi is more commonly a maize importer than exporter, with 
relatively small annual informal imports and no formal imports in most 
years, unless there is a national food shortage demanding large-scale 
formal imports and increasing informal imports. 
 •  Informal imports have been fairly constant during the subsidy years, 
after major imports in 2006 following the poor 2004/5 harvest. 
 •  Following the large estimated harvest in 2007, the government allowed 
formal exports of maize amounting to around 400,000 tonnes through 
the granting of licenses for export, particularly to Zimbabwe (licenses 
were granted to exporters that had unsold stock from the 2006 harvest, 
with permission for ADMARC to export up to 100,000 metric tons of 
maize, with the rest exported by private exporters). 
 •  This was followed by a dramatic maize price surge, peaking at 90MK/kg 
and formal imports from South Africa of around 40,000 MT in 2008/9 
(Jayne et al., 2010). 
 •  According to FEWS NET (2011) the government also issued export 
licences from July 2010 to August 2011, allowing an increased export of 
maize mainly to Kenya and Zimbabwe, although it has been diffi cult to 
track records of these exports. 
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 This suggests that the overall domestic maize supply has improved except 
in 2008/9 (following the 2007/8 harvest). However these fi gures need to be 
interpreted together with information on domestic maize prices, to which we 
now turn. 
 7.5.  Impacts on maize prices and rural wages 
 Maize is the main staple food in Malawi. The price of maize has the largest 
weight in the food price index of the consumer price index. Increased maize 
production as a result of the subsidy programme should push maize prices 
down and promote more general price stability and benefi t net maize buyers 
among both benefi ciaries and non-benefi ciaries of the subsidy programme. 
Changes in maize prices are therefore a critical determinant of real wages and 
consideration of changes in real wages thus requires consideration of changes 
in both maize prices and nominal wage rates. We examine these in turn. 
 7.5.1.  Maize prices 
 One of the expected benefi ts of the farm input subsidy is to reduce both 
the price of maize relative to rural incomes (Dorward, 2013) and its intra- 
and inter-seasonal price variability.  Figure 7.3 shows nominal and real maize 
prices between 2001 and 2011 in Malawi Kwacha and US dollars per kilogram. 
Both inter-seasonal and intra-seasonal variability of prices are evident, and 
prices have not behaved as might be expected. The FISP period has experi-
enced higher average and peak nominal maize prices than the pre-FISP period 
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 Figure 7.3.  Nominal and real maize prices in Malawi, 2001–11 
 Source: Computed by authors based on MoAFS Price Monitoring Data. 
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with prices in the FISP period reaching a peak of 70MK per kilogram (US$.50 
per kilogram) in January/February 2009 compared to a peak of 50MK per kilo-
gram (US$0.39 per kilogram) in February 2006. As regards real prices (defl ated 
by the CPI), averages in the pre-FISP and FISP period are not substantially dif-
ferent: as the moving averages show they are a little higher in the FISP period 
when measured in Malawi Kwacha and a little lower when measured in US$. 
 Between 2001 and 2011 there were three surges in the price of maize: in 
2001/2, 2005/6, and 2008/9. Chirwa (2009) notes that price surges in 2001/2 
and 2005/6 are mainly explained by reductions in maize production owing to 
poor weather conditions (with heavy rains in March and dry spells and fl oods 
in some areas exacerbated by low input uptake in 2000/1; and late distribu-
tion of inputs and poor rains in many areas in 2004/5). 
 The surge in maize prices in the 2008/9 market season should not be 
attributable to such supply-side issues because of relatively good rains and 
improved access to subsidized seeds and fertilizer. High prices in 2008/9 
(and other market seasons) also raise questions about MoAFS’ high national 
maize production estimates.  Figure 7.4 shows 1993/4 to 2010/11 maize prices 
(average annual prices from MoAFS market surveys, in US$) against esti-
mated quantity consumed per capita, calculated from Ministry of Agriculture 
and Food Security crop production estimates, census data, and exports and 
import estimates compiled from various sources. 3 This perspective on prices 
and supply estimates draws attention to an apparent shift in the relationship 
between net supply and prices from around the 2006/7 production season. 
 Chirwa (2009) suggests several reasons for the high maize prices in 2008/9 
despite estimated high maize production levels in the 2007/8 production 
season. 
 1.  Poor quality of information about domestic supply from the govern-
ment, both in terms of domestic production and stocks in reserves, cre-
ated speculative behaviour. Even with record reported maize production 
levels, maize prices remained high, creating uncertainty about domestic 
supply, with asymmetric information among different agents. 
 2.  The unsatisfi ed contract to export to Zimbabwe from the 2006/7 harvest 
also fuelled speculation that there was a domestic maize shortage. By 
February 2008, only 302,000 metric tons of maize had been exported 
to Zimbabwe by the private sector through the National Food Reserve 
Agency (NFRA), and Malawi failed to satisfy the contract of maize exports 
to Zimbabwe (FEWS NET, 2008). In addition, there was speculation that 
 3  Production estimates from a production season are linked to prices in the following market-
ing season. Thus, for example, the very high prices experienced in the 2008/9 market season are 
shown in  Figure 7.4 against the 2007/8 production season. 
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exports to Zimbabwe would continue from the 2007/8 harvest, which 
was also a surplus year according to the MoAFS crop estimates. The pri-
vate sector was having diffi culty in sourcing maize from the market and 
this sent signals that there were supply shortages and prices began to 
increase substantially. 
 3.  The behaviour of state agencies, ADMARC and the National Food Reserve 
Agency (NFRA), who were offering higher purchase prices to farmers than 
the private sector, and the government’s imposition of a ban on private 
trader purchases, also appeared to signal domestic supply shortages. 
 4. High international maize prices, amid continued reported surplus maize 
production, created speculation that the export market for maize would 
be lucrative, leading to stockpiling and purchasing maize from farmers 
at higher prices by the private sector. 
 5. A further possible cause of tighter markets could be government pur-
chases of maize for stockpiling of the national grain reserve following 
the construction of a 60,000 MT new storage capacity. 
 Table 7.2 shows average nominal maize prices in Malawi and major cities 
between 2001 and 2011, and suggests that during the FISP period the aver-
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 Figure 7.4.  Maize prices and estimated quantity consumed per capita from 1993/4 to 
2010/11 production seasons 7 
Source: Adapted and updated from Dorward and Chirwa, (2011c). 
 7  The regression estimate is discussed in Chapter 9. 
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doubled in Malawi Kwacha terms. Monthly variability of maize prices (meas-
ured in standard deviations) has also increased in the FISP period, although 
the coeffi cient of variation has fallen slightly. Prices and price variability have 
also increased in US$ terms, though not as dramatically. It appears therefore 
that the subsidy programme has not signifi cantly reduced either prices or 
food price risks. 
 It seems clear then that maize prices have not fallen in real or nominal 
terms over the period of FISP implementation. However, this does not nec-
essarily mean that the FISP has not exerted downward pressure on maize 
prices but rather that other pressures pushed prices up in 2008/9 (as discussed 
above). In the absence of such pressures maize prices did fall and remain low 
throughout the 2006/7 marketing season, following the introduction of FISP 
in 2005/6 and before government interventions tightened the market after 
the 2007 harvest. Prices were also low throughout the 2010/11 market sea-
son, prior to the macro-economic problems that surfaced in mid 2011. 
 CGE and partial equilibrium models also suggest that FISP should lead to 
maize price falls in the absence of interventions or macro-economic or other 
changes affecting maize prices. Simulations by Buffi e and Atolia (2009) esti-
mate long-run falls in domestic food prices of 2% to 5%, with higher short-
run falls of up to 9%. Filipski and Taylor (2011) estimate that the 2005/6 
subsidy would have led to a 5% increase in maize production in a model that 
assumes perfectly competitive markets (they also unfortunately assume that 
maize prices are determined exogenously on the world market and therefore 
do not estimate any price changes). The introduction of credit constraints 
on input purchases (one part of the low maize productivity trap discussed 
earlier in Chapter 4) reduces the overall agricultural production impacts of 
the FISP to a little over 2% (specifi c impacts on maize production are not 
stated) but an alternative specifi cation that introduces unemployment and 
effi ciency wages results in the FISP increasing agricultural production by 
over 13%. The Informal Rural Economy partial equilibrium models also give 
 Table 7.2.  Average nominal maize prices, 2001–11 
 Malawi Kwacha per kilogram  US Dollars per kilogram 
 Period  National  Mzuzu  Lilongwe  Blantyre  National  Mzuzu  Lilongwe  Blantyre 
 Pre-FISP  18.12  17.32  18.43  19.16  0.19  0.18  0.19  0.2 



















 Note: Figures in parenthesis are standard deviations in monthly prices. 
 Source : Computed by authors based on MoAFS Price Monitoring Data. 
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consistent estimates of increases in maize production of 10% to 20% across 
all households with the FISP, although direct benefi ciary impacts tend to be 
higher (Dorward and Chirwa, 2012b). Aggregate production increases lead to 
lower maize prices, with median falls across different years varying from 8% 
to 40% under different scenarios. Given the clear endogeneity of Malawian 
maize prices, the large maize production impacts of the FISP in these simula-
tions should have substantial price impacts. 
 It is, therefore, surprising that falls in real maize prices are not observed, 
despite the upward pressures on maize prices discussed above. This discus-
sion, however, has examined only nominal prices and real prices defl ated 
by the CPI. As noted by Dorward (2011) and Dorward (2013), real consumer 
prices are often best examined in relation to incomes, and in this regard there 
is evidence that real maize prices have fallen relative to wages. We therefore 
turn now to consider evidence of changes in nominal wage rates. 
 7.5.2.  Wages 
 One of the expected economy-wide benefi ts of such a large-scale input subsidy 
programme is its infl uence on rural wages relative to maize prices. As outlined 
in Chapter 4, rural wages may increase due to the low supply of casual labour 
and high demand for labour among labour-hiring farming households. With 
low and stable maize prices, the increase in rural wages should increase real 
incomes of poor households. We discussed maize price movements in Malawi 
before and after the introduction of the FISP in Section 7.5.1. We now con-
sider wage rates in both nominal terms and relative to maize prices. 
 Despite diffi culties in obtaining reliable data on rural wage rates, there 
is evidence of rising wage rates in rural areas following the introduction of 
FISP. School of Oriental and African Studies et al. (2008) report survey data 
fi ndings that median wage rates rose by 33% from 2005/6 (following a poor 
2004/5 crop production season) to 2006/7 (following the 2005/6 subsidy and 
better rains) per day across the two years. Focus group discussions and key 
informant interviews also reported increases in wages and increased bargain-
ing power for sellers of labour in a tighter market, with a shift from price 
setting by buyers of  ganyu to sellers of  ganyu and wage increases of 50% or 
more in some areas. School of Oriental and African Studies et al. (2008) also 
report anecdotal evidence of increased  ganyu rates from commercial farm-
ers who faced diffi culties in obtaining hired labour without paying higher 
wage rates. FEWS NET (2007) also reported reduced search for employment 
by  ganyu labour in November 2007 with increased scarcity and cost of hired 
labour reported by farmers wishing to hire labour. 
 As noted earlier in Chapter 6, Ricker-Gilbert (2011) reports contractions in 
labour supply over the period 2003/4 to 2008/9, with a large contraction in 
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labour supply before 2006/7 followed by a smaller expansion before 2008/9. 
He does not report changes in wage rates, although with relatively stable 
labour demand (and he only reports agricultural labour demand) higher 
real wage rates would be expected. Dorward et al. (2010a) state that focus 
group discussions and key informant interviews in 2008/9 reported contin-
ued improvements in  ganyu wage rates and bargaining positions for sellers 
of  ganyu (as in 2006/7). Household survey estimates of changes in nominal 
wage rates from 2006/7 to 2008/9 suggest increases of around 70%, so that 
over the period 2005/6 to 2008/9 they just about kept abreast with maize 
price increases, although this involved a dramatic increase in real wages from 
2005/6 to 2006/7 and then a smaller decline from 2006/7 to 2008/9. 
 Chirwa et al. (2011d) fi nd that nominal wages have continued to increase 
in rural areas since 2009, and when coupled with falling maize prices this 
implies increased real wages among households participating in the labour 
market.  Figure 7.5 shows mean farm-gate purchase prices for maize, selling 
prices for tobacco prices, and  ganyu wage rates between 2009 and 2011, as 
reported by survey respondents in 2011. With respect to maize prices, the 
overall prices at which households buy maize show strong seasonal effects 
in all districts (with January prices considerably higher than June prices) 
and falling prices from 2009/10 to 2010/11 ( Figure 7.5a ). This is consistent 
with maize market prices shown earlier in  Figure 7.3 . Tobacco prices gener-
ally fell slightly between 2009 and 2010 ( Figure 7.5b ), although in Blantyre 
and Zomba households reported improved tobacco prices. Again this is con-
sistent with national data on tobacco prices in  Figure 7.1 . With respect to 
wages ( Figure 7.5c ), there is a steady increase in  ganyu cropping season wages 
reported by households over the period January 2009 to January 2011, and 
these increases occurred in all the districts that were surveyed. Wage increases 
are broadly similar across all districts in percentage terms. 
 These wage rates and maize price developments were also widely reported 
in focus group discussions and in life histories of some of benefi ciaries. In 
most life histories of benefi ciaries, engaging in  ganyu to earn income to pur-
chase food is a common strategy among poor households and improvements 
in wages and reduction in maize prices made maize more affordable even for 
poor households. This is confi rmed in  Figure 7.5d which shows real increases 
in  ganyu wages in terms of its maize grain purchasing power (variability in 
prices between areas may be due to bias and reporting inconsistencies, but 
data collection methods attempted to minimize changes in bias between sur-
veys, and hence estimates of percentage change in wages within in each area 
should be and appear to be more consistent). Overall, the reported maize 
purchasing power of daily  ganyu wages increased by 47% between January 
2009 and January 2010, with the highest reported increase of 80% in Ntcheu 
district and lowest increase of 34% in Phalombe district. 
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 It appears then that real wages increased from 2005/6 to 2006/7, fell back 
somewhat from 2006/7 to 2008/9, and then increased again from 2009 to 
2010. How far can this be attributed to the impact of FISP? The four approaches 
set out in Section 7.2 may be examined to investigate this, in addition to 
focus group discussions and key informants attributing increased wage rates 
to the impact of FISP in household surveys (School of Oriental and African 
Studies et al., 2008; Dorward et al., 2010a; Chirwa et al., 2011d). 
 Considering fi rst general patterns of change, the two primary explanations 
for improved rural wages are improved tobacco prices and earnings, and 
the FISP. It appears that while nominal wage rates increased over the period 
2005/6 to 2009/10, real wage rates improved from 2005/6 to 2006/7, fell back 
somewhat from 2006/7 to 2008/9, and then rose again from 2009 to 2010/11. 
Tobacco prices rose in 2006/7 and therefore cannot explain increases in 
nominal or real wage rates from 2005/6 to 2006/7. These increases might be 
explained by improved crop production in 2005/6 as compared with 2004/5 
as a result of both the FISP and improved weather. Increased nominal wage 
rates from 2006/7 to 2008/9 would be consistent with the effects of increased 
maize production as a result of relatively good weather and the FISP and/or 
the effects of higher tobacco prices received from 2007 onwards. Increased 
nominal wage rates from 2008/9 to 2010/11 would be consistent with the 
effects of falling maize prices as a result of the removal of maize market distor-
tions with continued high production (with good weather and the FISP) and 
with continuing relatively high tobacco prices (these remained above 2005/5 
levels: as  Figure 7.1 shows 2009 and 2010 prices were similar to 2007 prices, 
higher than 2006 prices, but lower than 2008 prices). 
 Further evidence of the impact of the FISP on wage rates is provided by 
Ricker-Gilbert (2011) in his use of regression analysis to examine the relation-
ship between the amount of subsidy received in communities and median 
 ganyu wage rates in these communities. He fi nds signifi cant (p = 0.01) positive 
relationships between wages and subsidy receipt, commercial fertilizer price, 
hybrid maize price, tobacco price, and coeffi cient of variation of rainfall. He 
also fi nds signifi cant (p = 0.01) negative relationships between wages and the 
standard deviation of subsidy receipt per household and long-run average 
rainfall. The estimated effects of subsidy receipt and of maize and tobacco 
prices are particularly interesting, with an average of 50 kg per household 
estimated to increase nominal wages by 10%, and an increase in 1 standard 
deviation decreasing nominal wages by 0.1%. An increase in tobacco prices 
by 50MK/kg (very approximately the increase in 2007, 2008, and 2009 above 
2005/6 and earlier prices) is estimated to also raise nominal wages by 10%. 
An increase in maize prices of 30MK/kg would lead to an increase in nominal 
wages of a little over 4%. However, since a 30MK/kg increase in maize prices 
represents an increase of 100% or more over 2003/4 or 2006/7 maize prices, 
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and maize accounts for a signifi cant proportion of expenditure of the poorer 
people who hire their labour out for  ganyu work, the small increase in nomi-
nal wages will not be enough to prevent a fall in real wage rates. 
 Positive impacts of FISP are found in both the CGE models discussed ear-
lier in the chapter. Buffi e and Atolia (2009) fi nd real unskilled wages rising 
by up to 5% immediately after the introduction of FISP, and then declining 
slightly or signifi cantly depending in later years on the sources of programme 
fi nance. Filipski and Taylor (2011) also report FISP leading to an increase in 
rural wages with their ‘perfect competition’ model, although the scale of this 
increase is not reported. There is no specifi c mention of wage effects with 
the model allowing for liquidity constraints. Where they postulate effi ciency 
wages, the impact of the subsidy is not on wage levels but on employment, 
and the impact of the subsidy on labour income is very large. 
 The importance of economy-wide effects on real wages is also supported 
by informal economy model simulations of the two largest livelihood zones 
(Shire Highlands and Kasungu–Lilongwe Plain) in Malawi between 2005/6 
and 2010/11 (Dorward and Chirwa, 2012b). Small increases in wages and 
larger post-harvest falls in maize prices combine to give increases in the wage 
to maize price ratio, with average increases in the pre-harvest period of 19% 
and 5% for the Shire Highlands and Kasungu–Lilongwe Plain respectively, 
and 73% and 32% in the post-harvest period. These ‘basic scenario’ simula-
tions are consistent with the earlier discussion of potential impacts in Section 
4.4, with differences between the two zones explained by the greater propor-
tion of poor households in the Shire Highlands livelihoods zone. 
 7.6.  Other variables 
 The previous section considered different sources of information on possible 
subsidy impacts on maize prices and wages. This refl ected both the impor-
tance of these impacts (indicated, for example, by their central position in the 
causal impact chains set out in  Figures 2.2 ,  4.2, and II.1) and the availability 
of information and analysis on these impacts. There are, however, a range 
of other potential FISP impacts that are important for welfare and economic 
benefi ts, but where there is less evidence on impact. In this section we review 
changes in these variables over the period in which FISP has been imple-
mented. Arriving at fi rm conclusions regarding change is diffi cult. A number 
of data sources are supported by anecdotal evidence in suggesting improve-
ment on many variables over the period 2005 to early 2011, after which there 
were increasing political and economic diffi culties associated with a number 
of President Mutharika’s policies. However the third Integrated Household 
Survey (IHS3, National Statistical Offi ce, 2012), reporting on the situation 
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in 2010/11, contains a number of statistics that present a much less positive 
picture. Finding consistency across these estimates and other data sources, 
including those on estimated FISP impacts, is problematic. 
 7.6.1.  Food availability and consumption 
 National food production and per capita availability indices show increases 
in national food security in Malawi since the implementation of the FISP in 
2005/6. As discussed earlier in this chapter, there are questions about the reli-
ability of some of the national crop production estimates on which these are 
based (possible discrepancies between maize production estimates and prices 
were discussed earlier, and there are longstanding queries about inconsisten-
cies between national crop estimates and survey estimates of root crop areas 
and production). 4 Nevertheless, there is general agreement that the food 
security situation has improved in the country partly owing to incremental 
use of fertilizers and improved seeds provided under the subsidy programme 
and partly owing to the good weather conditions that Malawi has had during 
this period. These trends of national food security are consistent with house-
hold survey fi ndings that show improved self-assessment of food security. 
 Table 7.3 shows the proportion of households with different food consump-
tion between the 2006/7 and 2008/9 seasons from a survey of benefi ciaries 
and non-benefi ciaries of FISP. Overall, there is a shift to more households 
reporting adequate and more than adequate food consumption. 
 However, National Statistical Offi ce (2012) fi nds that 33% of households 
experienced situations on food insecurity, with 42% of the rural population 
being food insecure in 2010/11. Concerns also arise about the large numbers 
of people continuing to experience food insecurity and needing emergency 
humanitarian support. This appears to be particularly serious in 2012/13 with 
estimates that about 1.6 million people in 15 districts, mainly in southern 
Malawi, will be unable to meet adequate basic food requirements (FEWS NET, 
2012). This is mainly due to prolonged dry spells and poor rains: similar situ-
ations in previous years have been associated with local droughts or fl oods 
and are arguably unrelated to the FISP. 
 4  This is illustrated by the divergence between estimates in Ministry of Agriculture and Food 
Security (2007) and National Statistical Offi ce (2010a). 
 Table 7.3.  Household food consumption over the past 1 month, 2006/7–8/9 (%) 









 Note: Interviews with households were conducted in May and June, shortly after harvest. 
 Source: Dorward et al. (2010a). 
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 7.6.2.  Incomes and poverty 
 Earlier discussion of FISP focus group discussion and key informant reports 
of FISP impacts on real wages implicitly or explicitly linked this to improved 
real incomes. Estimates of subsidy impacts on nominal wages (Ricker-Gilbert, 
2011)  when combined with estimates on maize production also suggest 
increases in real incomes for poorer non-benefi ciaries as well as benefi ciaries. 
There are explicit results from the different CGE models of Buffi e and Atolia 
(2009) and Filipski and Taylor (2011), with Buffi e and Atolia (2009) estimating 
short-term real income increases of the poor (many of whom may not receive 
subsidized inputs) rising by 4% to 8%, and Filipski and Taylor (2011) estimat-
ing that the introduction of liquidity and labour market imperfections into 
their model increases the income gains of non-benefi ciaries from spillover 
effects. The IRE partial economy model of Dorward and Chirwa (2012b) also 
estimates substantial real income gains from wage and maize price change 
impacts, averaging 10% and 3% across all households in the ‘basic scenario’ in 
the Shire Highlands and Kasungu–Lilongwe Plains respectively. In this, poor 
non-benefi ciary households gain most, non-poor benefi ciaries, and poor non-
benefi ciaries gain direct and indirect benefi ts respectively, and non-poor non-
benefi ciaries generally lose from the indirect impacts through higher wages 
and low maize prices. In the Shire Highland Livelihood Zone (SHI), simulated 
‘indirect gains’ to real incomes for target households are considerably higher 
than the direct gains from subsidy receipt (13% as compared with 7%). These 
indirect gains are higher than simulated for the Kasungu–Lilongwe Plain (KAS) 
because of the former’s high rates of poverty incidence, high land pressure, 
and larger numbers of poor people relying more on sales of  ganyu labour and 
spending a higher proportion of their income on maize purchases. 
 If the farm input subsidy raises the income of the poor then it should also 
play a role in poverty reduction. Indeed evidence of the impacts of the FISP 
on the wage to maize price ratio and the impact of tobacco prices on wages (as 
reported earlier) should have led to falls in poverty from 2005/6 to 2010/11. 
Given the scale of the FISP, these should show up in national poverty statis-
tics. Evidence on changes in poverty at the national level is, however, mixed. 
 Table 7.4 shows the trend in different estimates of the poverty head count 
ratio between 1998 and 2011. The national head count poverty rate in 2005, 
prior to the implementation of the subsidy programme, was estimated at 52% 
while in the rural areas it was estimated that 56% of the population were liv-
ing below the poverty line. Seasonally adjusted model-based estimates from 
welfare monitoring surveys suggest that the poverty rate increased in 2005/6 
following the poor 2004/5 crop season and subsequent food shortages, 
then declined sharply between 2006 and 2007 before stabilizing from 2007 
to 2009 (Chirwa et al., 2012). The urban poverty rate is estimated to have 
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fallen by almost half in this period. However, recent poverty estimates based 
on the 2010/11 integrated household survey suggest that between 2004/5 
and 2010/11 the national poverty rate was much higher than predicted by 
the WMS estimates, and only fell by 2% between 2004/5 and 2010/11, sug-
gesting only a marginal change in the well-being of the population. This 
would be consistent with high maize prices putting a brake on growth in real 
incomes in these years: one would then expect low maize prices in 2010/11 
to stimulate further growth in real incomes and falling poverty. However, 
poverty incidence in rural areas is estimated at over 56% in 2010/11 (National 
Statistical Offi ce, 2012), much higher than expected, with a fall of only 1.5% 
from 58.1% in 2004/5 to 56.6% in 2010/11. 
 The very limited fall in estimated poverty incidence from 2004/5 to 
2010/11, as reported by National Statistical Offi ce (2012), is diffi cult to recon-
cile with estimates of wider changes (in labour supply, wages, crop income, 
school enrolment, child health, subjective well-being, asset ownership, and 
experience of shocks) reported in different surveys discussed in this and the 
previous chapter. However the continued high reported poverty incidence in 
2010/11 (with high incidence of ultra-poverty) is consistent with a number of 
other estimates of change from 2004/5 to 2010/11 (National Statistical Offi ce, 
2005a, 2012): increases in moderate stunting, wasting, and underweight and 
small reductions in ownership of tables, radios, and sickles. On the other 
hand, these fi ndings are less easy to reconcile with other estimates from 
these surveys: falls in severe stunting, wasting, and underweight; increases 
in ownership of beds and bicycles; increases in permanent and semi-perma-
nent housing with decreases in traditional housing; increases in access to 
improved water sources and use of improved sanitation; and decreases in the 
proportion of people reporting inadequate food, clothing, and health care. 5 
Furthermore, examination of changes in poverty incidence across districts 
shows a wide range of changes. 6 These apparent inconsistencies pose impor-
tant questions that need to be resolved, suggesting inconsistencies in either 
the IHS2 or the IHS3. 
 7.6.3.  Nutrition 
 As with the poverty incidence estimates, one would expect economy-wide FISP 
impacts on real incomes to lead to national improvements in the nutrition 
status of children in Malawi. Anthropometric indicators, however, present an 
 5  These improvements are found across all income quintiles. 
 6  These, for example, range from an astonishing almost halving of poverty incidence in six 
years in Thyolo and Rumphi Districts, from 65 to 37% and from 62 to 37% respectively, to a rise 
in poverty incidence from 38 to 57% in Lilongwe, from 66 to 82% in Chikwawa, and from 51 to 
61% in Mzimba District (next to Rumphi). 
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apparently confusing picture ( Table 7.5 ). This expectation requires fi rst that 
the FISP has raised the real incomes of poorer households, and second that 
such increases in real income lead to improved child nutrition. We consider 
here fi rst evidence of wider changes in children’s nutritional status, and then, 
more briefl y, evidence that higher incomes do lead to improved child nutri-
tion. There are, however, diffi culties in interpreting anthropometric meas-
ures across different surveys as a new standard population reference for the 
calculation of under-nutrition measures was developed by the WHO in 2006, 
replacing the 1977 NCHS/CDC/WHO reference. Estimates calculated using 
the different reference populations are not comparable (de Onis et al., 2006; 
National Statistical Offi ce and ICF Macro, 2011), but the 2010 Demographic 
and Health Survey (National Statistical Offi ce and ICF Macro, 2011) usefully 
provides estimates derived from both standard population references, and we 
include both of these in  Table 7.5 to provide some indication of the way that 
the different standard population references may affect comparisons across 
surveys. 
 Stunting is the measure that should provide the best indicator of longer 
term child nutrition, as it is less affected than underweight and wasting by 
seasonal variations in food intake and disease. Simple comparison of the esti-
mates in  Table 7.5 suggests that there has not been much of a fall in under-
nutrition from 2000 to 2011. However, allowance needs to be made for the 
change in standard reference population for the 2010 DHS and 2010/11 IHS3 
surveys. These two surveys give similar estimates using the 2006 WHO refer-
ence population (47.1% and 48.1% prevalence of moderate stunting, respec-
tively). The DHS2010 estimate translates into a much lower prevalence when 
calculated using the 1977 NCHS/CDC/WHO reference. There would presum-
ably be a similar adjustment to the 2010/11 IHS3 (making it something like 
42.5%) providing no evidence of any increase in stunting and suggesting 
that if anything it may have fallen. Similar arguments apply with regard to 
estimates of severe stunting, with much stronger evidence for a fall in the 
prevalence of severe stunting. 
 Table 7.4.  Trends in poverty headcount in Malawi, 1998–2011 (%) 
 1998  2004/5  2005*  2006 *  2007 *  2008 *  2009 *  2010/11 
 National  54.1  52.4  56  58.4  41.3  41  40  50.7 
 Urban**  18.5  25.4  24  25  11  13  14  17.3 
 Rural**  58.1  55.9  53  47  44  44  43  56.6 
 Note:  * Predicted poverty rates based on an econometric model using welfare monitoring survey data (Mathiassen, 
2006 and National Statistical Offi ce, 2005b) with seasonal adjustments as in Chirwa et al. (2012). 
 **WMS urban and rural fi gures are not seasonally adjusted. 
 Sources: Government of Malawi and World Bank (2006), National Statistical Offi ce (2005b, 2007, 2008b, 2009, 
2010b, 2012), Chirwa et al. (2012) 
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 Measurement of wasting and being underweight requires accurate weigh-
ing of children. On both these indicators the 2010/11 Integrated Household 
Survey (IHS) stands out for very high prevalence estimates as compared with 
other surveys (even allowing for adjustments for the different reference popu-
lations, which are very small for wasting). This contrasts with the percentage 
underweight estimates in the 2010 Demographic Household Survey (DHS), 
estimates which are particularly low compared to earlier surveys when stand-
ardized against the same reference population. The 2010/11 IHS estimates of 
the prevalence of severely wasted and underweight children are however rela-
tively low, particularly when possible adjustments are made to the prevalence 
of severe wasting to standardize the reference population. 
 Overall, it is diffi cult to drawn any fi rm conclusions on changes in chil-
dren’s nutritional status from these different estimates. There are, however, 
possible indications that the prevalence of moderate stunting has fallen a 
little (although it is still very high) but that there has been a more substantial 
reduction in the prevalence of severely stunted and of moderately and severely 
underweight children (if we ignore the 2010/11 Integrated Household Survey 
estimate of the prevalence of moderately underweight children as an outlier). 
 The various surveys reported in Table 7.5 also have the potential to provide 
evidence on links between income and child nutrition. Both the IHS sur-
veys report anthropometric results by consumption quintile, and all surveys 
report estimates separately by region and for urban and rural areas. Neither 
the 2004/5 nor 2010/11 IHS show any clear decline in stunting or severe 
stunting in higher income quintiles. However in the 2010/11 IHS the propor-
tion of children who are moderately or severely wasted or underweight falls 
 Table 7.5.  Nutritional status of children under 5 years, 2000–11 (%) 
 Indicator  2000  2004/5  2006  2009  2010  2011 
 (DHS*)  (IHS2*)  (MICS*)  (WMS)  (DHS*) (DHS**)  (IHS3**) 
 Stunting  49  43.2  46  36  41.5  47.1  48.1 
 Severe stunting  -  17.8  20.5  -  15.4  19.6  14 
 Wasting  5.5  4.6  3.5  1  3.7  4  11.4 
 Severe wasting  -  1.3  0.5  -  0.9  1.5  1 
 Underweight  25.4  22.2  20.5  17  17.8  12.8  30.6 
 Severely 
underweight 
 -  7.4  3.6  -  3  3  1.2 
 Note: DHS = Demographic and Health Survey, IHS = Integrated Household Survey, MICS = Multiple Indicator Cluster 
Survey, WMS = Welfare Monitoring Survey. 
 *: compared against 1977 NCHS/CDC/WHO reference. 
 **: compared against WHO Child Growth Standards adopted in 2006. 
 Sources: National Statistical Offi ce and ORC Macro (2001), National Statistical Offi ce and ICF Macro (2011), National 
Statistical Offi ce (2007, 2010b, 2012), Government of Malawi and World Bank (2006). 
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in higher income quintiles. This is the case for the 2004/5 IHS2 estimates of 
moderate and severe wasting but not for estimates of the prevalence of under-
weight children. Both the 2006 MICS and the 2010 DHS show declining stunt-
ing and underweight prevalence (moderate and severe) with higher wealth 
quintiles, but only the 2010 DHS shows this for wasting. International cross-
country analysis (for example, Headey, 2011a; Webb and Block, 2012) sug-
gests a stronger relationship between income growth and stunting and a 
weaker one between income growth and wasting at lower income levels. 
 Examination of regional differences in anthropometric measures in Malawi 
may shed a little more light on the relationships between these measures 
and income and on the consistency between different surveys. Both the IHS2 
and the IHS3 estimate highest median incomes and lowest poverty incidence 
in the central region, and lowest median incomes and highest poverty inci-
dence in the southern region, with the northern region in between. With 
regard to anthropometric measures the different surveys present somewhat 
inter-regional comparisons as regards particular measures, but in broad terms 
the northern region seems to have a lower prevalence of under-nutrition 
while the central region tends to have the highest prevalence, despite higher 
median income and lower poverty incidence than the other regions. 
 7.7. Summary 
 The chapter set out to review the economy-wide impacts of the Farm Input 
Subsidy Programme in Malawi. These are important to arguments put for-
ward in Part I regarding the importance of such impacts for large-scale input 
subsidy programmes supporting staple crop production. Examination of 
these impacts involved identifi cation of changes potentially associated with 
the implementation of the FISP and consideration of the attribution of these 
changes to the FISP and to other potential infl uences (such as macro-economic 
management, rainfall, and tobacco prices) using four principle approaches: 
consideration of patterns of change in different variables; regression analysis; 
simulations with CGE models; and simulations with a partial equilibrium 
Informal Rural Economy model. 
 Although most macro-economic indicators show an environment of 
macro-economic stability, some of the indicators—such as fi scal defi cits and 
domestic debt—have been unfavourable within the period of implementa-
tion of the subsidy programme. While good macro-economic management 
made the implementation of the FISP possible, the FISP may have then con-
tributed both to good agricultural growth and to fi scal defi cits and domestic 
debt (in and following years when FISP costs were not well controlled). There 
are possible diffi culties with published estimates of GDP growth, but even 
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allowing for these, agricultural sector performance in the FISP period would 
still average a little under 8%—or a little under 7% if the 2006 recovery from 
bad 2005 rains is factored in. 
 The analysis of the economy-wide effects of the input subsidy programme 
must recognize some mixed and puzzling results. While there are multiple 
sources of evidence for the positive effect of the subsidy programme on pro-
duction, high maize prices from 2007 to 2009 are not obviously consistent 
with this, but a number of explanations for this are put forward. Evidence 
for rising nominal and real wages (as measured against maize prices) is very 
strong, derived from a variety of different information sources and analytical 
approaches. Regression analysis linking wage rates to subsidy receipts in dif-
ferent areas is particularly revealing as it also provides insights into the effects 
of changes in tobacco prices and maize prices on nominal and real wage rates. 
Evidence of the FISP causing increases in real wage rates and consequent rises 
in real incomes is also provided by qualitative date from rural people and by 
CGE and IRE modelling. These sources also suggest that there have been or 
should have been increases in real incomes, especially among poor buyers of 
maize and sellers of  ganyu labour, and consequent falls in poverty incidence. 
However while there is a substantial body of evidence suggesting that this 
has been the case, the very recently released Integrated Household Survey 
poverty incidence estimates for 2010/11 are only very slightly lower than 
the 2004/5 estimates. We are not currently able to resolve the inconsistencies 
between these confl icting sets of information. 
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
167
 8 
 Impacts on input market development 
 8.1.  Introduction 
 The implementation of the Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) in Malawi 
since the 2005/6 agricultural season has involved the interaction of the 
government of Malawi, the private sector, the development partners, Civil 
Society Organisations (CSOs), non-governmental organizations, tradi-
tional leaders, and smallholder farmers. These have played various roles in 
the implementation and success of the programme. The private sector has 
played a critical role in the procurement, transportation, and retail of farm 
inputs, but their involvement in the programme has changed over time. 
The private sector is involved in several aspects of the subsidy programme 
including the procurement of fertilizers, the transportation of fertilizers to 
various markets, the retail sale of fertilizers, and the production and sale of 
improved seeds. 
 There are potential benefi ts from the inclusion of the private sector in the 
implementation of a large and nationwide agricultural input subsidy pro-
gramme, as noted in Imperial College et al. (2007). First, it is believed that 
most of the activities can be done more effi ciently by the private sector, which 
is less prone to the bureaucracy associated with state delivery of services. 
Second, the involvement of the private sector is seen as a strategy for develop-
ing the private market system, especially in remote areas where the incentives 
for private sector investment in markets are weak. Third, the involvement of 
the private sector may allow the government to use scarce resources on other 
activities, by reducing the cost of the subsidy to the government. Fourth, the 
participation of the private sector in input retailing may reduce the displace-
ment effects of the input subsidy programme. 
 This chapter assesses the impact of the Farm Input Subsidy Programme 
on the development of the private sector. The next section reviews the roles 
and nature of private sector participation in the input supply systems and 
the subsidy programme. Section 8.3 highlights the overall input purchases 
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and use. Section 8.4 analyses the changes that have occurred in the fertilizer 
market and the experiences of private sector participation in the subsidy pro-
gramme. Section 8.5 looks at the impact of the subsidy programme on the 
seed industry. Section 8.6 highlights the challenges and opportunities for 
greater private sector participation in the implementation of the subsidy pro-
gramme. In Section 8.7 we conclude and highlight the issues and options for 
improving private sector participation in the implementation of the subsidy 
programme. 
 8.2.  Roles of various players in input supply systems 
 The public and private sectors play various roles in the supply of farm inputs 
in Malawi, from procurement of inputs to retailing of inputs to farmers. 
The Malawi Government is directly involved in the supply of farm inputs 
through its two state-owned fi rms, the Agricultural Development and 
Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) and the Smallholder Farmer Fertilizer 
Revolving Fund of Malawi (SFFRFM). These state-owned fi rms compete 
with private sector enterprises comprising large-scale enterprises, coopera-
tive, retail chain stores, and small-scale agro-dealers. With the introduction 
of the farm input subsidy, state enterprises and private fi rms have played 
varying roles over the life time of the programme. The input suppliers have 
a number of associations and networks including the Fertilizer Association 
of Malawi (FAM), the Seed Traders Association of Malawi, Agricultural Input 
Suppliers Association of Malawi (AISAM), and a network of input suppli-
ers under the Citizen Network for Foreign Affairs (CNFA)/Rural Market 
Development Trust (RUMARK). In addition, the National Association of 
Smallholder Farmers of Malawi (NASFAM), a farmer cooperative, also pro-
vides input access to smallholder farmers on a commercial basis through 
a network of input supply shops. While state-owned enterprises have had 
consistency in the supply of inputs, the private sector participates in the 
subsidy programme in various ways in the fertilizer and seeds components 
of the programme. On the one hand, the relative roles of the private sec-
tor in the fertilizer component of the programme have varied over time as 
regards their participation in and exclusion from retail sales while remain-
ing important partners in the procurement of fertilizers for the programme 
and commercial sales. On the other hand, private sector participation in 
the seed component of the programme has been consistent. Apart from 
participation in the subsidy programme, the private sector also procures 
fertilizers and seeds for commercial sales in various market outlets across 
the country. 
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 8.2.1.  Fertilizer markets under FISP 
 The structure of the fertilizer industry in Malawi has evolved since the 
introduction of the input subsidy programme, with exits and entries, but it 
remains dominated by a few players with vertical and horizontal relation-
ships.  Figure 8.1 shows the characteristics and level of participation of various 
players in the supply of fertilizers in procurement, distribution, and retail. At 
procurement level, the private sector players can be categorized into large/
well-established private fi rms (commercial fi rms and cooperatives) and small/
new entrants, while in the public sector there is SFFRFM and ADMARC. The 
private sector fi rms and SFFRFM import fertilizers for both the subsidy pro-
gramme and commercial sales while ADMARC has only procured for the sub-
sidy programme. The private sector fi rms participate in the procurement of 
fertilizers for the programme in a competitive tendering process. In addition, 
the two state-owned enterprises, ADMARC and SFFRFM, also take part in the 
fertilizer tendering process. 
 Over time, the business opportunities in the supply of fertilizers to the pro-
gramme have led to new entrants in the importation of fertilizers. Dorward 
et al. (2010b) note that there has been increased participation of the private 
sector in the supply of fertilizers to the programme, be it in terms of number 
of players and the relative volume handled by the private sector relative to 
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 Figure 8.1.  Structure of the fertilizer industry in Malawi in 2010 
 Source : Kelly et al. (2010) and School of Oriental and African Studies et al. (2008). 
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volumes handled by the state-owned enterprises or parastatals. Most impor-
tantly, private sector participation in the procurement of fertilizers has been 
consistent since the programme started in 2005/06. There has been growing 
interest in the supply of fertilizers to the programme. Logistics Unit (2012) 
shows that in the 2011/12 season, 65 enterprises submitted bids to supply 
fertilizers to the subsidy programme of which 20 were awarded contracts, an 
increase from 11 companies in the 2007/8 season (Logistics Unit, 2008). 
 Procurement is vertically linked to the distribution and retail of fertilizers to 
farmers, with some of the private sector fi rms and the two state-owned enter-
prises owning retail outlets in different parts of the country. The large private 
fi rms and some small to medium-scale new entrants also supply unsubsidized 
fertilizers to a network of agro-dealers and retail chain stores or supermarkets. 
However, the participation of the private sector in the retailing of subsidized 
fertilizers has been limited. Although the private sector plays a dominant 
role in the procurement of fertilizers, its participation in fertilizer retailing 
to smallholder farmers under the subsidy programme has varied, with the 
private sector participating only in the 2006/7 and 2007/8 agricultural sea-
sons (Dorward and Chirwa, 2011c). In these two seasons, smallholder farmers 
were able to redeem fertilizer coupons at some of the major retailers of fertiliz-
ers, but smallholder agro-dealer sellers were excluded from the redemption 
of fertilizer coupons. Otherwise, ADMARC and SFFRFM have been the only 
market outlets through which smallholder farmers have redeemed their sub-
sidy fertilizer coupons. 
 The other important role played by the private sector in the implementa-
tion of the subsidy programme is the transportation of fertilizers from the 
national depots to retail outlets in various parts of the country. There is no 
participation of state-owned enterprises in this activity, and this service is 
purely provided by private transporters through competitive bidding. The 
transporters of fertilizers from depots to unit markets are selected by the 
Ministry of Agriculture through a bidding process (Logistics Unit, 2008). In 
the 2011/12 season, a total of 23 transporters participated in the distribution 
of fertilizers from SFFRFM depots to various unit markets across the coun-
try (Logistics Unit, 2012) compared to 16 transporters in the 2008/9 season 
(Logistics Unit, 2009). 
 8.2.2.  Seeds market 
 In contrast to the fertilizer market, the seeds market is a private sector-based 
system, with no state-owned enterprise playing a role in the procurement of 
seeds.  Figure 8.2 shows the structure of the seed industry in Malawi at vari-
ous levels of the supply chain. The seed industry comprises the growers and 
retailers. The growers form the Seed Trade Association of Malawi (STAM) and 
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are classifi ed by ownership into international fi rms and domestic fi rms; by 
2011/12 there were18 seed growers in Malawi. The international companies 
are involved in the production of hybrid and open pollinated varieties while 
Malawian-owned companies tend to specialize in open pollinated varieties 
and legume seeds. The international fi rms include Pioneer and Monsanto 
who specialize in hybrid maize, and Pannar and Seed Co specializing in both 
hybrids and open pollinated varieties (OPV). The domestic fi rms specialize 
in OPVs and legume seeds and include Funwe, Demeter, and the Association 
of Smallholder Seed Multiplication Group (ASSMAG). The retail sector of the 
seed industry consists of seed growers’ distributor outlets, agro-dealers, coop-
eratives, supermarkets, and parastatals (ADMARC and SFFRFM). 
 The private sector has been a major player at all stages of seed supply and 
distribution of seeds in the subsidy programme. Its exclusive role in seed 
procurement and retail has been consistent since the commencement of the 
programme in 2005/6. Both large international and smaller domestic fi rms 
(including smallholder seed multiplication groups) have been awarded con-
tracts to supply hybrid and OPV maize seeds and legumes to the programme. 
In the 2007/8 season, for instance, six growers of seeds participated in the 
supply of maize seeds to the subsidy programme with one specializing in 
hybrid seeds, two in both hybrids and OPV, and three specializing in OPV 
seeds. More recently, as we observe below, the number of companies for sup-
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 Figure 8.2.  Structure of the seed industry in Malawi in 2010 
 Source: Kelly et al. (2010) and School of Oriental and African Studies et al. (2008). 
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Implementation and Impacts
172
 The delivery of the seed component of the programme has, since 2006/7, 
been consistent with the promotion of private sector development in input 
markets. In the 2005/6 season, all the distribution and retailing of seeds under 
the subsidy programme was done through ADMARC and SFFRFM (Imperial 
College et al., 2007). However, beginning with the 2006/7 season, seed pro-
curement has been handled purely by the private sector, and seed suppliers 
have been distributing the seeds to retailers (parastatal and private sector retail-
ers) across the country. The 2006/7 season also saw the inclusion of small-scale 
agro-dealers in the redemption of seed coupons (Dorward and Chirwa, 2011c) 
and Logistics Unit (2008) notes that maize seed dealer outlets were unrestricted 
and seed producers entered into various arrangements with small-scale input 
agro-dealers and retail chain stores in addition to ADMARC and SFFRFM outlets. 
 8.3.  Overall input purchase and use 
 There are diffi culties in estimating the overall purchases and use of fertilizers 
due to lack of consistent data on commercial sales of fertilizers. However, we 
use import fi gures to estimate fertilizers available for commercial sales after 
accounting for subsidized fertilizers. The offi cial import data include fertiliz-
ers for both estates and smallholder farmers.  Figure 8.3 shows the trends in 
imports, disaggregated between subsidy fertilizers and fertilizers available for 
commercial sales, using industry data from 2004 to 2006 (School of Oriental 
and African Studies et al., 2008) and NSO import data from 2007. The trend 
in the fertilizers available for commercial sales after subtracting the subsidy 
from imports shows a marginal increase between the 2004/5 and 2005/6 sea-
son and a sharp decrease in 2006/7. 1 
 After falling in 2006/7, the trend from 2007/8 is for increasing availability 
of commercial fertilizers in addition to increases in total imports of fertilizers. 
However, available commercial fertilizer in 2010/11 is still below the 2004/5 
level (the year before the commencement of the subsidy programme). A small 
reduction in subsidized fertilizer between 2007/8 and 2008/9 is associated 
with a substantial increase in the quantity of fertilizer available for commer-
cial sales in 2008/9. There is a decline in importation of fertilizers and avail-
ability of commercial fertilizers in 2009/10 but an increase in imports and 
available commercial fertilizers in 2010/11 while the subsidy levels remained 
 1  Industry data on total fertilizer sales from 1998 to 2006 as reported in School of Oriental and 
African Studies et al. (2008) are not consistent with NSO import data over the same period, and 
are on average around 80,000 MT per year higher. If this continues from 2007 then commercial 
sales from 2007 would be around 80,000 MT higher than indicated in  Figure 8.3 . It should also be 
noted that annual estimates on sales may not be accurate due to carry forward of stocks, but these 
should average out over two or more seasons. 
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unchanged. The decline in 2009/10 is also associated with a sharp decline 
in the previous season’s price for burley tobacco. Chirwa et al. (2011a) note 
that 2008/9 prices for burley were signifi cantly low towards the end of the 
marketing season compared to three previous seasons. This might have led to 
reduced demand for commercial fertilizers. 
 Interestingly, available commercial fertilizer in 2010/11 was more than 
subsidized fertilizer. The subsidy programme in the 2010/11 season excluded 
tobacco fertilizers, and the increase in the available commercial fertilizers 
may refl ect lower displacement due to the focus of the programme on maize 
fertilizers. As noted in School of Oriental and African Studies et al. (2008), 
the subsidy on tobacco fertilizers had higher displacement than the sub-
sidy on maize fertilizers. Then, in 2011/12 there is another drop in imports, 
subsidized fertilizers, and available commercial fertilizers. Tobacco was also 
excluded in 2011/12 but the decline in available commercial fertilizer may be 
partly due to the collapse of tobacco prices in 2010/11 season which led many 
smallholder farmers to abandon tobacco production in the 2011/12 season. 
The 2011/12 crop estimates show that tobacco production was expected to 
decline by more than 36%. Except for bad years for tobacco, these results 
show that there has been an overall increase in fertilizer importation and an 
increase in the fertilizers available for commercial use, suggesting that after 
















Imports Actual subsidy Commercial supply
 Figure 8.3.  Fertilizer imports and fertilizer use, 2004/5–11/12 2 
Sources: National Statistical Offi ce (2009)—Statistical Year Book Data Set; Dorward 
and Chirwa (2011c) and School of Oriental and African Studies et al. (2008). 
 2  ‘Commercial supply’ estimated by subtraction of subsidy from imports for 2007/8 and 
thereafter. 
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 Data on overall purchases and use of seeds are not readily available. However, 
national estimates from household surveys show that the quantity of hybrid 
maize seeds used increased.  Table 8.1 shows that total hybrid and OPV maize 
seeds use has increased by 160% between 2007/8 and 2010/11 season, while 
legume seeds use almost doubled between 2009/10 and 2010/11 largely due 
to increased levels of seed subsidization. 
 8.4.  Developments in the fertilizer markets 
 8.4.1.  Changes in competition in fertilizer procurement 
 The introduction of the Farm Input Subsidy Programme has attracted a num-
ber of entrepreneurs in the fertilizer import sector.  Figure 8.4 presents the 
trend in the number of fi rms that participate in the procurement of ferti-
lizers under the subsidy programme. There are two parastatals involved in 
the procurement of fertilizers, ADMARC and SFFRFM, but only SFFRFM has 
been active in the bidding while ADMARC has benefi ted from uncompeti-
tive allocation as a parastatal, except in 2011/12 where it also participated 
as a bidder. There are increasing trends in both the number of private sector 
bidders interested in procuring fertilizers and the number of bidders who 
were awarded contracts to supply subsidy programme fertilizers, particularly 
from the 2009/10 season. The number of interested private bidders increased 
from 24 companies in 2009/10 to 65 companies in 2011/12. The subsidy pro-
gramme has over time attracted new companies whose traditional business 
is not importation of agricultural inputs. Similarly, the number of successful 
awards of contracts has also increased from 10 private companies in 2009/10 
to 20 private companies in 2011/12. Some of the new companies, as well as 
the more established ones, have had links with different political parties, and 
 Table 8.1.  Household survey estimates of total seed purchases (‘000 metric tons) 
 Subsidized Unsubsidized   Total 













 2007/8  1.7  -  4.3  -  6.1  - 
 2008/9  4.7  -  5.4  -  10  - 
 2009/10  5.4  0.9  3.6  1.6  10.9  2.5 
 2010/11  8.2  1.6  4.8  2.8  15.9  4.4 
 Note: Estimates based on NSO population estimates. 
 Source: Dorward and Chirwa (2011a). 
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these may have affected their participation in the programme. With respect 
to parastatals, SFFRFM has always participated and succeeded in the supply of 
subsidy fertilizers while ADMARC has only been awarded contracts to supply 
in the 2009/10 and 2011/12 agricultural seasons. However, what is not clear 
is whether the new entrants in fertilizer imports are also importing fertilizers 
for commercial sales. 
 Apart from the entry of other players in the supply of fertilizers under 
the programme, there have also been notable exits, such as the National 
Association of Smallholder Farmers of Malawi (NASFAM), Rab Processors, 
and Yara who participated in 2006/7 but have not since continued to partici-
pate in the programme (Kelly et al., 2010). Yara closed down its international 
representation in Malawi, turning over an exclusive right to import Yara fer-
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 Figure 8.4.  Number of bids and awards in fertilizer procurement, 
2008/9–11/12 
 Source : Logistics Unit (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012). 
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Implementation and Impacts
176
subsidized fertilizers; the fi rms have continued to supply fertilizers in the 
market on commercial basis. 
 Figure 8.5 shows the share of fertilizers supplied to the programme by the 
private fi rms and parastatals in terms of value of supplies. Panel (a) shows 
large annual variations in the value of fertilizer purchases by the private 
sector between 2007/8 and 2010/11. In panel (b), however, there is a steady 
increase in the share of the value of supplies accounted for by the private 
sector, increasing from 71% in 2008/9 to 95% in 2010/11, but falling to 78% 
in 2011/12. In monetary terms, the highest realized value to the private sec-
tor occurred in 2008/9, amounting to $203.75 million, consistent with the 
high volume procured by the private sector but also refl ecting high interna-
































 Figure 8.5.  Value and value share of subsidized fertilizers supplied by 
sector, 2007/8–11/12 
 Note : The fi gures are new procurement during the season. 
 Source : Logistics Unit (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012). 
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 8.4.2.  Changes in competition in the fertilizer retail market 
 There are several kinds of players in the fertilizer retail market including 
importer-managed outlets, cooperative-managed outlets, chain stores and 
supermarkets, agro-dealers, and parastatals’ unit markets (Kelly et al., 2010). 
The participation of the private sector in the retail marketing of subsidized 
fertilizers has been the most diffi cult aspect in relation to the development of 
the private input markets across the country. As noted above, the private sec-
tor was allowed to redeem fertilizer vouchers only in the 2006/7 and 2007/8 
seasons. 
 In the 2006/7 season, a total of 174,688 metric tons of subsidized fertilizers 
was sold to smallholder farmers with ADMARC and SFFRFM sales accounting 
for 72% of fertilizer sales and the private retailers accounting for 28% (School 
of Oriental and African Studies et al., 2008). The private sector continued 
to participate in retail of subsidized fertilizers in 2007/8, with the innova-
tion of a remote market premium. According to Logistics Unit (2008), ‘in cer-
tain extension planning areas (EPAs) within the districts where private sector 
involvement had been limited in the previous year, it was agreed to pay the 
retailers an additional sum of either 100MK or 200MK per voucher depend-
ing based on last year’s sales fi gures for each EPA’. Kelly et al. (2010) fi nd that 
the ‘remoteness’ premium encouraged the private sector to provide inputs in 
more locations in 2007/8 than in the previous season, although there was no 
evidence that such outreach was on a medium to long term basis. 
 Those in favour of private sector participation in fertilizer subsidy retail sales 
point to several benefi ts, including effi ciency, freeing government resources, 
facilitating a strategy for promoting input markets in remote areas, broaden-
ing of choice of and competition between outlets for smallholder farmers, 
and reducing transaction costs and costs of queuing. However, opponents of 
private sector participation in the subsidy fertilizer retail market argue that 
the private sector cannot be trusted as they may be exchanging coupons for 
other merchandise rather than fertilizers in the absence of an audit system, 3 
the available stocks held by private sector fi rms cannot be verifi ed, that there 
is a high incidence of fraud in the private sector, and that private sector sales 
make it diffi cult to control the cost of the subsidy programme. These argu-
ments were cited as grounds for the government’s decision to exclude the 
private sector from retail sales of subsidized fertilizer from 2008/9 onwards. 
 Counter-arguments are that there is also evidence of fraud and corrup-
tion by some parastatal sales clerks, and that effective cost control should be 
achieved through control of coupon issue—as has been achieved from the 
 3  There were anecdotal claims in the media that some farmers were obtaining iron sheets in 
exchange for fertilizer coupons in some private sector input outlets. 
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2009/10 season (although diffi culties are also illustrated by major problems 
with excess seed costs in 2010/11 as a result of problems in detecting large 
numbers of counterfeit seed vouchers). 
 8.4.3.  Fertilizer sales trends: evidence from household surveys 
 The household surveys shed light on the trends in the commercial sales of 
fertilizers among smallholder farmers.  Figure  8.6 shows the various retail 
channels from which households reported purchasing their commercial fer-
tilizers in the 2006/7, 2008/9, and 2010/11 seasons. The proportion of house-
holds accessing private company market outlets for commercial purchases 
has increased signifi cantly from about 6% in the 2006/7 season to about 30% 
in 2010/11. This increasing trend is also evident in the use of club or farmer 
cooperatives as a source of commercial fertilizers. The purchase of fertilizers 
on a commercial basis from parastatals has been falling, from 18% in 2006/7 
to about 13% in the 2010/11 season. These fi gures suggest that commercial 
sales of fertilizers have fl ourished in the presence of the subsidy programme. 
Although, the private sector has been excluded in the retail of subsidized 
fertilizers, the subsidy programme might have stimulated demand for com-
















































 Figure 8.6.  Sources of households’ commercial fertilizer purchases, 2006/7–10/11 
 Source : Computed by authors based on AISS1, AISS2, and AISS3. 
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 The evidence on household use of different marketing channels for pur-
chase of commercial fertilizers in  Figure 8.6 is also supported by information 
on the average volumes of commercial fertilizers purchased by households, 
shown in  Figure 8.7 . On average, the volume purchased from traders has 
fallen signifi cantly from about 50 kg in 2006/7 to about 10 kg in 2010/11. 
Sourcing fertilizers from relatives or neighbours increased, but this may be fer-
tilizer that could either have been subsidized and resold or received through 
remittances. There is an increase in average volumes purchased from the local 
market initially, but this declined between 2008/9 and 2010/11. There is a 
declining trend, however, in average commercial purchases from parastatals 
(ADMARC and SFFRFM). The increasing trends in the volume purchased from 
farmer cooperatives and private company outlets suggest positive private sec-
tor market development. For instance, in the 2006/7 season, households pur-
chased on average 9 kg of commercial fertilizers, but this increases to 42 kg 
in 2008/9 and 60 kg in 2010/11, despite fertilizer price increases. This further 
suggests that the subsidy programme may have helped in stimulating com-
mercial demand for fertilizers, and certainly has not depressed it over the 
























































 Figure  8.7.  Mean quantities of commercial fertilizer purchases per household, 
2006/7–10/11 
 Source: Computed by authors based on AISS1, AISS2, and AISS3. 
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 Interestingly, although the international fertilizer price almost tripled in 
the 2008/9 season (Dorward and Chirwa, 2011c), there was an increase in the 
purchase of commercial fertilizers from private company retail shops. This 
is also consistent with the lower estimated displacement in 2008/9 season 
(Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne, 2010a). Similarly, Chirwa et al. (2011d), using a 
matched panel, note general increases in the purchase of commercial fertiliz-
ers between 2008/9 and 2010/11 among poor and non-poor households and 
a decrease in average subsidy fertilizers received by households. 
 These positive changes in private sector market development are also 
consistent with earlier studies. For example, Kelly et al. (2010) note that 
the perceived number of retailers selling only fertilizers increased, while 
those selling both seeds and fertilizers fell between the 2006/7 and 2008/9 
agricultural seasons, although community surveys revealed little change in 
the number of input suppliers. Nonetheless, there were also a number of 
exits from seed and fertilizer markets during the period. Similarly, a higher 
proportion of retailers revealed that their business performance in terms 
of sales and profi ts had increased between 2007/8 and 2008/9 (Kelly et al., 
2010). 
 8.4.4.  Displacement of commercial fertilizer sales 
 The Farm Input Subsidy Programme could have several impacts on the input 
market system depending on the scale, targeting, and other implementation 
modalities. On the one hand, a poorly-targeted large-scale programme results 
in displacement of commercial sales and introduces disincentives for private 
investments in input markets. On the other hand, a well-targeted programme 
can stimulate additional demand for commercial fertilizers among subsidized 
households by improving the productivity and profi tability of their farming 
activities and their ability to fi nance fertilizer purchases. The displacement 
effects are a function of targeting among other factors such as fertilizer prices 
and prices of agricultural produce: where subsidized fertilizers are provided 
to farmers that can afford commercial purchases, the displacement of com-
mercial sales is likely to be high, thereby depressing incremental production. 
Thus, poor targeting, in which better-off farmers also tend to be recipients 
of subsidized fertilizers, may lead to substantial displacement of commercial 
sales by subsidized sales, resulting in a reduction of production and welfare 
impacts of the subsidy programme. 
 The relative promotional and displacement effects are examined in 
 Table 8.2 which shows the quantity of subsidized and commercial fertilizers 
acquired by households in the 2009/10 and 2010/11 seasons by IHS2 pov-
erty status (2002/3 and 2003/4) compared with commercial fertilizers in the 
IHS2. Among poor households the average quantity of subsidized fertilizers 
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declined from 54 kg in 2009/10 to 47 kg in 2010/11, while commercial ferti-
lizers increased from 48 to 61 kg. A similar trend is observed among non-poor 
households, and may be related to economy-wide impacts of the programme. 
The data also shows that both poor and non-poor households supplement 
subsidized fertilizers with commercial fertilizers, but among the poor the 
higher the number of seasons a household benefi ts from the subsidy, the 
lower the supplementation with commercial fertilizers. No consistent pattern 
emerges with respect to non-poor households that are subsidized. 
 A comparison of the 2009 and 2010 commercial purchases with the 
2003/4 purchases shows a mixed picture among different households. On 
the one hand, among the category of poor households, only those that 
have had access to the subsidy in seasons 1 and 3 are on average purchas-
ing more in 2010 than in 2003/4. On the other hand, among the non-poor 
households, only for households that have had access to the subsidy in 
seasons 1 and 4 do we witness purchases above the 2003/4 levels. This sug-
gests some crowding out of commercial fertilizer sales due to the subsidy 
programme, although the decline in commercial purchases also occurred 
among households that have never received subsidized fertilizers. However, 
it should also be noted that the average prices of commercial fertilizers sub-
stantially increased from 37MK per kg in 2003/4 to 97MK per kg in 2010/11, 
an increase of 162% over the period; this might have dampened the demand 
for commercial fertilizers. 
 School of Oriental and African Studies et al. (2008) using national ferti-
lizer sales data and taking into account the price effects, estimated displace-
ment rates of 20% and 42% in 2005/6 and 2006/7, respectively, without any 
allowance for the effects of fertilizer and maize or tobacco price changes 





 Poor households in 2003/4  Non-poor households in 2003/4 
 Subsidy  Commercial  Subsidy  Commercial 
 N  2009  2010  2003/4  2009  2010  N  2009  2010  2003/4  2009  2010 
 0  4  0  0  82  58  55  11  0  0  691  132  128 
 1  17  3  12  37  61  79  18  10  17  123  246  250 
 2  15  44  20  176  126  92  13  32  17  221  157  181 
 3  18  52  36  68  29  80  23  35  44  174  98  99 
 4  22  59  50  130  54  70  22  49  39  79  141  151 
 5  37  51  38  52  31  51  37  54  40  162  72  102 
 6  114  70  66  72  40  51  112  75  74  116  61  63 
 All  227  54  47  78  48  61  236  53  49  165  100  109 
 Source: Computed by authors based on IHS2 and FISS3 data. 
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on demand. The displacement rates were substantially higher for tobacco 
fertilizers compared to maize fertilizers. Using household survey data and 
a matched sample of smallholder farmers, Ricker-Gilbert et al. (2010) note 
that the proportion of smallholder farmers purchasing commercial fertilizers 
fell from 40% in 2003/4 to 16% in the 2006/7 season. The regression results, 
from a double hurdle model allowing for fertilizer and maize or tobacco 
price changes, revealed a displacement rate of 22%, with 18% among poorer 
households and 30% among non-poor farmers (Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2010). 
Using a similar model, Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne (2010a) estimate an average 
displacement rate of 3% in 2008/9. 
 Chirwa et  al. (2011d), using household data for 2002/3, 2003/4, and 
2010/11 seasons, fi nd that for a matched sample of households that bought 
commercial fertilizer in the 2002/3 and 2003/4 seasons, a 1% increase in sub-
sidized fertilizers led to a 0.39% reduction in commercial sales, but this fell to 
an elasticity of –0.15 (or a net displacement rate of 15%) for the whole sample 
of panel households who bought commercial fertilizers in either of the sea-
sons. The decrease in the elasticity suggests that the subsidy programme does 
not only have displacement effects, but also promotional effects when one 
accounts for households that did not initially purchase commercial fertilizers. 
 The displacement rates in the seed market tend to be higher, although there 
is also anecdotal evidence suggesting that the subsidy programme is stimulat-
ing demand for improved maize seeds. School of Oriental and African Studies 
et al. (2008) note that in 2006/7 one of the major suppliers of improved seeds 
reported a sales increase of 52% over 2005/6 levels, with many suppliers 
qualitatively indicating improvements in sales. Kelly et al. (2010) also fi nd 
evidence of the positive impact of the subsidy programme on seed sales in 
the 2007/8 and 2008/9 agricultural seasons. In addition, a large proportion of 
retailers surveyed were in favour of the continuation of the seed subsidy: 95% 
of those that participated and 76% of those that did not participate in the 
2008/9 agricultural season (Kelly et al., 2010). However, Mason and Ricker-
Gilbert (2012) fi nd that a 1 kg increase in subsidized seed acquired by the 
household reduces commercial improved maize seed purchases by 0.56 kg 
in Malawi (a displacement rate of 56%), higher than in Zambia where the 
displacement rate is 49%. Improved seeds are substantially cheaper than sub-
sidized fertilizers, and relatively more households can afford to buy commer-
cially thereby increasing displacement rates relative to the displacement rates 
in fertilizer markets. However, it must be recognized that estimation of both 
fertilizer and seed displacement rates involves diffi culties in categorization of 
some purchases as subsidized or unsubsidized. This is likely to be particularly 
diffi cult for seeds, where purchases of recycled hybrid seed may be diffi cult to 
distinguish from purchases of new seed. 
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 8.5.  Developments in the seed market 
 8.5.1.  Changes in competition in the seed market 
 The private sector has, from 2006/7, consistently participated in the distribu-
tion and retailing of seeds under the subsidy programme, as noted above. 
Improved maize seeds and legumes have been made available to the pro-
gramme by the private sector in all years, though the retailing of seeds under 
the programme was implemented from the 2006/7 season. This has meant 
players in the seed value chain—including seed producers, agro-dealers, and 
supermarkets—have been participating in the subsidy programme. Previous 
evaluation reports such as School of Oriental and African Studies et al. (2008) 
and Kelly et al. (2010) have pointed to the positive impact of the subsidy pro-
gramme in promoting private sector businesses in input provision. 
 In terms of the structure of the seed industry, there have been some limited 
changes in the number of seed growers, but the major changes in the struc-
ture seem to have occurred at retail level.  Table 8.3 provides the distribution 
of fi rms supplying various seeds to the subsidy programme and shows that 
the number of fi rms supplying seeds has increased from 6 in 2006/7 to 12 in 
2011/12. Two new growers entered into the market in 2009/10: Seed Tech 
supplying maize hybrid and OPV, and National Association of Smallholder 
Farmers of Malawi (NASFAM) supplying groundnut seeds (Logistics Unit, 
2010). In 2010/11 the number of fi rms supplying seeds to the programme 
increased to nine, with the exit of Agricultural Input Suppliers Association 
of Malawi (AISAM) and entry of Panthochi supplying OPV maize seeds and 
Peacock supplying tested groundnut seeds to the programme (Logistics Unit, 
2011). In 2011/12, 12 companies supplied seeds to the programme with 
 Table 8.3.  Number of seed suppliers to the subsidy programme, 2006/7–11/12 
 Seed type  2006/7  2007/8  2008/9  2009/10  2010/11  2011/12 
 Hybrid maize  3  3  3  4  3  5 
 OPV maize  5  5  4  4  4  6 
 Tested bean  -  -  -  4  2  5 
 Tested 
groundnut 
 -  -  -  4  4  10 
 Soya bean  -  -  -  2  2  3 
 Pigeon pea  -  -  -  1  1  5 
 Cow peas  -  -  -  1  1  1 
 Cotton  -  -  2  -  -  - 
 Number of fi rms  6  6  8  8  9  12 
 Note: Some fi rms supply more than one type of seed, so the total number of fi rms is not the total for the columns. 
 Source : Logistics Unit (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012). 
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the re-entry of AISAM, ASSMAG, and Seed Tech and a new entry, Pindulani 
(Logistics Unit, 2012). Although the number of fi rms has increased over the 
years, Kelly et al. (2010) note that this has not resulted in competitive pricing 
as the supply prices to the programme are negotiated between STAM and the 
government: this competition has just broadened the choice of seeds for the 
farmers. 
 Nonetheless, the seed industry is highly oligopolistic, with new entrants 
just providing fringe competition. Data from the Logistics Unit shows that 
the two largest suppliers of seeds to the subsidy programme account for 71% 
of maize voucher redemption and the three largest suppliers account for 87% 
of maize voucher redemptions. Similarly, in the legume seed market, the two 
and three largest suppliers to the subsidy programme account for 65% and 
75% of voucher redemptions, respectively. 
 There is, however, an increase in the level of competition at retail level in 
terms of the number of competitors in the local communities. Kelly et al. 
(2010) fi nd that agro-dealers reported a 15% increase in competitors between 
2005/6 and 2008/9, while distributors reported a 3% increase in the num-
ber of competitors. However, community surveys revealed that only 22% of 
the communities believed that the number of seed sellers accessible in their 
community had increased, while 57% maintained that the numbers had 
remained the same between 2006/7 and 2008/9 (Kelly et al., 2010). 
 8.5.2.  Trends in subsidized seeds sales 
 As described in Chapter 5, under the subsidy programme, smallholder farm-
ers are provided with maize seed vouchers and fl exible vouchers that they 
can use to purchase legume seeds. In 2007/8 and 2008/9, fl exible vouchers 
were also allowed for maize seed redemption, but they have been restricted 
to legumes since the 2009/10 season.  Table 8.4 presents the size of the seed 
component of the subsidy programme, which provides indicators of private 
sector participation. In terms of coupons redeemed, maize is the main com-
ponent and when fl exible vouchers were also accepted for maize seeds a high 
proportion of them were also redeemed for maize seeds. One reason for this 
was the problem of availability of legume seeds in the earlier seasons of the 
programme (School of Oriental and African Studies et al., 2008). 
 On average, the programme has distributed to smallholder farmers 5840 
MT of hybrid maize seeds, 1,837 MT of OPV maize seeds and 2,256 MT of 
legume seeds per year. As discussed in Chapter 5, there has been a steady 
increase in hybrid seeds obtained by smallholder farmers since 2007/8 until 
a fall in 2011/12. The volume of OPV maize seeds dropped substantially in 
2008/9 but then increased steadily from the 2009/10 season. The consequent 
value of private seed business promoted directly by the subsidy amounted on 
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average to US$19.1 million per year over the fi ve agricultural seasons (exclud-
ing farmer top up payments for hybrid maize).  Figure 8.8 shows the values 
and value shares of this seed business and the increasing share of legumes 
in the cost of the seed supplies obtained by smallholder farmers from the 
subsidy programme. This refl ects substantial improvements in the availabil-
ity of legume seeds in the market under the programme, such that legumes 
accounted for nearly 30% of the seed component in the 2011/12 season com-
pared to only 5% in the 2008/9 season. 
 With respect to the relative cost of maize seeds and legume seeds 
( Figure 8.8(b) ), there is an increasing share of legumes in the cost of the seed 
supplies obtained by smallholder farmers from the subsidy programme. With 
the increase in the number of seed growers providing legume seeds, the trend 
refl ects substantial improvements in the availability of legume seeds in the 
market under the programme, such that legumes accounted for nearly 30% 
of the seed component in the 2011/12 season compared to only 5% in the 
2008/9 season. 
 8.5.3.  Seed purchases, use and preferences: evidence 
from household surveys 
 The role of the private sector in the marketing of seeds can be deduced from 
household survey data obtained in the 2006/7, 2008/9, and 2010/11 seasons. 
 Figure 8.9 shows the use of various market channels to access improved maize 
 Table 8.4.  Size of the seed component of the subsidy programme, 2007/8–11/12 
 Variable  2007/8  2008/9  2009/10  2010/11  2011/12 
 Coupons redeemed 
(N) 
 Maize coupons  1,603,302  1,561,329  1,614,070  1,988,066  1,376,216 
 Flexi 
coupons—maize 
 518,264  929,382 - - -
 Flexi 
coupons—legumes 
 142,043  87,228  1,142,738  1,310,420  1,245,172 
 Seeds distributed 
(MT) 
 Hybrid maize seeds  2,944  4,532  7,619  8,521  5,586 
 OPV maize seeds  2,597  833  1,033  2,129  2,591 
 Legume seeds  -  -  1,551  2,727  2,490 
 Cost of seeds 
($ millions) 
 Maize seeds  8.18  11.94  17.171  23.237  16.487 
 Legume seeds  0.99  0.63  2.837  7.147  6.734 
 Source: Logistics Unit (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012). 
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seeds (hybrid and OPV) by households in the survey years. 4 The parastatals, 
ADMARC and SFFRFM, are the main retail markets from which smallholder 
farmers obtained their improved seeds, with about 70% of farmers utilizing 
these outlets. With respect to private outlets, use of private companies by 
households to obtain improved seeds has been increasing from 10% of house-
holds in 2006/7 to 17% in 2010/11. There is also increasing use of relatives or 
neighbours as a source of improved seeds, from 4% of households in 2006/7 
to 13% in 2010/11. These sales through relatives or neighbours could be of 
recycled seeds or remittance seeds offered for resale or subsidy seeds offered 
for resale. 
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 Figure  8.8.  Values and value shares of subsidized maize seed sales, 
2007/8–11/12 
 Source: Computed based on Logistics Unit (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012). 
 4  For each market channel, we compute the proportion of households using the market chan-
nel, and due to multiple uses of markets by some households the total for the year is more than 
100%. 
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Impacts on input market development
187
 With respect to quantities of seeds bought commercially or using the seed 
subsidy vouchers,  Figure 8.10(a) shows fi rst for total hybrid and OPV seed 
purchases and then for each type separately an average decline per household 
of commercial purchase and an increase in subsidy purchase between 2008/9 
and 2010/11. The 2010/11 fi gure also refl ects the increase in the number of 
seed coupons provided under the programme compared to the 2008/9 season. 
Farmers are also purchasing more hybrid maize seeds both commercially and 
under the subsidy programme compared to OPV maize seeds. While commer-
cial purchases of OPV maize seeds have remained the same, for hybrid maize 
seeds commercial purchases declined from an average of 2.1 kg in 2008/9 
to 1.6 kg in 2010/11 per household. In both cases of hybrid and OPV maize 
seeds, there is an increase in subsidy redemption. These declining trends sug-
gest that the subsidy programme is crowding out commercial purchases, as 
discussed above with regard to displacement estimates, although the overall 
use of improved seeds has been increasing. 
 With respect to the relative participation of state and private retailers 
between 2008/9 and 2010/11,  Figure 8.10(b) shows that there was a substan-
tial decline in average purchases of commercial seeds through private retailers 
but a greater increase in subsidized seed purchases by households. Similarly, 
average commercial purchases of hybrid maize seeds fell but average subsi-
dized purchases of hybrid maize seeds increased. In contrast, average pur-
chases of commercial seeds from state marketing outlets marginally declined 




















































 Figure 8.9.  Households accessing improved maize seeds by retailer, 2006/7–10/11 
Source: Computed by authors based on AISS1, AISS2, and AISS3. 
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in hybrid maize purchases. Although, the proportion of households access-
ing the private market system is small relative to households accessing state 
markets, as observed above, the average purchases of seeds per household 
purchasing is higher from private market outlets than from parastatal outlets. 
Agro-dealers have played an important role in facilitating access to inputs in 
rural areas. Chinsinga (2011) notes that with FISP there has been an increase 
in the number of seasonal agro-dealers, a situation that has been supported 
by the practice of seed companies who collect the unsold inventories from 
contracted agro-dealers during the off-peak FISP period. 
 There has been a proliferation of maize seeds varieties in the market, which has 
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Hybrid & OPV - commercial Hybrid & OPV - subsidy
Hybrid maize - commercial Hybrid maize - subsidy
OPV maize - commercial OPV maize - subsidy
 Figure 8.10.  Volumes of improved maize seeds purchased per household, 
2008/9 and 2010/11 
 Source: Computed by authors based on AISS2 and AISS3. 
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choice is constrained by the availability of preferred seeds and seed varieties in 
different markets and times when farmers require the seeds.  Table 8.5 illustrates 
the seed preferences by farmers in the 2010/11 season. For maize seeds, there is 
higher preference for hybrid maize seeds with 84% getting the hybrid variety 
they wanted and 13% getting alternative hybrid varieties. This preference for 
hybrid maize is also refl ected in the 40% of those that got OPV seeds but wanted 
hybrid seeds. Lunduka et al. (2012) fi nd that farmers prefer hybrid maize seeds 
in Malawi due to high yields and their drought tolerance, while OPV maize 
seeds are preferred due to their early maturity. Among the legume seeds, farmers 
tend to prefer groundnuts and bean seeds and a higher proportion of them got 
what they wanted. The higher preference for groundnut seeds is also refl ected in 
the additional 35% that got soya seeds who wanted groundnut seeds. 
 There are regional variations in seed preferences, but most farmers in dif-
ferent regions usually got the seeds and the seed varieties that they wanted 
(Dorward and Chirwa, 2011a).These fi gures suggest that hybrid maize seeds 
are the preferred maize seeds for smallholder farmers. The differences between 
what was obtained and what farmers wanted were, however, noticeable for 
legume seeds, with groundnut seeds being most in demand, but due to scar-
city many farmers having to opt for soya seeds. Groundnuts and bean seeds 
are the legume seeds most wanted by smallholder farmers. 
 8.6.  Challenges and opportunities of private sector participation 5 
 The participation of the private sector in the input subsidy programme is 
challenging but can also provide opportunities for improving the imple-
mentation and effi ciency of the programme. For instance, on the one hand, 
 Table 8.5.  Inputs actually obtained against those wanted by farmers in 2010/11(%) 
 Inputs obtained  As 
wanted 
 Other inputs wanted 
 Hybrid 
maize 
 OPV maize  Soya  Groundnut  Beans 
 Hybrid maize  84  13  1  0  0  0 
 OPV maize  58  40  0  2  0  0 
 Soya  56  0  0  0  35  9 
 Groundnut  94  0  0  0  2  4 
 Beans  85  0  0  0  15  0 
 Source: Dorward and Chirwa (2011a) 
 5  This section draws heavily on Chirwa and Dorward (2012). 
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major challenges are the exclusion of the private sector from the retailing 
of subsidized fertilizers and policy inconsistency in its role in the subsidy 
programme. On the other hand, however, private sector participation could 
provide opportunities for achieving multiple development objectives and for 
improving effi ciency in the implementation of the programme. 
 8.6.1.  Challenges in private sector participation 
 Several challenges have been experienced with regard to the roles of the 
private sector in the implementation of the subsidy programme. First, the 
timing of the award of tenders, particularly for supply of fertilizers to the 
programme, has been a major source of diffi culty, as discussed in Chapter 5. 
The longer the time between submission of tenders and the awards of ten-
ders the more likely the prices are to change and this can lead to protracted 
negotiation about supply prices for fertilizers. There have been cases in which 
companies awarded tenders have been unable to supply at the tender prices 
due to increased costs of supply. However, there is evidence that this has 
improved over time. Kelly et al. (2010) note that most stakeholders in 2008/9 
were of the view that the announcement of tenders improved but the tenders 
were awarded late. Dorward et al. (2010b) argue that the delays in award of 
tenders increased private sector risks as both the prices of fertilizers and fuel 
had risen dramatically in the period between June 2006/7 and June 2008/9.
There have been improvements in the timing of announcement of tender 
awards more recently (Dorward and Chirwa, 2011c). 
 Second, there is often a problem of trust between the private sector and the 
government and this has contributed to the continued exclusion of the pri-
vate sector in the retailing of subsidized fertilizers. The lack of trust emerges 
from both sides. From the government side, there are some in government 
that believe that private sector fi rms with their profi t motive are likely to 
exploit their engagement to the detriment of smallholder farmers and pub-
lic welfare. Chinsinga (2011) documents some of the profi t and quick-gain 
motives of some of the agro-dealers in input supply markets. There have been 
allegations, based on anecdotal incidents reported in the media but not sub-
stantiated, that some private sector retailers were accepting fertilizer coupons 
in exchange for non-fertilizer items. This reinforced the views of those scepti-
cal of the private sector that the private sector was unable to self-regulate its 
behaviour in the programme. Others have also argued that when the private 
sector was involved in the retailing of subsidized fertilizers, there was high 
incidence of tips paid by farmers. However, Kelly et al. (2010) fi nd that the 
incidence of tips and malpractices was higher in parastatals than in private 
sector retails, although the differences were not statistically signifi cant, and 
the incidents of accepted fake vouchers were higher in parastatals outlets. 
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Furthermore, even with exclusion of the private sector in subsidized fertilizer 
retailing, smallholder farmers still report an increased incidence of tips from 
ADMARC and SFFRFM outlets (Dorward et al., 2010b; Dorward and Chirwa, 
2011c). The mistrust of the private sector is also exacerbated by the absence of 
an audit system on the stock movement of inputs as a way of detecting mal-
practices. From the private sector’s point of view, the government’s inconsist-
ent decisions on private sector participation in retail of subsidized fertilizers, 
and delays in making inclusion or exclusion decisions, characterize policy 
instability, creating uncertainty for private input market development. This 
was particularly the case in 2008/9 when a decision was made about private 
sector involvement and contracts for inclusion provided, but the govern-
ment reversed the decision without prior notice (Kelly et al., 2010). By the 
time the government had made the decision to exclude the private sector, 
the private companies had already stocked their retail shops in readiness for 
redemption of vouchers. 
 Third, the subsidy programme has attracted new entrants that were hitherto 
uninterested in the fertilizer business, particularly from domestic companies, 
some just created to bid for contracts to supply fertilizers to the programme 
(Holden and Tostensen, 2011). Some of these companies were highly con-
nected to the political establishment, but when awarded contracts they had 
diffi culties in fulfi lling their deliveries. For non-established agricultural input 
suppliers, their main interest is the short-term gains from participation in the 
programme rather than the medium to long-term development of the input 
supply market. Chinsinga (2012a) notes that most of the contracts in the 
provision of transport services were awarded to companies politically linked 
to the ruling party. Logistics Unit (2012) notes that although it became clear 
in the 2011/12 programme that some of the suppliers were unlikely to sup-
ply, the government continued to grant extensions and the fi nal deliveries 
occurred in February 2012 instead of the end of October 2011. The existence 
of vested interests is one reason for non-compliance with the terms of the 
fertilizer supply. Although there have been improvements in the timing of 
deliveries, late deliveries were evident and this problem has been attributed 
to the lack of penalty clauses in the contracts (Dorward et al., 2010b; Dorward 
and Chirwa, 2011c; Logistics Unit, 2011). Large numbers of new entrants in 
seed sales may also be associated with poor service to farmers (Chinsinga, 
2011) and in 2010/11 may have contributed to the use of large numbers of 
fake vouchers in subsidized purchases. 
 Fourth, in the seed component of the subsidy programme, there is some 
collusive behaviour of seed suppliers in deciding the supply price of seeds 
offered to the programme. Although the subsidy programme has attracted a 
number of players in seed production and supply, the pricing arrangement 
is tantamount to collusive pricing due to the desire by the government to 
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have a uniform top up for farmers (Kelly et al., 2010).There is no competitive 
tendering in the seed supply to the subsidy programme, in contrast to the fer-
tilizer supply system, although in recent years, a variable ‘top up’ payment by 
farmers on subsidized hybrid seed packages has provided some competition 
and benefi ted some smallholder farmers. Thus, in 2010/11, seed companies 
were allowed to apply a discretionary maximum farmer payment of 100MK 
per maize seed voucher topping up the government redemption value of 
1,650MK, and all hybrid seeds providers applied the maximum top up while 
only one OPV provider made a top up charge (Logistics Unit, 2011, 2012). 
 Finally, there is evidence that the payment system used by the government 
for supplies and services rendered to the programme by the private sector is 
ineffi cient. Logistics Unit (2012) reports some companies waiting six months 
to be paid after delivery of fertilizer supplies. Similarly, seed companies had 
outstanding invoices for three months in the 2010/11 season (Logistics Unit, 
2012). The Logistics Unit fi nal weekly report for the 2011/12 programme 
indicated that the government still owed seed companies, fertilizer compa-
nies, and transporters for supplies and services provided during the 2010/11 
subsidy programme. These delays in payment are likely to lead to the high 
supply price of inputs and services as suppliers factor in the risk of delayed 
payments in their prices. 
 8.6.2.  Opportunities from greater private sector participation 
 Greater involvement of the private sector in the subsidy programme not only 
promotes private sector development in input markets but can also improve 
effi ciency in the implementation of the programme. There are several ways 
in which the private sector can play a positive role in input market develop-
ment. First, increased involvement of the private sector provides the opportu-
nity for increasing the effi ciency of implementation of the programme. This 
can be achieved by increasing the number of outlets from which smallholder 
farmers can redeem their input coupons and broadening their choice of mar-
kets. The increase in the competition may consequently improve the quality 
of services at market outlets and reduce the incidence of tips at the markets. 
Kelly et al. (2010) note that although the incidence of tips was not signifi -
cantly different between parastatals outlets and private sector outlets, small-
holder farmers were more likely to ‘never pay tips’ in private sector outlets. 
The increase in the number of outlets can also reduce the opportunity cost of 
queuing—a phenomena that has been evident in the programme. 
 Second, the involvement of the private sector can also encourage pri-
vate investment in rural input markets. This requires consistency and trans-
parency in the government’s decisions to build the confi dence needed for 
investment. There are also opportunities for designing future private sector 
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participation on the basis of performance-based indicators, such as verifi able 
expansion of retail outlet coverage. Alternatively, the private sector could 
bid to supply specifi c quantities of subsidized fertilizer in under-served areas 
identifi ed by the government. These areas could be served directly by the 
private companies or through private company sub-contraction to agro-
dealers. As the analysis above has shown, private sales of fertilizers have 
fl ourished suggesting an increased demand for fertilizers, but it is not clear 
whether this has also facilitated the expansion of the private sector into 
poorly served areas. Such performance rewards, combined with increased 
demand for fertilizers, could provide the incentives needed for the private 
sector to invest in more input market infrastructure on a permanent or 
seasonal basis. 
 The third area in which the subsidy can exploit opportunities of private 
sector involvement is storage facilities. With the exclusion of the private 
sector from subsidized fertilizer retailing, all the programme fertilizers have 
to be delivered at one of three SFFRFM depots for uplifting to SFFRFM and 
ADMARC markets. The exclusion of the private sector has thus created pres-
sure on storage facilities at both the depots and parastatals unit markets. This 
has introduced ineffi ciencies and increased the incidence of stock-outs in 
unit markets. Logistics Unit (2012) notes that the shortage of storage space in 
markets in the critical early months of the programme in 2011/12 meant that 
although 63% of total annual fertilizer supply was available in the central 
depots, only a little over 60% of this was uplifted to unit markets. The limited 
storage capacity of SFFRFM depots in the past years of private sector exclusion 
from subsidized fertilizer retailing has led to congestion (Logistics Unit, 2011, 
2012), a situation that could be alleviated by more involvement of the private 
sector in retail markets. 
 Fourth, better methods of targeting that reduce displacement and there-
fore increase demand for commercial purchases could help in input market 
development. In Chapter 10 we discuss some targeting options that have the 
potential to reduce displacement and the practical diffi culties associated with 
these options. Fifth, improvements in the timing of coupon distribution, that 
is distributing earlier, can help farmers to plan for commercial purchases and 
thereby help commercial sales and encourage investment in input markets. 
Earlier distribution of coupons can bolster input sales as those that do not 
receive coupons and those that receive coupons but want to top up would be 
certain about their commercial purchases. In this case, involvement of the 
private sector could also offer opportunities for earlier purchase of inputs by 
farmers and hence more effective yield gains. Finally, there are also opportu-
nities that may arise with the use of electronic vouchers, which could enable 
the private sector to invest in an electronic system resulting in shared costs, 
benefi ting both government and private suppliers. 
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Implementation and Impacts
194
 8.7.  Summary 
 This chapter set out to review the impacts of the subsidy programme on the 
development of the private sector in farm input supply. The private sector has 
played a major role in the subsidy programme since 2006/7. It continues to 
play an increasing role in the importation and procurement of fertilizer for 
the subsidy programme, but was only allowed to retail subsidized fertilizers 
in the 2006/7 and 2007/8 seasons, and agro-dealers were excluded even then. 
Otherwise, the retailing of subsidized fertilizers has been monopolized by the 
two parastatals, ADMARC and SFFRFM. In the seed sector, however, various 
players in the seed value chain, including agro-dealers, have been allowed to 
participate in seed production and retailing of subsidized improved maize 
seeds and legumes, and indeed the production and distribution of subsidized 
seeds has been managed entirely by the private sector. 
 Overall, although the subsidy has had some negative impacts on private 
sector development in the form of short-run displacement of unsubsidized 
commercial sales, in the medium to long term it appears to have been cata-
lytic in raising the demand for fertilizers and improved seeds. In the fertilizer 
markets, the private sector is increasingly the main supplier of fertilizers to 
the programme, and their exclusion from the retail market for subsidized 
fertilizers does not appear to have dampened demand for commercial ferti-
lizers in the medium term. In the seeds market, the increase in the seed sub-
sidy from 2009/10 seems to be crowding out commercial sales. However, like 
the fertilizer market, in the medium to long term the massive seed subsidy 
may stimulate demand for improved seeds as farmers witness the benefi ts 
of technology adoption. In addition, there is an increase in the number of 
private sector players in both the fertilizer and seed markets, although exits, 
especially in the fertilizer market, are evident. However, the challenge is to 
translate the increase in competition into reasonably priced inputs and high 
quality services offered to smallholder farmers in under-served areas. 
 There are benefi ts from expanding the role of the private sector, in reducing 
programme costs, increasing effi ciency, and alleviating problems of storage 
capacity in parastatal markets. However the involvement of the private sec-
tor will require mutual trust among stakeholders, systems of transparency 
and accountability, and policy consistency and credibility. These conditions 
could create an environment that is conducive to private sector investment 
in input markets. As the demand for commercial fertilizers increases, assum-
ing current trends continue, there may be scope for a gradual reduction in 
the subsidy programme. However, this will require strategic investment in 
input markets by the private sector to sustain such demand and a strategic 
approach to programme graduation, an issue we discuss later in Chapter 11. 
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 While the volume of subsidized fertilizers has been falling from its peak 
in 2007/8, the growing demand for commercial purchases by smallholder 
farmers should also provide incentives for private companies to strategically 
position themselves by expanding their networks in under-served areas. One 
way this could be achieved might be by developing sustainable partnerships 
within the agro-dealer network that exists in rural areas. There is also scope 
for increasing private participation in the fertilizer retail market through per-
formance-based contracts to supply under-served areas. 
 Nonetheless, it is important to continuously monitor the impact of the 
subsidy programme on private sector markets and to monitor the integ-
rity and effi ciency of the private sector in input supply. As we argue later in 
Chapter 11, improving the effi ciency and competitiveness of input suppli-
ers is one of the conditions that can facilitate graduation from the subsidy 
programme, at household, area, and national levels. In particular, periodic 
surveys tracking programme effects on smallholder farmers’ commercial 
purchases and on input markets should generate useful information for 
evidence-based decision making about private sector roles and government 
engagement with and policy for input market development. An important 
element of this engagement should be the monitoring of market effi ciency 
through analysis of market structure (considering the number and charac-
teristics of players, their market power, and vertical restraints), behaviour in 
the market, and resultant benefi ts in terms of effi ciency that promotes small-
holder development and welfare. 
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 Benefi t–cost analysis, 2006/7 to 2010/11 1 
 9.1.  Introduction 
 In this chapter we develop benefi t–cost estimates for the FISP, using methods 
that have relatively simple analytical and data demands (to allow their appli-
cation in practical policy analysis) but nevertheless yield reasonably robust 
estimates that allow valid comparisons with estimates of the costs and ben-
efi ts to potential alternative investments. 
 The chapter is structured as follows. After this introduction we fi rst con-
sider the purpose and principles for benefi t–cost analysis (BCA) and common 
methods used in BCA. We then review problems and challenges identifi ed 
with previous BCA on the FISP. This leads on (in Section 9.5) to technical 
suggestions for methodological improvements in estimating benefi t–costs of 
FISP and we then apply these methodologies to estimate returns to invest-
ment over the life of the programme. Readers without a particular meth-
odological interest in benefi t–cost analysis may like to skip this section. We 
conclude with a discussion of the implications of the analysis for FISP’s design 
and implementation. 
 9.2.  Benefi t–cost analysis purposes and principles 
 Benefi t–cost analysis (BCA) of input subsidy programmes has two main 
functions. 
 •  It gives an indication of the returns to specifi c programmes as compared 
to returns that might be achieved from alternative investments, 
and can thus guide overall government investment and spending 
decisions. Estimates of such returns are also commonly used for more 
 1  This chapter draws heavily on Dorward and Chirwa (2011b). 
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Benefi t–cost analysis, 2006/7 to 2010/11
197
general comparisons of the returns to different types of investments 
(for example, between agricultural input subsidies, research, and 
infrastructural development) in order to guide investment choices 
between programmes. 
 •  It provides information about the variables that are important 
in determining costs and benefi ts of a specifi c programme or 
type of programme, and hence can guide programme design and 
implementation decisions to increase benefi ts relative to costs. 
 These two uses of BCA are both important, but they present analysts with 
something of a dilemma. The fi rst requires the use of common standards 
across different programmes, perhaps in different sectors, to give compara-
ble results across investment alternatives. These standards generally involve 
standardized methods, but it is often diffi cult to apply such methods across 
programmes that affect people and the economy in different and complex 
ways and in different policy contexts. These diffi culties need to be recog-
nized when making comparisons between BCA results obtained for different 
programmes. The second purpose of BCA requires not so much standards for 
comparable estimates of returns, but accurate estimates of the relative impor-
tance of different variables affecting these returns in particular  investments—
and here there may be more value in tailoring methods to match specifi c 
programme features. This, however, leads to a danger that the results may 
not be comparable with results from analysis of other investments, but may 
nevertheless be (wrongly) used for making such comparisons. 
 Taking these two purposes together with an overall objective that BCA 
should provide rigorous, reliable, and objective estimates of benefi ts and 
costs, we suggest the following seven principles for the choice and implemen-
tation of BCA methods (these are not set out according to any prioritization). 
BCA methods applied in any situation should be 
 1.  Practicable : They must be applicable to the data and analytical resources 
(skills and software, for example) that are available (or can reasonably 
be obtained). 
 2.  Externally consistent : They must provide measures that are comparable 
with generally accepted good practice in defi nitions of costs and ben-
efi ts (for example, in defi nitions of fi nancial and economic benefi ts). 
 3.  Contextualized : They must take account of particularities that affect the 
benefi ts and costs of a programme as regards the processes by which 
costs and benefi ts are linked, the effects of other policies and invest-
ments on these, and the conditions affecting these. 
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 4.  Holistic : They must take account of all the signifi cant benefi ts and costs 
associated with a policy or investment programme, both direct benefi ts 
and costs to recipients or benefi ciaries and indirect benefi ts and costs to 
others. 
 5.  Internally consistent : They must properly represent the signifi cant rela-
tionships between investments and behaviours by different stakehold-
ers, taking account of ‘counterfactuals’ (comparing actual behaviours 
and outcomes under a programme or investments against those that 
would have occurred in its absence). 
 6.  Transparent : Assumptions, measures, data sources, shortcomings, and 
possible bias and inaccuracies in methods and their results must be 
stated and discussed. 
 7.  Cost-effective : BCA methods should be chosen, developed, and imple-
mented to ensure that costs of analysis are commensurate with the 
value of the information provided. 
 The cost-effectiveness of methods is of course affected by the costs of 
BCA methods in providing information and in value of the information 
provided. 
 •  Costs are determined by resource demands for gathering extra 
information needed and for analysis (as discussed above under 
 practicability and as we discuss below as regards demands for different 
methods). 
 •  The value of the information provided is determined by its quality and 
by the scope for its use.
 •  The determinants of quality are  external and internal consistency , 
 holism , and  contextualization (as discussed above) and the 
strengths and weaknesses of analytical methods (which we discuss 
below). 
 •  Scope for use of information is determined by  transparency of results 
(as discussed above), by the strengths and weaknesses of different 
methods (which we discuss below), and by the potential ‘decision 
space’ for changes in policy choices, design, and implementation in 
the light of new information provided by BCA. 
 There are particular challenges in applying the fi rst four of the principles 
above to the specifi c situation in which the FISP operates. 
 1.  Practicable . There are severe limitations in data availability (for 
 example, on crop areas and yields, the yield and production effects of 
subsidized seed and fertilizer, and the number of farm families in the 
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country). There are also limited fi nancial and human resources avail-
able for analysis, but the determination of the ‘counterfactual’ situa-
tion of what would have happened without a subsidy is very complex, 
properly requiring consideration of changes throughout the whole 
economy as a result of changes in farm incomes, in food prices, and in 
the real incomes of consumers. The data and resource limitations lead 
to a fundamental question about the practicability of making any reli-
able estimates without substantial improvements, particularly in data 
availability. 
 2.  Externally consistent . Limited availability of good quality data poses 
problems for the application of good practice in BCA. A  further dif-
fi culty arises with the longstanding history of policy interventions 
inhibiting maize imports and exports, as this makes it very diffi cult to 
identify true economic prices for maize—conventionally, import and 
export parity prices should be used in economic analysis, but one may 
legitimately ask if liberalized market policies are a real policy option 
for the Malawian Government (see Tschirley and Jayne (2010) for a 
nuanced discussion of these issues). If import parity prices are to be 
used in the analysis then it is very diffi cult to determine what national 
prices would actually have prevailed with and without the subsidy (this 
adds to the already diffi cult task of estimating counterfactual ‘without 
subsidy’ prices for comparison against the ‘with subsidy’ situation—a 
‘double counterfactual problem’). 
 3.  Contextualized . The effects of the subsidy on livelihoods are complex, 
widespread, and in many ways specifi c to the problems faced by poor 
Malawian smallholders (with the low maize productivity trap and 
policy context discussed in Chapter 4). Analysis has to take account 
of these contextual issues—but this may lead to confl ict with the 
two previous principles—requiring more complex, non-standard 
analysis. 
 4.  Holistic : The scale and nature of the FISP means that it has widespread, 
complex, and varied effects on the livelihoods of different farm house-
holds, on consumers, and on maize and labour markets. Ideally this 
requires holistic consideration of dynamic and interacting changes in 
rural livelihoods and in rural and national markets. This presents very 
large data and analytical challenges. This is clearly related to the prob-
lems of contextualization, with similar potential for confl ict with the 
principles of practicality and external consistency—for example: can 
simpler methods be modifi ed to represent key effects of wider, complex 
changes and also generate results that allow meaningful comparison 
with BCA on other investments? 
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 9.3.  Benefi t–cost analysis methods 
 Investment and policy analysis methods can be classifi ed according to the 
extent to which they focus on direct, ‘partial equilibrium’ effects of an invest-
ment or policy on the benefi ciaries in the relevant sector as against wider, 
indirect ‘general equilibrium’ effects on benefi ciaries and non-benefi ciaries 
across all sectors in an economy. Increasing consideration of wider indirect 
effect increases the analytical complexity and data requirements. However 
although these effects may not be important for smaller scale interventions, 
they may dominate the direct effects for large-scale investments in the agri-
cultural sector if these affect food prices and the productivity of large areas of 
land and large amounts of labour. Where more complex and demanding gen-
eral equilibrium methods are used, these should properly represent markets’ 
and different stakeholders’ behaviours and interactions. Where more simple 
partial equilibrium methods are used, then these should where possible build 
in simple adjustments to simulate possible wider economy effects. 
 It is helpful to distinguish between three basic methodological approaches 
to BCA for large-scale policy investments: 
 a)  Regression models which estimate returns to investments by analysing 
comparative data sets across different regions in a country, for example, 
and estimate the impacts of investments on welfare measures or eco-
nomic growth (for example, Fan et al. (2007)), implicitly taking account 
of multipliers and wider general equilibrium market effects. 2 
 b)  Computable general equilibrium (CGE) and multi-market models that ana-
lyse the effects of investments by simulating economic behaviour with 
and without investments—with general equilibrium models simulat-
ing economy-wide effects, and multi-market models examining effects 
across a more restricted set of markets (for example, Buffi e and Atolia 
(2009) use a CGE analysis of the Malawi FISP to consider the relative 
benefi ts of investment in the FISP against investment in infrastructure, 
but do not undertake a formal BCA of the FISP). 
 c)  Partial equilibrium models that examine investment’s welfare impacts on 
producers and consumers (see, for example, C. P. Timmer (1989) for 
Indonesia). 
 2  These regression models are different from those discussed earlier in Chapter 7. The models 
discussed there can provide insights into economy-wide impacts, but their use in capturing all the 
major economy-wide impacts of a programme are limited if there is substantial market integration 
and price transmission across different areas. This will often be the case for cereal markets within 
countries. 
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 These models differ as regards their data demands, the nature of the analyti-
cal challenges they present, and their ability to allow for market failures, dif-
ferential effects on different types of consumers and producers, linkages and 
 Table 9.1.  Broad characteristics of three model types 
 Regression models  CGE/Multi-market 
models 
 Partial equilibrium 
models 
 Data demands  Very challenging: time 
series data for different 
& relatively independ-
ent regions: invest-
ment, welfare & other 
variables 
 Very challeng-
ing: national & 
multi-sectoral 






ity impacts of 
investment/policy 
interventions 
 Demand (& ideally 
supply) informa-
tion on specifi c 
commodity/
ies of interest; 
direct productiv-
ity impacts of 
investment/policy 
interventions 
 Capacity to describe 
multi-market, 
indirect effects 
 Good: intrinsic in analysis 
of broader welfare 
effects 
 Good: the key 
benefi t of these 
models, but 
depends on 
quality of model 
formulation & 
data 
 Weak: no explicit 
consideration, but 
can introduce  ad 
hoc adjustments 
to allow for these 
effects 
 Capacity to describe 
differential market 
failure effects 
 Good: should be intrinsic 
in analysis of broader 
welfare effects but 
may not capture some 
spillovers 
 Weak: very challeng-
ing as regards 
data demands & 
model formulation 
 Weak: no explicit 
consideration, but 
can introduce  ad 
hoc adjustments 
to allow for these 
effects 
 Capacity to isolate 
effects of specifi ed 
intervention(s) 
 Depends on range of 
conditions in data 
set—diffi cult if covariant 
changes or if there are 
varying spillovers across 
regions 
 Good, depending on 
quality of model 
 Can be good, 
depending 
on context & 
processes 
 Strengths  Good data sets & properly 
executed analysis can 
give very holistic empiri-
cal analysis 
 Multi-market effects, 
counterfactuals 
 Relatively simple 
data & methodo-
logical demands 
 Weaknesses  Very demanding require-
ments as regards 
historical/empirical 
data sets—this can limit 
breadth of application 
of models; assumptions/
context may not be 
explicit or generalizable; 
may not account for 
some spillover effects 
 Complex & demand-
ing; proper 
representation of 
market failures & 
differential behav-
iour of producers 




context may not 
be explicit 
 Does not take 
account of market 
effects—these can 
only be addressed 
with simple 
relatively  ad hoc 
adjustments 
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multipliers across markets, and the interactions between these.  Table 9.1 sets 
out the broad characteristics of these three types of model. 
 It is clear from  Table 9.1 that the three different approaches have different 
and in many ways complementary features, strengths, and weaknesses. We 
can conclude from this that 
 •  In different contexts there will be different choices of method to best 
follow the principles outlined earlier. 
 •  In all cases analysts must recognize and take account of the limitations 
of their methods and data, and document these to ensure that those 
using their results are able to properly interpret them. 
 •  Those using BCA results to compare returns from different investments 
or to guide policy or investment design and implementation must take 
great care to ensure that differences in analytical methods, issues, and 
data quality are properly allowed for in their considerations. 
 •  In the particular situation of the Malawi FISP
 •  it is impossible to conduct regression analysis as the empirical 
situations and data available do not allow this; 
 •  CGE and multi-market models are very demanding of analytical 
resources and data, and consequently these models may be used 
for stylized analysis of possible effects, but will be too expensive in 
implementation, too complex in application/interpretation, and too 
reliant on weak data to provide a practicable method for regular and 
detailed year by year analysis; 
 •  the more limited data and analytical demands of simpler partial 
equilibrium models mean that they are the most practicable (though 
there are still signifi cant challenges here). 
 9.4.  Problems and challenges with benefi t–cost analysis (BCA) 
of the FISP 
 Dorward and Chirwa (2009, 2010a) and School of Oriental and African 
Studies et al. (2008) have used standard partial equilibrium methodology 
for estimating the economic benefi t–cost ratio and fi scal effi ciency of the 
subsidy programme. They recognize, however, that this method does not 
take account of wider benefi ts to poor consumers from lower food prices, 
and that paradoxically a greater fall in the price of maize provided a lower 
estimate of programme benefi t when in fact larger price falls should lead to 
wider growth and poverty reduction benefi ts. They also consistently identify 
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a number of concerns with the use of their results in comparing estimated 
returns from subsidies and from other investments. These concerns are also 
relevant to the limited reports of benefi t–cost and related analysis by others 
(For example Buffi e and Atolia (2009) and Denning et al. (2009)) and to dis-
cussion of these results. 
 The concerns may be broadly classifi ed into related problems fi rst with 
data, second with methodology, and third with wider theoretical issues. 
These problems are of course related, as 
 •  methodologies embody theory and require, and are limited by, data, and 
 •  theories require, and are embodied in and limited by, methodologies. 
 The three major theoretical questions concern 
 (a)  the measure of benefi ts, 
 (b)  the extent of benefi ts and processes of change, and 
 (c)  the valuation of incremental production. 
 The measure of benefi ts : Ideally benefi ts should represent welfare changes 
to recipients and non-recipients. This, however, raises questions about the 
nature of welfare, methods of measurement or estimation, and the relative 
importance and weighting of welfare changes for different stakeholders (for 
example, questions about the relative importance of welfare changes in 
poorer and less-poor people, and about the relative importance of welfare 
changes in people now and in the future). Economic theory provides widely 
used measures of welfare changes through the concepts of consumer and pro-
ducer surplus. There are, however, severe methodological and data diffi cul-
ties in the estimation of supply curves needed for the estimation of changes 
in producer surplus. As a result, changes in real income are commonly used 
as proxy measures of welfare in benefi t–cost analysis, and generally provide 
similar answers (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995; Alston et al., 2000). The rela-
tively simple analysis in School of Oriental and African Studies et al. (2008), 
Dorward and Chirwa (2009), and Dorward et al. (2010a) provides reasonable 
estimates of changes in aggregate real income across producers and consum-
ers, but no information about the distribution of these benefi ts between pro-
ducers and consumers or between benefi ciaries and non-benefi ciaries. This 
differentiation is important for the use of weights to address distributional 
questions about welfare changes for different types of people. 
 The extent of benefi ts and the processes of change : We argued in Chapters 2 and 
4 that subsidy programme benefi ts can have wide-ranging and far-reaching 
dynamic effects where they directly overcome fi nancial market failure and 
investment affordability problems of recipients, and address these same prob-
lems for poor non-recipients through staple food prices and higher wages; 
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and that they should also generate more conventional multiplier growth 
effects (where, for example, increases in recipients’ income lead to increases 
in consumption of locally produced goods and services, and hence increases 
in incomes for local providers of these goods and services). Haggblade et al. 
(2007a) suggest agricultural multipliers (excluding dynamic effects from 
overcoming market failures) range from 1.3 to 1.5 in sub-Saharan Africa, 
while Davies and Davey (2008) report estimated multipliers of 2 to 2.45 from 
conditional cash transfers in Dowa (though these fi xed price estimates may 
be reduced by 30% to allow for supply constraints, to give estimates of 1.4 
to 1.7). Diao et al. (2003) estimate a multiplier of 1.5 from increases in grain 
productivity in Malawi while Benin et al. (2008) estimate a multiplier of 1.1 
from increases in maize productivity in Malawi. 
 Dynamic effects and multipliers are implicitly allowed for in BCA using 
regression analysis (for example, Fan et al. (2007)), and they should be explic-
itly modelled in general equilibrium analysis, although this is seldom the 
case for the dynamic effects of overcoming market failures. Multipliers and 
dynamic effects are not allowed for in estimates derived from partial equi-
librium methods, and this leads to a biased under-estimate of returns when 
these estimates are compared with estimates of other investments’ returns if 
these estimates are derived from regression or general equilibrium analyses. 3 
 The valuation of incremental production : The concerns discussed above about 
the measure of benefi ts and their extent and distribution are concerned with 
the valuing of incremental production, in a very broad sense. Here, however, 
we discuss two narrower issues: fi rst the choice of prices for valuing output 
and second the discount rate to use. 
 As noted earlier, there are legitimate questions about the feasibility of liber-
alized market policies as a real policy option for the Malawian Government, 
and hence if economic analysis should use border or domestic prices. Either 
way there are then serious methodological challenges in determining ‘coun-
terfactual’ prices for a situation without the subsidy (with a ‘double coun-
terfactual’ problem if combinations of domestic and border prices are to be 
used). Dorward et  al. (2010a) and School of Oriental and African Studies 
et al. (2008) use information on border prices with informed judgement to 
address the ‘double counterfactual’ problem to estimate what border prices 
would have prevailed with and without the subsidy in the absence of policies 
restricting imports. 
 3  We do not attempt to consider the health and education benefi ts discussed in Chapter 7 in 
the benefi t–cost analysis in this chapter. In using market prices as the basis of valuation we are 
also ignoring questions raised about the value of maize to people who cannot afford to buy it at 
higher prices. 
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 They also do not use an explicit discount rate when comparing programme 
benefi ts and costs. However any comparison of the programme’s benefi t–
cost ratio with internal rates of return estimated for longer term investments 
involves an implicit assumption that benefi ts are achieved one year after 
investment. It might, however, be argued that costs are incurred in December 
to January (when seeds and fertilizers are paid for and applied to the fi eld) but 
benefi ts are obtained in June (when crops are harvested), giving a return after 
6 or 7 months. It might also be considered, however, that benefi ts from lower 
maize prices and increased consumption are enjoyed over the period June 
to May, yielding a return over an average of around 12 months. These two 
alternatives have major implications for estimates of internal rates of annual 
return, as the former has a net Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 70–80% higher 
than the net benefi t–cost ratio (BCR, net benefi ts divided by costs). 
 The discussion above addresses theoretical and related methodological 
concerns with the standard use of partial equilibrium analysis in BCA for 
the FISP. These concerns are exacerbated by and linked to diffi culties with 
the quality and availability of critical data on yield responses to subsidized 
inputs, on overall production data, and on the number of rural and farm 
households—diffi culties that have been noted repeatedly in earlier chapters. 
 9.5.  Improving FISP benefi t–cost estimates 4 
 Consideration of these theoretical, methodological, and data diffi culties 
together with the earlier discussion of purposes and principles for BCA sug-
gests a number of approaches to improving the BCA of the subsidy pro-
gramme. These involve 
 1. Continued use of partial equilibrium analysis, with its relatively limited 
demands for data and analytical resources, but with more formal coun-
terfactual price estimation. 
 2. Extension of the method to distinguish between producer and con-
sumer gains and, among producers, between subsidy recipients and 
non-recipients. 
 3. Consideration of possible dynamic effects of growth and liquidity 
multipliers. 
 4. Consideration of results with alternative estimates of the time period for 
returns. 
 4  This section contains quite detailed consideration of methodological issues in improving BCA 
methods. Readers without specifi c technical interests in this may prefer to skip the section and go 
straight to Section 9.6. 
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 All these approaches involve elaboration of the estimation of programme 
benefi ts, as estimation of programme costs is not conceptually problem-
atic (although, as discussed in Chapter 5, there are diffi culties in obtaining 
reliable data on some cost items). Total costs incurred in input acquisition 
(including transport and distribution costs) are added to programme admin-
istration costs, with application of shadow exchange rates to non-tradable 
costs in the later years of the programme when the Malawi Kwacha is gener-
ally considered to have been over-valued. Costs of acquisition for subsidized 
inputs that displace unsubsidized inputs are subtracted from the programme 
costs, as these provide no incremental benefi ts and are simply a transfer from 
government to the recipients of those subsidized inputs. Although they con-
sequently have little effect on the benefi t–cost ratio of the programme (being 
excluded from both benefi ts and costs), they do affect the Net Present Value 
(NPV) of the programme, and hence its fi scal effi ciency (which we defi ne as 
NPV/fi scal costs). 
 9.5.1.  Methodology for formal estimation of prices and producer and 
consumer gains 
 To improve on existing estimates of programme benefi ts we therefore begin 
by formalizing price estimation, focusing on the effects of the subsidy 
programme on maize production. 5  Figure 9.1 shows how for an autarchic 
economy 6 a production subsidy causes a downward shift in the market price 
supply curve ( S to  S* ) and this leads to an expansion in supply (from  Q to  Q* ) 
and a fall in consumer price for the product (from  P to  P* ). 
 The change in real income for producers is analysed in terms of the effects 
of changes in output prices, costs, and volumes produced and sold. 
  Δ − Δ −⎡⎣ ⎤⎦Y Q= P + P Q C C −P F F* * * * *)−Q Q ( )Q Q− Δ [ ]QP Q− C  (9.1) 
  Δ − − −Y = Q Q − Q Q− Δ CP F F( *Q ) *P ( *−P P ) *Q− Δ C ( *Q )  (9.2) 
 5  The 2006/7, 2008/9, and 2010/11 household surveys reported in Dorward et al. (2010a) and 
School of Oriental and African Studies et al. (2008) show that almost all the incremental fertilizer 
use as a result of the subsidy programme was applied to maize and there is no evidence of shifts in 
cropping patterns in 2008/9 as a result of the subsidy programme. (Holden and Lunduka (2010c) 
also fi nd no evidence of shifts in cropping patterns, although Chibwana et al. (2012) suggest some 
shifting into maize by subsidy recipients.) 
 6  The assumption of autarchy is a reasonable analytical starting point for the Malawi maize 
market, given the high transport costs in exporting to or importing from the world market. We 
consider later the effects of informal imports from surrounding countries (notably Mozambique), 
actual or potential price ceilings from potential imports from South Africa, and exports to 
Zimbabwe in 2007/8. 
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 where YP *  = producers’ income after subsidy 
 YP  = producers’ income before subsidy 
Q*  = production after subsidy 
Q  = production before subsidy 
P*  = output price after subsidy 
P  = output price before subsidy 
 ΔQF  = increase in production from use of subsidized inputs 
 C  = producers’ average unit costs for output before/without subsidy 
 C *  = producers’ unit costs for extra output (i.e. excluding subsidized costs) 
 The change in producers’ income therefore consists of changes in sales 
value less the costs of production with the subsidy, plus the savings on unsub-
sidized production where this has been displaced by subsidized production. 
The change in sales value is made up of a loss due to the fall in product 
price for the original amount produced (area  abdf in  Figure 9.1 ), but a gain 
from extra production at the lower price (area  dchg in  Figure  9.1 ). 7 With 
totally elastic demand there would be no price loss and all the subsidized 





















 Figure 9.1.  Input subsidy impacts on output supply and price 
Source: Adapted from Dorward (2009b). 
 7  In the long run the loss of producer incomes from falls in unsubsidized maize production and 
in prices may be smaller than estimated here as rising real incomes for consumers will raise prices 
for non-maize and non-farm goods and services, which can replace their lost and/or lower value 
maize production. 
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Δ − −ΔY = Q Q CP F( *Q ) *P * . With totally inelastic demand there would be 
no increase in production and all the subsidized production would displace 
unsubsidized production, hence Δ −Y Q= − C CP F( *P P− ) (+ ΔQ *).  Under these 
circumstances Δ =YP 0  and hence
 Q C CF( *P P ) (Q *)  
The change in real income for consumers consists of the savings on existing 
purchases due to the price fall ( abdf in  Figure 9.1 ) plus the savings in extra 
purchases which are best valued in terms of savings on previous expenditures 
(area  bcd in  Figure 9.1 ). 
  
1
Changeinconsumer real income ( *) ( *)( * )
2C




 Total change in producers’ and consumers’ real income can be estimated by 
the sum of changes in producer and consumer incomes: 
 





 The method for estimating overall benefi ts in equation 9.4 is broadly that 
used in Dorward et al. (2010a) and School of Oriental and African Studies 
et al. (2008). They use analysts’ informal judgement of ‘double counterfac-
tual’ prices with and without the subsidy respectively to estimate  P* and  P 
in the absence of government bans on formal imports.  P can, however, be 
estimated using formal estimates of price elasticity of demand ( E D  ), together 
with information on prices and production with the subsidy. ( *)  can 













 We can then substitute for ( *)  into equations 9.2, 9.3, and 9.4 as follows: 
 Change in producer real income 




Q− Q− Q CP
D
F F( *Q ) *P
*
*
( *Q ) *− ΔQ C ( *Q )1  (9.6) 
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 Change in consumer real income 
Δ = −Y
E Q




( *Q )( ( *Q ))  (9.7)
 Change in producer and consumer real income 












 Equations 9.6 to 9.8 still present problems in that we require an estimate of 
( * )Q . However, the seasonal separation of supply and demand means 
that if we can initially ignore farmers’ expectations of lower prices in the fol-
lowing season then incremental production will be equal to the increase in 
production from use of subsidized inputs, so that ( * )Q QF= Δ . Introducing 
this into equations 9.6 to 9.8 gives the following estimates of changes in real 
income: 
Changein producer real income 1 *( * *)
*P F FD
P
Y Q P C Q Q
E Q
Δ = Δ − − Δ  (9.9) 
Changein consumer real income 1 * 1
* 2C F FD
P
Y Q Q Q
E Q
⎛ ⎞Δ = Δ + Δ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (9.10) 
 Change in producer and consumer real income 











2  (9.11) 
 All of the analysis in this section has been derived from our initial considera-
tion of a closed economy ( Figure 9.1 ). It does, however, also apply to a small 
open economy with a wide band between import and export parity prices. 
Thus, if increased production causes an economy to eliminate imports of  Q  M
so that the price falls to  P* , below import parity  P  M  , then this can be han-
dled by estimating gains in consumer and producer real incomes allowing for 
these prices. 8 
8  Note that where producers outside an economy export into that economy but at prices largely 
determined within the economy (as is broadly the case with Mozambican exports to Malawi), 
then the loss of producer income suffered by these producers due to the price fall is not a loss to 
the domestic producers and the domestic economy. 
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 In these circumstances then assuming that ( * )Q QF= Δ  as above then 
  Δ − −Y Q= Δ P Q Q P Q− ΔP CP F M M F* (− )( *) *  (9.12) 
  ΔY Q= P P−C M M F M( *P P− ) (+ *)( )ΔQ Q−
1
2  (9.13) 
and




 Use of equations 9.9 to 9.11 or 9.12 to 9.14 depends on the relative values of 
 PM and  P : equations 9.9 to 9.11 are used if  P M >  P , and equations 9.12 to 9.14 
are used if  PM <  P , where  P is estimated from equation 9.5. If, in addition,  P M 
<  P* then  PM replaces  P* in equations 9.12 to 9.14, and there are no consumer 
benefi ts or producer losses from price changes. The equations above can also 
be adjusted to allow for exports if  P* is below the export parity price  PX . In 
this case  P X replaces  P* in equations 9.12 to 9.13 if the subsidy would move 
domestic prices from above import parity to below export parity prices, or in 
equations 9.2 to 9.3 (with replacement of ( * )Q  by ΔQF ) if the subsidy 
would move domestic prices which are already import parity to below export 
parity. 
 The methodology developed in this sub-section demonstrates the basic 
validity of the BCA approach used in Dorward et  al. (2010a) and School 
of Oriental and African Studies et al. (2008), but also allows a breakdown 
between producer and consumer benefi ts with more formal estimates of  P 
 and  Q* if estimates of ΔQF  and of price elasticity of demand ( E  D  ) are available. 
 9.5.2.  Estimation of price/quantity demand relations and of 
incremental production 
 We now develop estimates of overall returns to the subsidy and of separate 
producer and consumer benefi ts using the methodology developed above. 
First, however, estimates are needed of price elasticity of demand ( E  D  ) and of 
ΔQF . These estimates are unfortunately not without their own diffi culties. 
 We fi rst consider the estimation of price elasticity of demand ( E  D  ) or (more 
generally) of the relationship between price and quantity demanded.  Figure 7.4 
in Chapter 7 shows maize prices and estimated quantities consumed per cap-
ita. This highlights an apparent discrepancy between the 1993/4 to 2005/6 
and 2006/7 to 2010/11 data sets, with higher prices in the latter set. Possible 
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explanations for this were discussed earlier in Chapter 7, but it raises wider 
questions regarding the impact of increases in production on maize prices. 
If production estimates from 1993/4 to 2005/6 are broadly correct, then this 
suggests that the 1993/4 to 2005/6 data should provide a reasonable estimate 
of price elasticity of demand with constant wages—although there may be 
upward shifts in demand when wages rise. 
 Three regression models were estimated of log quantity on log price quantity 
from maize price data and supply estimates from 1993/94. The fi rst is derived 
from data from the 1993/4 to 2009/10 seasons with the inclusion of a dummy 
variable for subsidy effects from 2005/6 onwards and a time variable to allow 
for changing base per capita demand over time. This gave an estimate of price 
elasticity of demand of –0.24 (n = 17, t = 1.5, R 2  = 0.56). Given concerns about 
the reliability of data from 2006/7 to 2009/10 as discussed above, and implau-
sibly high estimates of ‘without subsidy’ prices when subsequently applying 
this model, it was rejected. The second model regressed log quantity on log 
price quantity from the 1993/4 to 2005/6 seasons 9 and gives an estimate of 
price elasticity of demand of –0.38 (n = 13, t = 1.9, R 2  = 0.24). The third used 
the same data set with the inclusion of a time variable to allow for changing 
base per capita demand over time, and gives an estimate of price elasticity of 
demand of –0.51 (n = 13, t = 2.2, R 2  = 0.33). The third model was preferred as 
regards its better fi t and inclusion of a time effect, and was therefore used in 
the analysis that is reported below and is shown in  Figure 7.4 . 
 Having considered the estimation of the relationship between price and 
quantity demanded and hence of price elasticity of demand ( E  D  ), we now 
consider the estimation of ΔQF,  incremental production from the subsidy 
programme. The diffi culties of obtaining reliable and precise estimates of
ΔQF were discussed earlier in Chapter  6. As noted there, Dorward et  al. 
(2010a) and School of Oriental and African Studies et al. (2008) have there-
fore estimated incremental production assuming that every kg nitrogen (N) 
in incremental fertilizer application leads to 12 kg incremental grain produc-
tion when applied on local maize and to 18 kg incremental grain production 
when applied on hybrid maize. 10 This approach was also followed here, with 
incremental fertilizer application as a result of the subsidy programme esti-
mated from 2006/7, 2008/9, and 2010/11 survey estimates of displacement of 
unsubsidized fertilizer sales by subsidized fertilizer sales. 
 9  Restriction of the data series to the 1993/4 to 2005/6 seasons (a) provides more consistent 
estimates than are obtained from the 1993/4 to 2009/10 series and (b) standardizes for the effects 
of possible inconsistency in production estimates and of higher nominal wages in later years. 
 10  See School of Oriental and African Studies et al. (2008) for summary of a range of different 
studies from which these estimates were derived. 
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 9.5.3.  Formal estimation of prices and producer and consumer gains 
 Using these estimates of the relationship between price and quantity 
available and of the incremental production from the subsidy we can now 
estimate changes in overall incomes from equations 9.11 and 9.14 over 
a range of assumptions, as shown in  Table  9.2 for the years 2005/6 to 
2010/11. 11 
 Table 9.2 presents for each year the border adjusted prices estimated in one 
row with the demand elasticity discussed earlier (and shown in  Figure 7.4 ) 
and, in another row, using analysts’ judgements. Different columns then 
show estimates of net benefi ts, benefi t–cost ratios (BCRs) and fi scal effi cien-
cies (FEs) without any growth multipliers. 
 The main point of interest in  Table 9.2 is the differences between results 
obtained by prices estimated using demand elasticity calculations and those 
 Table 9.2.  Base benefi t–cost analysis, 2005/6–10/11 




 BCR  FE 
 (US$ mill) 
 2005/6  0.51  0.24  0.14  0.29  0.14  12.4  1.17  0.34 
 AE  mean =  0.14  n/a  n/a  -7.6  0.90  -0.21 
 2006/7  0.51  0.25  0.13  0.32  0.17  47.8  1.49  0.65 
 AE  mean =  0.15  n/a  n/a  6.0  1.06  0.08 
 2007/8  0.51  1.83  0.35  0.30  0.15  39.4  1.30  0.41 
 AE  mean =  0.25  n/a  n/a  8.9  1.07  0.09 
 2008/9  0.51  1.16  0.25  0.28  0.13  -39.0  0.87  -0.16 
 AE  mean =  0.28  n/a  n/a  -40.2  0.87  -0.16 
 2009/10  0.51  0.46  0.17  0.28  0.13  31.9  1.18  0.23 
 AE  mean =  0.26  n/a  n/a  35.4  1.20  0.25 
 2010/11  0.51  0.95  0.19  0.35  0.20  127.9  1.55  0.88 
 AE  mean =  0.30  n/a  n/a  106.0  1.46  0.73 
 Notes: E D , P, P*, P M, and P X represent respectively demand elasticities, without and with subsidy maize prices (in 
current US$), and import and export parity maize prices (calculated from SAFEX prices with import and export 
transport costs of $100/MT and $50/MT respectively). BCR (benefi t–cost ratio) is calculated as total economic benefi t 
divided by total economic costs; FE (Fiscal Effi ciency) as net benefi t (total economic benefi t less total economic costs) 
divided by total fi scal costs. Under E D , ‘AE’ stands for Analyst Estimates as reported in Dorward et al. (2010a) and 
School of Oriental and African Studies et al. (2008). ‘n/a’ indicates ‘not applicable’ 
 11  Elasticities of demand  per se were not used in these calculations, due to averaging problems 
over price and quantity ranges; instead the estimated equations were used to calculate price and 
quantity changes. 
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obtained by analysts’ judgements: 12 estimated returns are generally higher 
with prices estimated using demand elasticity calculations than with those 
obtained from analysts’ judgements. This arises partly from lower prices 
in analysts’ estimates, particularly in the earlier years, due to more weight 
being given to the possibility of substantially lower price imports from 
Mozambique in 2005/6 and 2006/7 and (to a lesser extent) in 2007/8 and 
2009/10. 13 
 9.5.4.  Effects of growth and liquidity multipliers 
 There is no particular methodology for the building of growth and liquidity 
multipliers into partial equilibrium analysis. We use equations 9.9, 9.10, 9.12, 
and 9.13 to estimate producers’ and consumers’ relative gains and losses, and 
then multiply these by relevant estimates of agricultural multipliers. As dis-
cussed earlier, a number of studies estimate agricultural multipliers of around 
1.4 in sub-Saharan Africa and Malawi. We therefore initially multiply farm 
benefi ts and costs by 1.4. In order to allow for possible multiplier effects of 
alternative use of resources invested in the programme, we use a multiplier of 
1.2 for alternative investments (the lower number to allow for the high mul-
tiplier effects of increases in income to poor rural people).  Table 9.3 shows 
the results of this analysis together with results without the use of multipliers 
(also shown earlier in  Table 9.2 ). 
 The table shows that estimates of net benefi ts, benefi t–cost ratios, and fi s-
cal effi ciencies generally increase when the effects of multipliers are allowed 
for, and these increases can be substantial. Further analysis (summarized in 
 Table 9.4 ) using different multipliers for different types of people (produc-
ers, consumers, and subsidy recipients) shows that if poorer households have 
higher multipliers (as they normally do) and account for a higher share of 
national maize consumption than of national maize production, then subsi-
dies that lead to domestic price falls will, other things being equal, generally 
lead to higher returns, as will greater targeting of the poor as subsidy recipi-
ents (Dorward and Chirwa, 2011b). 
 12  Differences in results across different years are due to variation in maize prices (with high 
domestic prices from 2007/8 requiring analysis using import parity prices for the ‘without subsidy’ 
situation—and even for the ‘with subsidy’ situation in 2007/8), and in fertilizer prices (which rose 
steadily from 2005/6 to a peak in 2008/9). Differences in some results from those presented in 
Dorward and Chirwa (2011b) are due to allowance here for weather-affected yields, as set out in 
the incremental production estimates presented in Chapter 6. 
 13  Where ‘without subsidy’ domestic prices would be higher than import parity, the formal 
price estimation also allows for part of the subsidized production to substitute for imports (so 
that consumer benefi ts are not derived from a simple average of import parity and ‘with subsidy’ 
domestic price). 
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 Table 9.4.  Alternative estimates of returns to FISP investments, 2005/6–10/11 
 Estimation  ED  Annual return 




US$ mill  BCR  FE  AIRR  FE 
 Basic estimate  0.51  36.72  1.26  0.39  1.32  0.49 
 AE  18.09  1.09  0.13  1.11  0.16 
 Simple multiplier  0.51  46.30  1.31  0.58  1.39  0.73 
 AE  16.65  1.12  0.14  1.14  0.17 
 Differentiated 
multipliers (a) 
 0.51  36.56  1.34  0.60  1.42  0.76 
 AE  11.45  1.13  0.19  1.16  0.23 
 Differentiated 
multipliers (b) 
 0.51  63.41  1.44  0.84  1.55  1.07 
 AE  27.86  1.22  0.30  1.26  0.37 
 See notes on previous tables. Simple (unweighted) averages. Differentiated multipliers with consumer multiplier of 
1.4, producer multiplier of 1.2, and recipient multiplier of 1.1 (a) or 1.4 (b). Annualized return if BCR is achieved over 
10 months. 
 Table 9.3.  Benefi t–cost analysis without and with growth multipliers 
 Year  ED  BASE Growth multiplier
 Net 
benefi t 
 BCR  FE  Net 
benefi t 
 BCR  FE 
 US$ mill  US$ mill 
 2005/6  0.51  12.4  1.17  0.34  23.0  1.24  0.63 
 AE  -7.6  0.90  -0.21  -3.7  0.95  -0.10 
 2006/7  0.51  47.8  1.49  0.65  77.5  1.61  1.05 
 AE  6.0  1.06  0.08  14.7  1.15  0.20 
 2007/8  0.51  39.4  1.30  0.41  71.6  1.42  0.75 
 AE  8.9  1.07  0.09  22.7  1.17  0.24 
 2008/9  0.51  -39.0  0.87  -0.16  -9.8  0.97  -0.04 
 AE  -40.2  0.87  -0.16  -9.2  0.97  -0.04 
 2009/10  0.51  31.9  1.18  0.23  69.1  1.31  0.49 
 AE  35.4  1.20  0.25  58.8  1.34  0.42 
 2010/11  0.51  127.9  1.55  0.88  204.5  1.69  1.41 
 AE  106.0  1.46  0.73  134.8  1.58  0.93 
 Notes: E D represents demand elasticities. BCR (benefi t–cost ratio) is calculated as total economic benefi t divided by 
total economic costs. FE (Fiscal Effi ciency) is calculated as net benefi t (total economic benefi t less total economic 
costs) divided by total fi scal costs. Under E D , ‘AE’ stands for Analyst Estimates as used in BCA reported in Dorward 
et al., (2010a); School of Oriental and African Studies et al., (2008). AE multiplier estimates derived from multiplier 
effects on base estimates with E D  = 0.51. Economic costs exclude costs of displaced fertilizers. Data from Dorward 
et al., (2010a); School of Oriental and African Studies et al., (2008) and  Table 9.2. 
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 9.5.5.  Sensitivity of BCA estimates to time of return, yields, and 
displacement 
 It was noted earlier that the use of benefi t–cost ratios implies an annual return 
on investment. However, it might be argued that returns are achieved over a 
shorter period, for example 7 months from fertilizer purchase and application 
to harvest. This can lead to substantial increases in the Annual Internal Rate 
of Return (AIRR), depending on the BCR—for a BCR of 1.2 the AIRR would 
increase by 14% to just under 1.4, while for a BCR of 1.3 the AIRR would 
increase by 21% to just under 1.6. Allowance for returns over 10 months (as 
illustrated in  Table 9.4 ) gives smaller increases in BCR. 
 For a given initial ‘without subsidy’ situation, returns to investment are 
also affected by changes in yield and displacement effects with the subsidy. 
Higher yields lead to higher returns from increased volumes of incremental 
production, but they also tend to lead to lower prices—increasing returns to 
consumers and losses to producers. The latter effect becomes important where 
differential multipliers are used. Where prices are very high and remain above 
import parity price then there are no price effects. 
 Increased displacement reduces incremental production, with opposite 
effects to those discussed above with increasing yields. Reduced returns are, 
however, counteracted to some extent by reduced costs, and this means that 
the BCR falls less than the Fiscal Effi ciency (indeed if costs fall by a smaller 
proportion than benefi ts then the BCR may rise slightly while the FE falls sig-
nifi cantly). Dorward and Chirwa (2011b) provide more detailed information 
on the sensitivity of investment returns to these changes. 
 9.6.  Summary 
 We conclude with a brief summary and review of the fi ndings in this chapter 
and discuss their wider relevance to the economic viability, design, imple-
mentation, and evaluation of the Malawi FISP and other subsidy programmes. 
 9.6.1.  Review of fi ndings 
 This chapter has considered purposes, principles, and alternative BCA meth-
odologies against particular theoretical, methodological, and data challenges 
faced in BCA of the FISP. We have then put forward a formal methodology 
for improving the estimation of producer and consumer gains and losses and 
used this to provide alternative estimates of the programmes’ annual net ben-
efi t, benefi t–cost ratio, and fi scal effi ciency from 2005/6 to 2009/10, with 
further investigation of the effects of multipliers (from growth linkages and 
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liquidity benefi ts for poor households). The results (using a simple average 
over the fi ve years) are summarized in  Table 9.4 . 
 Without consideration of any growth multipliers, the estimated average 
BCR of the six years of the subsidy programme ranges from 1.09 (the esti-
mates using analysts’ estimates of prices) to 1.26 (with formal estimation of 
demand and an elasticity of demand of 0.51). Adding in multipliers raises the 
estimated BCRs to between 1.12 and 1.22, using analysts’ price estimates, and 
between 1.31 and 1.44 with more formal demand estimation. Further allow-
ance for returns over 10 months raises the range of the AIRR to between 1.14 
and 1.55 (with multipliers). These are high estimated returns and suggest that 
returns estimated using simple partial equilibrium analysis are downwardly 
biased by, in particular, exclusion of the effects of growth multipliers. 
 However, precise estimation of the BCR remains diffi cult, for reasons that 
are set out in this and previous chapters. Nevertheless, leaving aside the pos-
sibility of achieving returns in less than a year, and taking formal price esti-
mation as more reliable than analysts’ estimation, suggests that the average 
BCR is likely to be around 1.35 after allowing for the effects of multipliers, 
with fi scal effi ciency of around 0.6. Lower estimates using analysts’ price esti-
mates give an estimated BCR of around 1.15 and fi scal effi ciency of 0.2. These 
estimates are sensitive to yield responses (and hence both programme imple-
mentation and weather), and international maize prices. The latter have been 
higher in recent years, and are likely to remain high, and there is consider-
able potential for higher yield responses than those assumed here. Higher 
displacement would not affect the BCR very much but would lower fi scal 
effi ciency. 
 9.6.2.  Economic viability of the Malawi FISP 
 Overall these returns are high and suggest that the FISP has provided a good 
return on investment—with scope for improved effi ciency and effectiveness 
to make returns much higher in the future. However there are, of course, also 
risks of poor implementation, unfavourable weather, and changes in prices 
that depress returns. 
 The extent to which the FISP represents the best use of investment funds 
depends upon competition for funds between different investments and 
their relative returns. Buffi e and Atolia (2009) fi nd, using CGE analysis, the 
net benefi ts of the FISP depend critically upon the relative returns to fertilizer 
use and to investments in roads, and upon the extent to which investment in 
FISP crowds out investments in infrastructure. They conclude that a strategy 
of mixed investments is probably best. However Filipski and Taylor (2011) 
fi nd that CGE model results are sensitive to model formulation regarding 
seasonal fi nance constraints on input purchases—which were not allowed for 
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 14  Rationing of large unit subsidies in the FISP should make it more effi cient than India’s univer-
sal subsidies; and its impact on liquidity constraints in the absence of a credit programme should 
mean that it generates some of the benefi ts that Fan et al. report for credit subsidies in India. Fan 
et al.’s estimates of returns to subsidies relative to roads may be under-estimated to some extent as 
a result of higher cross-region spillover effects from subsidies, not captured in the model. 
by Buffi e and Atolia. Fan et al. (2007) report that investments in education, 
roads, agricultural research and development, credit subsidies, and input sub-
sidies (in that order) all yielded high returns in such a mixed investment 
strategy in the early stages of the Green Revolution in India. 14 
 There is very limited specifi c information on returns to alternative invest-
ments, such as in roads and in agricultural research and development in 
Malawi, and it is common to rely on estimates from other African countries 
or from Asia. These tend to show very high returns to these investments. 
Buffi e and Atolia (2009) use returns to infrastructure investment of between 
10 and 30% (a BCR of 1.1 to 1.3), citing evidence from Fan et al. (2003) and 
Pohl and Mihaljek (1992). Alston et al. (2000) report a modal rate of return 
of 43% to agricultural research from a meta-analysis of studies but report 
very wide ranges in estimates with some possible biases indicated by lower 
estimates in peer reviewed and  ex ante (as opposed to  ex post ) studies and in 
studies in LDCs. Estimated returns from the FISP are comparable with these 
estimates. None of these returns allow for wider impacts, such as the health 
and education benefi ts discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 and the long-run effects 
of reduced food shortages and malnutrition on children’s mental and physi-
cal development and subsequent adult productivity. Any such allowance 
would have to take into account likely differences across the different invest-
ments being compared, as other investments may also yield such benefi ts 
without including them in the estimation of returns to investment. 
 9.6.3.  Implications for subsidy programme design and implementation 
 The formal price analysis and introduction of multipliers in the BCA in this 
chapter reinforces previous studies’ discussions of the lessons from BCA for 
FISP and other subsidy programme design and implementation: returns 
will be improved by measures that increase yield responses to fertilizer (for 
example, earlier input delivery, greater emphasis on integrated soil fertility 
management, improved application, more cost effective formulations, more 
technical advice, more targeting to the poor) and that reduce displacement 
(for example, better regional and household targeting, better control of diver-
sion and fraud, earlier registration and input delivery). The inclusion of mul-
tipliers in the BCA strengthens the importance of all of these issues, as gains 
from improved effi ciency and effectiveness are multiplied. It also adds fur-
ther weight to the importance of targeting, of ensuring that maize marketing 
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policies allow increased maize production to lower maize prices (as benefi ts 
to poorer subsidy recipients and consumers tend to have higher multipli-
ers) and suggests that to maximize linkages and reduce leakages (Dorward 
et al., 2003) there should be complementary investments in measures facili-
tating the growth of the non-farm economy and of non-staple agriculture 
(for example, horticulture, legumes, and livestock) in response to subsidy-led 
growth real in real incomes. 
 9.6.4.  Implications for future data collection and benefi t–cost analysis 
 The partial equilibrium methods developed in this chapter have sought to 
follow and fi nd appropriate compromises between the seven principles set 
out in Section 9.2: being practicable, externally consistent, contextualized, 
holistic, internally consistent, transparent, and cost-effective. The method is 
relatively simple in terms of its data needs and the calculations required but 
nevertheless it takes account of the context and complex processes affecting 
FISP returns, and it also addresses the key questions that policy makers and 
technicians ask (regarding both FISP’s overall returns—for comparison with 
other investments—and the critical variables that determine its effectiveness 
and effi ciency). It could be improved by further research leading to better esti-
mates of maize price determinants and of growth multipliers, and by more 
robust estimation of (quite probably changing) demand elasticity for maize 
and better information on yield and production effects of subsidized inputs. 
 Its application does, therefore, highlight the need for good data in Malawi’s 
agricultural sector. This is a major challenge. Malawi has excellent data on 
market prices, and the biennial FISP evaluation surveys have provided valu-
able information on targeting and use of subsidized inputs. However there 
are continuing diffi culties with data on the total number of farm households, 
on cropping areas and yields, and on yield responses to inputs and agronomic 
management. Improved data on these variables is critical not just for the 
evaluation of the FISP, but for much wider policy development, monitoring, 
and evaluation. 
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 Part III 
Strategic issues 
 The fi nal part of the book, before the conclusion, consists of two chapters 
that look at two strategic issues relevant to all agricultural input subsidy 
 programmes: targeting and graduation. 
 Targeting is an issue that has received attention in the theoretical and ana-
lytical literature on agricultural subsidies, as evidenced in Chapters 2 and 
3. Targeting systems and outcomes of the Malawi FISP were considered briefl y 
in Chapter 5. Chapter 10 examines these issues in more detail and considers 
challenges and options for improving targeting systems and outcomes in the 
Malawi FISP. 
 Like targeting, graduation has received considerable attention in the design, 
implementation, and analysis of social protection programmes. It has, how-
ever, received very little attention in agricultural input subsidy programmes 
where it has been considered largely in terms of the need for and diffi culties 
with ‘exits’. The processes by which the need for subsidies becomes redun-
dant and the criteria and mechanisms for programme exits have received 
much less attention. Chapter 11 takes the concept of graduation as used in 
social protection and develops it for application in the specifi c context of the 
Malawi FISP. 
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 10 
 Targeting and access to input subsidies 
 10.1.  Introduction 
 Targeting, the process of directing subsidized inputs to particular areas and 
households within those areas, plays a critical role in the Farm Input Subsidy 
Programme and is a hotly debated issue in its implementation. It is widely 
recognized that effi ciency in targeting is one of the critical factors determin-
ing the effectiveness and impact of the subsidy programme. Targeting also 
has implications for private sector input market development, actual gradu-
ation, and sustainability of the programme. A well-targeted farm input sub-
sidy programme should lead to incremental use of inputs, by minimizing 
displacement of commercial sales and ensuring that only those that need 
production support access the inputs. The choice of the types of targeting 
systems which are intended to deliver particular targeting outcomes depends 
on the targeting objectives and the objectives of the programme. Targeting 
objectives are determined by technical and political programme objectives 
and by an understanding of how subsidized inputs are used in different con-
texts and of how this affects input productivity and its economic and social 
impacts. Targeting, therefore, is not only important, it is also controversial, 
highly political (at national and local levels), and diffi cult to implement in a 
large-scale programme due to challenges and costs in its implementation and 
supervision. 
 This chapter sets out a conceptual framework for examining alternative 
targeting objectives and methods and their applicability in different situa-
tions. It then uses this conceptual framework and household survey analysis 
to examine the practice and outcomes of targeting in different programme 
years. The next section of the chapter reviews the framework for targeting 
farm input subsidies at national, district, and benefi ciary levels. Section 10.3 
examines factors that determine access to subsidized farm inputs, focusing 
on household characteristics and programme processes. Section 10.4 analy-
ses how the subsidy programme affects or is affected by gender relations by 
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investigating intra-household allocation of farm inputs to different plots. 
Section 10.5 reviews the diffi culties experienced by the most vulnerable 
groups in accessing subsidized farm inputs. Section 10.6 offers proposals for 
alternative targeting options and their implications. Finally, Section 10.7 pro-
vides concluding remarks. 
 10.2.  Targeting at national, district, and benefi ciary levels 1 
 10.2.1.  Targeting objectives and impacts 
 Targeting objectives depend on the objective of the programme and  Table 10.1 
illustrates how these may be related. It neither attempts to provide a compre-
hensive description of the range of possible programme objectives nor to 
explore in any depth their implications for targeting and targeting objectives. 
It does, however, introduce key issues that need to be considered about the 
impacts of targeting and the critical outcomes that targeting systems attempt 
to infl uence. In the case of the farm input subsidy, programme objectives 
might include increasing national and household production and food 
security, national food self-suffi ciency, benefi ciary asset building and gradu-
ation, environmental protection improving welfare of vulnerable groups, 
and wider, inclusive social and economic growth. There is therefore a link 
between programme objectives and targeting objectives. 2 For instance, if the 
programme objective is to increase production then the targeting objective 
may be to maximize input use (minimizing displacement) and productivity 
of incremental input use. This would entail identifying geographical areas 
and household types with low displacement and high input use effi ciency, 
such as poorer, able-bodied, good farmers in productive maize growing areas. 
Similarly, if the programme objective is to improve benefi ciary household 
food self-suffi ciency, then the targeting objective would be to target food defi -
cit or insecure households in productive maize growing areas who are able to 
redeem coupons and use them effectively. 
 Different objectives may be related in two ways. First, some of them may 
be complementary (as, for example, between maximizing production, as dis-
cussed above, and promoting national food self-suffi ciency). A different set of 
relationships between targeting systems, outcomes, and impacts is presented 
in  Figure 10.1 . This distinguishes between the  targeting system (intentions, 
implementation, and costs),  targeting outcomes (the number of benefi ciaries, 
the inputs received per benefi ciary, the characteristics of benefi ciaries, and 
 1  This section draws heavily on Dorward and Chirwa (2012c). 
 2  Dorward and Chirwa (2012c) provide a detailed analysis of the links between programme 
objectives and targeting objectives and their implications. 
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 Table 10.1.  Programme objectives and their implications for targeting 
 Programme objective  Targeting objectives  Implications 
 A1  Increased production  Maximize incremental input 
use (minimize displace-
ment) & productivity of 
incremental input use. 
 Identify geographical areas 
& household types with 
low displacement (i.e. 
unable to buy unsub-
sidized inputs) & high 
input use effi ciency—
poorer, able-bodied, 
‘good’ farmers in produc-
tive maize growing areas? 
 A2  National food self-suffi ciency  As above  As above 
 B1  Benefi ciary household food 
self-suffi ciency 
 Target  food defi cit/insecure 
households in produc-
tive maize growing areas 
& able to redeem the 
coupons & use the inputs 
effectively—complemen-
tary safety nets to aid 
fi nancing of redemp-
tion by poor targeted 
households 
 Identify such households 
 B2  Benefi ciary household food 
security 
 As in B1 above  As in B1 above 
 B3  Social protection for 
benefi ciaries 
 Target  most vulnerable 
households in produc-
tive maize growing areas 
& able to redeem the 
coupons & use the inputs 
effectively 
 Identify such households. 
Complementary safety 
nets to aid fi nancing of 
redemption 
 C1  Wider household food 
security 
 As in (A1) above  Complementary policies 
to promote access to 
maize markets with low & 
stable prices in rural and 
urban areas, higher  ganyu 
wages, complementary 
social protection (e.g. 
cash transfers) 
 C2  Social protection for all 
households 
 As in (C1) above  As in (C1) above 
 C3  Poverty reducing broad-
based growth 
 Some combination of (B2), 
(B3), and (C1) above, 
 Combination depends on 
the relative effective-
ness/effi ciency of direct 
impacts for targeted 
benefi ciaries and indirect 
impacts benefi ting the 
poor more generally 
 D  Programme 
graduation—area 
 As in (C3)  Together with develop-
ment of (private sector) 
input supply systems and 
produce markets 
(continued)
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 Programme objective  Targeting objectives  Implications 
 E  Programme 
graduation—households 
 As in (B1)  May need mechanisms to 
help benefi ciary 
household saving/other 
forms of affording input 
access to enable 
graduation (ability to 
afford unsubsidized 
fertilizer) after speci-
fi ed time as programme 
benefi ciary 
 F  Environmental protection  As in (C3)  Together with focus 
on areas with fragile and 
sloping soils, particular 
land pressure and 
pressure on forested 
hills. Complementary 
promotion of integrated 
soil fertility management 







Wage & ma ezi
price effects
Beneficiary
welfare & asset 
gains
Non-beneficiary
welfare & asset 
gains
Area characteristics








Stakeholder   interests













 Figure 10.1.  Targeting variables and impacts 
 Source: Dorward and Chirwa (2012c). 
Table 10.1. (continued)
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the characteristics of areas in which the benefi ciaries reside and farm), and 
 targeting impacts . These interact with other policies and stakeholder interests. 
The targeting system infl uences targeting outcomes through broad targeting 
design and implementation (determining the quantities of subsidized inputs 
in different areas, and hence the characteristics of areas receiving inputs and 
of potentially eligible benefi ciaries) and through more detailed processes of 
coupon allocation, issue, and redemption (determining the quantities of sub-
sidized inputs received by different individuals and households, and hence 
the characteristics of benefi ciaries and the number of benefi ciaries receiving 
different input combinations). These of course interact, and intentions are 
commonly modifi ed or subverted to some extent during implementation. 
This needs to be explicitly allowed for in targeting system design. 
 The major targeting impacts are affected by four issues which determine 
the effectiveness of the Farm Input Subsidy Programme: displacement, input 
productivity, economy-wide effects, and graduation. First, displacement 
implies that a household’s access to subsidized inputs reduces their purchase 
of unsubsidized inputs such that the incremental input use from the subsidy 
is less than the amount of subsidized inputs. Displacement rates are affected 
by benefi ciary characteristics, with higher displacement rates among non-
poor benefi ciary households and lower rates among poor benefi ciary house-
holds (Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2010). It is also likely that displacement will be 
lower in areas where market access is poorer and inputs more expensive. 3 
This suggests that to reduce displacement, targeting should be aimed at areas 
with poorer market access and a greater proportion of poorer households, 
and, within those areas, at poorer households. Second, input productivity is 
affected by benefi ciaries’ farming skills and knowledge, crop management, 
application of complementary inputs, timely planting and weeding, and 
overall rates of input application, rainfall, and soils. This implies that tar-
geting should focus on areas with higher productivity potential in order to 
maximize production and on possibly less-poor households able and keen to 
make the most productive use of the inputs. Third, as argued in earlier chap-
ters, economy-wide effects of the subsidy result from falling maize prices and 
higher wages benefi ting the poor, and helping to achieve pro-poor growth 
objectives. Linkage or multiplier effects are also likely to be higher where 
poorer households are the main income benefi ciaries (as argued in Chapters 
7 and 9). The implications for targeting are that inputs should be focused on 
households yielding the greatest incremental production benefi ts (allowing 
for possible trade-offs between higher input productivity and displacement if 
 3  Ricker-Gilbert et  al. (2010) report that participation in unsubsidized fertilizer purchase is 
depressed with increasing distance to a paved road, whereas subsidized purchases increase with 
distance to a paved road. Chirwa et al. (2011b) do not fi nd any signifi cant effect of distance to 
paved road on participation in unsubsidized fertilizer purchases. 
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Strategic issues  
226
less poor households use inputs more productively), with concerns for wage 
and linkage impacts strengthening arguments for more targeting of poorer 
households and poorer areas Finally, graduation (described in Chapter 11 as 
the process by which programme benefi ts to poor, vulnerable households 
and areas enable them to improve assets and livelihood opportunities suf-
fi ciently to allow withdrawal of subsidies without reversion to their former 
vulnerable state) is affected by both benefi ciary and area characteristics. As 
discussed in Chapter 11, this is critical for promoting programme impacts 
and controlling costs and involves the crossing of thresholds by benefi ciary 
households and/or areas. Targeting for graduation should then try to con-
centrate resources on households and/or areas for whom graduation, the 
crossing of thresholds, is easiest. Determination of these is, however, very 
diffi cult. 
 It is clear that even if programme objectives have a relatively simple focus 
on national food self-suffi ciency, targeting has to address diffi cult trade-offs 
between higher displacement and possibly higher incremental input pro-
ductivity among less poor benefi ciaries. There are greater and more com-
plex trade-offs if wider pro-poor growth and graduation objectives are also 
important, requiring more attention to welfare gains, growth linkages, and 
complex graduation processes among poorer benefi ciaries. Determination of 
ideal targeting outcomes is also made more diffi cult if objectives are unclear, 
contested, highly variable, and changeable; if there is limited information 
about differences in displacement, input productivity, labour market, and 
graduation effects of different subsidy allocations to different households 
and areas; and if the effectiveness of subsidies in meeting different objectives 
for and through different households and areas is also affected by a range of 
other policies and by macro-economic and other changeable and uncertain 
conditions. 
 10.2.2.  Targeting criteria and processes 
 If targeting desirable outcomes are determined by programme and hence tar-
geting objectives then, as set out in  Figure 10.1 , targeting criteria and pro-
cesses should be designed and implemented to deliver these outcomes. It 
is helpful to consider targeting within the FISP in terms of six main stages: 
(1) setting of targeting criteria; (2) identifi cation of areas and benefi ciaries; 
(3) allocation of coupons; (4) distribution of coupons; (5) redistribution of 
coupons; and (6) redemption of coupons. Processes and criteria within each of 
these activities are formally defi ned by the government through the MoAFS, 
and  Table 10.2 presents the major changes in targeting processes and criteria 
in the FISP from 2005/6 to 2009/10 (systems and criteria have been largely 
unchanged from 2009/10 to 2011/12). 
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 Coupon targeting and distribution processes were described in Chapter 5, 
Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.3, and are not described here although they are sum-
marized in relevant rows of  Table 10.2 . Here we discuss in more detail the 
criteria used in benefi ciary selection. 
 Selection of benefi ciaries is supposed to be guided by targeting criteria. In 
2008/9, for example, benefi ciaries of FISP were supposed to meet any of the 
following criteria (Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, 2008) 
 •  resource poor Malawian that owns a piece of land; 
 •  guardians looking after physically challenged persons; 
 •  bona fi de resident of the village; 
 •  vulnerable, such as child-headed, female-headed, or orphan-headed and 
those infected or affected with HIV and AIDS. 
 However, there have been a number of changes in benefi ciary and area target-
ing criteria over the life of the programme. For instance, benefi ciary targeting 
criteria have shifted from an initial focus on ‘full time smallholder farmers 
unable to afford purchase of 1 or 2 unsubsidized fertilizer bags’ to put more 
emphasis on poor and vulnerable groups. There are, however, diffi culties in 
applying these criteria due to ambiguities and tensions among different tar-
geting criteria, diffi culties in establishing measures for these criteria, large 
numbers of deserving households, and lack of understanding and other inter-
ests among those conducting benefi ciary targeting. As a result even with the 
best will in the world there is considerable ambiguity and inconsistency in 
the application of these criteria, and this creates space for abuses by those 
able to control the selection processes. Political considerations further com-
plicate matters. As noted earlier in Chapter 5, from 2005/6 to 2008/9 the 
‘supplementary distribution’ of coupons provided major opportunities for 
politically motivated targeting of coupons to particular districts, to particular 
areas within them, and to particular individuals (Chinsinga, 2012b). 
 Overall, despite signifi cant changes to improve benefi ciary targeting 
 criteria and processes, there are continuing fundamental diffi culties with the 
lack of clarity in targeting criteria, the large numbers of households satisfying 
the criteria, and inconsistent application of criteria by local leaders and gov-
ernment staff. These diffi culties continue to limit the achievement of desired 
benefi ciary targeting outcomes. 
 10.2.3.  Targeting outcomes 
 Targeting outcomes can be considered in terms of area and benefi ciary tar-
geting. Changes in area allocation criteria have led to changes in coupon 
distribution between regions, with increases in coupons redeemed in the 
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southern region reducing regional differences in redemptions per household. 
 Figure 10.2 shows the changing pattern of maize fertilizer redemptions per 
household by region from 2005/6 to 2010/11. 
 It also appears that districts with higher potential (roughly categorized 
by altitude) were generally allocated proportionally more coupons than 
low potential areas in 2006/7, but differentiation fell between 2006/7 and 
2010/11. This normally involved reduced allocations across the board in dis-
tricts with lower allocations, not the complete exclusion of signifi cant areas. 
There is no evidence of greater proportionate allocation to districts with 
more poor households, although this increased substantially from 2006/7 to 
2010/11 due to the shift in relative coupon allocations to districts with larger 
numbers of poor people in the south. 
 This should have led to increased subsidy access by poor people and in 
turn reduced displacement, increased incremental production, and increased 
maize and labour market effects, benefi ting poor non-benefi ciaries as well 
as poor benefi ciaries (School of Oriental and African Studies et  al., 2008). 
These should, other things being equal, improve programme effectiveness 
and effi ciency in promoting national and household food production, self-
suffi ciency, food security, social protection, and poverty reduction for both 
benefi ciaries and non-benefi ciaries. 
 These effects may, however, be undermined if incremental production 




















North Centre South All
 Figure  10.2.  Maize fertilizer voucher redemption per household per region, 
2005/6–10/11 
 Source: Dorward and Chirwa (2012c). 
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 Table 10.3.  Fertilizer coupon receipts per household, 2006/7–10/11 (%) 
 Coupons/hh  Zero  1 coupon/hh  2 coupons/hh  >2 coupons/hh 
 Survey year  06/7  08/9  10/11  06/7  08/9  10/11  06/7  08/9  10/11  06/7  08/9  10/11 
 % all households by number of coupons/hh 
 North  38  28  24  18  14  23  37  50  47  7  8  5 
 Centre  45  35  31  28  39  38  21  20  24  5  3  1 
 South  49  33  11  28  37  47  19  24  35  4  3  2 
 National  46  33  21  27  36  41  22  25  31  5  3  2 
 % recipient households by number of coupons/hh 
 North  n/a  n/a  n/a  29  19  31  60  69  63  11  11  7 
 Centre  n/a  n/a  n/a  52  63  60  39  32  38  9  5  2 
 South  n/a  n/a  n/a  55  58  56  37  38  42  8  5  2 
 National  n/a  n/a  n/a  50  56  55  41  39  42  9  5  3 
 Source: School of Oriental and African Studies et al. (2008), Dorward et al. (2010b), and Chirwa et al. (2011b). 
previous benefi ciaries in the centre and north and if targeting of the poor is 
less effective in the south. Others, such as Mason and Ricker-Gilbert (2012), 
fi nd that district allocations of the subsidized inputs appear to be politically 
driven with households in districts that the ruling party won in the general 
election receiving on average 1.7 kg more subsidized seeds and 11.4 kg more 
subsidized fertilizers than districts lost by the ruling party. 
 The targeting outcomes at benefi ciary level reveal that a large proportion of 
households receive less than 2 fertilizer coupons, partly due to the redistribu-
tion process that takes place at village level. Survey data show that the pro-
portion of households who lose or gain coupons as a result of redistribution 
(those household with only one coupon) has increased steadily from 2006/7 
to 2010/11 (from 27% to 36% to 41% across 2006/7, 2008/9, and 2010/11) and 
that this is most common and has increased most in the south ( Table 10.3 ). 
However, apart from a lower occurrence of redistribution in the north, the 
changes appear to be largely the result of increases in the numbers of cou-
pons and proportions of households receiving coupons in the south—if we 
examine the households receiving one coupon as a percentage of households 
receiving any coupons (i.e. excluding households not receiving any coupons), 
then this remains relatively constant across the three survey seasons (around 
30% in the north, between 52% and 63% in the centre, and around 57% in 
the south). 
 Rural people’s perceptions of targeting outcomes also do not suggest 
strong targeting to benefi t poorer or more vulnerable households, nor any 
increases in such targeting.  Table 10.4 illustrates the characteristics of rural 
households by the number of coupons for subsidized fertilizer in 2008/9, 
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and the pattern is similar to other survey years in 2006/7 and 2010/11 as 
targeting continues to tend to favour the non-poor. Holden and Lunduka 
(2012a) fi nd similar evidence, suggesting that the non-poor are more likely 
to get subsidized fertilizers than the poor. The characteristics of households 
receiving one coupon show a persistent pattern of poverty across the sur-
vey years. Land and other asset holdings and subjective welfare indicators 
suggest that across different survey years these households are consistently 
nearly as poor or sometimes poorer than households not receiving any cou-
pons. The relative bias against the poor suggests that when redistribution 
occurs it is poorer households who share one of their coupons (less-poor 
households with two coupons tend to hold onto both), and poorer house-
holds who receive the redistributed coupons. This involves both exclusion 
errors (with exclusion of poor and vulnerable households who ought to 
be included according to the targeting criteria) and inclusion errors (with 
inclusion of less-poor households who ought to be excluded according to 
the targeting criteria). Holden and Lunduka (2012a) fi nd that targeting effi -
ciency in 2008/09 was poor and no better than under the targeted input pro-
gramme in 2000/1 and 2001/2. This poor targeting is attributed to leakages 
of coupons and fertilizers before they reach the households (as discussed in 
Chapter 5) and poor targeting criteria. However, the lack of clarity in target-
ing criteria and the large numbers of relatively less-poor people (who can 
nevertheless be considered to meet the targeting criteria) make it diffi cult 
to identify exclusion and inclusion errors with any precision or confi dence. 
 Table 10.4.  Mean attributes of households by number of fertilizer subsidy coupons 
received, 2008/9 
 Household characteristics  Fertilizer coupon numbers per household  Sig. 
 Zero  0.5 to 1  1.5 to 2  > 2  All 
 % female-headed 
households 
 26  31  24  17  27  * 
 Owned area in hectares  1.16  1.09  1.48  2.17  1.27  ** 
 Value durable assets (MK)  19,621  15,630  20,340  28,111  18,702  
 Value livestock assets (MK)  18,689  22,947  41,807  58,946  28,699  * 
 Subjective score of HH food 
consumption over past 
12 months (1 = inade-
quate, . . . ., 3 = more than 
adequate) 
 1.5  1.5  1.6  1.7  1.5  * 
 Subjective score on welfare 
(1 = very unsatisfi ed, . . . ., 
5 = very satisfi ed) 
 2.3  2.2  2.5  2.8  2.3  ** 
 Month after harvest that 
maize ran out 
 7.2  7.1  7.9  8.6  7.4  * 
 Notes: * = one or more differences signifi cant at p = 0.05, ** = one or more differences signifi cant at p = 0.01. 
 Source: Dorward et al. (2010b). 
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 4  This section draws heavily on Chirwa et al. (2011c). 
 10.3.  Factors determining access to subsidies 4 
 The lack of clarity of the targeting criteria implies that they are subject to dif-
ferent interpretations and application at local level. Several studies have used 
multivariate regression analysis to isolate factors that are important deter-
minants in access to subsidized farm inputs (School of Oriental and African 
Studies et al., 2008; Chirwa et al., 2011c), whether those that received cou-
pons were more likely to be food insecure (Holden and Lunduka, 2012a), 
and factors determining the quantity of subsidized fertilizers received by the 
household (Ricker-Gilbert, 2011). Access to inputs is measured in two ways: 
receipt of fertilizer coupons and amount of subsidized fertilizers acquired by 
the households. Chirwa et al. (2011c) use a probit regression approach for 
estimating the likelihood of accessing subsidized fertilizer coupons and a 
tobit approach for determining factors that affect access to quantities of sub-
sidized fertilizers. Several factors are used to explain access to subsidized farm 
inputs and these include household characteristics (composition, headship, 
and assets); farming characteristics (land size, degree of commercialization, 
cash crop cultivation, quantity of commercial fertilizers bought in previous 
season); poverty and vulnerability indicators (own poverty assessment, ade-
quacy in food consumption, participation in safety nets, receipt of subsidy 
in previous season); and other control variables (labour market participation, 
remittances, business enterprise, open forum allocation of coupons, and 
regional fi xed effects).  Table 10.5 shows results from probit and tobit regres-
sion estimates of factors affecting access to subsidized fertilizers. 
 Several insights emerge from the results on the determinants of access 
to subsidized fertilizers. First, with respect to the age of the household, the 
results show that age matters. As the age of household heads increases, such 
households are more likely to receive coupons and the probability of getting 
a coupon increases by 0.3%. However, households that are headed by the 
elderly (those above 64 years) are unlikely to receive fertilizer coupons and 
the probability falls by 13%. Similarly, with respect to quantity of fertilizers 
acquired, there is a positive relation between age and quantity acquired but 
the elderly are disadvantaged. This is contrary to the emphasis on special vul-
nerable groups that has been placed recently in the targeting criteria for the 
subsidy programme. It may also be the case that elderly-headed households 
are labour-constrained for farming activities and are least likely to use the 
coupons in farming. 
 Second, households with larger parcels of land under cultivation are more 
likely to receive subsidized fertilizer coupons and tend to acquire larger 
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quantities of subsidized fertilizers than those with smaller parcels. The posi-
tive relationship is expected since land is one of the main criteria for targeting 
smallholder farmers. Third, the household’s commercial orientation is also 
an important factor as refl ected in the signifi cance of tobacco cultivation and 
marketing of maize in both models. This implies that fertilizer coupons are 
likely to go to those smallholder farmers that earn cash incomes from agri-
culture with the potential to purchase fertilizers at prevailing market prices. 
This would not seem to support current targeting objectives and criteria, and 
 Table 10.5.  Estimates for factors affecting access to subsidized fertilizer in 2008/9 
 (1) 





 Kilograms of subsidized 
fertilizer acquired 
 TOBIT 
 Variables  dF/dx  z  coeff  z 
 Age of household head (years)  0.0032  3.11 a  0.227  1.69 c 
 Male headed household (0/1)*  0.0021  0.08  1.698  0.49 
 Elderly headed household (0/1)*  -0.1304  -2.75 a  -7.94  -1.49 
 Household size (adult equivalents)  -0.0113  -2.02 b  -1.172  -1.62 
 Value of assets in US dollars in 2008/9  0.00001  -0.67  -0.004  -1.09 
 Cultivated land in hectares in 2008/9  0.0561  3.03 a  12.947  4.75 a 
 Tobacco cultivation in 2008/9 (0/1)*  0.172  5.29 a  27.639  7.21 a 
 Maize marketing in 2008/9 (0/1)*  0.1126  3.22 a  15.934  3.32 a 
 Quantity of commercial fertilizers bought in 
2007/8 (kg) 
 -0.0002  -2.50 b  -0.014  -1.28 
 Own poverty assessment as poor in 2007/8 
(0/1)* 
 -0.0802  -2.19 b  -15.299  -2.62 a 
 Adequate food consumption in 2008/9 
(0/1)* 
 0.0202  0.91  6.501  2.23 b 
 Business enterprise in 2007/8 (0/1)*  0.0051  0.23  0.432  0.15 
 Labour market participation in 2007/8 (0/1)*  -0.0411  -1.83 c  -8.217  -2.85 a 
 Remittance receipts in 2007/8 (0/1)*  0.0747  3.26 a  5.049  1.63 
 Access to social safety nets in 2007/8 (0/1)*  0.0704  2.36 b  4.666  1.4 
 Access to fertilizer coupons in 2007/8 (0/1)*  0.446  20.21 a  56.109  15.82 a 
 Open forum allocations 2008/9 and poor 
2007/8 (0/1)* 
 0.0981  3.39 a  13.167  3.36 a 
 Central region (0/1)*  -0.0367  -1.11  -24.973  -6.35 a 
 Southern region (0/1)*  -0.0321  -0.99  -18.023  -4.51 a 
 Constant  -  -  3.257  0.35 
 Number of observations  1982  1982 
 Pseudo R-squared  0.2703  0.0406 
 Note: The dependent variable in (1) is a dummy variable for access to subsidized fertilizer coupons received in the 
2008/09 agricultural season. (*) dF/dx (marginal effect) is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. The 
dependent variable in (2) is the quantity of subsidized fertilizers acquired in the 2008/9 season. Robust t-statistics 
with superscripts a, b, and c denote signifi cance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Source: Chirwa et al. (2011c). 
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suggests the existence of inclusion errors. However, households that bought 
commercial fertilizers in the previous season are less likely to be allocated 
subsidized fertilizer coupons, and purchase of commercial fertilizers margin-
ally leads to reduction in the probability of accessing coupons. This suggests 
weak adherence to targeting that should reduce inclusion errors and ineffec-
tiveness and ineffi ciency from subsidizing farmers who would have bought 
commercial fertilizer without the subsidy. 
 Fourth, households that view themselves as poor are less likely to receive 
coupons. In the fi rst two years of the subsidy, evidence of households having 
cash for coupon redemption was a precondition in some communities for 
households to receive fertilizer coupons (Imperial College et al., 2007; School 
of Oriental and African Studies et al., 2008). With respect to the quantity of 
fertilizers acquired, the poor acquire 15.4 kg less subsidized fertilizers than 
the non-poor. School of Oriental and African Studies et al. (2008) fi nd similar 
results on the effect of own poverty evaluation on the likelihood of receiv-
ing fertilizers, with wealthier households receiving disproportionately more 
coupons than poor households. 
 Fifth, participation in the labour market either through salaried or  ganyu 
employment in the 2007/8 season reduced the household’s chances of receiv-
ing coupons in the 2008/9 season. Similarly, households that participated 
in the labour market tended to acquire 8.2 kg less subsidized fertilizers than 
non-participants in the labour market. This implies that those in salaried 
employment are excluded as they are capable of purchasing fertilizers at com-
mercial prices and those in  ganyu employment may be those households that 
do not have adequate land and use their labour resource in  ganyu labour. 
Nonetheless,  ganyu labour is also the second most important source of cash 
for redeeming the coupons (School of Oriental and African Studies et  al., 
2008; Dorward et al., 2010b). 
 Sixth, receipt of remittances in the previous season increases the prob-
ability of receiving coupons, but this does not signifi cantly determine the 
quantity of subsidized fertilizers acquired by the household. Remittances are, 
however, an important source of cash for redemption of coupons and for 
purchase of farm inputs in the rural areas. 
 Seventh, access to other social safety nets in the previous season is positively 
associated with receipt of fertilizer coupons in the 2008/09 season, although 
this does not signifi cantly affect the quantity of subsidized fertilizers acquired by 
the household. This implies that participants in other social safety nets are not 
excluded from the fertilizer vouchers, and if these safety nets are well targeted 
then they can provide additional information about the vulnerable households 
in the communities. Some of the social safety nets, such as cash-for-work or 
public works programmes, if well coordinated can ease the cash constraint of 
vulnerable households and enable them to redeem the fertilizer coupons. 
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 Eighth, households that benefi ted from the subsidy in the previous season 
were more likely to receive the coupons in the next season. The probability 
of receiving fertilizer coupons increases by 45% for households targeted in 
the previous season who tend to acquire 56.1 kg more subsidized fertilizers 
than those that did not receive coupons in the previous season. The target-
ing impacts of this of course depend upon the criteria used in targeting the 
previous year and on criteria used in excluding previous benefi ciaries and 
including new ones. 
 Finally, transparency and accountability in allocation of coupons at the 
local level tends to be benefi cial for the poor. Open forums for allocating 
coupons increase the chance of targeting those that ranked themselves in 
the poor category. Similarly, the poor tend to acquire 13.2 kg more of subsi-
dized fertilizer when open forums are used than when coupon allocations are 
discrete. This suggests that community-based targeting may be superior to 
allocations that involve traditional leaders and committees, as was previously 
the case in the 2005/6 up to the 2007/8 season. 
 Overall, the results suggest that although the poor are not excluded from 
access to subsidized farm inputs, where they receive subsidized inputs they 
tend to receive fewer coupons and acquire less subsidized fertilizers than the 
non-poor. Holden and Lunduka (2012a), Ricker-Gilbert (2011), and to a lesser 
extent Chibwana et al. (2010) reach similar conclusions, with households 
receiving coupons being better off in terms of their livestock endowments 
and assets than those that did not receive coupons. The re-distribution of 
coupons at the village level tends to increase such a bias in which the poor 
tend to share the coupons and the non-poor tend to retain the two expected 
fertilizer coupons. The results also suggest that the fortunes of the poor in 
accessing subsidized farm inputs, and hence improvements in targeting effi -
ciency, can increase with increased use of coupon allocation processes such 
as open forums. Hence, transparency and accountability of systems are criti-
cal in achieving development results and outcomes. School of Oriental and 
African Studies et al. (2008) and Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne (2011) also found 
that in 2006/7 and 2008/9 the receipt of subsidized fertilizer was also associ-
ated with the presence of a resident MP in the community. 
 10.4.  Gender and use of subsidized inputs 5 
 Gender issues in FISP are considered in the targeting criteria, where 
 female-headed households are categorized as part of vulnerable groups requir-
ing particular attention in the targeting of subsidized farm inputs. However, 
 5  This section draws heavily on Chirwa et al. (2011e). 
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it is also important to consider how gender relations are affected or affect the 
use of subsidized inputs at household level. 
 The analysis of gender issues in the FISP has mostly concentrated on dif-
ferential access between male-headed and female-headed households. 
 Figure 10.3 shows the proportion of male-headed and female-headed house-
holds receiving fertilizer coupons from survey data in the 2006/7, 2008/9, 
and 2010/11 agricultural seasons. A  relatively higher proportion of male-
headed households had access to subsidized fertilizer coupons as compared 
with female-headed households in 2006/7 and 2010/11, while in the 2008/9 
season a slightly higher proportion of female-headed households got subsi-
dized fertilizer coupons than male-headed households. 
 However, School of Oriental and African Studies et al. (2008) also fi nd that 
male-headed recipient households tended to receive more maize fertilizer 
coupons than female-headed recipient households, with male-headed house-
holds receiving on average 1.55 coupons compared to 1.45 coupons received 
by female-headed households in 2008/9 (with 1.7 compared to 1.3 coupons 
received per households in 2006/7). Holden and Lunduka (2012a), in a study 
of six districts in central and southern Malawi, fi nd that 11% of female-
headed households received the full package of 2 bags compared to 29% of 
male-headed households. With respect to communities’ perceptions on who 
























 Figure 10.3 .  Proportion of male- and female-headed households receiving ferti-
lizer coupons, 2006/7–10/11 (%) 
Source: Computed from School of Oriental and African Studies et al. (2008), Dorward et al. 
(2010b), and Dorward and Chirwa (2011a). 
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male-headed and female-headed households across regions (Dorward et al., 
2010b). 
 Chirwa et al. (2011e) exploit detailed plot level information on decision-
making on farming activities by specifi c members of the household to under-
stand intra-household decision making in allocation of subsidized fertilizers 
on male- and female-controlled plots. Using probit regression models, the 
gender of the household member who controls input and farming decisions 
on the plot is the main variable of interest. The control variables in the model 
include farmer characteristics and other household characteristics such as plot 
size, age of household head, headship of household, cultivation of tobacco, 
sale of maize, access to safely nets, previous access to subsidized fertilizers, 
and district dummies. Female membership was interacted with household 
receipt of fertilizer coupons, male-headed membership, and with household 
with commercial fertilizers.  Table 10.6 presents results of probit regressions 
showing: (1) intra-household use in households with any fertilizers (regard-
less of the source of the fertilizers); (2) intra-household use in households 
with subsidized fertilizer (with or without additional unsubsidized fertilizer); 
and (3) intra-household use in households that only used subsidized fertiliz-
ers (with no purchases of unsubsidized fertilizer). 
 First, the results show that signifi cant gender differentials exist in the allo-
cation of fertilizers to plots within the households, with female-controlled 
plots less likely to have fertilizer applications compared to male-controlled 
plots. This is only in the case where we pool the sample of subsidized and 
unsubsidized households. The probability of applying fertilizer falls by 0.28 
points for female-controlled plots, and the marginal effect is statistically sig-
nifi cant at the 1% level. These results are similar to the fi ndings in other 
studies in African agriculture such as Doss and Morris (2001) and Chirwa 
(2005), although in both those studies the coeffi cients of female control 
were statistically insignifi cant. However, model (1) results also show that 
female-controlled plots in coupon-recipient households were more likely to 
be fertilized as compared with male-controlled plots and female-controlled 
plots in female-headed households. Access to subsidized fertilizers improves 
the odds for female-controlled plots, with the probability of fertilizer appli-
cation increasing by 35% compared to female-controlled plots in male-
headed and non-coupon recipient households. This implies that for a female 
household member in a coupon recipient household the mean increase in 
the probability of applying fertilizer on the plot is 0.07 points compared to 
a decrease of 0.28 points for a female member in a household without sub-
sidized fertilizers. 
 Female-controlled plots in male-headed households were less likely to 
be fertilized than either male-controlled plots or female-controlled plots 
in female-headed households. This is consistent with observations in focus 
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 Table 10.6.  Marginal effects from probit estimates of intra-household fertilizer use 
 Dependent variable: Plot 
controlled by member in 
household was fertilized 
(0/1) 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 All households  Use any fertilizer  Only use subsidy 
fertilizer 
 dF/dx  t-ratio  dF/dx  t-ratio  dF/dx  t-ratio 
 Female household member *  -0.2844  -3.50 a  0.078  1.3  0.0401  0.42 
 Female member in coupon 
recipient household * 
 0.3502  13.09 a  -  -  -  - 
 Female member in male-
headed household * 
 -0.2848  -3.32 a  -0.1581  -2.03 b  -0.073  -0.65 
 Female in household with 
commercial fertilizer * 
 0.2154  7.30 a  0.0729  2.66 a  -  - 
 Plot size in hectares  0.4308  12.59 a  0.4664  11.99 a  0.4502  8.42 a 
 Male-headed households *  0.1223  1.65 c  0.0535  0.84  0.012  0.12 
 Age of household head  -0.0008  -1.45  -0.0003  -0.64  0  -0.07 
 Number of adult equivalents  -0.0043  -1.12  -0.0085  -2.37 b  -0.0086  -1.66 c 
 Log of household land size in 
hectares 
 -0.2389  -15.05 a  -0.1672  -13.34 a  -0.2527  -11.52 a 
 Household that grew tobacco *  0.1368  6.88 a  0.1067  6.19 a  0.0755  2.51 b 
 Household that sold maize *  0.1255  4.90 a  0.0817  3.59 a  0.0937  2.82 a 
 Household had commercial 
fertilizers in 2007 * 
 0.151  8.59 a  0.0776  4.58 a  0.0101  0.31 
 Household own assessment as 
poor in 2007 * 
 -0.063  -2.99 a  -0.0447  -2.29 b  0.0069  0.22 
 Household had access to 
safety nets 2007 * 
 0.0109  0.49  0.0017  0.08  0.0276  0.96 
 Household had subsidized 
fertilizers 2007 * 
 0.1698  9.44 a  0.057  3.05 a  0.0389  1.43 
 District fi xed effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 Number of observations  4727  3551  1944 
 Pseudo R-squared  0.2281  0.1826  0.2003 
 Notes : (*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Superscripts a, b, and c denote statistically 
signifi cant at 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Source: Chirwa et al. (2011e). 
group discussions in Chirwa et  al. (2011c) that typically, in male-headed 
households, resources are likely to be controlled by husbands. However, this 
is only the case when commercial fertilizers are also available to the house-
hold (models (1) and (2)) but it is not the case when households have access 
to subsidized fertilizers only (model 3). The results show that being a female 
member controlling a plot in a male-headed household reduces the probabil-
ity of applying fertilizers by 28% in the model of subsidized and unsubsidized 
households (model (1)), but this bias reduces to 15% in subsidized house-
holds (model (2)). Hence, the bias against female-controlled plots in male-
headed households is reduced as compared with the case when commercial 
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fertilizer is also available at the household level. In model (1), the results 
imply that the mean decrease in the probability of a female-controlled plot 
being fertilized in a coupon-recipient and male-headed household is 0.21 
points. In model (2), the decrease in the mean probability of applying fer-
tilizer on female-controlled plots in male-headed households is only 0.08 
compared to a decrease of 0.57 points for the same situation in model (1). 
 Second, the results also show that access to commercial fertilizers in the 
2008/09 season also favoured women-controlled plots in the application of 
fertilizers and raised the probability of application of fertilizers on the plot by 
21% compared to male-controlled or female-controlled plots in households 
without commercial fertilizers. This is lower than the increase in the prob-
ability of 32% with household receipt of subsidized fertilizer. Third, larger 
plots are more likely to be fertilized than smaller plots. However, plots that 
belong to households with larger land holdings tend to be less fertilized. This 
may be due to the fact that most rural households are cash constrained to 
afford fertilizers and tend to be very selective on the plots that they apply 
fertilizers to. 
 Fourth, commercialization of agricultural activities, using indicators such 
as cultivation of tobacco and sale of maize, and acquisition of commercial 
fertilizer in the previous season by households is positively related to the 
probability of the plots being fertilized. This commercialization enables 
households to invest in fertilizers across all plots. Fifth, self-reported poverty 
in the 2007/8 season may be one of the constraints to the 2008/9 application 
of fertilizers by households, with plots that belong to poor households less 
likely to be fertilized regardless of availability of commercial or subsidized 
fertilizers. Finally, households’ access to subsidized fertilizers in the previous 
season increases the probability of the plot being fertilized, demonstrating 
the positive cumulative effects of fertilizer adoption or continued access to 
subsidized fertilizers. However, this relationship is only statistically signifi -
cant at the 1% level in models where commercial fertilizers are also available 
among households but not signifi cant among purely subsidized households. 
 Overall, although female-headed households are less likely to receive cou-
pons, potentially joint decision making prevails when it comes to use of 
subsidized fertilizers within the household, hence reducing the bias against 
female-controlled plots. This may be due to the fact that most of the subsi-
dized fertilizer is meant for the cultivation of maize for subsistence needs, in 
which case women may have a stronger countervailing power as providers of 
basic food needs at the household level. It is therefore important that analy-
sis of gender issues in the subsidy programme goes beyond examination of 
differential access of subsidized fertilizers among male-headed and female-
headed households, and also includes examination of intra-household use 
of subsidized fertilizers. The study implies that social transfers that focus on 
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provision of basic services, such as input subsidy for household food security, 
are likely to be effi ciently used even if they are targeted at the household level 
instead of at individual household members. 
 10.5.  Challenges of access for the most vulnerable groups 6 
 As noted in Section 10.2 above the targeting criteria in the FISP have recently 
emphasized the need to reach out to the most vulnerable groups, such as 
resource poor female-headed households, resource poor elderly-headed 
households, resource poor orphan-headed households, HIV-positive resource 
poor household heads, resource poor physically-challenged households, and 
resource poor households looking after elderly and/or physically challenged 
persons (Farmers Union of Malawi, 2011). These vulnerable groups may expe-
rience more challenges in accessing coupons and acquiring subsidized ferti-
lizers due to the processes and problems experienced in the implementation 
of the programme. Mvula et al. (2011) provide a detailed analysis of some of 
the challenges that the most vulnerable households experience in accessing 
subsidized farm inputs, and we highlight some of the major issues in this sec-
tion. The problems of access to farm inputs relate to access to coupons and 
access to subsidized fertilizers. 
 With respect to access to subsidized fertilizer coupons, several problems 
were documented, which include shortage of coupons earmarked for the vil-
lages, missing of benefi ciary names that were identifi ed and verifi ed, sharing 
of coupons, alleged sales of coupons by government agents and traditional 
leaders, and the process of benefi ciary identifi cation and coupon distribu-
tion. These fi ndings are consistent with assessment by Farmers Union of 
Malawi (2011) where they fi nd that among the 30% of respondents reporting 
problems of coupon distribution, the main problems were: not enough cou-
pons (34% of respondents reporting problems, 10% of all respondents); not 
receiving coupons though eligible (23% of respondents reporting problems, 
7% of all respondents) and being forced to share a coupon with those who did 
not register (17% of respondents reporting problems, 5% of all respondents). 
Although these problems tend to be common to all benefi ciaries, they tend 
to be worse for vulnerable groups. For instance, limited numbers of coupons 
available for villages against the number of resource poor households and vul-
nerable households tends to result in the most vulnerable households being 
left out. Similarly, the widespread reported practice of sharing of coupons on 
average favours less-poor benefi ciaries (in that poor benefi ciaries share their 
coupons but less-poor benefi ciaries do not) and makes vulnerable groups 
 6  This section relies heavily on Mvula et al. (2011). 
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benefi t less than the offi cial entitlement. The poor tend to share among the 
poor or share with the less-poor not in the benefi ciary list. Less-poor benefi -
ciaries tend to be less affected by the village level politics of sharing and usu-
ally retain their normal share of the coupons. In addition, the requirements 
for identifi cation documents excluded some of the most vulnerable groups 
from access to the subsidy. 7 
 Even with a coupon there are severe challenges in the process of acquiring 
subsidized fertilizers, with major implications for the most vulnerable groups. 
These challenges, discussed in Chapter 5, include long queues at the coupon 
redemption points, payment of ‘tips’, stock-outs, presence of thieves at the 
markets, distances to markets, lack of money to redeem coupons, and rudeness 
of some input selling clerks. First, long queues at input suppliers (requiring 
some households to spend days and nights buying inputs) and long distances 
to selling points are a major challenge for the most vulnerable groups such 
as female-headed, physically challenged, and elderly-headed households. 
Second, frequent stock-outs at markets lead to scrambles for farm inputs when-
ever they are in stock and this disadvantages female-headed households and 
the elderly, particularly where there is no provision for special queues for vul-
nerable groups. Third, where ‘tips’ or bribes are demanded by sellers of subsi-
dized inputs these are not affordable for the most vulnerable groups. Finally, 
incidents of theft, diffi culties in transportation of inputs, and lack of money to 
buy inputs are problems that particularly affect women and the elderly. 
 Overall, the problems in accessing coupons for most vulnerable households 
were not widespread, while the diffi culties in redeeming coupons were most 
severe for most households, particularly the most vulnerable groups. Access 
to subsidized inputs was more problematic for vulnerable groups due to long 
queues, frequent stock-outs, long distances to markets, and payment of tips 
and bribes. These raise the transaction costs and opportunity costs which 
most vulnerable groups could not afford. The most vulnerable households 
had particular challenges in fi nding money to redeem the coupons let alone 
payment of tips to purchase subsidized inputs. 
 10.6.  Options for targeting 8 
 Given the diffi culties noted in previous sections with targeting processes, 
criteria, and outcomes, we now consider three possible alternative targeting 
 7  As noted in chapter, voter ID cards have been required for benefi ciary registration from the 
2009/10 season. This proved particularly diffi cult for child-headed and elderly-headed households 
that were either under voting age or too old to participate in the general elections. 
 8  This section draws on Dorward and Chirwa (2012c). 
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approaches. We consider fi rst a universal but smaller per household subsidy 
providing 50 kg of fertilizer to all households (termed the ‘universal pro-
gramme’), second ‘tighter pro-poor targeting’ where the same total volume 
of subsidized fertilizer is targeted with a 100 kg ration to the poorest house-
holds, and third ‘pro-poor mixed targeting’ where the same proportion of 
households get 100 kg and 50 kg of fertilizer as in 2010/11, but these are bet-
ter targeted with the poorest households getting 100 kg, less poor households 
getting 50 kg, and the least poor getting none. 9 
 The fi rst approach, universal provision of 50  kg fertilizer, is effectively 
legitimizing and extending the widespread practice of redistribution. It has a 
number of advantages: 
 •  Elimination of targeting costs and diffi culties. 
 •  Increased transparency and accountability, as all households know their 
entitlement. 
 •  High correspondence between planned targeting outcomes and those 
achieved. 
 •  Increased effectiveness in targeting the poor as compared with 2010/11, 
as all the poor would receive some subsidized inputs. 
 •  Despite some increase in the number of less-poor households receiving 
fertilizers, the total quantity of fertilizer going to less-poor households 
would be similar to 2010/11 as households would receive only 50 kg per 
household. This may be seen as offering compensation for lower prices 
for less poor farmers’ surplus maize. 
 •  Reduced demands on coupon allocation and distribution processes may 
allow earlier coupon distribution and input purchase and use, greater 
farmer confi dence in subsidy receipt, and also release staff time for more 
extension support to farmers. 
 There are, however, also diffi culties with this approach. First, it may appear 
to be a reversion to the former ‘starter pack’ approach, although there are 
substantial differences with the larger scale of the subsidized ‘pack’ and in 
its objectives, and this may make it politically unacceptable. Second, there 
are concerns that incremental production from a smaller ration of subsidized 
inputs for each household may not provide poor households with enough 
productivity gains to ‘lift’ them over productivity and asset thresholds needed 
for graduation. Finally, graduation could only be achieved if the whole pro-
gramme were withdrawn from all benefi ciaries in an area at the same time. 
 9  For simple exposition, and also refl ecting the high economic and social value of fertilizer, we 
frame these options in terms of fertilizer allocations. In practice matching allocations of maize 
and legume seed should be considered with fertilizer allocations. 
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Progressive benefi ciary graduation and targeting would undermine the core 
benefi ts of universal targeting. However graduation might be pursued by pro-
gressive lowering of the subsidy with increasing benefi ciary redemption pay-
ments, with cash transfers to households not able to graduate. 
 The second approach, tight pro-poor targeting of 100 kg fertilizer, is broadly 
the approach that is supposed to be used currently. If implemented effectively 
this would provide the lowest displacement and the highest pro-poor growth 
potential. There are, however, serious diffi culties in applying this method, as 
discussed in this chapter, and targeting outcomes do not match aspirations. 
Improving the implementation of this approach must address current diffi -
culties in both setting and applying measurable targeting criteria. 
 The third approach, mixed pro-poor targeting of 50 and 100 kg fertilizer, 
is closest to the approach that is actually currently used, where there is redis-
tribution of subsidy coupons. However, whereas in the current system most 
redistribution seems to involve sharing by poor recipients with poor non-
recipients, a more pro-poor approach would prioritize poorer recipients keep-
ing their 100  kg fertilizer allocation, while less-poor recipients would get 
50 kg each, and the least poor would get nothing. While this lacks the strong 
transparency and accountability of the universal approach, it may provide 
better targeting and have wider community and political support than the 
tight pro-poor approach. In some ways this might allow easier implementa-
tion—but it will still run up against the interests of powerful people who 
may be excluded from subsidy benefi ts, and will still face challenges in set-
ting and applying criteria to identify target households. These are likely to 
make it more diffi cult to implement. It might also allow a natural benefi ciary 
graduation system with households being shifted from a 100 to 50 kg to zero 
fertilizer allocation. 
 Nonetheless, all systems face major practical challenges in determining 
the number of eligible farm families in each area. Attention is also needed 
to processes of coupon redemption, as these can be highly exclusionary to 
poorer and more vulnerable people. Options include distribution centre 
committees, more private sector involvement in subsidized input sales to 
promote competition (as discussed in Chapter 8), more effective market 
monitoring and auditing, and better integration with cash transfers for 
the productive poor who cannot afford redemption payments. In addition, 
the development of methods for better identifying benefi ciaries is a key 
requirement for improving targeting, unless it is accepted that diffi culties 
with this (together with power, politics, and problems of lack of account-
ability and transparency) make the universal approach the best practical 
approach. 
 Two main approaches may be considered for improving targeting: proxy 
wealth/income measures, and community targeting. Both these methods 
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 •  require formal identifi cation of targeting criteria and systems that, when 
implemented, provide improvements that justify their costs; 
 •  pay insuffi cient attention to diffi culties associated with the large 
number of households clustered around the poverty cut-off point, and 
hence local concerns about ‘fairness’; and 
 •  need to overcome interests of less-poor groups, with enforcement 
of more transparent and accountable allocation and distribution 
processes–with open and inclusive processes and/or published recipients 
lists and allocation criteria. 
 There is potential merit in the use of proxy poverty indicators, for exam-
ple, but also major costs and challenges in gathering and using reliable data. 
Houssou and Zeller (2011) propose an indicator-based system for setting tar-
geting criteria for FISP and argue that this approach would be more target- 
and cost-effective than the 2006/7 system in improving welfare transfers to 
the poor. 10 This approach presupposes (a) that the integrated household sur-
vey data and its estimation of income poverty (with its various challenges) 11 
provide more valid poverty measures than more subjective local defi nitions 
which may take account of wider defi nitions of poverty, 12 (b) that poverty 
targeting is the most effective way of meeting the range of programme objec-
tives discussed earlier in Section 10.2, (c) does not recognize the complex 
interactions between area and benefi ciary targeting that are important in the 
practicalities of targeting, and (d) does not pay suffi cient attention to diffi -
culties noted earlier with large numbers of households clustered around the 
poverty cut-off point, and hence local concerns about ‘fairness’. 13 
 Nevertheless, given the cost implications, it may be useful to consider and 
develop alternative ways of implementing this (for example, criteria might 
be developed by a process of participatory consultations with rural people, 
and a small number of low cost indicators combined into a points system 
for household prioritization in subsidy allocation). Community targeting 
with open meetings is the approach supposed to be used for identifying FISP 
 10  Ten indicators are proposed (household size, radio ownership, cement fl oor of house, bicycle 
ownership, use of electricity for lighting, panga ownership, educational qualifi cation in house-
hold, use of bed net, rubbish disposal facility, and household head literacy) and also area based 
factors based on Agricultural Development Divisions. 
 11  See, for example, Chirwa et al. (2012) on poverty estimation diffi culties as a result of 
seasonality. 
 12  See for example, World Bank (2000) for discussion of issues such as vulnerability, power, voice, 
assets, wealth, and well-being as poverty concepts alongside income or expenditure measures. 
 13  Houssou and Zeller (2011) do consider different patterns of distribution, including a ‘fair 
targeting’ approach that does not lift anyone above the poverty line—but this involves reducing 
subsidy receipts for households just below the poverty line to ensure that it does not lift them over 
it—a very challenging process, both politically and administratively. 
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benefi ciaries. There is widespread concern that traditional leaders, govern-
ment offi cials, and others are appropriating coupons and/or directing them 
to themselves and/or friends and relatives. This perception is promoted by 
lack of transparency in allocation, misunderstanding of coupon allocations 
and targeting processes, and widespread belief that there should be more cou-
pons. It may be diffi cult for targeting to be perceived to be fair if less than 
around 80% of households are targeted, and community targeting needs 
fairly costly training and facilitation with checks and balances to stop elite 
capture. 
 10.7.  Summary 
 Targeting is one of the critical elements of the Farm Input Subsidy Programme 
with implications for displacement, productivity, economy-wide effects, and 
graduation. It is also important that targeting criteria and processes are con-
sistent with the objectives of the programme in order to maximize the impact. 
Different programme objectives may entail different targeting objectives 
with implications for targeting criteria and processes. Hence, there should 
be a strong link between programme objectives, targeting systems, target-
ing outcomes, and programme impacts. These links have not been clearly 
articulated in the Farm Input Subsidy Programme, although targeting occurs 
at both area and benefi ciary levels. While changes have occurred over the 
life time of the programme, the alignment between programme objectives 
and targeting objectives and outcomes, and their interaction with political 
objectives and processes, remains an important issue in the implementation 
of the programme. 
 Changes in area targeting have resulted in more equitable distribution of 
input vouchers per household with per household regional differences nar-
rowing over time. There has been considerable scope for and some evidence 
of political considerations and processes affecting area distributions, particu-
larly in the earlier years of the programme. Major issues remain on how allo-
cations to areas, villages, and perhaps most importantly to benefi ciaries are 
determined. No major changes have taken place in the targeting criteria and 
processes of targeting at benefi ciary level, apart from increasing emphasis on 
vulnerable households and the promotion of open forums at community 
level in the identifi cation of benefi ciaries and allocation and distribution of 
coupons. 
 The broadness of the benefi ciary targeting criteria, covering a large 
 proportion of poor households, has allowed wide variations in the applica-
tion of the criteria at community level. This has resulted in biases in receipt 
of subsidized farm input coupons against the poor, with the non-poor more 
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likely to get coupons and then likely to get more coupons than the poor. 
The wide and increasing practice of redistribution and ‘sharing’ of coupons 
reduces the bias where by the poor are less likely to receive coupons. On the 
other hand, however, it increases the likelihood of poorer recipients receiving 
fewer coupons than less-poor recipients. However, open forum meetings for 
allocation of coupons appear to increase the likelihood of the poor receiv-
ing fertilizer coupons and acquiring more than the poor in areas where the 
coupon allocation was not made in an open manner. There are also gender 
biases in receipt of coupons and access to subsidized fertilizers, with female-
headed households receiving fewer coupons than male-headed households. 
However, this gender bias is not evident in the allocation of subsidized fertiliz-
ers on plots controlled by different members of the households. The analysis 
of intra-household use of inputs shows that female-controlled plots are less 
likely to have fertilizer applied when commercial fertilizer is available in the 
household, but this bias vanishes among households that acquire subsidized 
fertilizer inputs. Overall, however, the extent of elite capture does not appear 
to be as great as that reported by Pan and Christiaensen (2012) in Tanzania. 
 Options for targeting have been considered for improving patterns of 
coupon distribution among poorer and less-poor households, with discus-
sion of alternative targeting criteria and processes to achieve these  patterns. 
Regressive patterns appear to be undesirable due to associated high displace-
ment (leading to low incremental production even if there is higher input 
productivity) and low linkage effects. Three alternative approaches are con-
sidered—‘tight pro-poor targeting’, ‘mixed pro-poor targeting’, and universal 
(but more tightly rationed) access. Although ‘tight pro-poor targeting’ is the 
current desired outcome, diffi culties in setting criteria and with distribution 
and redistribution processes lead to outcomes that are very different from 
those that are desired. In any case, except for the universal approach, tar-
geting requires effi cient and cost-effective ways of improving the criteria for 
identifying  benefi ciary households. 
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 1  Much of this chapter draws heavily on Chirwa et al. (2011a). 
 11 
 Graduation 1 
 11.1.  Introduction 
 Graduation has emerged as an issue in debates about the future of the farm 
subsidy programme at the interface of a number of issues. The high costs of 
the programme pose serious questions about its fi scal and macro-economic 
sustainability and suggest a need for a process that goes beyond simple exits 
(as discussed in Chapter 2) to allow a phased scaling down that builds on 
(rather than undermines) the growth, food security, and market development 
impacts of the programme. 
 11.2.  Conceptualizing graduation 
 Graduation is a concept that is found in discussions about the impact, 
 dependency, exit, and sustainability of social protection programmes, 
addressing questions about the extent to which the fi nancial transfers to 
benefi ciaries should and can enable them to exit from the programme of 
assistance and hence reduce the scope and costs of social protection over 
time. Governments with tight budgets may be more willing to support social 
protection if access is time-bound or if there are clear prospects of a higher 
proportion of the target benefi ciaries voluntarily exiting over time. The issue 
of graduation from social protection is thus closely linked to the develop-
mental or transformative role of social protection, and also to the need to 
avoid ‘dependency  syndrome’ among benefi ciaries (Devereux, 2010). 
 These issues are highly relevant to the FISP, and Chirwa et  al. (2011a) 
 discuss the application to the FISP of the conceptualization of graduation in 
social protection. A review of this conceptualization leads to the conclusion 
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that graduation is viewed as the achievement of ‘the potential to embark on 
sustainable, independent livelihoods without social protection’ (p. 3). This 
requires further ‘unpacking’, leading them to defi ne  potential graduation as 
the use of transfers to achieve a shift in livelihood activities with ‘stepping 
up’ (intensifi cation and increased productivity in existing activities) and 
‘stepping out’ (into new more productive activities), and reduced emphasis 
on ‘hanging in’ (avoidance of ‘falling down and out’) (Dorward et al., 2006, 
2009a). These changes involve investing some of the transfers into produc-
tive activities and the building of assets, capabilities, or livelihood changes 
that allow benefi ciaries to embark on sustainable, independent livelihoods 
without transfers.  Actual graduation is then the removal of access to a trans-
fer programme that does not leave current benefi ciaries supported by the 
programme unable to pursue sustainable independent livelihoods. The dis-
tinction between actual and potential graduation is explored in  Figure 11.1 , 
where a movement from left to right (from A or C to B or D) represents the 
termination either of access to programme benefi t or of a programme itself, 
a movement from A to C downwards represents potential graduation, and a 
movement from A to D represents actual graduation. 
 These concepts can be applied at different scales of analysis (individual, 
household, area, or programme), where they raise questions about the 
relationships between graduation at different scales. These are particularly 
important when considering a large-scale programme with both household 
and economy-wide effects. 
 The more obvious relationship is dependence of graduation at wider scales 

























 Figure 11.1.  Termination, potential graduation, and actual graduation 
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programme graduation on achievement of some minimum scale of (poten-
tial) area graduation, and of area graduation on achievement of some mini-
mum scale of (potential) household graduation). This raises questions about 
the criteria used at different scales, in both the defi nition of (potential) 
household graduation and the required number or percentage of households 
graduating (or conversely the maximum number or percentage of ungradu-
ated households) for area and/or programme graduation. 
 However, Chirwa et al. (2011a) also note that lower units’ potential gradu-
ation may sometimes depend upon the continuation of transfers (rather than 
graduation or termination) at a wider scale of analysis. The most likely causes 
of this in a social protection programme will be where there are signifi cant 
insurance or indirect effects from transfers. The fi rst case may arise when 
the presence of a programme offering transfers gives households insurance 
against livelihood shocks and stresses and this allows them to take ‘stepping 
up’ and ‘stepping out’ investment risks even when they are not direct ben-
efi ciaries of a programme. Their pursuit of (and hence graduation to) inde-
pendent sustainable livelihoods may then be dependent on the presence of 
a transfer programme rather than on their direct receipt of benefi ts from it. 
Households that seem to have graduated from the programme may in fact 
still be dependent on its existence, though not, under normal circumstances, 
on their direct engagement with it. An example of such indirect effects is 
where there are signifi cant multiplier effects from households in receipt of 
transfers, for example where these lead to greater demand by recipient house-
holds of particular services whose supply provides income for other house-
holds. Where this is the case then withdrawal of transfers from a signifi cant 
number of households in an area may lead to a reduction in these multi-
pliers and undermine the livelihoods of households who appeared to have 
achieved independent sustainable livelihoods. 
 Consideration of these multi-scale relationships allows the defi nition of an 
apparently simple core requirement for graduation: that removal of access to 
a programme (termination) does not leave benefi ciaries currently supported 
by the programme unable to pursue sustainable independent livelihoods. 
 This requirement is only apparently simple because there are major practi-
cal and theoretical challenges in defi ning and measuring criteria for deter-
mining the point at which benefi ciaries can be weaned off a transfer with 
some minimum acceptable standard of welfare or probability of achieving 
a stable or upward welfare or livelihood trajectory. Devereux (2010) argues 
that there are diffi culties in identifying both indicators or variables and 
critical attainments of welfare and self-reliance, such as threshold values of 
incomes and assets that will not result in graduating households reverting 
back to situations of vulnerability. These thresholds may involve some mini-
mum income line, the accumulation of control and access to assets (physical, 
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social, human, fi nancial, and natural capital) that are necessary for sustain-
able livelihoods that can cope with shocks and stresses. These however, are 
likely to vary with household structure (for example, gender composition 
and dependency ratios), with socio-economic and cultural context, with live-
lihood strategies and opportunities, and with complex interactions between 
the different forms of capital listed above. Critically, graduation measures 
need to be concerned with the achievement of conditions (inputs and pro-
cesses) necessary for the pursuit of sustainable independent livelihoods rather 
than the achievement of welfare outcomes which may tell us little about live-
lihoods, independence, or sustainability. 
 A further complexity arises with the conceptualization of poverty traps 
operating at wider scales of analysis in local economies (Rodenstein-Rodan, 
1943; Dorward et al., 2005a, b, 2009). This is linked to different scales or 
units of graduation, as discussed above, and demands consideration of 
variables and thresholds for determining area and programme graduation. 
Determination of potential graduation for areas and programmes is likely 
to involve some threshold number or percentage of benefi ciary graduation 
at the area or programme level, and consideration of volumes of livelihood 
activities at these wider scales. 
 A fi nal comment is needed on the importance of social and political infl u-
ences on processes and decisions in graduation from transfers. Termination 
decisions are highly political, in terms of local, national, and bureaucratic 
policies concerned with, respectively, questions about which people and 
groups of people benefi t from transfers; which areas, constituencies, and eth-
nic groups benefi t; and how limited resources are allocated between agencies 
and sectors. 
 11.3.  Graduation pathways for the Malawi Farm Input 
Subsidy Programme 
 We now consider a defi nition of graduation specifi c to the FISP in order to 
identify possible processes, pathways, and criteria for graduation and design 
and implementation features that could promote graduation within the pro-
gramme. This brings together insights from more general discussion of gradu-
ation processes (in Section 11.2) with particular understanding of the role of 
FISP in promoting livelihood development and economic growth, as set out 
in Chapters 2, 4, 6, and 7. 
 Our discussion of graduation processes in transfer programmes in Section 
11.2 emphasized the processes of stepping up and stepping out; multi-scale 
aspects of interactions between graduation and termination; and alternative 
income, livelihood activity, and asset variables and thresholds in defi ning 
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potential graduation. Other issues discussed by Chirwa et al. (2011a) include 
the importance of a range of different conditions facilitating (or imped-
ing) graduation (including the depth and incidence of poverty among ben-
efi ciaries and non-benefi ciaries; the value, nature, and duration of benefi ts; 
complementary services, and the wider socio-economic environment); and 
socio-political factors. Graduation was defi ned as the removal of access to a 
transfer programme that does not leave current benefi ciaries supported by 
the programme unable to pursue sustainable independent livelihoods. 
 Discussion of the impacts of FISP throughout this book have raised similar 
issues regarding stepping up and stepping out processes; multi-scale interac-
tions; changes in livelihood activities as critical elements in economic growth 
and structural change within local and wider economies; and the importance 
of complementary services and the wider socio-economic environment. 
Issues which were implicitly rather than explicitly considered include effects 
on livelihoods of the depth and incidence of poverty among benefi ciaries 
and non-benefi ciaries; and the value, nature, and duration of subsidized ben-
efi ts. Socio-political considerations in area and household targeting have also 
been discussed more specifi cally in Chapters 4, 5, and 10, while input market 
development is a major issue in Chapter 8. 
 Our consideration of multi-scale and dynamic subsidy programme contri-
butions to development suggests that the core requirement for graduation 
from the subsidy programme should be that removal of access to the subsidy 
programme does not critically reduce land, labour, and capital productivity 
in maize production in the livelihoods of benefi ciaries and in the economy 
as a whole. This provides a defi nition of graduation analogous to our ear-
lier general defi nition of actual graduation from transfer programmes and 
it also, and importantly, allows the identifi cation of a number of ‘potential 
graduation conditions’ which are required in some combination as a result of 
and during the implementation of the FISP for subsequent actual graduation. 
These comprise 
 1.  Falls in unsubsidized farm-gate input prices and costs compared to pre-
programme prices and costs. 
 2.  Reduced requirements for the purchase of previously subsidized inputs 
due to increased effi ciency in use. 
 3.  Reduced requirements for the purchase of previously subsidized inputs 
due to substitution by cheaper inputs. 
 4.  Increase in working capital among poor benefi ciary households for the 
purchase of previously subsidized inputs. 
 5.  Poor benefi ciary households’ diversifi cation out of maize production 
through either transfer of land to other high value production use 
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(diversifi cation or stepping out of maize within agriculture) or transfer 
of land to another user with diversifi cation or stepping out of agricul-
ture into non-farm activities. 
 6.  Access to low-cost credit by poor benefi ciary households for the pur-
chase of previously subsidized inputs. 
 These conditions share a number of features: 
 •  None of these potential and desirable changes can be ruled out 
as irrelevant or impossible, nor can any be identifi ed as being of 
paramount importance. 
 •  Thresholds within each of these conditions cannot be determined 
independently of achievement of other conditions. 
 •  They are all dependent on the multi-scale processes of stepping up and 
stepping out to create the systemic conditions under which suffi cient 
change can be achieved for them to contribute to graduation by some 
households. 
 •  They can all benefi t from promotion in design and implementation. 
 We can, however, note that they are likely to vary in the extent to which they 
will be accessible to different households and in the speed at which necessary 
changes will happen. These changes also, of course, require different types of 
promotion in programme design and implementation and in complemen-
tary investments. 
 Table 11.1 summarizes the likely processes and requirements needed for 
each of the ‘potential graduation conditions’ listed above. The fi nal two col-
umns of the table classify these by the scale at which changes operate and 
the speed at which it is reasonable for the changes to become effective in 
promoting potential graduation. All processes and requirements operate at 
multiple scales, relying on wider structural, policy, and service changes at 
national and area level to support and be supported by each other and by 
changes within businesses or households’ livelihood activities. The speed 
of change then depends upon households’ initial structures and resource 
holdings, their receipt of subsidized inputs over the life of the subsidy pro-
gramme, events and shocks affecting their welfare and resources, and both 
policy-induced and other changes in the local and wider socio-economic 
environment. 
 Most of the entries in  Table 11.1 require little elaboration. For reduced input 
prices (1), there are a large number of reports on the potential for reducing 
prices for inorganic fertilizers by improving transport systems and manage-
ment during importation and distribution, by switching from 23:21:12 to 
a cheaper but equally effective formulation, and possibly by investing in a 
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of 
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For 
commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Strategic issues  
254
fertilizer blending plant in Malawi (for example, Munthali, 2007). Increasing 
working capital of benefi ciary households (4) is the most commonly consid-
ered pathway for potential graduation in social protection programmes (as 
discussed earlier). Its effectiveness in actually allowing potential graduation, 
however, is also very dependent upon a household’s initial asset status relative 
to some threshold needed for sustainable independent livelihoods, and upon 
structural issues (such as household composition) and exposure to adverse 
shocks. Diversifi cation out of maize production (5) is likely to take some time 
as it depends upon wider structural change and developing confi dence of 
low and stable maize prices in consumer markets. It is, however, likely to be 
a condition for the development of access to low-cost credit (6), since this is 
only likely to be possible with some form of micro-fi nance system where bor-
rowers engage in different micro-enterprises with different seasonal patterns 
of income and expenditure and different risks (see, for example, Dorward 
et al., 2001). 
 Turning now to consider (3)—‘increased effi ciency in input use’—there 
is considerable evidence for the potential of raising returns to fertilizer use 
by greater use of high yielding seed, more timely planting, more effective 
 Table 11.1.  Graduation processes, requirements, and sequencing of changes 
 Potential graduation 
conditions 
 Likely processes and requirements  Scale  Order 
 1. Reduced input prices  Effi cient & competitive importers, 
supplier(s), transporters; improved 
transport infrastructure 
 Business, area, 
national 
 1 
 2. Increased effi ciency in 
input use 
 Improved agronomy, complementary 
seed, inorganic & organic fertilizers, 
soil management. Investment in 
agricultural research and extension 
 Household, area, 
national 
 1 
 3. Substitution by cheaper 
inputs 
 Increased legume cultivation with 
rotational fallows. Good legume 
seed supply, produce demand & 
markets. Stable & reliable low maize 
prices & high maize productivity for 
transition before subsidy removal 
 Household, area, 
national 
 1 
 4. Increase working capi-
tal for input purchases 
 Increased incomes, diversifi ed incomes 
with reduced income seasonality 
 Household, area, 
national 
 1 
 5. Diversifi cation out of 
maize production 
 Stable & reliable low maize prices, 
strong demand for high value farm 
products and/or non-farm goods & 
services, land markets & safety nets 
 Household, area, 
national 
 2 
 6. Access to low-cost 
credit for input 
purchases 
 Increased & diversifi ed incomes, 
innovative & low-cost micro-fi nance 
systems. 
 Household, area, 
national 
 2 
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soil health management, timely weeding, more effective fertilizer applica-
tion methods, and greater use of complementary organic fertilizers (Maize 
Productivity Task Force, 1997; Snapp et  al., 2010). Holden and Lunduka 
(2012b) report encouraging fi ndings of complementary use of organic and 
inorganic fertilizers in a sample of farmers from six districts in the Southern 
and Central Regions of Malawi. 
 Organic fertilizers and legume intercropping and rotation can also substi-
tute for and augment inorganic fertilizers—listed under (4) above, ‘substi-
tution by cheaper inputs’. However, major diffi culties with the adoption of 
such systems have been the labour and/or land requirements for fallows, for 
tree planting and maintenance, and for growing green manures and mulches 
(for example, Barrett et al., 2002). These labour and land requirements are 
particularly problematic and high for land- and labour-constrained poor 
households who suffer most from the Low Maize Productivity Trap outlined 
in Chapter 4. Such households might be expected to gain signifi cant benefi ts 
from an improved maize/semi-perennial legume (pigeon pea and ground-
nut inter-crop) rotation system which can offer equivalent maize production 
to unfertilized maize but with added legume grain sales and high protein 
consumption (Snapp et al., 2010). However, adoption of these systems faces 
major transition problems as a result of lost maize production when intro-
ducing a legume crop in the fi rst year of a rotation. Participation in the sub-
sidy programme, however, offers opportunities to address this problem in 
three ways: 
 1.  By increasing maize productivity on people’s land, the programme 
should help farmers to get more maize from their land, so that if they 
allocate say 1/3 of their land to groundnuts/pigeon peas in year 1 and 
use fertilizer on the other 2/3 of their land, they could still have roughly 
the same or more maize as they would with all their land under maize 
production without the subsidy, plus the legume grain. In year 2 they 
could do the same but because of the benefi ts from the land rotated 
under the previous year, they would get more maize, and by year 4 they 
would have all their land under rotation. 
 2.  By reducing the price of maize and raising wages, the programme should 
also make farmers less desperate to grow all their own maize, allowing 
them to buy any shortfall for less. This should reduce the risks of not 
producing enough maize during the transition. 
 3.  By raising real incomes the programme should increase the demand for 
legumes within households and in the wider market, raising the value 
to households of their legume grain production. 
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 11.4.  Programme design and implementation to 
promote graduation 
 The identifi cation of different and complementary potential graduation path-
ways has immediate implications for two aspects of programme design and 
implementation: fi rst the programme should be implemented in ways that 
actively promote these graduation pathways, and second actual  graduation 
procedures should be built into programme implementation. 
 The interventions needed to promote graduation pathways vary between 
pathways and generally align with and strengthen the importance of exist-
ing programme or development objectives. Thus, interventions to promote 
lower input prices and to increase effi ciency in input use and substitution by 
cheaper inputs should all raise the effi ciency of the programme—and indeed 
have substantial contributions to make in their own right, independent of 
the programme. Similarly, increases in working capital among poor benefi -
ciary households should be aligned with programme objectives. Encouraging 
diversifi cation out of maize and agriculture and promoting access to low-cost 
credit are valuable general objectives for rural development, but are not so 
obviously complementary to the implementation of FISP, and may therefore 
need special (and specialized) attention alongside FISP. 
 What is striking, however, about the graduation conditions, processes, 
requirements, and scales of change detailed in  Table 11.1 is the importance 
of the multi-scale interactions between national, area, and household pro-
cesses of change. This is supported by the analysis reported in Chapter 7 sug-
gesting that indirect benefi ts may be larger than direct benefi ciaries for poor 
benefi ciaries in poorer areas, with benefi ciary graduation therefore critically 
dependent upon wider processes of change and potential area graduation. 
This requires a holistic multi-scale approach that coordinates programme 
design and implementation with complementary policies and investments 
that operate outside the programme—in infrastructure, research, extension, 
stable maize markets, and the development of the non-farm economy. Since 
(as set out in Chapter 2, in the causal pathway in  Figure II.1 and in the links 
between Chapters 6 and 7) this holistic approach is needed to obtain maxi-
mum food security and wider development benefi ts from the programme, 
there should be strong synergies between an emphasis on graduation and the 
wider pursuit of greater and lower cost achievement of a wide set of potential 
programme benefi ts. 
 As regards actual graduation (and termination) procedures, three broad 
approaches may be followed, singly or in any combination: (a) reductions 
in subsidy per household; (b) a reduction in the number of areas or dis-
tricts served by the programme with phased withdrawal of the programme 
from particular areas or districts; and (c) withdrawal of the programme from 
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particular households. Options (b) and (c) require criteria for determining 
graduation or termination of the subsidy by area or household, and these 
should be closely linked to targeting criteria and systems— the discussion on 
targeting in Chapter 10 is therefore critically relevant and consideration of 
the targeting alternatives discussed there should take account of the gradu-
ation options discussed here. One concern raised in focus group discussions 
and life histories about a smaller universal subsidy was that such subsidies 
were too small to improve households’ livelihoods suffi ciently for them 
make any progress towards graduation (see Section 6.7), although this per-
haps would not be such a concern if the subsidy was effectively driving posi-
tive economy-wide effects in maize prices, wages and livelihood, and local 
economy diversifi cation. Where area and household targeting are employed 
then graduation (and hence targeting) criteria are likely to include considera-
tion, at household and area scales, of budgetary constraints, political factors, 
effi ciency differentials, and potential graduation. 
 Political issues associated with different approaches to graduation require 
a special mention. Political diffi culties with reducing the scale of the subsidy 
per household by increasing farmer payments are evident from the determi-
nants of falling nominal payments for subsidized fertilizer as reported earlier 
in Section 5.5.1. Farmer’s concerns expressed in focus group discussions and 
life histories (summarized in Chapter 6) suggest that there are also political 
diffi culties with reducing household entitlements to one bag of fertilizer and 
associated seed. Reducing the number of subsidized households rather than 
the scale of subsidies to all households (by withdrawal of subsidies from 
particular areas and/or particular households) may face greater political 
opposition from smaller numbers of people. Political calculations will then 
consider which interest groups are politically most important or powerful 
with respect to the aspirations, strengths, and weaknesses of political leaders 
with responsibility for and/or power over the programme. Such calculations 
may not give technocratically preferred graduation policies, or any gradua-
tion policy at all. 
 Potential graduation may be measured using variables related to the poten-
tial graduation changes identifi ed in  Table 11.1 . Attention should also be 
paid to questions about relationships between area graduation/termination 
and household graduation as touched on earlier in Section 11.2. Just as there 
are synergies between measures that will promote graduation and those that 
will promote wider achievement of programme objectives, there should be 
similar synergies between the development and use of graduation criteria and 
wider monitoring and evaluation of programme achievements. It is, how-
ever, also important to note that the use of poor criteria or procedures in 
trying to promote graduation is also likely to damage the effectiveness of the 
wider programme (if, for example, termination rather than graduation were 
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to be an important target in programme implementation, either explicitly or 
as a result of poor setting or application of graduation criteria). 
 11.5.  Summary 
 In this chapter we have considered ways in which the concept of graduation 
may be usefully applied to the FISP. The conceptualization of graduation as 
the removal of access to transfers that does not leave current benefi ciaries 
unable to pursue sustainable independent livelihoods allows a distinction to 
be made between potential graduation, actual graduation, and termination of 
access. It also helps in consideration of the differences and inter-relationships 
between graduation and termination at different scales, such as household, 
area, and programme. These conceptual issues suggest that measures of grad-
uation should use variables and thresholds that measure assets and activities 
supporting sustainable independent livelihoods rather than income meas-
ures, and such measures need to take account of the different opportunities, 
threats, and diffi culties facing different people in different contexts. 
 This conceptualization provides an explicit focus on graduation which, 
as shown in Chapter 3, appears to be lacking from most programmes, and 
indeed, as is evident in Chapter 2, is also lacking from most wider discussion 
of programme exits, despite the widespread consideration of time-bound 
exits as a key feature of ‘smart subsidies’ (for example, Minde et al., 2008; 
Morris et al., 2007). This conceptualization has important implications for 
core political and technical issues in programme design and implementation. 
 Application of these lessons to graduation in agricultural input subsidy pro-
grammes like the Malawi FISP requires some understanding of the processes 
by which these programme promote sustainable independent livelihoods. In 
the Malawi FISP this allows a specifi c defi nition of graduation as a removal 
of access to the subsidy programme that does not reduce land, labour, and 
capital productivity in maize production. ‘Potential graduation conditions’ 
that promote this include reduced input prices, increased effi ciency in input 
use, substitution by cheaper inputs, increased working capital for input pur-
chases, diversifi cation out of maize production, and access to low-cost credit 
for input purchases. Identifi cation of these potential graduation conditions is 
valuable for suggesting types of change that programme designers and imple-
menters should seek to promote, as well as variables that may be used in mak-
ing decisions about graduation criteria and processes. Further work is needed 
to determine what criteria (variables and thresholds) may be best for judg-
ing potential graduation at different scales. However, graduation, the with-
drawal of access to subsidies, is an intensely political issue, and both political 
and technical considerations will be important determinants of graduation 
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policies and their implementation. The importance of wider indirect impacts 
of the programme for potential household and area graduation also suggests 
that there should be strong synergies between on the one hand a greater 
emphasis on graduation within the programme and on the other a more 
effective and effi cient achievement of a food security and wider development 
objectives. 
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 12.1.  Introduction 
 This book attempts to contribute to greater understanding of agricultural 
input subsidies’ potential contributions and pitfalls as instruments promot-
ing food security, poverty reduction, social protection, and wider economic 
growth in poor agrarian economies. This has been approached through a 
theoretical and practical discussion of agricultural input subsidies and their 
impacts (in Chapters 2 and 3), through detailed examination of Malawi’s 
experience in implementing a large-scale agricultural input subsidy pro-
gramme (in Chapters 4 to 9), and (in Chapters 10 and 11) through considera-
tion of targeting and graduation as two specifi c issues needing more strategic 
attention in the design and implementation of large-scale agricultural input 
subsidies in contemporary low-income agrarian economies. This conclud-
ing chapter draws these three topics together, and links them to a discus-
sion of a major concern for agricultural input subsidies: their sustainability. 
We consider each of these topics (subsidies’ changing theory and practice, 
Malawi’s experience, targeting and graduation, and sustainability) in turn. 
We conclude by considering possible lessons and ways forward from this for 
the wider application of agricultural input subsidies in Africa. 
 12.2.  Subsidies’ changing theory and practice 
 Consideration of conventional and more recent theoretical and empirical anal-
ysis of agricultural input subsidies in Chapter 2 suggests a number of potential 
contributions that input subsidies can make to economic development in poor 
agrarian economies. In addition to reducing food insecurity, ameliorating soil 
fertility problems, and increasing land and agricultural labour productivity, 
they can also drive wider, dynamic processes of pro-poor growth, structural 
change, economic diversifi cation, and market thickening and development. 
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 There are, however, a number of necessary conditions in order for sub-
sidy programmes to make these contributions. The principle conditions are 
targeting of subsidies to address market failures (in, for example, access to 
knowledge or to input or capital markets) with signifi cant and normally 
labour-demanding productivity increases for crops produced by large num-
bers of smallholders. Such crops will generally be staple crops, with a ‘double 
benefi t’ if staple food markets are relatively isolated from international mar-
kets, in which case the provision of inputs may also promote possible market 
or pecuniary externalities from staple crop cultivation. Programme design 
and implementation should then pay attention to, or at least be integrated 
with, policies promoting wider processes of growth and, where double ben-
efi ts can be achieved, to net buyer’s interests in programme impacts. 
 Large per unit price subsidies may be needed to address ‘affordability’ con-
straints on input purchases and use, and these lead to a particular need for good 
targeting and rationing systems. Poor systems may reduce programme effec-
tiveness and effi ciency as problems of ‘exclusion’ limit receipt of subsidized 
inputs by farmers facing market failures and able to make the most productive 
use of these inputs. Problems of ‘inclusion’, on the other hand, raise costs of 
supply to farmers whose productive input use is not otherwise constrained by 
the market failures addressed by the subsidy, and whose receipt of subsidies 
therefore does not yield benefi ts from incremental production. Inclusion of 
such farmers may also inhibit the development of unsubsidized input supply 
markets, and these may also be damaged by subsidy systems that undermine 
private sector investment incentives. Poor design and/or implementation of 
graduation policies may lead to increasing problems of exclusion, together 
with rising and unsustainable subsidy costs, falling benefi ts, and increasing 
opportunity costs from crowding out of more productive investment of scarce 
government resources. Effective input subsidies may also need attention to 
complementary policies and investments—needed to improve direct input 
uptake and production impacts, or to facilitate wider, dynamic benefi ts. 
 Finally, political commitment is critically important for major resource 
investments in large-scale input subsidies. However this itself raises major 
diffi culties where such commitment is driven by short-term patronage inter-
ests rather than longer term developmental interests. 
 The examination in Chapter  3 of recent subsidy programmes in sub-
Saharan Africa suggests that recognition of and attention to these issues is 
mixed—across countries and issues. Thus, almost all the national programmes 
reviewed involved large-scale subsidies for inputs for staple food production 
by large numbers of smallholders, with substantial price reductions, generally 
addressing (implicitly at least) affordability constraints on farmers’ input pur-
chases. This is associated with a general focus on producer benefi ts, including 
producers’ food security (though in Mali and Senegal it was also intended to 
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reduce urban rice prices). Late delivery of inputs, and hence reduced returns 
to farmers, were common. In no programme was there any reported recogni-
tion of potential wider dynamic growth benefi ts, nor any consideration of 
graduation processes and criteria. With regard to graduation, aspirations of 
time limits and scaling down were expressed in some cases, but there was 
no apparent in-depth consideration of processes by which the need for sub-
sidies would be reduced (apart from some explicit support to input supplier 
development). 
 Support to input suppliers was therefore one issue where intentions and 
practice varied across programmes—with some programmes giving it little 
or no attention, others recognizing its importance without effective action 
(and perhaps in practice undermining it), and others seriously pursuing it. 
Attention to targeting was similarly varied as regards stated intentions, but 
there were few if any cases of the achievement of effective targeting. Voucher-
based entitlement systems were common but not universal. Integrated atten-
tion to complementary policies and investments was relatively rare and where 
present appeared to be restricted to direct promotion of programme effective-
ness in raising on-farm input productivity or supporting input supplier devel-
opment. Political factors around programme initiation and implementation 
are not widely discussed, but are specifi cally reported in some programmes 
and their general importance and infl uence may be inferred for most. 
 12.3.  The Malawi experience 
 The introduction of the large-scale Farm Input Subsidy Programme in 2005/6 
in Malawi and its subsequent continuation have to be understood in the 
context of Malawi’s specifi c political, social, economic, food security, and 
agricultural policy history and conditions as set out in Chapter 4. These led 
to the emergence of ‘fertilizer politics’, with popular demands for fertilizer 
subsidies providing political opportunities that also had a technical rationale 
in addressing food insecurity and, with the ‘low maize productivity trap’, 
potential wider dynamic benefi ts for peoples’ livelihoods and wider eco-
nomic growth. The fi rst four years of the programme were, however, also 
shaped by very specifi c political challenges facing the minority government 
of President Bingu wa Mutharika. 
 The detailed description of the FISP in Chapter 5 shows that the FISP focused 
largely (but not exclusively at fi rst) on staple crop production, operated on 
a very large scale (reaching an impressively large number of dispersed small-
holders), provided large (and generally growing) price reductions explicitly 
addressing affordability constraints on input purchases, and focused on pro-
ducers’ (as opposed to buyers’) welfare and food security. The programme 
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did not explicitly articulate any longer term dynamic growth objectives, and 
consideration of graduation processes was initially absent, but has become 
more of an issue over time. However, the issue of graduation has not found its 
way into policy articulation and programme design. Engagement with input 
suppliers has varied—with fairly consistent engagement with private sector 
seed suppliers and fertilizer importers and transporters, but policy reversals 
on the involvement of private sector fertilizer retailers. Targeting objectives, 
criteria, and methods have evolved, but without dramatic changes in out-
comes. Complementary policies and investments have focused on direct pro-
motion of complementary inputs (seeds and maize storage chemicals), with 
some attention to extension messages and some complementary research on 
integrated soil fertility technologies. 
 There have been substantial changes in various aspects of programme 
design and implementation over the life of the programme. These have incor-
porated growing experience, responded to emerging problems and differ-
ent stakeholder interests, and recognized local solutions and good practice. 
Changes have involved removal of cash crop subsidies and modifi cations to 
targeting and allocation systems, to tender award and importation processes, 
and to coupon design and printing. These have led to improvements in tim-
ing of input purchase and distribution and in control of some aspects of fraud. 
There is also greater emphasis on the need for transparency in allocation 
and distribution of coupons, although in practice this has proved diffi cult 
to implement. However there are, inevitably, continuing challenges on these 
issues, and little evidence of improved targeting. Political considerations have 
appeared to dominate others, certainly up to the 2008/9 elections, and these 
appear to have been a major infl uence on the growing programme scale and 
costs from 2005/6 to 2007/8 (exceptionally high fertilizer prices led to a spike 
in costs in 2008/9, with subsequent costs being more tightly controlled). 
 The discussion of direct programme impacts in Chapter 6 is constrained 
by weaknesses in critical data on crop production and the number of farm 
families. However it suggests that production impacts have been smaller than 
might be suggested by increases in offi cial production estimates following 
the introduction of the subsidy, with very high maize prices in some years. 
Nevertheless, it still appears that there were substantial production impacts. 
Study of specifi c impacts on benefi ciary households shows immediate ben-
efi ts in maize production, net crop income, household income, and to a lesser 
extent food consumption, with continued (lagged) benefi ts on benefi ciaries’ 
maize production, and to a lesser extent food consumption. School enrol-
ment and child health also appear to have benefi ted from subsidy receipt. 
No signifi cant impacts of subsidy receipt were detected on subjective well-
being and investment in physical assets, but this may be affected by invest-
ment of gains from increased maize production in food consumption, school 
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enrolment, and health. The widespread practice of sharing subsidized fertiliz-
ers and more general increases in subjective well-being and asset ownership 
may also mask direct benefi ts. However, as discussed in Chapter 10, use of 
fertilizer on female controlled plots is increased by subsidy receipt. 
 As argued in Chapter 2, large-scale subsidy programmes like the Malawi 
FISP should have benefi cial economy-wide impacts affecting both subsidy 
recipients and non-recipients. Chapter 7 reports diffi culties with attribution 
of macro-economic changes to the FISP and with possible unreliability in 
GDP estimates. However, implementation of the FISP appears to be associ-
ated with good agricultural GDP growth, although high costs of the FISP in 
2008/9 were also a contributor to an increased budget defi cit—along with 
other expenditures related to the 2009 elections. There has also been some 
improvement in maize trade balances (except in 2008/9). There is stronger 
evidence of increases in real wage rates as a result of the FISP (despite more 
mixed evidence on maize price impacts), some evidence of increased national 
food availability and improved child nutrition, and mixed evidence on 
national changes in income and poverty incidence. Chapter 6 also reports 
wider positive changes in maize production, net crop income, subjective 
well-being, physical assets, school enrolment, and child health. Overall there 
is evidence of economy-wide changes, but it is not as strong as one would 
expect and hope for from a programme as large as the Malawi FISP. 
 FISP’s engagement with and impacts on suppliers, fertilizer importers and 
retailers, and seed growers and retailers is reported in Chapter 8. 
 The increasing use of private fertilizer importers has been associated with 
an increase in the number of fi rms tendering and being awarded tenders, but 
some of these have not been able to deliver timely supplies. Tenders have also 
been affected by late awards and payments, which increase supplier costs and 
risks and hence prices, although there have been some improvements in ten-
der procedures during the life of the programme. Engagement with fertilizer 
retailers has been limited, with six retail fi rms contracted to sell subsidized fer-
tilizers in 2006/7 and 2008/9, and sudden termination of these arrangements 
at the start of the 2008/9 season. There is potential for re-engagement with 
private retailing of subsidized fertilizers, but this requires increased mutual 
trust and would be more effective if it was open to a wider range of retail 
outlets, including agro-dealers (and applying lessons from experience with 
seed retail systems). Potential benefi ts from private sector involvement with 
retailing of subsidized fertilizers include greater effi ciency with lower costs, 
freeing and adding to government resources (including staff, transport logis-
tics, and storage facilities), potential promotion of input outlets in remote 
areas, broadening of farmer choice with competition between outlets, and 
reduced farmer transaction costs and queuing. Impacts of the programme 
on private retail sales of fertilizer have been mixed, with some displacement 
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of unsubsidized purchases by subsidized purchases, but also more recent evi-
dence of some ‘crowding in’ and increases in unsubsidized purchases. 
 Seed procurement has been exclusively from private organizations, with 
the number of suppliers growing from 6 to 12. These suppliers are respon-
sible for seed distribution to both parastatal and private retailers including 
agro-dealers, removing from government all responsibilities for managing 
and coordinating supply and also removing the risk of unsold stock holdings. 
Despite the increase in the number of seed suppliers, the market remains 
oligopolistic with collective negotiation of prices charged to the government 
for subsidized seed supply. Large increases in the number of agro-dealers sell-
ing subsidized seeds have, however, contributed to increased competition 
and farmer choice among retail outlets. There is limited industry informa-
tion available on unsubsidized seed sales. Farmers reported purchases suggest 
substantial rates of displacement of unsubsidized by subsidized maize seed 
purchases, but large increases in total purchases due to the large increases in 
subsidized maize seed supply. 
 Chapter 9 identifi es a number of challenges in estimating the benefi ts and 
costs of the FISP, and of input subsidy programmes in general. These include 
problems with data availability, with practicable methodologies that capture 
both indirect and direct impacts, and with consistency and comparability 
across estimates of costs and returns for different investments. Extension of 
standard partial equilibrium methods to include estimates of economy-wide 
impacts increases estimated benefi t–cost ratios for the programme. This sug-
gests that the programme has yielded an average BCR of around 1.35 after 
allowing for the effects of multipliers but ignoring potential long-term benefi ts 
from improved food consumption on children’s physical and mental develop-
ment and long-term development of human capital. The most valuable use 
of these methods, however, is in identifi cation of design and implementa-
tion parameters with critical impacts on programme effi ciency and effective-
ness. Returns would be improved by measures that increase yield responses to 
fertilizer (for example, earlier input delivery, greater emphasis on integrated 
soil fertility management, improved application, more cost effective formula-
tions, more targeting to the poor) and that reduce displacement and costs (for 
example, better regional and household targeting, better control of diversion 
and fraud, earlier registration and input delivery). The inclusion of multipliers 
in the BCA strengthens the importance of all of these issues and also adds fur-
ther weight to the importance of targeting, of ensuring that maize marketing 
policies allow increased maize production to lower maize prices, and of com-
plementary investments in measures facilitating the growth of the non-farm 
economy and of non-staple agriculture in response to subsidy-led growth in 
real incomes. Diffi culties with the availability of data needed for benefi t–cost 
analysis highlight the need for critical agricultural production statistics. 
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 This summary of FISP’s features shows that it shares many of the features of 
the other African programmes reviewed in Chapter 3: indeed many of these 
programmes were infl uenced by reports of dramatic success with the Malawi 
programme. These features include its emphasis on staple crop production, its 
scale, its large price reductions, its focus on producers’ welfare and food secu-
rity, its lack of dynamic growth objectives or consideration of graduation, its 
variable engagement with inputs suppliers, the challenges it has faced with 
targeting, and limited complementary policies and investments, focusing on 
complementary inputs and to a lesser extent research and extension. 
 The very limited information on the impacts of the programmes discussed 
in Chapter 3 makes comparison with FISP’s impacts diffi cult. Reports of late 
delivery of inputs are common, as are reports of impacts on private sector 
input suppliers—though these are sometimes positive and sometimes nega-
tive. Incremental input use and increased production and productivity are 
reported for some. There is only one programme where an  ex post estimated 
benefi t–cost ratio is reported, and the benefi ts considered are restricted to 
the direct value of incremental production. There is virtually no considera-
tion of macro-economic impacts, and no discussion of wage rate or wider 
growth impacts. Most of the estimates in Chapters 6 and 7 of the direct and 
indirect impacts of the Malawi FISP are unique. Detailed consideration of the 
political, livelihood, and economic background and context of the FISP is 
also unique, though less detailed examination of the policy and rural liveli-
hood context is not uncommon. This raises critical questions as regards the 
uniqueness and importance for the Malawian programme of the emergence 
of ‘fertilizer politics’, of the particular challenges facing President Bingu wa 
Mutharika’s minority government in the fi rst four years of the programme, 
and of the nature and extent of the ‘low maize productivity trap’ in Malawi. 
 12.4.  Targeting and graduation 
 Targeting is an issue that was given a considerable amount of attention in 
Chapter 2 as a critical element in input subsidy programmes, with impli-
cations for displacement, productivity, economy-wide effects, graduation, 
 programme costs, and distribution of direct benefi ciary benefi ts. It is an 
important issue across the Malawi FISP and a number of the programmes 
reviewed in Chapter 3—either because it is being attempted but not very suc-
cessfully, or because it does not appear to be considered an important issue. 
 Chapter  10 develops ideas introduced in Chapter  2 with a conceptual 
framework looking at the links between targeting and programme objectives 
and distinguishing between area and benefi ciary targeting. Both of these face 
political diffi culties, of different kinds, while there are also common practical 
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information and methodological diffi culties with benefi ciary targeting. It is 
suggested in the Malawian context that these diffi culties are suffi ciently seri-
ous for there to be a strong case for providing a universal but smaller subsidy 
to all households. This would also reduce opportunities for diversion and 
fraud that arise from lack of transparency and accountability in targeting 
processes. 
 Discussion of such targeting options, however, also raises complex  questions 
about graduation thresholds and processes. As outlined in Chapter 2, a major 
criticism of agricultural subsidies has been their tendency to continue long 
after they have outlived their usefulness in overcoming specifi c market fail-
ures. As a result ‘exits’ are a core feature of ‘smart subsidies’. These tend to 
focus on subsidies’ roles in farmers’ learning about input benefi ts and use, and 
on development of private sector input suppliers. There is, however, relatively 
little explicit consideration of other processes by which access to subsidies 
may lead to recipient households no longer needing them. Chapter 11 there-
fore extends the concept of ‘graduation’ from social protection programmes 
to the multi-scale dynamic processes of structural change promoted by large-
scale agricultural input subsidy programmes in poor agrarian economies. 
A defi nition of graduation as the removal of access to subsidies without criti-
cal livelihood or wider reductions in land, labour, and capital productivity in 
staple crop production allows, in the Malawi case, the identifi cation of a set 
of ‘graduation conditions’. These in turn allow identifi cation of processes and 
requirements needed to achieve potential graduation conditions, and design 
and implementation focus on these processes and requirements. Adopting 
this approach in programme design and implementation could offer major 
benefi ts, not only by its promotion of graduation but through its focus on the 
core processes by which agricultural input subsidy programmes can stimulate 
and facilitate core developmental processes of productivity growth, market 
development, and structural change. Success here could in turn reduce the 
political pressures that militate against graduation and the withdrawal of 
 subsidies from particular groups of people or areas. 
 12.5.  Sustainability 
 An important issue that has not been addressed in previous chapters is sus-
tainability. Short-term programmes that have strict time-bounds and exits 
do not need to be sustainable, although they should promote sustainable 
change. However, international experience suggests that quick exits from 
large input subsidy programmes are diffi cult and rarely achieved. It has been 
argued in Chapters 2 and 4 and in various parts of our analysis of the Malawi 
FISP that longer term subsidy implementation is often needed to achieve and 
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embed wider structural changes. In such circumstances a range of different 
aspects of programme sustainability become important—we consider fi scal, 
political, and agro-ecological sustainability. 
 Fiscal sustainability basically means that programmes must be fi scally 
affordable. Problems of high costs and crowding out of competing and com-
plementary investments are a common concern. Fiscal sustainability there-
fore requires constant striving for reductions in programme cost without 
compromising programme outputs and impacts. This may be promoted by 
a range of measures promoting programme effectiveness and effi ciency—for 
example, better use of private suppliers, control of fraud, improvements in 
input purchasing and distribution systems, more effective agronomic prac-
tices, budgeting and cost control, improved timing of input distribution, bet-
ter targeting, increased farmer contributions, and judicious complementary 
investments, with constant adjustments to match changing circumstances. 
What is affordable depends, of course, upon available funds and compet-
ing claims on those funds. Ellis and Maliro (in press), for example, suggest 
that, based on Malawi’s expenditures on subsidies and cash transfers, a mix 
of subsidy and social transfer programmes could be affordable, with space 
for strategic choices on combinations of policies providing both safety nets 
and livelihood opportunities. However, high international fertilizer prices 
can pose particular problems, as experienced by Malawi in 2008/9. If these 
costs are not passed on to farmers in higher contributions then this can lead 
to dramatic increases in programme costs. However, passing such costs onto 
farmers may make inputs unaffordable, and hence defeat the purpose of the 
subsidy and undermine farmer confi dence in the processes of change that are 
being promoted. 
 Continued  political commitment to programme investment is essential for 
the resource allocations needed to sustain large-scale agricultural input pro-
grammes. Such programmes are politically attractive as fast and highly vis-
ible responses to food security problems, with potential opportunities for 
directing patronage to garner political support. Challenges are faced here in 
combining often short-term political interests with the longer term technical 
requirements of effective targeting and cost control to make the most devel-
opmental use of invested resources. The analysis of Poulton (2012) may be 
helpful here, where he suggests that effective agricultural policies result from 
convergence between technocratic and political interests, but effectiveness 
may weaken over time with divergence in interests. Such divergence is likely 
unless governments face quite substantial threats that are best countered by 
sustained government support from rural electorates. 
 Finally, we consider the  agro-ecological sustainability of input subsidy pro-
grammes. In the programmes reviewed in Chapter 3 and in the case of Malawi 
there is a strong emphasis on inorganic fertilizer subsidies. Very low fertilizer 
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use in many African countries, as discussed in Chapter 1, is not sustainable, 
neither socially in supporting rural populations nor agro-ecologically, as con-
tinual cultivation without fertilization leads to soils losing their structure 
and becoming prone to erosion, while falling yields and growing popula-
tions encourage farmers to expand or shift cultivation to forests and steeper 
slopes—with consequent erosion and loss of trees. Over- or poor applica-
tion of fertilizers can also have damaging impacts on water courses and on 
soil health and fauna, while inorganic nitrogenous fertilizer use encourages 
greenhouse gas emissions from the release of nitrous oxide (N 2 O) and from 
CO 2 emissions from large energy use in its manufacture. 
 Judicious combinations of organic and inorganic fertilizers in integrated 
soil fertility management (ISFM) offer the potential for lower cost, economi-
cally and ecologically effi cient processes for increasing land and labour pro-
ductivity. Input subsidy programmes that promote this could, in principle, be 
designed and implemented. Section 11.3 discusses ways that subsidized inor-
ganic fertilization of maize could be combined with legume cultivation to 
reduce the need for and cost of inorganic fertilizers, increase the effi ciency of 
their use, and promote agricultural and livelihood diversifi cation. Developing 
and implementing such subsidy approaches presents a great opportunity and 
challenge. 
 12.6.  Conclusions 
 We conclude by returning to the fundamental problems with which this 
book opened: low cereal yields and input use, particularly of fertilizers, as a 
major cause of continuing poverty in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Can large-scale agricultural input subsidies help overcome these problems? 
 Druilhe and Barreiro-Hurlé (2012) consider that large-scale agricultural 
input subsidies have become a  de facto part of agricultural policies in many 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa. They conclude that most of the programmes 
they reviewed had been successful in raising agricultural production, but that 
they were generally poorly designed, poorly implemented, ‘highly politi-
cised, very costly, lack any strategy for phasing out, and are unsustainable in 
the long term’. Despite some smart subsidy innovations in targeting and in 
support to private sector distribution, ‘the new subsidies carry many of the 
problems of the past’ (p. 36). They then discuss possible disadvantages of sub-
sidies (for example, over-reliance on fertilizer subsidies as a ‘magic bullet’), 
but conclude that ‘their quick and visible results and direct political payoff’ 
means that they continue to be very attractive to governments. They go on 
to recommend means for improving implementation, which may be sum-
marized as integrating subsidy programmes with complementary measures 
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promoting wider rural development and social protection, clear and comple-
mentary (not multiple and confl icting) objectives, simultaneous measures 
addressing supply and demand constraints on fertilizer use, and greater use of 
‘smart’ design and implementation features, including appropriate targeting 
and entitlement systems, market friendliness, exit strategies, and monitoring 
and evaluation. They recognize, however, that these ‘smart design’ features 
make implementation more challenging. 
 These are in many ways admirable conclusions and recommendations. 
They may, however, be considered to be both too narrow and unambitious on 
the one hand and unrealistically over-ambitious on the other. They are too 
narrow and unambitious because they do not recognize the potential of such 
programmes to drive and support broad-based economic growth and eco-
nomic structural change if they are able to fulfi l their potential. On the other 
hand they are unrealistically over-ambitious because they do not address 
the fundamental paradox of political interests and processes both driving 
the introduction of large-scale agricultural input subsidies and undermining 
their better implementation. 
 Identifying mechanisms and processes which avoid this political paradox 
is very diffi cult. One approach that might help, however, could involve rais-
ing ambition with greater recognition of the role of agricultural input sub-
sidies and their inclusion in national, rather than sectoral, economic policy. 
This could carry its own risks and diffi culties, diluting responsibility outside 
the Ministry of Agriculture (normally responsible for such programmes) and 
reducing commitment to its success. However it could also lead to greater 
commitment by the Ministries of Finance and of Economic Development to 
ensuring timely availability of fi nancial resources and to sharper monitor-
ing of implementation, resource use, and outputs that extended beyond the 
agricultural sector to encompass much wider impacts (as, for example, set out 
earlier in Figure II.1). Reduced responsibilities for the Ministry of Agriculture 
would no doubt risk bureaucratic and power diffi culties, but if handled well 
could be used to increase local government and private sector involvement 
in programme implementation—one means of reducing implementation 
challenges with ‘smart subsidies’. This could free up Ministry of Agriculture 
staff and other resources for greater involvement in the promotion of effi -
cient input use with, for example, complementary use of organic fertilizers 
in integrated soil fertility management. Politically, spreading interest in and 
visibility of the longer term and wider objectives of such programmes across 
what are often the more powerful government ministries could provide more 
political and technical interest in improved design and implementation. This 
might fi t well with urban middle-class demands for accountability in the use 
of likely increasing earnings from hydrocarbons and minerals in many coun-
tries in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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 These ideas may or may not work. They would face many challenges: in 
their genesis and adoption and in their execution. A particular initial chal-
lenge is in identifying the circumstances where agricultural input subsidies 
do and do not have the potential to drive wider economic growth—the nec-
essary conditions summarized in Section 12.2 above. The wider impacts of 
the Malawi programme, though smaller than one would have hoped, suggest 
that this potential does exist in Malawi and much stronger wider impacts 
could be realized with greater programme effectiveness and effi ciency and 
with better integration with complementary policies and investments. This 
is a prize worth pursuing in Malawi and, though Malawi’s situation is in some 
ways unique, it is likely to be a prize worth pursuing in other sub-Saharan 
African countries too. 
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